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Abstract
The American Jewish Committee (AJC) was founded in 1906 by a group of elite Jewish
communal leaders. In the historiography on the organization, the Committee’s earliest activities
are described as limited to “quiet diplomacy,” involving the discreet lobbying of public officials.
This dissertation challenges this account of the AJC’s early activism, arguing that, from its
founding, the Committee was involved in more overt forms of public advocacy and was building
the infrastructure to carry out the public advocacy work of modern special interest groups. While
the AJC’s leaders continued to practice quiet diplomacy, they also released public statements,
sponsored research, subsidized the publication of books, became involved in public interest
litigation, and widely distributed pamphlets in an effort to influence public opinion. Using
documents from the AJC’s archives, this dissertation presents a series of case studies of the
organization’s earliest public advocacy work and describes its leaders’ deliberations about how
to expand the Committee’s research and advocacy infrastructure and avert an intensification of
anti-Semitism in the United States. The advocacy tactics the AJC employed were adaptations of
techniques used by older European Jewish leadership organizations. The Committee’s leaders
tailored these approaches according to their understanding of the threats the American Jewish
community faced during the early-twentieth century. The activities of the Committee’s founders
and early leaders shaped the AJC’s later, more conspicuous public advocacy on behalf of
American Jewry and other minority communities in the United States.

Key Words: American Jewish Committee, twentieth-century Jewish communal leadership,
American Jewry, public advocacy, public interest litigation, anti-Semitism, Louis Marshall,
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Public Advocacy and the American Jewish Committee
The American Jewish Committee (AJC) was established in New York City in 1906 as a
public advocacy and communal defense organization. The AJC was not the first Jewish
communal organization to claim a national mandate in the United States; however, in
comparison to earlier American Jewish interest groups and ethnic minority leadership
organizations, the Committee has consistently pursued a broader social and political agenda.1
The organization has been described as “one of American Jewry’s most influential institutions.”2
This study focuses on the origins and evolution of the AJC’s public advocacy work and on its
efforts to shape American public opinion, including influencing the attitudes and beliefs of
Jewish immigrants to the United States, American political leaders, white patrician elites, and the
broader American public. This dissertation provides an account of what the AJC accomplished
during the first twenty-five years of its history by employing public advocacy, journalism, media
and public relations, propaganda, mass media campaigns, philanthropy, the American judicial
system, and the sponsorship of academic research and argues that the breadth and significance of
the Committee’s earliest public advocacy efforts have not been recognized in the historiography
on the organization.

1

The Board of Delegates of American Israelites (“the Board”), which was founded in 1859, was the first Jewish
organization in the United States to claim a national mandate. The Board was organized in the wake of the “Mortara
Affair,” the kidnapping of an Italian Jewish child by Papal authorities who believed he had been secretly baptized by
his au pair. The incident garnered significant attention in European and American newspapers and European Jewish
leadership organizations became involved to try and secure the child’s release. The Board was established to unify,
represent, and advocate for the social and political interests of American Jewry. The organization lasted less than
twenty years. In 1878, the Board merged with the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. For a further
discussion of the formation of the Board, its activities, its fiscal challenges, and the circumstances which led to its
merger with the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, see: Allan Tarshish, “The Board of Delegates of
American Israelites, 1859-1878,” Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society 49 (1959): 16-32.
2
Morten Rosenstock, “Review of Cohen, Naomi W., Not Free to Desist: A History of the American Jewish
Committee, 1906-1966,” American Jewish Historical Quarterly 62 (1972): 88.

1

Measuring the extent of an advocacy organization’s influence is difficult.3 Although a
number of scholars and studies have attempted to objectively assess “interest group influence,”
the complexity of the issues, the length of time over which policy debates occur, and the
potential (and uncertain) impact of other factors and actors are among the complications that
weaken their conclusions.4 It is not, however, the intention of this study to attempt to quantify
the extent of the AJC’s influence. The study will describe some of the Committee’s successes
and failures, but the purpose is to analyze how and why the AJC tried to influence public opinion
and to provide case studies of the AJC’s diverse public advocacy work.5
The AJC was founded as an elite political organization with broad goals. One of the
intentions of the Committee’s founders was to attain a leadership position and to assert power
(and social control) over the American Jewish community, which, at the beginning of the
twentieth century, was a rapidly growing and heterogeneous community, deeply divided by
denomination, national origin, language, class, education, and, perhaps most importantly,
political ideologies.6 The AJC became a very high profile advocacy organization and interest

3

For a survey of some of the empirical models that have been developed to assess the influence of interest groups,
and for critiques of these approaches and their conclusions, see: Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof, “Interest groups: A
survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence,” European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996):
403-442.
4
For a more recent discussion of the methodological problems that continue to complicate efforts to objectively
assess the influence of interest groups, see: Silke Friedrich, “Measuring Interest Group Activity,” DICE Report 8
(2010): 37 and 45.
5
This dissertation describes the internal deliberations of the American Jewish Committee’s leadership in
formulating and developing the organization’s earliest approaches to public advocacy. The findings, arguments, and
evidence discussed in this study are substantiated by research undertaken at the AJC’s archives and library. I made
two research trips to the AJC’s headquarters in New York City to gather materials from the organization’s archives.
Charlotte Bonelli, the AJC’s librarian and Chief Archivist, allowed me complete access to all the organization’s files
from 1906 to 1932. Additionally, as part of the celebration of the organization’s centenary, in 2006 the AJC
uploaded tens of thousands of historical documents onto their archives’ website, including minutes of Executive
Committee meetings, Annual Reports, memorandums, correspondence, and internal policy papers and these primary
sources are cited extensively throughout this study.
6
The AJC became a very high profile advocacy organization and interest group. Until the founding of the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in 1963, and the rise of that organization to political prominence, the AJC,
along with the later founded American Jewish Congress and B’nai B’rith’s Anti-Defamation League, were the most
high profile and politically engaged American Jewish organizations.

2

group. Notwithstanding that the AJC was composed of a small group of elites and that the
organization was not a denominational body, a charity, a lodge, nor an arm of the Zionist
movement, the organization assumed a prominent leadership role within the American Jewish
community. At the heart of this dissertation is an examination of why the founders of the AJC
sought to claim this leadership role over the American Jewish community, and how they
exercised this role by trying to shape how the broader American public viewed the American
Jewish community.7
The AJC was established as an interest group dedicated to protecting Jewish
communities, in both the United States and abroad, from discrimination and persecution. Interest
groups have been defined as “any association of individuals or organizations…that, on the basis
of one or more shared concerns, attempts to influence public policy.”8 Gregory M. Randolph and
Michael T. Tasto argue that these organizations “play an extremely important role in the

7

In his essay Politics as a Vocation, Max Weber defined politics as “striving to share power or striving to influence
the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within the state.” The work of the American Jewish
Committee can be encompassed by this definition. Weber’s emphasis on “striving to influence” is also applicable to
the efforts of the AJC. In Politics as a Vocation, Weber argues that “When a question is said to be a ‘political’
question…what is always meant is that interests in the distribution, maintenance, or transfer of power are decisive
for answering the questions and determining the decision...He who is active in politics strives for power either as a
means in serving other aims, ideal or egotistic, or as ‘power for power's sake,’ that is, in order to enjoy the prestigefeeling that power gives.” Weber’s definition of “political” is a fitting characterization of the motivations of the
AJC’s founders. The Committee’s leaders had specific aims, including encouraging social harmony and religious
tolerance in the United States, but they were also interested in power. They sought this power because of ego but
they also adhered to specific social and political ideals which emphasized acculturation and integration into
American society and the American economy over religious or ethnic particularism and radical political and
economic change. For Weber’s definition of “politics” and “political” see: Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology, eds. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 78.
8
Anne Rasmussen, Brendan J. Carroll, and David Lowery, “Representatives of the public? Public opinion and
interest group activity,” European Journal of Political Research 53 (2014): 253. In the substantial and diverse
literature on interest groups, different terms are used, often interchangeably, to describe non-governmental
organizations that are trying to influence public policy and public opinion, including interest groups, special interests
groups, advocacy organizations, lobby groups, pressure groups, and activist groups. These terms are often used or
cited without reference to specific definition. All these terms refer to organizations that are engaged in forms of
political and social advocacy. According to Jonathan A. Obar, Paul Zube, and Clifford Lampe, “The concept of
‘advocacy” goes well beyond the notion of advocating for, championing, or supporting a specific viewpoint or
cause. Often applied in the political context, the terms suggest a systematic effort by specific actors who aim to
further or achieve specific policy goals.” See: Jonathan A. Obar, Paul Zube, and Clifford Lampe, “Advocacy 2.0: An
Analysis of How Advocacy Groups in the United States Perceive and Use Social Media as Tools for Facilitating
Civic Engagement and Collective Action,” Journal of Information Policy 2 (2012): 4

3

democratic process. They complement the electoral process by providing a means through which
citizens and interested parties can communicate with elected officials and influence policy with
more frequency and specificity.”9 The American Jewish Committee sought to influence those in
positions of power in the United States. As part of the organization’s efforts to prevent an
intensification of anti-Semitism in the United States and maintain liberal immigration policies, a
prominent aspect or their advocacy work were efforts to influence the views of American
lawmakers, white Protestant patricians, and the broader, gentile American public.
The founders of the AJC’s claim to leadership over American Jewry was grounded in the
argument that American Jewry should speak with one voice, and that, because the founders were
prominent men within the hierarchies of American society, economics, and politics, they
believed that they were in the best position to exert the most influence on American political
leaders and on the American people in general. As will be discussed further below, the founding
of the AJC and the elite composition of the organization was consistent with both Jewish
communal leadership traditions and the leadership positions assumed by wealthy elites and
professionals during the Progressive Era.
The founders of the AJC emphasized acculturation into American society, and they had
strong ties to Reform movement Judaism, but their organization had to compete with others
seeking to assume a leadership role within, or over, the American Jewish community. At the time
of the founding of the AJC, what can be described as the Americanism of AJC’s founders, with
its emphasis on acculturation and Reform Judaism, was in competition for the hearts and minds
of the growing American Jewish community with Jewish cultural and religious particularism,
and social and political ideologies including socialism, communism, and Zionism. In contrast to

9

Gregory M. Randolph and Michael T. Tasto, “Special Interest Group Formation in the United States: Do Special
Interest Groups Mirror the Success of their Spatial Neighbors?,” Economics & Politics 24 (2012): 119.

4

these more populist movements, the AJC was a small and elite organization that was created to
support the founders’ efforts to encourage the acculturation of new Jewish immigrants, to arrest
the growth of radical political ideologies among Jewish immigrants, and to forestall the
entrenchment of a belief among the broader American public that Jews were political radicals,
and thus untrustworthy and underserving of American citizenship.
In pursuing leadership and in setting a social and political agenda, the elite leaders of the
AJC were not purely altruistic; they were also concerned that their own prominent place or
patrician status in American society not be tarnished by the arrival of hundreds of thousands of
new and impoverished Jewish immigrants in the United States. As will be discussed further
below, the dynamics of race and racial difference in early-twentieth century America animated
their concerns about their social status. The founders of the AJC were wealthy and acculturated
Jews of German descent. The newly arrived and substantially larger community of Russian and
Eastern European Jewish immigrants were Caucasian in terms of skin tone but, in common with
Southern European and Irish Catholic immigrants, they were perceived by the white Protestant
establishment in the United States as racially different and inferior. The founders of the AJC
were concerned that the conspicuous growth of the population of new Jewish immigrants would
undermine their standing among the community of Protestant patricians. That said, this study
will also illustrate that the AJC was determined to protect the civil and human rights of the larger
American Jewish community, and will describe how the Committee gradually became more
involved in debates over domestic issues that did not specifically concern Jews, including efforts
to end discrimination against other religious and ethnic minority communities in the United
States.

5

The AJC, which continues to operate today, has always openly stated that it is an
organization with the mission of protecting the civil and religious rights of Jews, both in the
United States and internationally. In 1906, when the AJC’s founders published the Committee’s
constitution, they defined the organization’s mission as follows:
The purpose of this Committee is to prevent infringement of the
civil and religious rights of Jews, and to alleviate the consequences
of persecution. In the event of a threatened or actual denial or
invasion of such rights, or when conditions calling for relief from
calamities affecting Jews exist anywhere, correspondence may be
entered into with those familiar with the situation, and if the
persons on the spot feel themselves able to cope with the situation,
no action need be taken; if, on the other hand, they request aid,
steps shall be taken to furnish it.10
The leaders of the AJC, from the very beginning, interpreted this mission in the broadest possible
terms. While philanthropy, fundraising, and the coordination of relief efforts were significant
features of the Committee’s work, the organization also engaged in a wide range of public
relations activities and forms of political activism. As this study will show, their advocacy on
behalf of both American Jews and world Jewry was not limited to political lobbying, and often
took the form of efforts to influence American public opinion, and included short term and long
term approaches to mass persuasion, public education initiatives, public relations work, and
propaganda.
The social and political issues that the AJC regarded as important, and the techniques the
organization employed in its efforts to influence American public opinion are the main subjects
of this study.11 The Committee’s activities are unique in American Jewish history because the

10

Letter from Joseph Jacobs to David Wolffsohn, President of the Zionistische Central Bureau, December 27, 1906,
American Jewish Committee Archives, General Correspondence Papers, Series II: Subject Files, 1906-32, Box 1,
File 11.
11
This study does not apply any of the quantitative methods that have been developed to assess interest group
influence because quantitatively measuring the successes or failures of the AJC’s efforts to influence public opinion

6

organization was the first American Jewish communal body to engage in public relations
activities that were directed at both Jewish and gentile audiences, and that aimed to broadly
shape American public opinion. The AJC’s innovative public relations activities sought to
influence the social, religious, and political attitudes of the American Jewish community, and to
shape how this minority community was viewed by the majority of Americans.
As already noted, the AJC claimed to speak for American Jewry, but it had rivals.
Other Jewish organizations, such as the American Jewish Congress, which was established in
1918, twelve years after the AJC, would also claim to speak on behalf of a unified American
Jewry; however, the AJC is exceptional in the history of American Jewish politics because,
unlike its rivals, until the 1940s, the Committee publically opposed the Zionist movement.12 As
will be discussed further below, it can be argued (and has been argued) that the AJC was
founded, at least in part, as an anti-Zionist or non-Zionist response to the growing popularity of
Zionism among Yiddish-speaking Jewish immigrants in the United States.13
This study will reveal that, from the perspective of Jewish cultural and political history,
the AJC’s attempts to engage public opinion and the power of constitutional courts to protect the
safety and advance the political and social interests of the American Jewish community were a
dramatic departure from Jewish political traditions and from the public advocacy and communal

is not the purpose of this study. Instead, this study provides an account of the AJC’s early public advocacy activities
and the deliberations of the organization’s founders.
12
In the context of the history of American Jewish politics, the AJC is also unique because of the association of
many of its leaders and early members with the Republican Party. This is significant because the historiography on
the political views of American Jews emphasises their liberal attitudes on social and economic issues, and the
community’s staunch support of the Democratic Party. The early leaders of the AJC, such as Jacob Schiff and Louis
Marshall, however, had strong ties to prominent Republicans and the Republican Party. See: David G. Dalin,
“Louis Marshall, the Jewish Vote, and the Republican Party,” Jewish Political Studies Review 4 (1992): 55-84. See
also: Jonathan D. Sarna, “American Jewish Political Conservatism in Historical Perspective,” American Jewish
History 87 (1999): 113-122.
13
Moses Rischin, “The Early Attitude of the American Jewish Committee to Zionism (1906-1922),” Publications of
the American Jewish Historical Society 49 (1959): 188-201.

7

defense techniques employed by previous generations of Jewish communal leaders around the
world. The methods of the AJC were notable for the resources that were devoted to influencing
American public opinion, the scope of the Committee’s ambitions, and the various means
employed, some of which were original and innovative. As will be argued below, the public
advocacy work of the AJC, including the organization’s successes and failures, has been
neglected in the existing historiography on the organization, which has focused on the
Committee’s lobbying of American politicians, its status as an communal leadership organization
that was led or controlled by a small group of elites, and its conflicts with other American Jewish
organizations, including the Zionists and the American Jewish Congress movement. The AJC’s
public advocacy work and its efforts to influence public opinion were historically significant and
innovative, and contributed to the remarkable and rapid integration of over a million Jewish
immigrants into the society and culture of twentieth-century America.
The work of the AJC is also historically significant because of the prominent people who
were involved in the establishment, implementation, and evolution of the Committee’s mission
and approaches to public relations and public advocacy. The men who founded the AJC had
ambitious goals, immense wealth, and extensive political connections, but, despite their claim to
be the spokespersons of the American Jewish community, they did not have a broad base of
support within American Jewry. Although the founders of the AJC claimed to speak for and on
behalf of American Jewry, the truth was that the AJC was an elite institution, founded by and
composed of wealthy and successful men who were at a distance from the community they
purported to represent. The Committee’s founders and its first generation of leaders were
prominent members of a small group of acculturated Jews who have often been described in the

8

historiography on late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century American Jewry as the American
Jewish establishment.14
This so-called establishment community composed of predominantly German-born Jews
who had immigrated to the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, or their American-born
children, had achieved unprecedented commercial and professional success. The founders
included Cyrus Sulzberger, an extraordinarily successful textile merchant, investment banker
Jacob H. Schiff, prominent commercial and constitutional lawyer Louis B. Marshall, Judge
Julian Mack of the Circuit Court of Illinois, Judge Mayer Sulzberger of the Pennsylvania Courts
of Common Pleas, and Justices Nathan Bijur and Samuel Greenbaum of the New York State
Supreme Court. The AJC’s first generation of leaders included members of the some of the
wealthiest Jewish families in the United States, including the Warburg, Guggenheim, Loeb,
Lehman, Rosenwald, and Seligman families.
Even before he assumed the role of President of the AJC in 1912, Louis Marshall was the
organization’s leading figure. Marshall was the “guiding force”15 of the organization in terms of
both developing strategy and coordinating the Committee’s activities. He was a very prominent
public figure during the early-twentieth century and when the Committee did release public
statements, Marshall was the author of the message.16 His influence in early-twentieth century

14

See, for example: Leonard Dinnerstein, Uneasy At Home: Antisemitism and the American Jewish Experience
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 30-33.
15
Naomi W. Cohen, Not Free to Desist: The American Jewish Committee 1906-1966 (Philadelphia: The Jewish
Publication Society of America, 1972), 28.
16
Naomi W. Cohen provides the following description of Marshall and his leadership qualities: “He was a short,
stocky man of stern appearance, always confident in his opinions and impatient with those who differed with him,
whose forthrightness permitted no public display of humor or sentiment. However, none could gainsay his abilities.
A forceful and convincing speaker who courageously fought for his beliefs regardless of their popularity, he earned
the respect of his community and the tremendous esteem of his colleagues.” See: Cohen, Not Free to Desist, 28.

9

American Jewish communal affairs has been well-documented and, to both the general public
and the American Jewish community, Marshall became synonymous with the AJC.17
Many of the Committee’s founders and members were prominent lawyers or judges, and
they recognized that, because of the doctrine of the rule of law and the oversight power of the
judicial branch of government, courts could be an effective means of protecting the civil and
religious rights of Jews and of minority groups generally.18 This study will describe how the
Committee used the American legal system, including seeking judicial review of administrative
action and the filing of amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) briefs, to advance its social and
political agenda. In common with the organization’s application of political lobbying and public
advocacy techniques, the AJC’s use of juridical means illustrates the substantial and innovative
approaches it used to advance its mission during the early history of the organization. Although
the Committee’s most significant amicus curiae interventions occurred after the Second World
War, the AJC’s practice of using the legal system as a mechanism to effect social and political
change emerged during the leadership tenures of Mayer Sulzberger and Louis Marshall, which is
the period under consideration in this study.19

17

See: Cohen, Not Free to Desists, 29.
In common law legal systems, constitutional courts have the power to strike down or invalidate legislation that
impinges on constitutionally protected rights. Constitutional courts were (and remain) a particularly appealing
alternative means of furthering the AJC’s agenda (and for safeguarding minority rights) because success in this
arena does not require securing public support or overcoming public opposition. This strategy relies on the
adjudication of so-called “test cases.” If the legitimacy of a law, administrative policy, or government program can
be framed as a question of determining or defining the scope or limits of a constitutionally protected right, then its
legal validity can be determined by the judiciary.
19
By the 1950s, the AJC was one of the most active and high profile interveners in constitutional litigation. The
organization submitted dozens of amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme Court of the United States and to lower State
and Federal Courts. These briefs were cited in landmark decisions, including Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925), which protected the right of parents to send their children to parochial schools, Shelley v. Kramer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948), which declared that it was unconstitutional to enforce racist restrictive covenants on the sale of land,
and Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the landmark ruling which declared school
segregation to be unconstitutional.
18

10

The AJC was established during a dynamic and tumultuous period in the history of
American capitalism, American social and political thought, and American journalism. The
organization was founded during the so-called “Era of the Trusts” and during the Progressive Era
of social and political reform. The founders of the AJC and its first generation of leaders were
active in the economic developments in the public and private sector, in fund raising, in
philanthropic projects, and in the changes to the media that defined the “Era of the Trusts” and
the Progressive Era.
In their efforts to both attain a leadership position within the American Jewish
community and to influence how this community was perceived by the majority of Americans,
the elite leaders of the AJC manifested the tendencies that were prevalent among other wealthy
philanthropists and middle class social reform activists of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
century. The historical context for the activities of these reformers and philanthropists was an era
of unprecedented social and economic change in the United States. The late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth century was a period of dramatic economic growth in the American industrial
sector that saw the consolidation of huge corporate monopolies. The growth of American
industry was accompanied by an extraordinary migration of Americans from their rural
birthplaces into cities looking for employment. Economic growth was also fed by the arrival in
the United States of millions of immigrants, including hundreds of thousands of Russian and
Eastern European Jews. The concentration of mostly poor and unskilled workers in urban
centers, along with the absence of public health and social service institutions and rapid
population growth, were further aggravated by the social and political context that accompanied
the mass industrialization of the economy, including unrestrained greed, labor force exploitation,
and, in New York City, the political corruption of the Tammany Hall machine. The state of
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affairs in poor and immigrant neighborhoods spurred social reformers to investigate ways to
improve the living conditions of the poor and fostered the development of social work as a
profession.20
The reformers of the Progressive Era were realistic and pragmatic; they believed that
solutions could be found, and they were motivated by noblesse oblige, religious faith, and
confidence in the scientific method.21 The Progressive Era was a golden age for philanthropy by
the reform-minded in American society, but some of their altruism was also animated by selfinterest. It must be noted that some of the social reformers of this era, including members of the
AJC, recognized that dramatic economic inequality and the concentration of poor, unskilled, and
under-educated masses in cities was a potential threat to their own security and the political
stability of the nation.
Further, the reformers recognized that philanthropy and large charitable donations,
including the creation of philanthropic foundations, offered them an opportunity to exercise
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See: Alfreda P. Iglehart and Rosina M. Becerra, Social Services and the Ethnic Community, 2nd ed. (Long Grove:
Waveland Press, 2011), 219. Iglehart and Becerra argue that social work as a profession was shaped by the
ideologies and methodologies that defined the Progressive Era: “Social work is the product of the era in which it was
born—an era that incorporated the ideologies of Social Gospel and Social Darwinism. This was the era that defined
some groups as White and other as not White…Social work can be considered as the outgrowth of a country that
was suffering from growing pains. From this seemingly chaotic world, charity organization societies and settlement
houses emerged to assist White ethnics with the process of assimilation. These workers were inspired by the hope
that foreign immigrants would one day melt into the pot of Americanism…As products of their environment, the
profession’s founders acquiesced to what was happening to the country’s minority populations. These leaders had
been socialized by American values and beliefs about these groups. They were not immune to all the negative and
pervasive messages about the place of minority groups in [American] society. As the profession matured, its
members continued to be socialized in the norms of the larger society. Socialization is, after all, one of the major
functions of society.” See: Iglehart and Becerra, 219-220.
21
The use of the scientific method to establish the efficacy, or improve the efficiency, of social reform and
philanthropy was consistent with the pragmatism of the Progressives; they wanted to be able to assess or measure
their efforts. According to Peter Levine, “Some reformers hoped to make government more efficient and effective
by introducing both scientific methods and professional credentials into public management. Such ideas were not the
Progressive’s alone; they also inspired American robber barons, French socialists, Prussian aristocrats, and British
imperial administrators…As Leonard White wrote in 1927, ‘What the whole world is witnessing is the emergence of
government by experts, by men and women who are trained technicians highly specialized to perform some service
by scientific methods.’” See: Peter Levine, The New Progressive Era: Toward a Fair and Deliberative Democracy
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 27.
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greater political influence. Historian Judith Sealander argues that the wealthy philanthropists of
the Progressive Era “intended the money distributed through their institutions to serve publicpolicy-making purposes. In effect, their organized charitable giving would grant them access to
influence in the arenas of government at local, state, and federal levels and a role in the public
decision-making process.”22 In the historiography on the Progressive Era, the wealthy
philanthropists and middle-class social reformers of this period have been praised for their desire
to help the poor, and for their application of business administration innovations to increase the
effectiveness of aid programs; however, they have also been criticized for their elitism and for
using philanthropy to both gain greater political influence and to mask attempts to exercise social
control over a steadily growing, poor, undereducated, and immigrant population.23
The philanthropy of the American Jewish establishment during this period has been
similarly criticized. The acculturated and wealthy Jews of German descent gave generously to
help their Yiddish-speaking coreligionists; however, the Jewish establishment used philanthropy
to encourage the new immigrants to acculturate into the American way of life. “Spurred by their
own status insecurity, the German Jews sponsored a series of programs to remake their
coreligionists as quickly as possible.”24 As will be discussed further below, these efforts created
significant intra-communal tension between the acculturated Jews of German descent, who were
prominent members and leaders of the AJC, and the new Jewish immigrants from Russia and
Eastern Europe, who now constituted the majority of the population of Jews in the United States.
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Judith Sealander, Foundation Philanthropy and the Reshaping of American Social Policy from the Progressive
Era to the New Deal (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 2.
23
For a brief discussion of the historiography on Progressive Era philanthropy and social control see: Daniel Eli
Burnstein, Next to G-dliness: Confronting Dirt and Despair in Progressive Era New York City (Champaign:
University of Illinois Press, 2006), 120.
24
Gerald Sorin, “Mutual Contempt, Mutual Benefit: The Strained Encounter Between German and Eastern
European Jews in America, 1880-1920,” American Jewish History 81 (1993): 45.
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At the same time as the American economy was undergoing significant changes, there
were also important developments in the academic disciplines of political science, philosophy,
psychology, and sociology that would strongly influence modern democratic theory and the work
of non-governmental advocacy groups in civil society, including the AJC. 25 The advent of new
communication technologies and the increasing political consciousness of the broader American
public would fundamentally change the means of mass persuasion (publicity, advertising, and
propaganda) and its effects on American politics. As will be seen, the AJC employed propaganda
and these new means of mass persuasion to further the Committee’s social and political
agenda.26
The American Jewish Committee was also established during the highpoint of
“muckraking” investigative journalism, which followed the publication, in 1906, of Upton

25

It was during the period of the developmental years of the AJC that social psychology emerged as a separate
academic discipline. Between 1880 and 1920, a number of significant studies were published that sought to analyze
group behavior, including works by Gustave Le Bon, Sigmund Freud, and Gabriel Tarde. Their ideas and findings,
in addition to the historical context described above and discussed in detail below, were some of the inspiration for
later landmark works of American democratic theory such as Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion and John Dewey’s
The Public and Its Problems. See: Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company,
1922); John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1927).
26
Walter Lippmann and John Dewey were two of the most prominent American public intellectuals of the twentieth
century. The so-called “Lippmann-Dewey debate” is an important concept in the historiography on the influence of
public opinion. This debate has been described as “a battle of ideas fought…between these two intellectual giants
about the proper role of the public in a large complex, modern democracy.” See: David Greenberg, “Lippmann vs.
Mencken: Debating Democracy,” Raritan 32(2012): 120. It has been argued that the extent of the disagreements
between Lippmann and Dewey has been exaggerated in the historiography on American political thought. It has also
been argued that using the concept of a debate to describe their relationship is a misnomer. According to David
Greenberg, “Although certain differences clearly divided the two men, both in their views of newspaper journalism
and in their prescriptions for fixing American democracy, Dewey and Lippmann were in accord on most aspects of
the central question, including the need for professional, objective expertise. They did not regard themselves as in a
debate, with the adversarial postures that the term implies…In truth, it makes more sense to speak of a Lippmann[Henry Louis] Mencken debate.” See: Greenberg, 121. According to Greenberg, Mencken is a more fitting
antagonist to Lippmann because Mencken’s critiques of the general public’s role in a modern democracy was more
anti-democratic than Dewey’s. Additionally, by reviewing each other’s books, Lippmann and Mencken actually did
engage in a form of a public debate on democratic theory and the role of technocrats in public policy decisions. For
more on the extent of the differences between Lippmann, Dewey, and Mencken’s views on the roles of the general
public and technocrats in modern democracies, and for an assessment of the recent scholarship that calls into
question the validity of the “Lippmann-Dewey debate,” see: Greenberg, 121-123.
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Sinclair’s The Jungle.27 Some of the most influential members of the AJC had substantial
experience in print journalism.28 As this study will reveal, these dynamic historical forces in
journalism and the development of public relations as a business practice also animated the
motivations and methods of the elite group that founded the AJC.
The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century was a period of dramatic growth for the
American media. “Magazines and newspapers were entering an entirely new phase. Many of
them,” according to historian Eric F. Goldman, “were becoming in fact what they had long liked
to call themselves—the people’s press.”29 At the forefront of the Progressive reform movement
were a new generation of journalists and writers who did not shy away from exposing political

27

Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (Chicago: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1906).
Adolph S. Ochs, the publisher of The New York Times, was also connected to the AJC. Ochs, like many of the
AJC’s founders and first generation of leaders, was of German-Jewish descent, and was active in philanthropy.
During the early conferences which led to establishment of the AJC, Ochs’ name was put forward for election to
“The Committee of Fifty” that was being assembled to build the organization. See: Minutes of the American Jewish
Committee Meeting of Committee of Fifteen, July 1, 1906, American Jewish Committee Archives: Digital Archives.
Accessed June 5, 2013. http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajcarchive/FileViewer.aspx?id=16440. He was not elected to
that committee and he never formally joined the AJC. Ochs was, however, the First Vice-President of the Jewish
Publication Society of America (JPSA). The JPSA collaborated with the AJC on many projects, including the
publication of the American Jewish Yearbook. In 1911, Ochs met with members of the AJC’s executive committee
to advise them on the creation of the AJC’s “Publicity Bureau.” See: Minutes of the American Jewish Committee’s
Executive Committee meeting held on March 19, 1911, American Jewish Committee Archives: Digital Archives.
Accessed June 5, 2013. http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajcarchive/FileViewer.aspx?id=16451. Ochs was present at the
AJC executive committee meeting held on April 23, 1911, “upon the invitation of the President, to confer with the
Committee on the matter of a publicity bureau.” See: Minutes of the American Jewish Committee’s Executive
Committee meeting held on April 23, 1911, American Jewish Committee Archives: Digital Archives. Accessed June
5, 2013. http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajcarchive/FileViewer.aspx?id=16451. Ochs’ role in the discussions about the
AJC’s publicity bureau is discussed further in Chapter 6 of this study. It is also noteworthy that Ochs had family ties
to the AJC. Arthur Hays Sulzberger, Ochs’ son-in-law who ultimately succeeded him as the publisher of The New
York Times in 1935, was the son of Cyrus Sulzberger, one of the founders of the AJC. While Ochs had strong
connections to important members of the AJC, Ochs himself did not join the organization and did not want his
newspaper to gain a reputation as a Jewish newspaper. Ochs opposed some of the work of the AJC because he
believed in the Reform movement’s definition of Judaism, which emphasized that the Jews were followers of a
particular religion not members of a separate people or nation. According to historian Laurel Leff, Ochs opposed
Jewish organizations whose mandates were not exclusively religious. Ochs opposed the AJC’s lobbying and public
relations work because he believed that it created false and potentially harmful distinctions between Jews and other
Americans. For more on Ochs’ concerns about his newspaper’s reputation and his opposition to the work of the
AJC, see: Laurel Leff, “A Tragic ‘Fight in the Family’: The New York Times, Reform Judaism and the Holocaust,”
American Jewish History 88 (2000): 3-12.
29
Eric F. Goldman, “Public Relations and the Progressive Surge: 1898-1917,” Public Relations Review 4 (1978):
55.
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corruption, appalling living conditions, and dangerous manufacturing processes. The new media
was an important forum for debates about the limits of laissez-faire economic liberalism and the
potential role of government in regulating the economy and protecting workers and consumers.
These debates also focused on the importance of civic instruction for workers and new
immigrants, and the role of professionals and technocrats in managing an increasingly
complicated economy and regulatory state.
Underlying these debates was an inquiry into the role of public opinion in a new age of
higher literacy rates, mass communication, rapid population growth, ethnic and religious
diversity, and economic, technological, and social change.30 All of these matters were of intense
interest and importance to the members of the AJC, and influenced the development of the
Committee’s public relations and public advocacy work on behalf of American Jewry.
The media growth that occurred during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century
included the creation of hundreds of specialized or niche newspapers that were produced for
specific audiences, including workers in a particular industry and adherents of particular political
ideologies. Specialized newspapers were also produced for specific faith groups, and some of the
leaders of the AJC published, edited, or contributed to newspapers intended for Jewish readers.
For example, Cyrus Adler, Cyrus Sulzberger, Samuel Greenbaum, and Joseph Jacobs were all
members of the editorial board of The American Hebrew, which, until the 1930s, was arguably
the most important English-language Jewish newspaper in the United States. The newspaper’s
readership was principally the acculturated Jews of the American Jewish establishment;
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In the late-nineteenth century, literacy rates in the United States varied substantially among ethnic groups. By the
American Civil War, more than eighty percent of Caucasian American men and women could read and write. See:
Paul Gutjahr, “Literacy and the Mass Media: Higher literacy rates contribute to growth and success of media forms,”
in History of the Mass Media in the United States: An Encyclopedia, ed. Margaret A. Blanchard (New York: Fitzroy
Dearborn Publishers, 1998), 314-315.
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however, The American Hebrew’s editors wanted their newspaper “to be sought by the best
classes of non-Jews.”31 At a time when the Jewish population of the United States was growing
at an unprecedented rate, The American Hebrew was only one of a series of efforts sponsored by
the American Jewish establishment that attempted to shape the attitudes of gentile patricians and
the broader American public towards American Jews. “The stated aim of The American Hebrew
was to promote pride in Judaism, fight its enemies and welcome its friends…The main ideal,
according to the publisher, Philip Cowen, was an adequate representation of the Jewish
community to the outside world.”32 Throughout its history, the AJC continued, and expanded
upon these public relations efforts.
The American Jewish establishment also endeavored to use print journalism to influence
the political beliefs and social behaviors of the growing population of Yiddish-speaking Jewish
immigrants. In 1902, Louis Marshall, with the financial backing of members of the Schiff,
Warburg, Guggenheim, Lehman, and Seligman families, established The Jewish World (Di
yidish velt). The newspaper “was intended to be an Americanizing and stabilizing force,
intellectually, morally, religiously, and politically, among the east-European immigrants who
crowded the East Side” of Manhattan.33
It is significant that the founding of the AJC coincided with the professionalization of the
modern field of public relations and the earliest attempts of “the trusts” and large corporations to
garner public support and counter negative coverage in the press. As journalists began exposing
some of the more disreputable business practices of American monopolies, including labor force
31

Yehezkel Wyszkowski, “The American Hebrew: An Exercise in Ambivalence,” American Jewish History 76
(1987): 341.
32
Ibid.
33
Lucy S. Dawidowicz, “Louis Marshall’s Yiddish Newspaper, ‘The Jewish World’: A Study in Contrasts,” Jewish
Social Studies 25(1963): 102. The Jewish World was founded to compete with the myriad of other Yiddish-language
publications, including Zionist, socialist, communists, and other radical newspapers, which had large circulations
among new Jewish immigrants to the United States.
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exploitation, price fixing, price gouging, and tying, public relations became an important
consideration for the men who controlled these monopolies and the men who organized the
public trading of stock in these companies. Further, some of the founders of the AJC, in their
professional work outside the Committee as investment bankers and financiers, had extensive
exposure to the impact of public relations.34
The AJC was a pioneer in the political uses of mass media including radio, television,
movies, cartoons, and comics. The organization created public relations and media campaigns to
discredit or marginalize prominent anti-Semites, including Father Charles Edward Coughlin, and
employed all available forms of media to promote racial and religious tolerance.35 The means
that the Committee employed to further the organization’s social and political agenda have
evolved considerably over the course of the AJC’s history, but many of the tactics the
organization employed, and the strategies underlying these approaches, were developed during
the period covered by this study.
In addition to employing philanthropy, fundraising, journalism, mass media campaigns,
constitutional court challenges, public relations work, propaganda, and public advocacy, the AJC
also sponsored high profile academic research. For example, during the late 1940s and early
1950s, the Committee funded the Berkeley “Studies in Prejudice,” a historically significant
sociological and scientific research project which examined the causes and impact of racial and
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For example, Jacob Schiff was a board member of the Pennsylvania Railroad, the first corporation to employ a
full-time, in house public relations executive. That executive was Ivy Lee, who is considered the father of modern
public relations. In the historiography on the development and professionalization of public relations, Ivy Lee’s
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religious prejudice. In particular, the Berkeley study focused on identifying personality traits that
predisposed a person to tolerate authoritarianism and anti-Semitism.36 The AJC’s sponsorship of
this and other research was an extension of the organization’s early commitment to the gathering
of information and sponsoring research. During the period covered by this study, the AJC
devoted considerable resources, often the majority of its operational budget, to the gathering and
collating of information, including statistics and detailed information about the congregational
affiliation, crime rate, philanthropic activity, vocations, professions, and military service of
American Jews.
The AJC’s social and political agenda has evolved considerably over the course of its
history. In the AJC’s early years, from 1906 to roughly 1930, which is the period covered by this
study,37 the Committee’s agenda included goals such as protecting vulnerable Jewish
communities in Eastern Europe and Russia from systematic violence, averting an intensification
of anti-Semitism in in the United States, maintaining liberal or open immigration policies,
expanding the scope of civil rights laws, and promoting a vision of the United States as a
harmonious and heterogeneous ethnic and religious melting pot.38
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In some of the case studies and examples discussed in this dissertation, the AJC made
efforts to minimize the appearance of their involvement by financing or contributing to the work
of other advocacy organizations that were not Jewish interest groups. In other case studies, the
AJC’s name and official seal were prominently displayed, and their involvement advertised. The
AJC’s leaders privileged discretion and were conscious of what today would be described as the
“optics” of their efforts, that is, how their activities and advocacy campaigns would appear to the
broader public and how their work could potentially intensify or mitigate anti-Semitism among
Christian Americans.
The AJC was not a secret organization. The Committee publically announced its
founding; the names of its members were a matter of public record; its leaders were prominent
public figures; its annual meetings and activities were covered by the media; and it published
Annual Reports which summarized its activities during the previous year and described its future
intentions.
While the AJC certainly pursued a broad and sometimes controversial political and social
agenda, there was nothing unpatriotic about the Committee’s efforts. In a narrow sense, the AJC
wanted to ensure that the United States would be a safe home for the nation’s Jewish citizens.
More broadly, the Committee worked to entrench religious, cultural, and ethnic pluralism in

proposed solution for the problems [of the] downtown [East Side]: the sooner the immigrants from Eastern Europe
would give up their cultural distinctiveness and ‘melt’ into the homogenized mass, the sooner anti-Semitism would
also melt.” See: Sorin, 45. Other scholars, however, disagree with this assessment of the American Jewish
establishment’s embrace of the social visions described in Zangwill’s The Melting Pot. According to Matthew Mark
Silver, for example, despite the fact that Louis Marshall and Zangwill “maintained a warm personal
relationship…there was little chance that Marshall would have sympathy for Zangwill’s gospel of intermarriage in
The Melting Pot.” See: Matthew Mark Silver, Louis Marshall and the Rise of Jewish Ethnicity in America: A
Biography (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2013), 150. Do to the unique social circumstances of earlytwentieth century America, where race-based distinctions between black and white entailed profound social
consequences for both individuals and entire minority communities, American Jewish leaders continually struggled
with how to encourage the rapid acculturation of new Jewish immigrants and maintain their community’s unique
religious and cultural heritage while simultaneously trying instill the perception among the white gentile population
that Jews were ordinary, white Americans, and were entitled to the standing and privileges that accompanied that
status in the United States.
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American political culture and American law as a means of protecting the rights of minority
communities such as American Jews, and ensuring social harmony and social cohesion. The
Committee privileged the rapid acculturation of new Jewish immigrants over complete
assimilation in American society and the total abandonment of Judaism. They wanted Jews to be
able to practice their faith and preserve elements of their religious heritage, but they also wanted
Jews to adopt the American way of life and be viewed by the broader American public as
ordinary, white Americans.39
This is not to say that the AJC and all of the organization’s actions and public relations
work are above criticism or disapproval. Its work was intended to influence American society to
be more accepting of religious, ethnic, and cultural difference, but the organization made
mistakes, and some of its policy choices were of debatable social merit and political value. Its
leaders were successful men, and they could be arrogant, domineering, and dismissive of
opposing views and opinions, including those of their less wealthy and less acculturated Russian
and Eastern European coreligionists. They were elitist, and, because of the popularity of radical
political ideas among new Jewish immigrants, the AJC’s leaders opposed establishing a
democratic or genuinely representative political body for Jewish communal leadership in the
United States.
In general, the leaders of the AJC were motivated by concerns about how the American
public viewed the American Jewish community, and thus the Committee’s leaders opposed any
action they believed would foster the impression that the loyalty of American Jews was divided
between their country and their religion (“dual loyalty”), and they opposed any action they
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As the examination will reveal, the AJC’s agenda and the goals of the projects that the organization financed did
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serve the cause of Jewish nationalism.
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believed would lend credibility to long-standing anti-Semitic tropes. These overarching concerns
inspired some of the AJC’s most successful lobbying and public advocacy, but also contributed
to some of the organization’s most substantial failures.40 The leaders of the Committee
overreacted to provocations, failed to respond to real threats, and, at times, declined to work with
and opposed or undermined the work of other Jewish groups. Both the organization and the men
who led it made serious mistakes that would have far reaching consequences for both the
American Jewish community and world Jewry.

Public Advocacy and the “Cult of Synthesis”
In the historiography on American Jewry, and in particular in the historiography on
Jewish interest groups, a neglected aspect of the effects of Jewish communal leadership is the
impact of the public advocacy work of these organizations in fostering the so-called “cult of
synthesis.” The “cult of synthesis” is a prevalent theme in American Jewish historiography, and,
arguably, one of the central tenets of American Jewish culture and identity. As an analytical
approach, the “cult of synthesis” focuses on identifying instances when American Jews, whether
deliberately or unconsciously, sought to integrate their own history and beliefs into the dominant
historical narratives and civic traditions of the United States. This category of historical analysis
also seeks to explain why these efforts were made, focussing on the status insecurity of Jews as a
minority population with a long and well-known history of persecution. As a component of
American Jewish culture, the “cult of synthesis” describes the results of over one hundred years
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The events surrounding the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany and its persecution of German Jews is outside the
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of endeavours by American Jews to fully integrate into the American way of life by developing a
unique ethnic and religious identity that preserved important elements of their cultural and
religious heritage while simultaneously emphasising acculturation. As both an analytical
approach and as an aspect of American Jewish identity, the “cult of synthesis” is used to
substantiate the argument that the two traditions, Americanism and Judaism, are fundamentally
compatible. 41
In his article “The Cult of Synthesis in American Jewish Culture,” Jonathan Sarna
describes numerous examples when Jewish leaders in the United States sought either to highlight
congruencies between Jewish history and American history or to graft or adapt elements of
Jewish history into significant American historical narratives. According to Sarna, “for some
American Jews, the cult of synthesis represented more than just a familiar exercise in group
loyalty and patriotism. For some, at least, it also represented a bold attempt to redefine America
itself.”42 Sarna cites the efforts of prominent nineteenth-century American Jewish leaders,
including Mordecai Noah, to link or “insert” Jews and Jewish history into important events in
American history. In his article, Sarna specifically mentions attempts to popularize the notion
that the aboriginal peoples of the United States were descendants of the lost tribes of Israel, that
Christopher Columbus was Jewish, and that the Puritan settlers adhered to Mosaic Law.43
Historian John Bodnar argues that these efforts are common among ethnic and religious
minorities and immigrant groups in the United States, and, importantly, often originate from
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within the elite and leadership groups of minority communities.44 “Most cultural leaders in the
United States,” Bodnar argues, “come from a broad group of middle-class professionals—
government officials, editors, lawyers, clerics, teachers, military officers, and small businessmen.
They are ‘self-conscious purveyors’ of loyalty to larger political structures and existing
institutions.”45 Bodnar’s description of the aims and activities of elite communal leaders of
minority communities in the United States captures the ambitions of the founders of the AJC and
the organization’s first generation of leaders. Like their Catholic, Irish, Italian, Chinese, Latino,
and African American counterparts, they sought to instill the perception among both Protestant
patricians, and the broader American public, that their minority community were loyal citizens
who belonged in the United States and would contribute to the wealth and progress of the nation.
As will be discussed further in Chapter 3 of this study, the racialized nature of how white
Protestant elites conceived of the United States’ national identity, and the entrenched racial
hierarchy that divided white and black and characterized American society, were barriers to the
social integration of minority communities that the American Jewish Committee had to reckon
with when developing its approaches to public advocacy during the early-twentieth century.
While the efforts of the leaders of the American Jewish community may not be unique in
American history, the intensity and scope of their efforts is noteworthy. “Of all the many ethnic
and religious groups that have demanded shares in America's founding myths, Jews are
apparently unique,” Sarna argues, “in attempting to insert themselves into so many. This
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bespeaks their eagerness for acceptance, to be sure, but also their deep-seated insecurity.”46
Sarna identifies evidence of the movement towards, and emphasis on, synthesis in developments
or changes in a number of areas of Jewish life and Jewish culture in late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth-century America, including the names given to American-born Jewish children.47 For
example, the German-born Jewish investment banker, Joseph Seligman and his wife Babet
Steinhart named their first son David, traditionally a very common name in Jewish families, but
their second son was given the name George Washington Seligman.48 Among other examples,
Sarna cites a passage from the Reform Passover Haggadah, which was first published in 1903,
as further evidence of the efforts by American Jews to join their own history and religion with
the history and civic traditions of the United States. The Reform Passover Haggadah is
organized as a “call and response” dialogue. Before the third cup of wine, a “child” is prompted
to ask “Where do we find civil, political, and religious liberty united today?” The scripted
response, which begins with the phrase “Here in America,” integrates Jewish history with
American history and values. In comparison to traditional Seder services, which include
descriptions of Jewish slavery in Egypt, an account of the liberation of the Jews, and rituals to
mark and celebrate this event, the content of the Reform Passover Haggadah is explicitly
political, and includes rhetoric that openly draws connections between Jewish beliefs and
American history and political ideals. 49
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Joseph Seligman and Babet Steinhardt had three other sons. All three were given names that could be described as
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Seligman.
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As will be seen, the AJC used similar techniques and similar rhetoric in its own efforts to
use published works to effect cultural change and to foster the impression of a fundamental
compatibility between American and Jewish culture. The impetus to craft at least the appearance
of synthesis can be discerned in American Jewish cultural production, historiography, and, most
importantly for this study, public advocacy. The case studies included in this study will illustrate
the AJC’s role in crafting and propagating the so-called “cult of synthesis” during the earlytwentieth century.
The tendency to highlight or insert elements of Jewish history into significant American
historical narratives, and thus into the nation’s historical memory, can also be found in both the
popular and academic historiography on American Jewry. Historical writing is this genre
emphasizes the continuity of Jewish presence in the United States. Numerous volumes have been
written that provide accounts of Jewish contributions to the economic, military, and political
achievements of the United States.50 This tendency is also present in the historiography on the

should be free and equal before the law; free to worship G-d as their conscience dictated. To us the United States of
America stands as the foremost among nations granting the greatest liberty to all who dwell here. Therefore we
grace our table with the national flag…. America is the child of the Old Testament. It is the ‘Moses and Prophets’ of
modern times. The Pilgrim Fathers landed here inspired by Israel's wondering to go out even to the wilderness and
worship G-d. The immortal Declaration of Independence is the Great Charter announced before Pharaoh by Moses.
The Abolitionists are the product of the Bible, and the love of civil liberty that moved Channing and Parker, Whittier
and Lloyd Garrison was nourished by it. The Old Testament first taught men that Government must be a government
by law equally applicable to all and this is the controlling idea of Mosaic and American legislation. The Fourth of
July is the American Passover. Thanksgiving is the American Feast of Tabernacles. It is therefore quite in keeping
with the service this evening to pledge our country. In raising this third glass of wine to our lips let us pray that G-d
will ever protect our land, that here liberty may forever dwell, that peace may abide within her borders and
prosperity within her homes.” See: Sarna, 63.
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One example in this category of historical writing is Seymour Brody’s Jewish Heroes and Heroines of America:
151 True Stories of American Jewish Heroism (Hollywood, Florida: Frederick Fell Publishers, Inc., 2004). In his
introduction, Brody explicitly acknowledges that his book was written with the purpose of highlighting Jewish
contributions to America and his hope that the work will be useful in enhancing the reputation of American Jewry:
“This book documents the many notable contributions and sacrifices made by Jewish men and women, in war and in
peace. This book refutes the lies and distortions of truth regarding the Jew in America. It is hoped that the readers of
this book will use it to combat any lies about Jews and that it will arouse your curiosity to investigate further about
these and other Jews who have so notably given of themselves to our country.” See: Brody, 12. American Jews are
not unique among major American immigrant groups in producing historiography that highlights their contributions
to the nation. See, for example: John Mariano, The Italian Contribution to American Democracy (Boston:
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AJC. The introduction of Nathan Schachner’s account of the history of the AJC, which was
commissioned by the Committee in 1948, includes the following description of the historical role
of Jews in the discovery of America: “The Jews were no newcomers in this land across the sea.
They might indeed be said to have a proprietary interest in the western hemisphere. For without
the encouragement, financial and otherwise, of the Marranos of Spain Columbus might never
have been able to sail. And it was a Jew who first set foot on the virgin soil of the New World.
From the earliest times the Colonies had Jews in their midst.”51
To understand the role played by the “cult of synthesis” on the agenda and methods of the
AJC, it is also helpful to see how the emphasis on synthesis manifested itself in other
contemporaneous Jewish organizations. In terms of public advocacy, Sarna argues that furthering
the development and the popularization of a synthesis between Judaism and Americanism was
the crucial impetus for the founding of the American Jewish Historical Society (AJHS) in 1892,
fourteen years before the founding of the AJC. Sarna notes that the AJHS “privileged the goal of
synthesis above all others.”52 The emphasis on synthesis was explicitly set out in the society’s
founding document.53
From a public relations perspective, it is significant that efforts to foster this synthesis
were part of a conscious process, that is, that Jewish leaders, including the leaders of the AJC,

Christopher Publishing House, 1921). See also, Thomas Hobbs Maginniss, Jr., The Irish Contribution to America’s
Independence (Philadelphia: The Doire Publishing Company, 1913).
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The founding document of the American Jewish Historical Society defines the organization’s mission as follows:
“The object of this Society is to collect and publish material bearing upon the history of our country. It is known that
Jews in Spain and Portugal participated in some degree in the voyages which led to the discovery of America, and
that there were Jews from Holland, Great Britain, Jamaica, and other countries among the earliest settlers of several
of the colonies. There were also a number of Jews in the Continental army, and others contributed liberally to defray
the expenses of the Revolutionary war. Since the foundation of our government a number of Jews have held
important public positions. The genealogy of these men and the record of their achievements will, when gathered
together, be of value and interest to the historian and perchance contribute materially to the history of our country.”
See: Sarna, 55.
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had agency in these efforts, and had specific goals. According to historian Beth Wenger, the
“invention of these narratives both eased Jewish adjustment to American life and created a
distinct ethnic history compatible with American ideals.”54 The building of the “cult of
synthesis” served to both encourage the acculturation of Jews into the American majority while
simultaneously preparing the majority to accept Jews as equal citizens. Synthesis, according to
Sarna, “was not just whipped up for internal consumption. Jews also looked outward and
attempted to transform America's vision of itself. By undercutting the claims of ‘Christian
America’ and promoting pluralism as a national ideal, they attempted to forge a new America—
one where they might finally be accepted as insiders.”55 As already noted above, these were
important goals for the founders of the AJC.
The emphasis on synthesis can also be tied to arguments about American exceptionalism,
another important concept in the historiography on American Jewry. As will be discussed below,
the unique historical conditions of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century America as an
ethnically heterogeneous nation experiencing tremendous economic and population growth,
which espoused a deeply rooted reverence for constitutionally protected rights and which
simultaneously lacked a state religion and a formal aristocracy, created unique conditions for the
growing population of American Jews. American Jewish leaders recognized a historically
unprecedented opportunity to establish in America social conditions and legal protections that
Diaspora Jewry had never experienced. The United States “was a nation in process, engaged in
defining what being an American actually meant. Jews played a disproportionately important
role in this process, and unsurprisingly they propounded a definition of America that warmly
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embraced them as insiders…Here, Jews could help to shape a pluralistic national identity that
won them insider status; almost everywhere else that seem patently impossible.”56 It can be
argued that the pursuit of synthesis was, at least in part, a public relations campaign to further the
goal of establishing and then protecting these favorable social and political conditions. Nurturing
and reinforcing this synthesis was part of the public relations mission of the AJC. 57
While Sarna emphasises that the “efforts to merge Jewish and American identities
proceeded at the popular and folk levels,”58 it is one of the arguments of this dissertation that the
pursuit of both a genuine synthesis and the appearance of synthesis between Judaism and
Americanism also proceeded at the political level. It was advanced through diverse means of
political engagement and public advocacy, including the various public advocacy and public
relations techniques developed and applied by the AJC to further the organization’s social and
political agenda. This dissertation will show the extent to which the AJC and its leaders were at
the forefront of these efforts.
In fostering the “cult of synthesis,” one of the goals of American Jewish leaders was to
encourage the broader American public to see Jews as white people and accept Jews as full
participants in American social and political life without compelling American Jews to convert
or abandon their religious identity. In common with other immigrant groups and minority
communities, “American Jews searched relentlessly for the threads within existing historical
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Sarna argues that “Over the course of American Jewish history, the cult of synthesis has…provided American
Jews with the optimistic hope that, in the United States, they could accomplish what Jews had not successfully
achieved elsewhere in the Diaspora. Instead of having to choose between competing allegiances—the great
enlightenment dilemma—here they could be both American and Jewish. Their dual identities, they ardently
believed, were complementary and mutually enhancing. This served both an apologetic and a subversive purpose: it
provided a powerful response to Christian triumphalists and conversionists, who looked upon Jews as second-class
citizens, and it tacitly functioned to de-Christianize America's cultural boundaries so as to render Jews more
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narratives that emphasized their belonging in America, their contributions to the nation, and their
right to maintain distinct religious and cultural traditions.”59 This pursuit was done to secure their
belonging in America and their social status as citizens of a minority faith. This work was also
done self-consciously, that is, with the intent to establish a culture, social structure, and legal
system that would offer greater protections to American Jews than any other historical Diaspora
Jewish community had ever enjoyed.
The effort to synthesize elements of American and Jewish history can be described as an
attempt to interpret (or pejoratively, to manipulate) history in order to profoundly shape the
future. The work of the AJC during the early-twentieth century is significant because the
organization was working not just to mould the past, but to shape the future. 60
There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the efforts of American Jews to create the
perception of a synthesis between Judaism and Americanism have been very successful. “The
regularity with which American Jews continue to articulate the convergence and compatibility of
Jewish and American ideals,” Wenger argues, “reveals just how thoroughly this maxim has
penetrated American Jewish culture. Indeed, in American Jewish history, no theme resounds as
loudly or as consistently as the perceived symbiosis between Judaism and American
democracy.”61
Arguably, the successes of the efforts to establish the synthesis has obscured the agency
of Jewish leaders, including the leaders of the AJC, who employed a number of public relations
and advocacy strategies to both construct and popularize this synthesis. Consequently, a number
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of significant questions about why and how the synthesis was constructed have been neglected in
the historiography on American Jewry and, in particular, in the historiography on American
Jewish communal leadership. Even if the synthesis between Judaism and Americanism is a
historical construction or a historical fiction,62 it is reasonable to ask how this fiction was
constructed and how it has been maintained,63 and public advocacy, public relations, and other
political activities carried out by communal leadership organizations and defense organizations,
including the examples of the work of the AJC discussed later in this study, played a significant
role in both creating and maintaining this synthesis. At the heart of this dissertation is the
argument that public advocacy carried out in various forms by communal leadership
organizations contributed to this process. The numerous case studies of the AJC’s public
advocacy work provided below will illustrate the aims and breadth of these efforts.

The AJC and the Battle against Anti-Semitism
The most important aspect of all Jewish public advocacy in the United States during the
early-twentieth century was the effort to prevent the growth (or an intensification) of anti62

Beth Wenger, who is a professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania, opens her book History Lessons:
The Creation of American Jewish Heritage with the following anecdote about teaching American Jewish history:
“Each year I teach a course in American Jewish history, and almost without fail, at some point during the semester,
the class discussion takes a familiar detour. We might be discussing the mass migration of Jews to the United States
or perhaps the various political expressions of American Jews, and invariably, a hand goes up. “Judaism teaches
democracy,” a student says in an attempt to explain historical developments ranging from immigrant acculturation to
social activism to labor organizing. Heads nod. More often than not, I am the sole detractor, pointing out that
Judaism and democracy have never been synonymous except…in the narratives created by American Jews.” See:
Wenger, 1.
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Although the “cult of synthesis” has become well entrenched, it has also been described as a historical
construction, that is, as the deliberate product of efforts to foster and enhance the credibility of the perception of
synthesis. Jerold S. Auerbach, for example, has argued that “the synthesis of Judaism and Americanism is a
historical fiction.” See: Jerold S. Auerbach, Rabbis and Lawyers: The Journey from Torah to Constitution
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), x. While this assertion may be true insofar as this synthesis did not
develop organically or without the intervention of American Jewish religious, communal, and political leaders, it is
also unquestionably historically significant. The conflation of Judaism and Americanism is a historical construction
that is the product of active engagement by Jewish leaders acting with the aim of establishing in America the social,
political, and cultural environment where native born Jews and Jewish immigrants could feel secure, at home, and
fully engaged in their country’s social institutions, political processes, and economy.
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Semitism among the broader American public, including white patricians and middle and lower
class white Christians. Anti-Semitism is a specific term insofar as it denotes hatred of Jews, but
the term has been broadly applied to many different actions, privately held beliefs, unconscious
biases, and forms of expression. The term has been used to describe incidents as varied as
organized violence against Jewish communities, hate speech by individuals, government
approved discrimination in the armed forces, and official or unofficial quotas that limited the
number of Jewish students in universities or the number of Jewish employees in the public
service or private corporations. There are many manifestations and forms of anti-Semitism, and
numerous means of fostering intolerance and spreading hate.
Although the American Jewish Committee is well-known for its efforts to lobby
American legislators on behalf of persecuted Jewish communities in foreign countries, the most
fundamental item on its agenda was the suppression of anti-Semitism in the United States. The
AJC carried out these efforts through political engagement, including efforts to influence public
opinion. No single tactic is effective against all the means of expressing hate or all the forms of
bigotry and discrimination, but throughout the history of the American Jewish Committee, the
organization has endeavored to develop effective approaches to countering all forms and
manifestations of anti-Semitism. During the leadership tenures of Mayer Sulzberger and Louis
Marshall, as part of its public advocacy work, the AJC applied a number of different strategies
and approaches to combat anti-Semitism in the United States.
As already noted, late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century American Jewry made
significant efforts to foster the perception of compatibility between American and Jewish culture.
Historian Beth Wenger notes “American Jews participated in an array of public events and
produced and consumed a vast corpus of popular literature that championed the possibilities for
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Jewish life in the United States. In speeches, newspapers, textbooks, public celebrations, and
institutional proclamations, Jews regularly asserted the compatibility, similarity, shared values,
and parallel trajectories of Jewish and American cultures.”64 These efforts, for both inter and
intra communal audiences, can all be described as forms of political engagement and public
advocacy, and can be seen as part of a campaign to prevent the spread of anti-Semitism in the
United States. As will be discussed below, the AJC devoted considerable resources to producing
materials for both a Jewish audience and also the general American public that aimed to bolster
these efforts, and convince both Jews and the general public that Jews belonged in America.
The range of public advocacy work carried out by the AJC illustrates that the
organization’s leaders believed that American Jewry had to do more than just assert
compatibility between Jewish and American culture: they had to demonstrate it, and, further,
they had to engage actively to preserve it by shaping the social and political culture of the United
States and the definition and scope of the nation’s laws protecting individual and civil rights.
“Although they certainly harbored occasional doubts about the promises of America,” Wenger
argues, “the overwhelming majority of Jews came to believe that the nation had indeed ushered
in a new epoch in Jewish history.”65 Some American Jewish communal leaders took an active
role in ushering in that new epoch. They were active in the public arena in order to broadly shape
a culture that would be tolerant of ethnic and religious diversity and to ensure that, in contrast to
past Jewish historical experience, in America, the Jews would not be viewed as alien outsiders,
usurers, heretics, and deicides, but, first and foremost, as equal citizens—as Americans.66 The
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AJC was founded during a period of violent persecution against Jews abroad, but the leaders of
the AJC were, from the founding of the organization, concerned about anti-Semitism in the
United States. They viewed manifestations of anti-Jewish bigotry and intolerance in America as
among the “consequences of persecution” that they were dedicated to alleviating. The leaders of
the AJC were consistent, however, in preferring quiet approaches to curbing all forms of antiSemitism. In particular, they regarded public protests in the form of mass meetings, rallies, or
counter-demonstrations as potentially harmful to the status and public perception of Jews
because they felt that such public assemblies reinforced an already established and growing
perception of Jews as a politically radicalized minority population.
As this study will reveal, the AJC also deliberately chose not to respond to some
manifestations of anti-Semitism. This refusal to engage with anti-Semites is often described as
“the silent treatment.” This tactic can be seen as complementary to the organization’s emphasis
on, or preference for, quiet diplomacy, but, as will be shown, a number of concepts beyond
concerns about optics and an aversion towards publicity informed the development and
application of the AJC’s approaches to public advocacy and combatting anti-Semitism. During
the first twenty-five years of its history, the AJC was, in general, apprehensive about publically
responding to anti-Semitism in the United States because the organization calculated that any
response could be either counterproductive or exacerbate the problem.
From a public relations perspective, there were a number of reasons cited by AJC leaders
to justify disregarding some provocations; however, it must be noted that pride, whether ethnic,
religious, cultural, or communal, also underlay this approach. Some Jewish leaders believed that
it was beneath the dignity of American Jews as both adherents of one of the world’s great
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religions and as American citizens with constitutionally protected rights to respond to scurrilous
hate speech.
The strategy of declining to respond to some manifestations of anti-Semitism, whether in
the form of speech or discrimination, was based on the premise that reacting to every occurrence
of prejudice and intolerance could unintentionally lend credibility to anti-Semitic accusations
and provide greater public exposure and media coverage for anti-Semites and their beliefs.
Responding to every outburst of bigotry could, paradoxically, create the impression that these
accusations or claims deserved to be taken seriously, and thus could do more harm.67 Rather than
responding directly to every anti-Semitic outburst or incidents of anti-Jewish discrimination, the
AJC chose more indirect and long-term approaches. As will be shown, while the organization
eschewed any protest activity that could reinforce the perception that American Jews were
political radicals, the AJC was, from its founding, concerned about an intensification of antiSemitism in the United States and active in efforts to influence American public opinion. The
AJC’s emphasis on discretion, restraint, and avoidance of public protest has led to strong
condemnations of the organization’s approach to public advocacy. Its leadership has been called
passive, timid, and even “cowardly;”68 however, as this study will show, their silence should not
be construed as passivity. When the AJC chose not to respond publically to a provocation, they
were not ignoring the problem but had deliberated about the best way to respond given their
overarching concerns about how their community would be perceived and their desire not to
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have problematic or difficult social and political issues defined as “Jewish issues.” The previous
scholarship on the AJC that minimizes the significance and breadth of the organization’s early
advocacy and institution-building has mischaracterized the Committee’s early activities.

A New Account and Interpretation of the Early Years of the AJC
In the historiography on American Jewry and in the historiography on Jewish interest
groups, the magnitude of the contribution of the American Jewish Committee’s work in its early
years, and the originality of its approaches to public advocacy, have been underappreciated. On
the occasion of the AJC’s sixtieth anniversary, the organization commissioned Naomi W. Cohen,
who was at that time an associate professor of history at Hunter College, to write a history of the
Committee’s first six decades. Cohen’s book Not Free To Desist: The American Jewish
Committee 1906-1966, which was published in 1972, provides an account of the founding of the
AJC and its activities up to the escalation of the Vietnam War. Her work is frequently cited by
historians of American Jewry.69 Not Free to Desist, according to historian Jonathan Sarna, “has
become the standard history of the organization, and is well known to all students of American
Jewish history.”70
In her introduction, Cohen argues that the “For the first twenty-five years of its existence,
the [American Jewish] Committee’s functions were limited, its scope narrow.”71 This study will
show that this is not a fair assessment of the early history of the AJC. From the beginning, the
AJC pursued a broad agenda. Further, the leaders of the AJC were innovative in the public
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relations and juridical means that they employed in pursuit of their social and political
objectives.
In Not Free To Desist, Cohen emphasizes the historical continuity between the public and
political advocacy of the AJC and traditional forms of Jewish politics and diplomacy that were
conducted throughout Jewish history by elite members of Diaspora communities, including
leading members of the American Jewish community during the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth century. Cohen draws a parallel between the advocacy techniques employed by the
AJC and the efforts of the Hofjuden or “court Jews” who formally represented Jewish
communities at the Royal Courts of Early Modern Europe. She argues that the “creation of the
American Jewish Committee did not significantly alter the Hofjude pattern of Jewish defense
that the founders had traditionally pursued. Discreet pressure and backstairs diplomacy remained
the trademark of the organization.”72 It is the argument of this dissertation, however, that this
common and established assessment of the Committee’s early advocacy strategies fails to
adequately appreciate that the projects undertaken or financed by the AJC that aimed to influence
American public opinion and combat anti-Semitism represented a significant departure from the
Hofjude model of public advocacy and Jewish politics. The scope of the AJC’s work during its
first twenty-five years was neither limited nor narrow; their public relations work and public
advocacy on behalf of the American Jewish community and world Jewry was substantial and, in
some cases, innovative and unprecedented.
The AJC's public advocacy efforts between its founding in 1906 and the death of Louis
Marshall in 1929 were new in the history of Jewish advocacy and Jewish communal leadership
in the United States; their work was sophisticated, and, although they were influenced by
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methods previously employed by Jewish leadership organizations in Europe, their approaches
were innovative, including the way advocacy techniques employed by other Jewish organizations
were tailored to be most effective in an American context. Their work was done with purpose,
and inadequate attention has been given in the historiography, including in Professor Cohen’s
work, to the historical development and application of these techniques, and the impetus for their
development.
Additionally, while the advocacy work of the AJC was not perfect or above criticism, it
can be argued that some of the condemnations of the AJC in American Jewish historiography
have been too strong or tainted by bias, particularly the criticisms found in what can be described
as triumphalist historiography that, consciously or unconsciously, frames debates about the
successes and failures of American Jewish communal leadership during the first half of the
twentieth century from a Zionist perspective. These criticisms privilege the aims of the Zionist
movement to restore or re-establish Jewish political sovereignty in the Middle East. For reasons
that will be discussed below, the AJC and many of its first generation leaders were opposed to
Jewish nationalism, and the organization itself is often described as being founded as an antiZionist group. As the AJC is perceived as being on the wrong side (or losing side) of the intracommunal debate over Zionism, it has been criticized for creating political and financial
obstructions that arguably or potentially delayed the establishment of the State of Israel.
The assessment of the AJC should be more nuanced. As will be seen, the AJC’s methods
of advocacy were far more innovative than Cohen suggests, particularly in the organization’s
interplay between the use of the quiet lobbying that characterized Diaspora political traditions
and the use of modern approaches to public relations and public advocacy. The organization
continued to act as a lobby group and practice quiet diplomacy, but it did not eschew modern
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public relations; rather, it was deliberate about when and how to cross the line between
traditional strategies and methods and modern approaches to public and political advocacy.
Significantly, the range of advocacy approaches deployed by the AJC throughout the twentieth
century can be traced back to the work of the first generation of AJC leaders.
For example, in April 1913, only seven years after its founding, the AJC was informed
that the American Humane Society was planning to organize a “nation-wide” protest against
shechita, the Jewish ritual method for slaughtering animals.73 The Committee’s leadership
recognized that such a protest was a potential threat to the American Jewish community, singling
out Jews as unnecessarily cruel to animals, and thereby casting aspersions against the entire
community. In response, the AJC sought the cooperation of the British Board of Deputies, who
had already had to contend with similar protests against kosher slaughtering practices in
Britain.74 The AJC also appointed a subcommittee made up of Judah Magnes, Cyrus Adler,
Harry Friedenwald, and Solomon Solis-Cohen to study the subject further. The subcommittee
was specifically empowered “to consult with distinguished American scientists, non-Jews, with a
view to gathering expert opinions on the relative humanity of shechita as compared with other
methods.”75
The AJC understood the optics of the American Humane Society’s accusations; the
leadership was anticipating an adverse public relations fallout from the publicity of these charges
and moved to have a response ready to counter the Humane Society’s claims. Further, the leaders
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recognized that securing the expert opinion of non-Jewish scientists would lend their response
greater credibility and forestall the general public’s rejection of any arguments made by Jewish
scientists as tainted by bias.
The AJC was prepared to respond to the accusations, but it made no attempt to pre-empt
(or get ahead of) the Humane Society by releasing a public statement before the protest was
announced. This forbearance was consistent with the AJC’s established policy of refraining,
whenever possible, from drawing unnecessary public attention and media scrutiny to the
American Jewish community.76 In the event, the Committee’s patience was prescient; the
Humane Society did not go forward with a nation-wide protest and there was no broader and
potentially inflammatory public discussion of shechita.
Almost ten years later, however, the AJC again had to mobilize to counter accusations
from the Humane Society that kosher slaughtering practices were cruel. The circumstances this
time were significantly different. Instead of a protest campaign, the Humane Society had
organized a Committee on Slaughter House Reform to study slaughtering practices across the
country and prepare recommendations for new legislation regulating the meat and poultry
packing industry. In connection with this effort, in 1922, the AJC received a request from the
Humane Society to send a representative to the organization’s fifth annual meeting that was
being convened in St. Paul, Minnesota.77
The mere fact of the request reveals the standing and reputation the AJC had established
for itself. Although it was neither a democratic nor representative body, the Committee was
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sought out to speak for American Jewry.78 The Humane Society wanted the AJC to provide an
expert who could authoritatively describe kosher slaughtering practices to the attendees. The
AJC did not ask a non-Jewish scientist to address the annual meeting. Louis Marshall asked
Moses Hyamson, the Former Chief Rabbi of the British Empire, to attend the annual meeting on
behalf of the Committee, and the AJC financed the Rabbi’s trip.79
Although he was not a scientist, Rabbi Hyamson’s speech was a significant success. The
AJC’s Executive Committee reported that the address had been “well received” and that,
following the meeting, Dr. Francis S. Rowley, the Chairman of the Committee on Slaughter
House Reform, had made a public statement indicating that shechita would be exempt from any
reform proposals and legislation supported by the Humane Society.80 The AJC printed
Hyamson’s address in the organization’s Annual Report and distributed it as a pamphlet.81
This discussion of the AJC’s response to the Humane Society’s allegations that kosher
slaughtering practices were cruel has been included in the introduction to this study because the
episode illustrates a number of quintessential features of the public advocacy of the Committee
during the organization’s early history. The organization’s leaders and members kept themselves
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apprised of current events and trends in public opinion, and from a public relations perspective,
they anticipated challenges and circumstances that could be exploited by anti-Semites (and
supporters of immigration restrictions) to tarnish the reputation of their community. They
avoided publicity and forbear responding to potential provocations while simultaneously
preparing to act publically if necessary. They conducted research, gathering expert opinion,
including experts who could not be easily disdained or dismissed by their opponents because of
their religion.82 They used media to sway public opinion and support their arguments.
The description of how the AJC handled the threat posed by the Humane Society’s claims
about the cruelty of kosher slaughtering practices was also included here because it challenges
some of the generalizations made about the Committee’s advocacy during the early history of the
organization. The AJC’s direct response to the Humane Society’s Committee on Slaughter
House Reform was to accept the Humane Society’s invitation to speak at a public meeting,
which was open to members of the public and the press. Certainly the founders and early leaders
of the AJC preferred quieter approaches, but they also recognized that public opinion could not
be ignored and could be usefully martialled to further elements of the organization’s agenda,
including the Committee’s efforts to prevent an intensification of anti-Semitism in the United
States.
While the AJC became more active and more visible after the Second World War, the
Committee became involved in public relations and public advocacy from its founding in 1906.
One of the purposes of this study is to illustrate the extent to which, beyond the lobbying of
legislators and public officials, there has been historical continuity in the advocacy techniques
employed by the AJC from the establishment of the organization, including the calculated use of
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publicity, the gathering and dissemination of information, the funding of publications (or what
could be described as the use of mass media), and the use of the American justice system.
This dissertation provides an account of the earliest efforts of the American Jewish
Committee to influence American public opinion and advance its social and political agenda. It
aims to show that, while the AJC certainly preferred and continued to practice the quiet
diplomacy of traditional Jewish advocacy and communal defense, the organization was willing
to employ more active and more public methods to further its agenda. The tactics the
organization developed under Mayer Sulzberger and Louis Marshall’s leadership would become
important facets of Jewish communal advocacy, and were the inspiration for subsequent public
advocacy efforts in the United States for the remainder of the twentieth century.
In order to situate the analysis of the public advocacy strategies of the American Jewish
Committee within the broader contexts of developments in modern Jewish communal leadership,
and the history of the mass migration of Russian and Eastern European Jews to the United States,
Chapters 2 and 3 of this study offer historiography and contextual background information.
Chapter 2 examines the existing historiography relevant to this study, including analyses of
nineteenth-century Jewish communal leadership organizations in a number of countries that were
forerunners of the AJC.
One of the criticisms of the existing historiography and political science research on
interest groups is that in privileging discussions of the goals of these organizations and the tactics
they use to further their agendas, the context in which they act and which motivates them to act
is neglected.83 In light of this criticism, Chapter 3 provides a detailed analysis of the unique
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constellation of factors in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century America which led
members of the American Jewish establishment to found the AJC, and describes how these
factors would subsequently shape the Committee’s approaches to public advocacy. When
compared to the post-Second World War advocacy of prominent Civil Rights organizations, the
AJC’s efforts during the early history of the organization appear timid or passive and the
organization has been criticized for privileging restraint and quiet lobbying over public protests
and confrontations with anti-Semites. The AJC was certainly cautious but the organization’s
public advocacy was calculated to both prevent an intensification of anti-Semitism in the United
States and foster a society in which Jews would be perceived and accepted as “insiders,” as full
participants and beneficiaries of American citizenship. The AJC’s leaders’ cautiousness must be
understood in the context of the dynamics of race in early-twentieth century America, the
ambiguous position of Jews in that racial dynamic, and the AJC’s leadership’s anxieties about
the potential social and political consequences for acculturated American Jews of the mass
arrival of hundreds of thousands of Eastern European Jews in the United States.
Chapters 4 through 8 include case studies of the diverse advocacy work that was carried
out by the AJC between 1906 and 1930. Chapter 4 examines the AJC’s responses to a number of
anti-Semitic incidents in the United States. These case studies reveal that the AJC consistently
emphasized minimizing publicity, but was willing on several occasions, or felt compelled, to act
more publically in some circumstances in order to prevent an intensification of anti-Semitism in
the United States. Chapter 4 includes examples in which the AJC declined to respond to antiSemitic provocations, including incitement sponsored by the Ku Klux Klan, because the
organization’s leadership calculated that their intervention would only aggravate the situation.
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Chapter 5 provides detailed case studies of two major incidents of anti-Semitism in the
United States, the publication of Henry Ford’s newspaper the Dearborn Independent and the
blood libel accusation made against the small Jewish community in the town of Massena, New
York. No study of Jewish public advocacy and communal leadership in the United States during
the early-twentieth century would be complete without reference to these two high profile
historical events. How the AJC responded to both provocations reveals a great deal about the
organization’s communal leadership and advocacy strategies and illustrates the strengths and
weaknesses of the AJC’s early approaches to communal defense and public advocacy.
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the development of what can be described as the AJC’s
internal infrastructure to carry out its mandate as an advocacy organization. Considerable
financial resources were devoted to building the Committee’s information gathering and
dissemination infrastructure between 1906 and 1930. Chapter 6 includes a discussion of the
leaders’ deliberations about how to organize and finance the organization’s activities. The
dissemination of information to so-called “molders of opinion” was an important aspect of the
AJC’s public advocacy work. Chapter 7 includes an account of the substantial resources the
organization devoted to compiling a service roll (or honor roll) which recorded the names of all
Jews who fought for the United States in all branches of the America military during the First
World War. Chapter 7 also contains case studies of the publications sponsored by the AJC. The
AJC was a pioneer in the application of mass media as a public advocacy tool; however, between
1906 and 1930, the AJC relied on texts to reach the broadest possible audience. During the
period covered by this study, books, articles, and pamphlets were the principal way the AJC
sought to influence public opinion, and Chapter 7 examines in detail why the organization
became involved in publishing and what the organization chose to publish.
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Chapter 8 provides an account of the origins of the Committee’s use of the American
justice system to further its agenda. The AJC became much more active in using a litigation
approach to public advocacy after the Second World War; however, between 1906 and 1930,
legal recourses and juridical mechanisms were invoked by AJC leaders in the interest of either
furthering the organization’s social and political aims or curbing the spread of anti-Semitism in
the United States. This chapter includes an account of the AJC’s involvement in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters,84 a landmark case about parents’ rights to send their children to religious schools. The
case was AJC’s earliest venture into the arena of constitutional “test cases” and public interest
and civil rights litigation before the United States Supreme Court.
Finally, Chapter 9 briefly examines how the public advocacy strategies and techniques
developed by the first generation of AJC leaders influenced the organization’s later advocacy
work. Examinations of Committee policy statements and internal memorandums from the 1930s
and 1940s reveal that the use of the public advocacy approaches employed by the founders of the
organization continued to be mainstays of the AJC well into the twentieth century. The
organization’s later, more ambitious, and more well-known campaigns on behalf of American
Jewry and other minority communities can be described as expansions or extensions of the
advocacy strategies, efforts, and innovations of the organization’s first generation of leaders
The fight against anti-Semitism, the forging of the “cult of synthesis,” and the emergence
of Jewish interest groups and political lobbying in the United States are important subjects in the
historiography on American Jewry. A study of the public advocacy work of the AJC provides
insight into all these areas. In essence, this dissertation is an account of the public relations and
public advocacy work of one particular group of elite leaders from a minority community that,
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especially during the period covered by this study, felt vulnerable and perhaps unwelcome in
America. The AJC’s public advocacy and public relations work illustrates the complexity of
developing social cohesion in multicultural societies, the anxieties that spur leaders within
minority communities to act, the intra-communal strife that can ensue as minority communities
grow, acculturate, and stratify, and the breadth of public advocacy strategies that are available to
minority and immigrant communities during the process of absorption, leading potentially to
acculturation or fostering social acceptance.
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Chapter 2: Historiography
Introduction
This chapter is divided into two parts and examines the existing historiography on Jewish
communal leadership, describing the evolution of traditional Jewish communal defense towards
the development of modern leadership and advocacy organizations, including the AJC. Part I
describes historical Jewish leadership institutions and provides an analysis of nineteenth-century
European Jewish communal leadership organizations that were forerunners of the American
Jewish Committee. Some of the organizations mentioned in this section have not been
adequately studied because the existing historiography and political science research on interest
groups often privileges discussions of the goals of interests groups, and the tactics they use to
further their agendas, without sufficiently considering the particular historical contexts in which
these organizations form, and the motivations and historical forces that shape their activities. Part
II provides an account of the historiography on the early history of the American Jewish
Committee, and assesses and critiques the existing scholarship on the earliest public advocacy
work of the organization.

Part I: The Evolution of Modern Jewish Leadership and Public Advocacy
In the Diaspora Jewish communities of Europe, Russia, North Africa, and the Middle
East, there was a long established tradition of communal leadership and public advocacy carried
out by individual members of those communities. Jewish communities were consistently
vulnerable minority populations with limited civil and political rights; however, throughout the
history of the Diaspora, there are numerous examples of Jews ascending to important positions in
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government, gaining access to those in positions of power, or holding official status at court.85 In
his book Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History, historian David Biale argues that, despite
their historical status as a minority community, the survival of the Jews as a people suggests that
at least some Jews must have possessed and exercised political power:
Without an appreciation of the political acumen of the Jews in
earlier times, their long history can only appear to be a miraculous
accomplishment. If we wish to understand Jewish survival from a
historical rather than a theological point of view, however, we must
look for explanations from the world of power and politics.
Without some modicum of political strength and the ability to use
it, the Jewish people would certainly have vanished. The history of
the Jews is ‘abnormal’ due to their lack of territory for such a long
period of time, but their response to this abnormal condition was
always in fact political.86
The social and political conditions of Diaspora communities varied considerably. Some were
more insular and isolated than others. Some Jewish communities benefited from formal policies
of tolerance and accommodation which, while denying them full equality and citizenship, and
burdening them with higher rates of taxation than the majority of citizens, provided Jews with
political status as a tolerated minority, and the privilege to self-govern their religious and internal
affairs.
Regardless of their social and political conditions, Jewish communities had to work and
live with their non-Jewish neighbors and establish relationships with government officials and
other representatives of those in power. These interactions were often conducted or overseen by
shtadlanim, individual Jews who would act as advocates and quasi-diplomats for their
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communities. The noun shtadlan has been variously translated as ambassador, pleader, advocate,
intermediary, and intercessor. Translated literally, the term means “one who tries.”87 Matthias
Lehmann notes that the “role of the shtadlan (an ad hoc or even permanent representative of
Jewish interests to the government) was common throughout the Jewish world.”88 Throughout
the Medieval era, shtadlanim served as an “intermediary between a clearly defined Jewish
community and the gentile political authorities.”89 These political representatives were usually
prominent members of Jewish communities, who, because of their wealth or social position, had
earned the confidence of their coreligionists and the esteem of the political leadership of the
state. The shtadlanim lobbied those in power and intervened when they could to advocate for the
interests of the Jewish community. In other instances, the work of the shtadlanim was less
ambassadorial. Some merely acted as agents who were empowered by small local Jewish
governing councils to deliver bribes to those in power.90
By the Early Modern Era, the shtadlan approach to Jewish public advocacy had been
formalized in the Royal Courts of central Europe. The shtadlanim of the Medieval Era evolved
into the so called “Hofjuden” or “court Jews” of the Early Modern Era. According to Jacob Katz,
the “social ascent of court Jews in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been pointed to
as an undoubtedly new feature of Jewish society at that time.”91 The Hofjuden served their
sovereigns as representatives of their coreligionists and as important financial agents for both
their own communities and for the host governments. “This type of Jew who acquires
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forbearance and standing by serving the politically powerful is no novelty in Jewish history. He
is found,” Katz argues, “wherever Jews lived amongst Gentiles and relied on the protection of
the mighty.”92 Hofjuden enjoyed official status at Court, access to those in positions of power,
and privileges denied to both their coreligionists and the broader Christian majority. 93 They
provided or arranged the financing their rulers needed to build armies and navies, to wage wars,
and, in some cases, to consolidate their power towards absolutism.94 As noted by Dean Philip
Bell: “Although the position was rife with ambiguity, the court Jew could attain rank, honor, and
respect; he was, however, always the servant of the sovereign. Court Jews…were not typically
viewed as socially acceptable. They were, further, often easy targets for their enemies and their
broad sphere of activity and influence often fostered hatred of an ever-impoverished
population.”95 Their power over the communities they ostensibly represented was also often
resented by their coreligionists, who could not easily access their supposed representative
because they were away at Court, and by other Royal officials, who were jealous over the
privileges and access to the Sovereign enjoyed by Court Jews. 96
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In her essay “Privileged Jews,” Hannah Arendt describes the Hofjuden as “exceptional
Jews” in two ways.97 In one sense, they were exceptional “because princes made exceptions in
their favor.”98 For reasons of both political expediency and financial necessity, European rulers
granted a very small number of Jews extraordinary rights and unprecedented power both at Court
and within the communities they formally represented. “It is true,” according to Arendt, “that
behind the credit of every prince stood the credit of his hofjude.”99 Secondly, the Hofjuden were
exceptional individuals. They “owed their rise from the ghetto not only to favorable
circumstances but also to their personal merits, their self-earned wealth, and their self-created
social relations. They were particularly gifted, clever men, with a high degree of initiative.”100
In exchange for their work as financial agents, the Hofjuden were empowered to directly
petition their rulers on behalf of the communities they represented. As quasi-finance ministers,
the scope of their work was, in many cases, substantial, international, and historically
significant.101 However, as diplomats on behalf of their coreligionists, their diplomacy was
restrained and of the modest and quiet variety: they did not seek to rally their people to particular
causes; they did not lobby for dramatic changes or improvements; and they did not leverage their
considerable financial influence to materially improve the social and political conditions of their
coreligionists. When local grievances were brought before them, the Hofjuden intervened only
when and where they felt they safely could. They were not classical liberals or agents of social
and political progress for their communities; in fact, it can be argued that their service to their
sovereigns perpetuated the oppression of their coreligionists and abetted the rise of absolutism in
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Europe. The Hofjuden offered their communities formal representation to those in power and a
limited means of redress; however, during the era of the Hofjuden, the Jewish communities of
Europe remained marginalized and oppressed.

Nineteenth-Century Jewish Communal Leadership Organizations
In contrast to the traditions and practices of the shtadlanim and the Hofjuden, modern
Jewish leadership organizations developed far more expansive and activist approaches to public
advocacy. The body of academic research on American Jewish history and Jewish communal
leadership is substantial. It is beyond the scope of this study to provide more than a survey of the
historical and academic material about the communal leadership of American Jewry, the
relationships between the organizations that attempted to lead (or actually did lead) Jewish
communities in America, and about how their efforts differed from the shtadlanim and the
Hofjuden. It is, however, important to note at the outset that the establishment of the American
Jewish Committee in the United States in 1906 was part of a pattern in the history of Jewish
communal leadership or institutions around the world. Political Scientist David Truman’s
observation that that the “formation of associations tends to occur in waves” is accurate with
respect to the development of modern Jewish leadership and communal defense organizations.102
Throughout the nineteenth century, elite Jewish communal leadership organizations, such
as the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, and the Centralverein
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deutscher Straatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens, were established in a number of European
countries. As discussed further below, it is significant to note that these organizations engaged in
forms of public advocacy. The leaders of the AJC imitated or adapted the earlier advocacy work
of these European organizations to further the Committee’s social and political agenda in the
United States. In some cases, the Committee developed new and more intensive approaches to
public advocacy. For the purpose of this study, it may be emphasised that, in many ways,
European Jewish organizations and their activities were precursors for the AJC and the
Committee’s approaches to public advocacy and public relations. Accordingly, an examination
of some of these organizations and some of the existing scholarship on these groups has been
included in this study to illustrate how the public advocacy strategies and techniques employed
by the AJC in the United States were both influenced by the earlier efforts of Jewish communal
organizations in Europe and, in some cases, represent a substantial expansion upon those efforts.
The leaders of the AJC were very alert to what was happening in Jewish communities
around the world. The AJC’s public relations projects aimed to utilize mass media and political
and judicial processes to further the interests of the American Jewish community and, more
broadly, to advance the cause of universal human rights and civil liberties for Jews and other
minority groups in the United States, and around the world. While the AJC’s wealthy and
politically connected leaders and members continued to lobby for the interests of the American
Jewish community and world Jewry, these efforts were now coupled with attempts to inform and
edify the broader American public, and then appeal to that public for support. The case studies
discussed in this study illustrate that the AJC’s efforts were a significant historical departure
from the far less activist shtadlan and Hofjude traditions of Jewish public advocacy.
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The founding of the AJC can be seen as part of nineteenth-century trends in the evolution
of Jewish communal leadership, the growing participation of emancipated European Jewries in
the public sphere, and the advent of Jewish journalism. “The era of the court Jew was followed
by that of Jewish emancipation.”103 The outbreak of political revolutions, the rise of modern
nation states, increasing Jewish economic integration, the spread of Enlightenment liberal
individualism, and Jewish activism aimed at securing civil equality profoundly shaped
nineteenth-century Jewish communal leadership. In her book Moses Montefiore: Jewish
Liberator, Imperial Hero, Abigail Green notes that the nineteenth century, which witnessed the
formal or legal emancipation of Jewish populations across Western and Central Europe, was a
formative period for Jewish political activism. “By the 1860s,” Green argues, “Jewish activism
was beginning to come of age.”104 With emancipation and acculturation, as well as greater
exposure through the Jewish press to domestic discriminatory practices and the oppression of
their coreligionists in other countries, nineteenth-century Western and Central European Jews,
particularly acculturated, wealthy elites, became increasingly politically conscious and active. It
must be noted that Eastern European and Russian Jews also became more politically active
during the nineteenth century; however, in comparison to their Western and Central European
coreligionists, the Jews of Eastern Europe and Russia were significantly more oppressed. After
their emancipation, many Western European Jewish leaders emphasised efforts to accelerate
acculturation as a step towards broader social acceptance by the majority. In Russia and Eastern
Europe, ongoing oppression and often violent persecution resulted in Jewish activism and
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communal leadership with different priorities. Although there were certainly Eastern European
and Russian Jewish leaders who believed that acculturation would improve social, political, and
economic conditions, in comparison to Jewish activism in Western and Central Europe, in
general, Jewish activism in the East was either more radical (communist, socialist, and Zionist)
or more religious, such as the Chabad-Lubavitch movement, and therefore privileged separation
over acculturation.
The leadership aspirations of wealthy elites among recently emancipated European
Jewish populations to create national communal organizations, as well as the proliferation of the
Jewish press, were crucial nineteenth-century historical developments that provided alternatives
to reliance on shtadlanim and Hofjuden. Before the establishment of organizations such as the
Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Alliance Israélite Universelle, Jewish communal
leadership can fairly be described as a matter of local concern. Jewish communities across
Europe had small governing councils, known as kehilot, which oversaw local, internal matters
and appointed shtadlanim to liaise with government leaders or conduct commercial negotiations
with the majority population. With the founding of communal organizations with larger
leadership ambitions and political goals, and significantly greater financial resources, Jewish
political activism entered a new, modern phase.
The emergence of Jewish journalism also ushered in new approaches to public advocacy.
The dramatic growth of Jewish journalism during the nineteenth century has been recognized as
fundamental to the development of Jewish political activism, including the emergence of the
modern Zionist movement. As historian Jonathan Frankel has noted, “in 1838 there was only one
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Jewish journal in the world that carried a substantial quantity of news.”105 Less than fifty years
later, there were more than one hundred.106 As noted by Frankel, “by linking Jews around the
world and defining their common concerns, the Jewish press played a primary role in the
evolution of a modern form of Jewish solidarity and ethnic identity.”107
Nineteenth-century Jewish political activism, in this period before the rise of the modern
Zionist movement and the establishment of the State of Israel, was in a nascent but nevertheless
dynamic phase. Numerous Jewish organizations were founded across Western and Central
Europe that claimed to speak for their communities, and these organizations began to engage in
different forms of advocacy. As noted above, although the AJC was not founded until 1906, the
creation of the Committee can be viewed as part of nineteenth-century trends in European Jewish
political activism. Some of the most prominent founders of the AJC were born in Europe, and
would have been familiar with these organizations and their advocacy. Once in America, through
the Jewish press and through personal correspondence, the American leaders were able to remain
informed of the ambitions and activities of Jewish communal organizations in Europe.
Nineteenth-century Jewish leadership and political organizations were numerous and
diverse in terms of their composition, constituencies, ideologies, goals, financial resources,
political connections, and tactics.108 Indeed, they were significantly fragmented.109 Some of these
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Jewish organizations were class-based, that is, tailored to suit the interests of, for example,
wealthy acculturated elites or Jewish workers. Accordingly, some organizations had significantly
greater financial resources and political connections than others. Among the new leadership
organizations, there were some that sought to present themselves as official intermediaries
between the state and the Jewish community, and some, such as the Board of Deputies of British
Jews, were indeed given quasi-regulatory functions to issue marriages licences, or supply permits
to allow Jewish-owned businesses to remain open on Sundays.110 Some organizations wanted to
be accepted by both their coreligionists and the broader majority as the voice or spokesperson of
the Jewish community. Some organizations favored cooperation and coordination between
Jewish communities in different countries, while others, conscious of the potential repercussions
of any perception of “dual loyalty” among recently emancipated Jewries, sought to minimize the
appearance of international ties between Jewish communities. Some organizations favored
acculturation while others championed Jewish cultural particularism and legally protected
minority rights, or campaigned for different forms of Jewish political sovereignty.111 The
nineteenth century also saw the beginnings of nationalistic organizations and the development of
the modern Zionist movement.112 Some of the new organizations were composed of Jews, but
reflected ideological as opposed to nationalist ambitions, such as groups of Jewish socialists.
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Others were founded as religious bodies to resolve ecclesiastical disputes and coordinate
relations between congregations. The denominational organizations were composed of religious
leaders who were in many cases highly esteemed by their congregations, and, in their sermons
and work as community organizers, they also engaged in activities that could be described as
political.

The Nature of the American Jewish Committee and the Evolution of Modern Jewish
Leadership and Public Advocacy
What did the American Jewish Committee imitate, reject, and adapt from the beliefs and
advocacy tactics of nineteenth-century Jewish organizations such as the Centralverein, the Board
of Deputies of British Jews, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the Baron de Hirsh Fund, the
Jewish Colonization Association, and B’nai B’rith, among others? In his article “The
Centralverein and the American Jewish Committee: A Comparative Study,” 113 Evyatar Friesel
employs a comparative approach to analyze how both the AJC and Centralverein responded to
the growth of Jewish immigrant populations, their leaders’ conceptions of modern Jewish
identity, the evolution of their organizational structure, and their leaders’ attitudes towards
Zionism. Friesel concludes that the AJC and Centralverein “should be considered as the
outstanding organizations of their type, in modern Jewish history. Both attained a level of
ideological and organizational development much higher than that of comparable Jewish
associations, the Alliance Israélite Universelle included.”114 By applying a compare and contrast
analysis similar to Friesel’s to a survey of nineteenth-century Jewish organizations,115 it is
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possible to illustrate the range of the organizational structures, ideological beliefs, and advocacy
tactics of these groups and their influence on the American Jewish Committee.116 A brief
description of the nature, attributes, and characteristics of the AJC has been included below to
provide a point of reference
The AJC, particularly during its first twenty-five years, was an elite leadership
organization that, by design, was composed of few members and led by a small group of
extraordinarily successful and wealthy men. In the historiography on American Jewry, the AJC
is often identified with the early-twentieth-century American Jewish establishment. As Friesel
notes, the AJC “had no rank-and-file,” its leadership were “self-appointed spokesmen for Jewish
causes.”117 The AJC did not aspire to be a democratic organization; the Committee purported to
be “representative body” in the sense that its leadership and membership were the most qualified,
most politically connected, and most financially capable of representing or speaking for the

study. In various forms, and using different rhetoric to describe their aims, these organizations were engaged in
advocacy to defend Jews from ongoing persecution or establish conditions in which Jews would be free from the
political and social disabilities that shaped Jewish life during the Medieval and Early Modern Eras in Europe. In
Jewish Reactions to German Anti-Semitism, 1870-1914, Ismar Schorsch, argues that: “The historical significance of
the defense effort is that it took place at all.” See: Ismar Schorsch, Jewish Reactions to German Anti-Semitism,
1870-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 204. Under different circumstances, with different
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reforms or did it favor more radical solutions, such as political revolution, mass emigration, or the establishment of
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American Jewish community. As will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this study, it can be argued
the Committee was founded in order to avert the establishment of a democratic Jewish
communal leadership body in the United States.
As for leadership, although the AJC had an Executive Committee to direct its operations
and small advisory councils organized according to the geographic distribution of American
Jewry, several leaders, most notably Louis Marshall , Cyrus Sulzberger, Cyrus Adler, and Jacob
Schiff, were empowered (sometimes after the fact) to act in the name of the organization.
Historian Deborah Dash Moore describes Adler, Marshal, and Schiff as “an oligarchic
triumvirate” that used the AJC as an “organization framework for activities they had previously
pursued as individuals.”118
The AJC did not have a broad base of support among American Jewry from which to
fundraise. Although it did devote significant resources to fundraising, during the period covered
by this study, the AJC relied on donations from a small number of its leaders and members in
order to finance its operations and its public advocacy projects. The Committee’s “annual
income averaged about $8,000.00 and never exceeded $10,000.00 prior to World War I.”119
However, as will be discussed in Chapter 7 of this study, some of the wealthiest leaders of the
AJC, including Jacob Schiff and Julius Rosenwald, supplemented the AJC’s budget for public
advocacy work by personally financing a number of projects, including the publication of books
and the distribution of pamphlets.
The AJC was founded as a political organization. Although it was established to lead and
speak for the American Jewish community, its ambitions did not include attaining a leadership
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position over Jewish denominational or congregational bodies. It must be noted, however, that
many of the AJC’s members were ardent supporters of Reform movement Judaism. They
favored the Reform movement’s significantly less rigid ritualism and emphasis on acculturation
as a means of securing social acceptance for American Jews by the Christian majority.
The AJC’s leaders had strong beliefs about the rights of Jews to feel secure, and fully
participate in American society, politics, and the economy, but they were gradualists and
pragmatists. They wanted to see improvements and effectively exercise political influence, but
they were cautious men, not radicals. In terms of defining the organization’s political orientation,
it is fair to describe the AJC as liberal. While it purported to represent and speak for the
American Jewish community, the AJC’s public advocacy in the United States concentrated on
preserving or enhancing the rights of Jews as individuals, as American citizens with
constitutionally protected rights. As will be discussed further below, in general, the Committee’s
leaders avoided any action that might be perceived as politically radical or might foster the
impression that Jews were radicals or, as a group, fundamentally different from Caucasian,
Christian Americans. Accordingly, the AJC preferred quiet approaches in its advocacy work.120
With the notable exception of the organization’s campaign to build public support for the
abrogation of the 1832 Russo-America Treaty, the AJC consistently counselled against the use of
mass demonstrations or public confrontations. Quiet diplomacy and the fostering of “back
channel” contacts would always remain a central component of the Committee’s approach to
advocacy and communal defense; however, as the case studies included in this study will show,
the AJC was willing, from the beginning, to engage in more public and more active forms of
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political advocacy, and was willing to use mass media, constitutional courts, and the mainstream
and Jewish press to further its social and political agenda. The organization engaged in use of
publicity, propaganda, information gathering, and juridical means to achieve its objectives. The
AJC’s early public advocacy efforts have been either overlooked by historians of American
Jewry and Jewish communal leadership, or unfairly characterized as merely the work of modern,
extraordinarily wealthy shtadlanim. The AJC’s diverse public advocacy efforts during the earlytwentieth century were calculated and sophisticated attempts to influence public opinion. These
activities can be seen as part of the maturation of Jewish political activism and public advocacy
during the mid-to-late-nineteenth century, and can be described as significant departures from
traditional approaches to Jewish public advocacy and communal defense.

The Board of Deputies of British Jews and Sir Moses Montefiore
The Board of Deputies of British Jews (“The Board”) was founded in London in 1760,
and was originally called the London Board of Deputies. It was not until the nineteenth century,
and the drawn-out, piecemeal campaign towards full civic equality for British Jews, that the
organization matured into a communal leadership organization with broader political
ambitions.121 At its inception, the Board was composed of seven members, and it was not a
representative body or democratic organization; the Board was composed of delegates
representing Jewish congregations and, initially, was primarily concerned with fostering
communal ties between older Sephardic congregations and the newly arrived and growing
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Ashkenazi community. With the arrival of Reform Judaism in Britain, the Board became an
important forum for establishing relationships and fostering social cohesion between older,
traditional or Orthodox congregations and new Reform movement synagogues.
Like the AJC, the Board sought to claim a leadership position within its Jewish
community.122 Also like the AJC, the Board was linked to the Jewish establishment, which, in
the United Kingdom, was composed of extraordinarily wealthy merchants and bankers and
Sephardic Jewish families who arrived before the substantial influx of impoverished Eastern
European and Russian Jews to Britain during the nineteenth century. The Board was criticized
along similar lines to the AJC for being an elite and undemocratic organization.123 Its leaders
were wealthy, politically connected, and acculturated Jews. Eventually, rival Jewish
organizations emerged in the United Kingdom that challenged the leadership position of the
Board, including the Anglo-Jewish Association, which had strong ties to the Alliance Israélite
Universelle, and the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland. The AJC experienced
similar rivalries, most notably with the American Jewish Congress.124
There is no formal or complete history of the Board.125 The absence of a thorough
historical account is surprising, firstly, because the organization is “currently regarded as the
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representative body for Jews in Britain,” and secondly, because for half the nineteenth century,
Sir Moses Montefiore was the organization’s leading figure.126 Green asserts that “Outside of
Jewish circles,” Montefiore “is now a forgotten figure.”127 However, during the nineteenth
century, he “was one of the first truly global celebrities.”128 Montefiore, who became one of the
wealthiest men in Britain through his work as a stockbroker, assumed the Presidency of the
Board in 1835, and, “until his final retirement in 1874, he virtually personified the Board.”129
The recent publication of Abigail Green’s biography of Moses Montefiore includes a
thorough account of his philanthropy and leadership of the Board. Green’s work reveals that both
as a private individual and in his capacity as President of the Board, Montefiore engaged in
public advocacy that aimed to shape public opinion in Britain, the British Empire, and
globally.130 The Board under his leadership applied a number of different advocacy tactics
including quiet diplomacy, philanthropy, and public relations to achieve its objectives. For
example, to secure full participation for Jews in the British political system, including the right to
sit as Members of Parliament without first being baptized, the Board employed quiet diplomacy.
This effort is often referred to as the campaign for “Jewish emancipation” in Britain, and it was

efforts to combat anti-Semitism, its role in the Jewish emancipation movement, advocacy on behalf of Jews in
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conducted discretely.131 In this campaign and in others, Montefiore, and other Anglo-Jewish
leaders such as Nathan Rothschild and Isaac Goldsmid, used the less confrontational approaches
of writing private letters to influential figures and lobbying for reforms by gathering signatures
for petitions to important political leaders and British institutions, including the House of
Lords.132
On domestic matters and campaigns for reforms within Britain, Montefiore and the Board
preferred less confrontational approaches. For external matters outside the British Empire,
however, Montefiore was willing to engage in much more public forms of advocacy. Montefiore
is perhaps most well-known for his pilgrimages seeking relief and redress for persecuted Jewish
communities in the Middle East and North Africa. The pilgrimages, which were calculated
attempts to garner media attention, made him internationally famous, and a hero to nineteenthcentury Jews.133
Montefiore and the Board were conscious of the optics of their philanthropy and
advocacy work, and were judicious about the imagery and language they used to frame their
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reform proposals and relief work.134 They were innovative in terms of collaborating with other
interest groups in order to further their objectives. The Board sought to build goodwill between
Anglo-Jewish leaders and other philanthropists and social and political activists to enable them
to frame their advocacy as important for the British Empire, and civilization in general, as
opposed to narrowly significant for only British Jews or Jews living outside the British
Empire.135 For example, Montefiore cultivated a strong relationship with leaders of the
antislavery movement in Britain. According to Green, “antislavery was the middle-class cause
par excellence” and Montefiore became involved in the ultimately successful antislavery
campaign out of personal conviction but also to build alliances with other reformers.136
In linking their efforts to improve the situation for Jews with broader efforts at social and
political reform, Montefiore and the Board exhibited a tendency in nineteenth-century Jewish
activism that would continue well into the twentieth century, and remains a feature of
contemporary Jewish advocacy. This approach emphasises influencing social and political
change without drawing attention to Jewish interests in the proposed reforms, or the Jewish
leaders involved in the campaign and the fundraising to bring about those reforms. As will be
seen in the case studies included in this study, the AJC also practiced this form of indirect
advocacy. For example, the leaders of the AJC recognized that the social and political position of
American Jews was tied to the social and political conditions of all minority populations in the
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United States. With this in mind, they contributed financially to the advocacy work of nonJewish interest groups, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
and intervened in constitutional litigation concerning the rights of minority communities in
which Jews were not involved but stood to benefit from a ruling that clarified or reinforced the
civil rights of minorities in the United States.
Another commonality that the Board shares with other nineteenth-century Jewish
organizations, as well as with the AJC, was a preoccupation with the collection of information,
particularly statistical information that could be cited to dispel allegations made against the
Jewish community.137 The acceptance of this responsibility was part of a public advocacy
strategy that anticipated that future problems or slights against British Jews could be countered
with the dissemination of clear and reliable information to molders of public opinion, including
political leaders and the mainstream press. 138
In common with other European Jewish organizations, the Board was concerned about
education, including that provided to Jewish immigrants and their children.139 The Board was
active in efforts to expand and reform the curriculum of schools, and Montefiore was a governor
and significant fundraiser for the Jews’ Free School in London. The philanthropy to improve
education was noble, but it was also shaped by the concerns of acculturated Jews in Britain that
the growing population of Jewish immigrants, with their alien appearance, strange customs, and
crowded living conditions, would tarnish the social status and reputation of Anglo-Jewish elites.
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Education was emphasised in Anglo-Jewish philanthropy in order to encourage or enhance the
pace of acculturation.
Montefiore and the Board were involved in efforts to influence the attitudes of the
general public, and Montefiore consistently demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of
publicity and media relations. From the middle of the nineteenth century, the Board used the
press and publications to influence public opinion and further its social and political agenda. The
Board’s careful management of optics and efforts to garner positive coverage in the mainstream
press reflected the fact that, during the nineteenth century, text and photographs were really the
only forms of mass media. The organization recognized the potential utility of the mainstream
press in any effort to reach and provide information to a broad audience. The Board also
subsidized the publication of books and pamphlets that were intended for a gentile audience,
including refutations of anti-Semitic charges, such as the alleged use of Christian blood in Jewish
rituals.140
The Board’s leadership within Anglo-Jewry was eventually challenged by the emergence
of rival Jewish groups in Britain, and the Board did resist its displacement by other leadership
organizations. At the international level, however, the Board demonstrated a willingness to
cooperate with other groups and coordinate its relief work with other Jewish organizations in
order to maximize the efficiency of these efforts.141 In contrast to Jewish organizations such as
the Zionists and the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the Board did not seek to claim an
international leadership role over a unified world Jewry. The Board was interested in providing
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relief to impoverished or oppressed Jewish communities, but it conceived of this work as
philanthropy as opposed to political advocacy. In its philanthropy, the Board built close ties, and
was willing to collaborate with Jewish leaders in other European countries, including Adolphe
Crémieux of the Alliance Israélite Universelle.142
The Board’s attitude towards Zionism and relationship with Jewish nationalists was more
nuanced than that of the AJC. Under Montefiore’s leadership, there was considerable advocacy
concerning the Jewish community of Palestine, but that advocacy occurred before the
organization of Zionism into an international movement. With some notable exceptions,
members of the early-twentieth-century American Jewish establishment were hostile towards the
aspirations of the Zionist movement because they viewed Zionism as either a religious fad or as a
threat to the reputation of American Jews. The American Jewish establishment feared Zionism
because it could lead to allegations of dual loyalty. Anglo-Jewish leaders were also concerned
about how Jewish nationalism might impact the reputation of British Jewry, but the imperial
ambitions of the British Empire and the religious fervor of Victorian Era evangelicals made it
possible for Anglo-Jewish leaders to safely and actively engage in efforts to support the Jewish
population of Palestine and encourage Jewish immigration to Palestine.143 The Board and
Montefiore were, therefore, able to openly engage in philanthropy on behalf of the Jewish
community of Palestine.144
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Although it was founded in the eighteenth century, the Board was a very important
nineteenth-century Jewish organization. Under Montefiore’s leadership, the Board engaged in a
wide variety of advocacy, including quiet diplomacy, but also calculated efforts to garner media
attention and sway public opinion through the collection and dissemination of information. The
Board’s work illustrates Green’s assessment that, by the middle of the nineteenth century, at least
in Britain, Jewish activism had “come of age” and progressed well beyond the traditional
communal defense approaches used by generations of Jewish leaders in the Diaspora.145

The Alliance Israélite Universelle and its Affiliates
Jewish emancipation in France was a development connected to the outbreak of the
French Revolution in 1789. Emancipation was realized through an act of the Constituent
Assembly, passed on September 27, 1791. The act formally extended the equal rights promised
in the Declaration of Rights and Man and Citizen to French Jews; nevertheless, disabilities
remained in the post-Revolutionary Era and well into the nineteenth century. The emancipation
edict was the first of its kind in Western Europe, but it would take additional advocacy
campaigns, carried out by both French Jews and sympathetic allies, to bring about full civic
equality for French Jewry.146
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The Alliance Israélite Universelle (“the Alliance”) was founded in 1860 “by a small
group of…activists who believed that French Jews had a special mission to combat antiSemitism and fight for Jewish emancipation worldwide.”147 Its founders included lawyer
Narcisse Leven, journalist Isidore Cahen, businessman Charles Netter, Jules Carvallo, an
engineer, and Eugène Manuel, a writer and educator. The most high-profile founder was lawyer
and politician Adolphe Crémieux, who was sixty-four when the Alliance was founded, and had
already had a long career of involvement in Jewish communal leadership and activism in France,
including a ten year tenure as a member, vice president, and briefly president, of the Central
Consistory, the foremost Jewish leadership organization in France.148
The Alliance was founded and led by professional, upper middle-class, and acculturated
French Jews, but the Alliance was not an establishment organization. The organization was
created to challenge the Consistoire (or Consistory system), which was the existing,
establishment leadership structure of nineteenth-century French Jewry. 149 The Consistory had
been instituted during Napoleon I’s rule and, based on the geographic distribution of French
Jewry, established small councils and ecclesiastical courts consisting of both Rabbis and laymen
to ensure that French Jews were adhering to the edicts of the central government, engaging in
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secular as well as religious education, and complying with French military conscription
policies.150
In the historiography on French Jewry, the Consistory is regarded as a politically
conservative institution151 as compared to the Alliance, which was a far more activist and
ambitious organization, whose leaders claimed a much broader political mandate.152 In the
historiography on Jewish communal leadership, the Alliance is often listed along with the Board
of British Deputies, the AJC, and the Centralverein deutscher Straatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens,
as the major modern Jewish organizations. It is frequently suggested that all these organizations
shared similar goals153 The Alliance, however, was unique from other major nineteenth-century
Jewish organizations for a number of reasons, including, perhaps most importantly, for its
internationalism. The leaders of the Alliance espoused a conception of modern Jewish identity in
which cultural and religious bonds between Jews living in different countries were not
diminished for reasons of public perception, or the affinity between Jews subordinated out of
political necessity to protect their status as newly emancipated citizens with equal rights.
Under the Alliance model, there was no inherent antagonism between religion and
nationality: an individual’s status as a Jew, or adherent to any religion, could exist in harmony
with that individual’s status as a French, British, German, or American citizen. This model
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contrasts sharply with the guiding principles of the AJC, whose leaders were consistently
concerned with how highlighting Jewish religious difference, racial and cultural distinctiveness,
and ties to Jews living in other countries, could lead to accusations of dual loyalty or engender
hostility from the majority.
At the time of its founding, the Alliance’s political agenda was steeped in both the
rhetoric and principles of the French revolution, which purported to be “universal” ideas,
relevant to all people regardless of faith or nationality. Later, the organization’s philanthropic
projects, including its well-known international network of French-language schools, reflected
French imperial ambitions in the Middle East and North Africa.154
In some ways, the Alliance defies some of the categories that are often used to distinguish
between the political agendas of modern Jewish organizations. On the surface, there are difficult
to reconcile contradictions in its ideology. On the one hand, the Alliance emphasized the cultural
and religious bonds that existed among Jews globally; on the other, accelerating the pace of the
acculturation of Jewish populations, both inside and outside of France, was at the heart of the
organization’s ideology and agenda. Like the Board of Deputies and the AJC, the Alliance was
careful and deliberate about the rhetoric the organization used to describe its aims. Its leaders
advocated international Jewish “solidarity,” but always framed it in a manner appealing to
France’s political leaders and general public; their notion of solidarity was consistent with
nineteenth-century French political ideals.155
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The appeal to universalism sets the Alliance apart from Jewish organizations that limited
their mandates to improving social and political conditions for Jews in individual countries,
providing relief to the victims of violent persecution, or building international support for Jewish
political sovereignty.156 In common with British politicians and philanthropists who saw the
British Empire as a “civilizing” force around the world, the Alliance’s rhetoric of solidarity
appealed to French political elites who believed the ideals of the French Revolution could and
should be exported around the world. The “Alliance leaders’ use of universalism rhetoric formed
an important part of their ongoing process of acculturation.”157 Historian Lisa Moses Leff argues
that “By grounding republican concepts within Jewish tradition, Alliance leaders found a way to
express their Jewish identity in terms meaningful in French political culture.”158 This political
language achieved a number of important objectives. Domestically, it allowed the leaders of the
Alliance to maintain that Jews belonged in France and that France was good for the Jews. The
Republic’s universal ideals were aiding Jewry’s transition from archaic religious practice and
social isolation into modernity. At the international level, the leaders of the Alliance used this
rhetoric to define their aims and to portray their efforts as good for French Jewry, good for world
Jewry, and, perhaps most importantly, as consistent with the ideals of the Revolution and in the
best interests of the French Republic.
To further its objectives, the Alliance built strong ties to non-Jewish and non-French
reformers and politicians who were sympathetic to their aims, including Emmanuel PétavalOlliff. The organization also began to fundraise and recruit members outside of France, including
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in the United States.159 The recruitment of non-French Jews was controversial: for example, the
activities of Nissim Béhar, the Alliance’s representative in the United States, were deeply
resented by American Jewish leaders because they felt that the Alliance’s conception of Jewish
identity, and its political agenda, could tarnish the reputation of American Jews.160
The Alliance also sought to establish affiliate organizations in other European countries,
including the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Austrian Allianz, and the Hifsverein Der Deutschen
Juden. The relationship between the Alliance and its affiliates was often contentious because the
affiliates wanted greater autonomy from the organization’s Central Committee in Paris, and grew
concerned that their organizations (and therefore their advocacy) would be perceived as being
tied to the interests of France, a foreign power.161
Although the Alliance contributed substantially to philanthropic efforts to improve the
social and economic conditions of the Jewish population of Palestine, the Alliance was not a
Zionist organization. Its espoused internationalism conceived of the Jewish populations
dispersed throughout the world as potential vanguards of progressive, republican, or liberal
ideals. This view contrasted sharply with Zionism’s vision of an ingathering of exiles.162 The
Alliance’s ideology is often described as being in opposition to Zionist aspirations. Nevertheless,
Michael Graetz argues that the Alliance can be treated as a forerunner of Zionism. After ongoing

159

“By 1869, the Alliance had a membership of 11,364 Jews…organized into local chapters of ten or more.” See:
Schorsch, 26.
160
See: Zosa Szajkowski, “Jewish Diplomacy: Notes on the Occasion of the Centenary of the Alliance Israélite
Universelle,” Jewish Social Studies 22 (1960): 145 and 151.
161
For a discussion of the leadership structure of the Alliance and the dynamics which brought about the
establishment of its affiliates, see: Zosa Szajkowski, “Conflicts in the Alliance Israélite Universelle and the
Founding of the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Vienna Allianz and the Hilfsverein,” Jewish Social Studies 19
(1957): 29-50.
162
Graetz portrays the emergence of the Alliance as reflective of the modernizing and integrationist trends that
followed the emancipation of Western and Central European Jewries. He argues that, in France, “a new Jewish
attitude was coming into existence…whose essence lay in the idea of a mission. It was a set of diffuse historical and
philosophical traits that were nevertheless sufficiently consistent to reanimate a vanished pride and inspire new
confidence in the persistence of Judaism.” See: Graetz, 257.

76

persecution in Eastern Europe and Russia, and scandals such as the Dreyfus Affair, undermined
the notion that acculturation would entail social acceptance, Graetz argues that the same sense of
mission that inspired the founders of the Alliance would invigorate the campaign for Jewish
political and territorial sovereignty.
From its founding, the Alliance placed an emphasis on media relations and demonstrated
an understanding of the power of the modern press to reach and influence a mass audience.163
The Alliance’s Manifesto describes the press as “an invaluable lever to remove the mountains of
hostile prejudice. This is a force of only recent creation—one which was not at the free disposal
of our fathers. We…must make greater efforts to avail ourselves of it…At every moment, there
are facts to reveal, accusations to refute, truths to spread.”164 The Alliance also saw the press,
including the burgeoning Jewish press, as an invaluable source of information and, like the AJC
and other nineteenth-century Jewish groups, placed a premium on gathering information.
The Alliance used the press extensively to draw attention to outbreaks of anti-Jewish
violence overseas, but the organization was more cautious at home.165 Its application of public
advocacy techniques, including media relations, distinguishes the Alliance as a modern
communal leadership organization, but inside France, the organization’s leaders habitually chose
to practice the traditional, quieter approaches to Jewish communal defense. In his Jewish
Reactions to German Anti-Semitism, 1870-1914, Ismar Schorsch argues that, in its domestic
political advocacy, nineteenth-century French Jewry “never made the same transition to selfdefense” as was exhibited by comparable German Jewish leadership organizations such as the
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Centralverein.166 The Alliance’s rhetoric and advocacy strategies granted the organization
significant freedom to criticize publically the activities of foreign governments, but constrained it
to remain silent on abuses and outrages at home.
The leaders of the Alliance were also reluctant to invoke the French justice system to
achieve domestic reforms.167 Before entering French politics, Adolphe Crémieux was a wellknown French jurist and, decades before he became involved with the Alliance, he participated
in important legal challenges that sought to erase distinctions between the rights of Jews and the
rights of other French citizens. Most notably, Crémieux argued two successful challenges to the
oath more Judaico. Crémieux and the Alliance’s later reluctance to use a litigation approach in
their advocacy reflected the organization’s preference for more discreet reform efforts within
France.
The Alliance Israélite Universelle was a major nineteenth-century Jewish organization.
While central elements of its internationalism would have been anathema to the men who
founded the AJC, many of its public advocacy strategies, including its use of the press, the
collection of information, and discretion in the domestic exercise of publicity, were incorporated
into the AJC’s earliest approaches to public advocacy.
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The Baron De Hirsch Fund and the Jewish Colonization Association
Baron Maurice de Hirsch was a German-born Jewish financier and a major figure in latenineteenth-century Jewish philanthropy. He was born into a family with a long history of
involvement in banking. It was one of the few Bavarian Jewish families that had been elevated
into the nobility. De Hirsch made a fortune of his own as a bond trader and in the railway
business. He was not a religious man, but after the death of his only son, Lucien de Hirsch, in
1887, the Baron became deeply involved in international Jewish philanthropy.
De Hirsch sponsored two organizations whose primary purpose was to help persecuted
Russian and Eastern European Jews emigrate, resettle, and sustain themselves in new homes
through farming or participation in the skilled labor force. De Hirsch’s philanthropy was
motivated by a collection of ideas, including auto-emancipation and a conception of the
oppressed Jews of Russia and Eastern Europe as a people in need of redemption. De Hirsch
believed they could be redeemed through the modernization of their way of life and their
reintegration into the ordinary economy, as productive farmers or skilled tradesmen. He
“disdained the traditional form of Jewish philanthropy, the giving of alms.”168 Instead, he
privileged education and labor, and his goal was to provide Jews with the skills that were needed
to be successful in modern economies. Further, he believed that Jewish participation in the labor
force would change the perception or image of the Jews among the people with whom they lived,
leading to social acceptance, tolerance, and greater security.169
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In 1889, de Hirsch allocated 2.4 million dollars of his fortune to establish the Baron de
Hirsh Fund (“the Fund”). Two years later he established a separate organization, the Jewish
Colonization Association (“JCA”), with an initial capital investment of two million pounds. A
year later, he invested an additional seven million pounds to support the JCA.170 While both
organizations were endowed by de Hirsch, the two organizations were structured differently and
used different rhetoric to describe their mandates.
The concept of auto-emancipation, with its emphasis on political autonomy,
sustainability, and Jewish participation in the labor force, was very important for the Zionist
movement as well, but the Fund and the JCA’s model was different from the Zionist project,
because it was not necessarily tied to any particular territory.171 The policies of the Fund and the
JCA reflected a pragmatic conclusion that there was no feasible way to substantially ameliorate
the social and economic conditions of oppressed Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe, and that
Palestine could not sustain a substantial influx of Jewish immigrants.
The Baron de Hirsch Fund was an American organization, led by prominent American
Jewish leaders. Concerns about public perception shaped how the Fund described and carried out
its philanthropy. It framed its philanthropy as “immigrant aid” to Jews who had already arrived
in the United States as opposed to defining itself as an organization that encouraged and
subsidized the emigration of Russian and Eastern European Jews. The Fund described its
philanthropy as being designed to relieve overcrowding in East Coast cities by directing the

society was through productive labor…The existence of a self-sufficient Jewish working force…would also
demonstrate to the rest of the world that despite prejudice and restriction Jews were capable of playing a ‘useful’
role in society.” See: Switzer-Rakos, 388-389.
170
Switzer-Rakos, 391n.
171
Ibid., 390.

80

newcomers to occupations outside the cities and which would promote the integration of Jewish
immigrants into the American economy as productive farmers or skilled tradesmen. 172
The Fund’s focus on providing assistance to Jewish immigrants to help them settle in less
developed areas in the United States, and the careful rhetoric the organization used to describe
these efforts, is consistent with the anxieties of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century
American Jewish establishment. Since the 1880s, American Jewish leaders had been deeply
concerned about the growing number of Russian Jewish immigrants seeking refuge in the United
States. These leaders did not want to be perceived as facilitating the en masse immigration of
their coreligionists; at the same time, they wanted to ensure that when new Jewish immigrants
settled in the United States, they did not become a conspicuous minority population.
The leaders of the Fund were comfortable describing their work as educational, as being
intended to impart the necessary skills to new immigrants who had never been involved in
agriculture or the skilled vocations, and were unfamiliar with democratic institutions and the
American way of life. 173 The Fund established the Educational Alliance in New York City and
sponsored the publication of pamphlets in order to further these objectives. The Fund’s most
substantial efforts were directed towards establishing agricultural colonies for new Jewish
immigrants, such as Woodbine, New Jersey. Its trustees were also comfortable describing their
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activities as a means of providing commercial assistance, including loans and land grants, to new
immigrants who were essentially starting small businesses.174
The JCA’s sphere of influence was significantly broader than the Fund’s, and its leaders
used different rhetoric to describe the organization’s goals. During de Hirsch’s life, in contrast to
the Fund, the JCA described its work as dedicated to facilitating the mass emigration of
persecuted Jews. The JCA sponsored large scale efforts to resettle Russian and Eastern European
Jews in Argentina, Brazil, and Canada, including the purchase of large swathes of land to be
apportioned to new immigrants.175 After de Hirsch died in 1896, the leaders of the JCA placed
less emphasis on emigration and began to devote a considerable portion of their resources to
establishing educational institutions for Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe or in areas that had
already experienced a substantial influx of Jewish immigrants, including Canada.
It is important to emphasize that the work of both the Baron De Hirsch Fund and the
Jewish Colonization Association was philanthropic in nature. Neither organization purported to
be political organizations like the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the AJC, or the Alliance.
Their agenda did not include political advocacy aimed at enhancing Jewish rights in countries
where they were an oppressed minority; instead, these organizations focussed on programs to
resettle as many Jews as possible, or provide them with the training they would need to
participate in the economy and acculturate into the way of life of their new countries.
It is also important to note that, while both these organizations were philanthropic
endeavors, they were structured and incorporated as businesses. Like the AJC, both the Fund and
the JCA were led and controlled by a small number of men. The Fund was managed by a board
of trustees that included Jacob Schiff, Oscar Straus, and Mayer Sulzberger, some of the
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prominent America Jewish leaders who would later establish and lead the American Jewish
Committee. The JCA had shareholders and a Council of Administration. De Hirsch was by far
the largest shareholder, but among the others were high profile Jewish leaders from a number of
countries, including Nathanial Rothschild and Eugene Pereire.176
As already noted, after De Hirsch died, the JCA shifted its priorities. “By the time the
First World War broke out, it had become a very different agency…it was no longer dedicated
solely to the removal of Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe…The new administrators
sponsored programmes they believed would make Jews thrive in the East and in the New
World.”177 Many of the JCA’s resettlement projects failed,178 and because of ongoing
persecution and economic stagnation, Jews continued to flee the East en masse. The majority
wanted to resettle in North America or Palestine, but many also arrived in Central and Western
Europe. The shift in the JCA’s priorities reflected the concerns of Western European Jewish
leaders that the continuing growth of Jewish immigrant populations in their countries posed a
threat to the social status and security of acculturated Jews. The Jewish leaders devoted
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considerable resources to providing Jews with skills training in Russia and Eastern Europe in
order to reduce the level of Jewish emigration and in the hope that greater Jewish participation in
the labor force would result in a decline in anti-Semitism.
The Baron de Hirsch Fund and the JCA possessed both unprecedented financial resources
and larger ambitions than previous Jewish communal organizations. Neither organization was
part of the Zionist movement, but they did possess certain ideological convictions. Both
organizations espoused their founder’s beliefs about the importance of skills training and labor
force participation to improving the social and economic conditions of Jews and the perception
of the Jewish community. The ideological foundations for their programs share a great deal in
common with the integrationist priorities of other nineteenth-century Jewish leadership
organizations. These priorities would influence later work by the AJC, which was consistently
concerned with how the majority of the American people viewed the American Jewish
community, and what they could to improve that perception and, thereby, reduce anti-Semitism.

B’nai B’rith and the Board of Delegates of American Israelites
The Independent Order of B’nai B’rith (“B’nai B’rith”) was founded by twelve young
German-Jewish immigrants in New York City in 1843. The organization challenged the
established leadership structures of the early-nineteenth-century American Jewish community,
which were grounded in congregationalism and, in New York City, the aspirations of a small
community of well-established Sephardic Jewish families. The founding of the organization, the
mandate it claimed, and its social and philanthropic activities, reflect a pattern in modern Jewish
history and the sociological evolution of Diaspora communities, in which intra-communal
conflict between an establishment community and recently arrived immigrants results in a
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redistribution of communal leadership power. In this case, the conflict was between the patrician
Sephardic establishment and the growing community of Ashkenazi immigrants from
Germany.179
The mid-nineteenth-century American Jewish community did not have central leadership
organizations. Separate congregations remained the major religious and communal institutions of
American Jewry during this period. Numerous proposals to facilitate greater cooperation
between congregations had failed.180 Antagonism between the Jewish establishment and the new
immigrant community, the absence of a strong central leadership organization, and rivalries
between congregations left the American Jewish community unable to effectively cooperate to
pursue large scale philanthropic projects, expand Jewish educational institutions, engage in
public advocacy, or agree on who should represent the community in interactions with
government authorities.
Small Jewish charities, synagogue-based chartable initiatives, mutual aid societies, and
landsmanshaftn (benefit societies based on geographic origins), were very active during this
period, but the scale of these efforts paled in comparison to what would be carried out later by
larger and more ambitious organizations. B’nai B’rith “developed as an indigenous response to
‘the vacuum created by the absence of an organized communal framework and the chaos of
synagogue autonomy.’”181 The founding of B’nai B’rith also reflected a trend in the growth of
voluntary community and civic associations in the United States during the mid-to-late-
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nineteenth century.182 Fraternal orders were among the forms of voluntary association that were
in ascendency during this period in the United States. 183 B’nai B’rith adopted the customs and
rituals of earlier established fraternal orders and claimed the broad social and philanthropic
mandate of non-Jewish organizations. Indeed, the most significant distinguishing feature of
B’nai B’rith during the early history of the organization was its status as a fraternal order. This
organizational structure, and emphasis on symbolism and initiation rituals, set B’nai B’rith apart
from any of the other nineteenth-century Jewish leadership or philanthropic organizations
discussed in this chapter.
Several of the organization’s founders, including Henry Jones, Reuben Roadacher,
William Renau, and Isaac Rosenbourg, had been members of older, predominantly non-Jewish,
fraternal orders, such as the Masons and the Odd Fellows. The founders incorporated some of the
symbolism and ritualism of these fraternal orders into the new organization’s rites. Rituals that
included ceremonial objects, costumes, passwords, the recitation of specific texts, and sometimes
“role-playing,”184 were a “central component of American fraternal culture.”185 The founders of
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B’nai B’rith were deliberate in their efforts to fuse the rites of fraternal orders with symbolism
that would appeal to Jews. 186
B’nai B’rith was composed of Jews, but it was a secular organization that aimed to
synthesize or amalgamate elements of traditional Jewish communal ties and culture with the
American way of life. “It synthesized the components of both Jewishness and Americanism into
a unique amalgam that assumed the benefits of emancipation and affirmed the value of being
Jewish.”187 Acculturation and Americanization were therefore at the heart of B’nai B’rith’s
earliest agenda. The organization’s “immediate orientation derived largely from the needs of
German-Jewish immigrants. Foremost was that for fellowship, a feeling of belonging, a sense of
community…B’nai B’rith appealed directly to those suffering from the isolation and insecurity
of immigrant life.”188 In the absence of both close ties between the Sephardic Jewish
establishment and German immigrants and a recognized communal leadership framework, B’nai
B’rith offered its members a means of adjusting to American society, of preserving some
elements of their religious and cultural heritage, and of fostering a sense of community and
friendship. In her B’nai B’rith and the Challenge of Ethnic Leadership, Deborah Dash Moore
argues that the organization’s founders fashioned a historically unique path towards
acculturation.189
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In its earliest years, the organization was a bastion of the emerging American Jewish
middle and upper-middle class, which was composed of the recent German Jewish immigrants
who made up the majority of B’nai B’rith members. The organization’s mandate expanded with
the influx, beginning in the 1880s, of the largest waves of Russian and Eastern European Jewish
immigration to United States. While the organization’s lodges continued to facilitate the
Americanization of Jewish immigrants, it also began to broaden its agenda to include
philanthropic and educational activities for Russian and Eastern European Jewish immigrants
and, eventually, public advocacy in an organized and public effort to combat anti-Semitism in
the United States.
In 1913, in the aftermath of the lynching in Georgia of Leo Frank, B’nai B’rith founded
the Anti-Defamation League (“ADL”). Until the founding of the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee in 1963, the ADL was arguably the only Jewish defense organization in the United
States that had a higher public profile than the American Jewish Committee. The ADL’s higher
profile stemmed from both its strategy to combat anti-Semitism, which emphasized publically
responding to manifestations and expressions of anti-Semitism, and the considerable financial
resources the organization was prepared to dedicate to their efforts.
The national philanthropic fundraising apparatus B’nai B’rith developed over the first
seventy years of its history was used to support their new defense organization’s campaign
against anti-Semitism. The ADL “concentrated on the struggle against anti-Semitism and
operated with a budget and professional staff significantly larger than those of the American
Jewish Committee.”190
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The AJC and the ADL approached the fight against anti-Semitism with different, even
contrasting, philosophies. The AJC was willing to use public advocacy but, as this study will
show, the Committee’s methods were more subtle and more cautious than those of the ADL. The
ADL was dedicated to an open, often confrontational approach, to fighting anti-Semitism. “B’nai
B’rith explained that its reason for establishing the ADL was that ‘Jewish and non-Jewish
citizens [had] failed to meet [defamation] by any means save quiet criticism.’”191 The name
B’nai B’rith chose for the ADL, which emphasizes that its purpose is to reply to expressions of
anti-Jewish prejudice, reveals the extent to which they were committed to public advocacy to
achieve their objectives. The ADL’s founding charter defined its aims and identified the means
the organization was prepared to employ:
The immediate object of the League is to stop, by appeals
to reason and conscience, and if necessary, by appeals to law, the
defamation of the Jewish people.
Its ultimate purpose is to secure justice and fair treatment to
all citizens alike and to put an end forever to unjust and unfair
discrimination against, and ridicule of any sect or body of
citizens.192
From the beginning, the ADL emphasized efforts to shape public opinion. Sigmund Livingston,
the Chicago-based lawyer who was the ADL’s first leader, saw “public opinion as the arbiter of
social behavior…[and] shaped the ADL’s philosophy accordingly.”193 At the heart of the ADL’s
approach to public advocacy was the idea that slurs against Jews and Judaism could not be
ignored or go unanswered. The AJC was often prepared to let scurrilous hate speech and
manifestations of anti-Semitism go unanswered because they believed that any response could
exacerbate the problem. In contrast, the ADL believed that expressions of hostility and prejudice
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towards Jews, if unanswered, would propagate social and political conditions in which antiSemitism was tolerated by the general public.194
Both the AJC and the ADL were prepared to use censorship as a tool to fight antiSemitism. Both organizations ultimately abandoned this strategy; however, the ADL’s early
emphasis on censorship was different than that of the AJC. The AJC considered using statutes
that prohibited the dissemination of offensive material through the mail to curb the spread of
anti-Semitic materials. The ADL’s approach was more public. The organization threatened to
organize boycotts against theaters that staged anti-Semitic productions and newspapers that
espoused anti-Semitic views or published anti-Semitic advertisements.195 Ultimately, the ADL
moved away from advocating censorship, and “adopted a policy of public protest of offensive
material,” including demanding retractions or corrections, and threats to exert financial pressure
by organizing boycotts against companies that advertised in newspapers that carried anti-Semitic
content.196
To combat anti-Semitism, the ADL used many of the same techniques as the AJC. The
ADL sponsored public education campaigns, published materials, financed academic research,
lobbied legislatures, cooperated with other Jewish and non-Jewish civil rights and defense
organizations, and became a very high profile intervener in civil rights litigation.
It was during the earliest years of the ADL that the contrasts between the League and the
Committee’s approaches to public advocacy were most evident. In comparison to the AJC, the
ADL was bolder in both describing and pursuing its agenda. There was antagonism between the
194
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two groups as they competed with each other, and with the Zionist movement and the American
Jewish Congress, to assert a leadership position over American Jewry. Eventually, however, the
two organizations became close collaborators. The ADL was the public face of a multi-leveled
effort to fight anti-Semitism that included both immediate replies to provocations and the AJC’s
long term strategies.
The growth of voluntary associations constituted a major American social movement in
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century.197 American Jews, including recent immigrants,
embraced lodges and fraternal orders. B’nai B’rith was the first and largest Jewish fraternal
order, but “at least twenty-two” other similar Jewish fraternal organizations were founded in the
United States at the turn of the twentieth century, including the Order of Brith Abraham and the
Independent Western Star Order.198 Reflecting the social antagonism that divided Russian and
Eastern European Jewish immigrants from the German Jews who became the new American
Jewish establishment, Yiddish-speaking immigrants also formed their own fraternal orders, such
as the Oshmener Brotherhood. By 1917, the “Jewish orders enrolled nearly half a million
individuals in close to three thousand lodges.”199
As a fraternal order, B’nai B’rith was distinct from subsequent Jewish leadership
organizations. From the perspective of the development of Jewish communal leadership in the
United States, arguably the organization’s significance rests in how it functioned as a proving
ground for future leaders of American Jewry. Many of the most well-known leaders of American
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Jewry, including Simon Wolf, Adolph Kraus, and Oscar Straus, became involved in Jewish
politics and Jewish activism through B’nai B’rith.
Although Jewish fraternal orders and lodges proliferated during the mid-to-latenineteenth century, efforts continued to establish a Jewish communal leadership organization that
could encompass the religious differences, economic disparities, and social and political
ambitions of the growing American Jewish community. By the mid-nineteenth century,
American Jewry was a well-organized community with dozens of fraternal associations and
charities; however, there was no central leadership, and some Jewish leaders recognized that this
absence was undermining the effectiveness of Jewish-sponsored philanthropy and the social
cohesion of American Jewry.
After the founding and growth of B’nai B’rith, the Board of Delegates of American
Israelites (“the Board”) was founded in 1859. This is historically significant because the Board
was the first Jewish leadership organization in the United States to claim a national mandate. The
Board was established to unify, represent, and advocate for the social and political interests of
American Jewry, but the organization dissolved after less than twenty years when, in 1878, the
Board merged with the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. In comparison to the AJC,
the Board of Delegates of American Israelites had a different organizational structure, different
aims, and significantly less financial means.
The Board was a congregational body. It was composed of representatives from different
synagogues whose members or leadership chose to join the organization. At the time that the
Board was founded, there were about one-hundred and fifty Jewish congregations in the United
States. Only twenty-four agreed to join. The members were overwhelmingly traditional or
Orthodox congregations. Several Sephardic synagogues joined, but no Reform movement
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synagogues agreed to participate. One similarity between the Board and the AJC, therefore, was
that while both organizations claimed national mandates, they both lacked broad bases of support
from the community they purported to represent.
The historical context of the establishment of the Board was dramatically different from
the circumstances that led to the establishment of the AJC, which was formed during a period of
unprecedented Jewish immigration to the United States. The Board was organized to unify the
mid-nineteenth-century American Jewish community, which was small, geographically
dispersed, and divided by denomination and national origin. The Board gave itself the mandate
of coordinating fundraising, philanthropy, and religious education. It was also established to
“collect statistics” on the American Jewish community and “to keep a watchful eye on all
occurrences at home and abroad.”200
Like the AJC, the Board was concerned about the growth of anti-Semitism in the United
States and did lobby on behalf of Jewish interests. As a lobby group, the Board had some notable
achievements, including a successful effort to persuade the United States Congress to provide
Jewish clergymen to the Union Army during the American Civil War. Ultimately, however, due
to a lack of financial support from either wealthy benefactors or from the relatively small
American Jewish community, the Board could not sustain itself as an independent communal
leadership organization.201

200

Allan Tarshish, “The Board of Delegates of American Israelites, 1859-1878,” Publications of the American
Jewish Historical Society 49 (1959): 20.
201
Given the organization’s roots as a congregational body mostly composed of delegates from traditional or
Orthodox congregations in the United States, it is perhaps ironic that the Board ultimately merged with the Reform
movement’s Union of American Hebrew Congregations. It is significant that an organization that was founded for
philanthropic and communal leadership purposes could be ultimately absorbed into an ecclesiastical organization.
This did not develop into a pattern in the history of American Jewish leadership organizations. The most high profile
American Jewish leadership organizations of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century established a sharper
distinction between ecclesiastical bodies and political organizations. Rabbis were often prominent leaders of Jewish
public advocacy and defense organizations, but these groups were dedicated to achieving social and political goals

93

While this effort to organize a national body ultimately failed, the Board established a
precedent of greater and broader cooperation between different elements of the Jewish
community in the United States. The subsequent establishment of organizations such as the AJC,
the ADL, the New York Kehillah, and the Congress movement were based on the Board’s model
of more substantial cooperation between elements of American Jewry to achieve recognized
communal objectives.

The German Jewish Organizations
A discussion of the advocacy of nineteenth-century Jewish leadership organizations in
Germany has been reserved for the end of this section because of the close nature of the cultural
and ideological connections that existed between the leaders of these organizations and the men
who founded the AJC. Some of the AJC’s earliest public advocacy and public relations work,
including the compiling of a First World War Honor Roll, were modelled on the work of German
Jewish leadership and advocacy organizations. As will be discussed further in Chapter 3, the
founders of the AJC were principally German-born Jews or the American-born children of midnineteenth-century German-Jewish immigrants to the United States. The founders of the AJC’s
approach to communal defense, and their attitudes about controlling or shaping the general
public’s perception of American Jewry, was strongly influenced by the problematic experience
of German Jewry during and following that community’s campaign for legal emancipation and
civic equality during the nineteenth century. Some of the AJC’s attitudes and approaches were

that affected the status and security of the Jewish community as opposed to resolving intra-communal debates over
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because of the influence religious leaders could exert on the opinions of their congregations but American Jewry has
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discussion of the formation of the Board, its activities, its fiscal challenges, and the circumstances which led to its
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formed in response to lessons learned from the similar aspirations, but much more serious and
difficult circumstances, of their German coreligionists.
While there were ideological commonalities and similar approaches to public advocacy
between the AJC and major German Jewish organizations, most importantly the Centralverein
deutscher Straatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens (“Centralverein”), there were significant, indeed
profound differences, in the context in which the groups formed and attempted to exert influence.
Jewish political and social activity has always been easier in the United States than in
Germany.202 In contrast to Jewish communal leadership in the United States, in building their
leadership organizations and developing their approaches to communal defense, German Jewish
leaders had to contend with the legacy of legal disabilities, social isolation, and deeply
entrenched anti-Semitism among German elites, the general public, and within important
institutions such as the civil service and the military. 203 Further, for most of the nineteenth
century, support for the political unification of Germany had been nurtured through appeals to
nationalism, with an emphasis on common language, religion, and culture, and these nationalist
aspirations created significant barriers to the social integration of German Jews.204 During the
nineteenth century, German Jews who wanted to integrate into German society and the economy
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encountered greater barriers to their acculturation and social acceptance than were present in the
United States during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century.
The course of the emancipation of German Jewry during the nineteenth century and the
outcome of these reforms was different from Jewish emancipation in other Western European
countries, such as Britain and France. Germany was not a unified, modern nation-state with a
central government until 1871 and the establishment of the German Empire under Kaiser
Wilhelm I. Some of the many kingdoms, principalities, duchies, and territories that made up the
pre-unification German Kleinstaaterei had substantial Jewish populations, and, in contrast to
Britain and France, the fragmented nature of Germany’s political geography resulted in
staggered emancipation, with some German-speaking territories emancipating their Jewish
populations much earlier than others.
There was no new or uniform legal regime for emancipated Jews across the region;
different territories granted Jews different rights at different times. Some Jewish communities,
for example, were granted greater economic freedom long before political rights. While reforms
to the legal status of Jewish minority populations were all described as emancipation, the result
of the various reform efforts was that Jewish communities dispersed across the numerous
German-speaking territories of Central Europe did not all have the same rights.205
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In terms of Jewish communal leadership, there was no central authority that presided over
the Jewish populations scattered throughout the territories that would eventually be absorbed into
Germany, but there were numerous local Jewish governing councils and religious courts and
small leadership organizations made up of rabbis and laymen. 206 Many rural Jewish
communities were geographically isolated. In German cities, Jewish communities were often
legally required to remain concentrated in certain neighborhoods. For practicing Jews, their
cultural and religious life, and their sense of communal cohesion, was deeply tied to their local
synagogue. 207
In some of the German territories that had been occupied by Napoleon’s forces in 1813,
Jewish leadership bodies analogous to the French consistory model were founded and were
allowed to remain in power after the defeat and withdrawal of the French.208 Jewish leadership
organizations were also established by German sovereigns. In Baden, for example, “a Jewish
Oberrat was founded by the grand duke in 1809.”209 In Prussia, which had one of the largest
Jewish populations in the pre-unification Kleinstaaterei, and which became the center of German
power after unification, some Jewish communities had leadership organizations modelled
according to the traditions of the kehillot or more modern derivatives of the consistory and these
unconsolidated organizations were allowed to continue.210
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Local Jewish leadership organizations were sanctioned by German sovereigns and
allowed to remain in power (or continue functioning) because they could be appropriated to
further the interests of regimes that were undergoing a process of modernization towards
political absolutism while simultaneously managing the growth and regulation of an early
industrial economy. The existing Jewish leadership bodies, regardless of their composition or
historical mandate, “created an easy opportunity to control the Jewish community…they were
also a tool to have new laws easily implemented and…they served to have the support of the
Jewish elite in the nationalization of the community.”211 While these Jewish organizations were
historically significant, their ability to effectively exert political influence was undercut by both
the relatively small size of their constituencies and the political reality that, despite formal
emancipation, greater economic opportunity, and growing participation in the professions,
German Jews remained a marginalized, victimized, and distrusted minority population in
Germany throughout the nineteenth century.
The staggered and imperfect nature of the emancipation of German Jewry, and the length
and difficulty of the campaign for civic equality, profoundly affected the German Jewish
community. Post-emancipation German Jewry was a deeply divided community. There were
traditional Orthodox Jews who wanted to maintain the separation (judicial and administrative
autonomy) between the Jewish community and the German majority, political liberals who
favored acculturation or assimilation, early Jewish nationalists who believed Jews would never
be truly safe as a tolerated minority in Germany, and adherents of the Haskallah and the Reform
movements who believed in the need to substantially change Jewish religious practice and
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communal customs in order to end the social isolation and persecution of the German Jewish
community.
Intra-communal mistrust resulting from both theological and political differences
undermined social cohesion. Some Orthodox leaders rejected “cooperation with liberal Jews,
whom they regarded as poshim, or sinners.”212 Liberal German Jews viewed the Orthodox as an
archaic community whose commitment to traditional rituals and separation propagated antiSemitism. The antagonism that existed between the different sectors of German Jewry created
impediments to the development of stronger Jewish leadership bodies.
Even after formal emancipation, disabilities remained that hindered the full participation
and integration of German Jews into German society and the economy. In many cases, as noted
above, for German Jews, the political status of citizen did not entail the same rights and
privileges as their Christian neighbors. Social exclusion and employment discrimination, in
addition to the perseverance of anti-Semitic beliefs among the general population, prompted
numerous debates both within the Jewish community and by German politicians and
intellectuals, about how to integrate the Jewish community into the German nation. According to
Ismar Schorsch, “the common denominator of the endless debate…was the extent to which Jews
would have to surrender their Jewishness to gain full citizenship.”213 Many German Jews were
prepared to undertake religious conversion in order to overcome the social, political, and
economic barriers that continued to obstruct their full integration into German society. 214
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Some aspects of these debates about assimilation, acculturation, religious reform, and
conversion affected leaders within the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century American
Jewish establishment. The American context, of course, was substantially and substantively
different; however, as in Germany, Jewish leaders in the United States struggled with how to
sculpt the public image of Judaism and the Jewish community in order to ensure that
acculturation, integration, and full civic equality did not require religious conversion or provoke
an anti-Semitic backlash from white patricians and the Christian majority.
In Germany, acculturation was significantly more difficult and more complicated
because, to a much greater extent than in the United States, religious affiliation in Germany, even
after emancipation, continued to have political, legal, social, and economic ramifications for
Jews as individuals and as a community. Consequently, German Jews had to contend with a
hostile and xenophobic environment and were pressured to either repress and conceal all aspects
of their cultural and religious difference or convert to Christianity in order to gain the full rights
of German citizenship.
American Jews would have to contend with similar pressures but never to the same
extent. American Jewish leaders were, however, alert to the need to enhance the pace of the
acculturation of new Jewish immigrants from Russia and Eastern Europe in order to preserve
their own patrician reputation and ensure that a hostile environment did not develop in the
United States. In Germany, with the hostile environment already well-established, Jewish leaders
struggled to find ways to balance the preservation of their religious and cultural heritage and
traditional communal ties while, at the same time, trying to influence how the Jewish community
was perceived by the majority of Protestant and Catholic Germans and prevent a further
intensification of anti-Semitism in Germany.
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In the post-emancipation era, some elements of German Jewry had benefited
substantially, with greater economic prosperity and participation in some professions. “German
states had granted their Jewish subjects economic freedom far earlier than civic equality, with the
result that by the beginning of Bismarck’s Empire the urban and occupational concentration and
the prosperous economic circumstances of German Jewry decisively offset its numerical
insignificance.”215 In the campaign for emancipation, German Jews had accepted an arrangement
wherein, as individuals, they exchanged formal equality and access to greater economic
opportunities for the public suppression of their communal identity. For many German Jews, this
bargain had entailed profound economic and social benefits but, ultimately, it was not without
political consequences. “Nearly a century of German pressure,” Schorsch argues, “had rendered
[German Jews] incapable of any public affirmation of their Jewishness.”216
Additionally, the rapid economic assent of the Jewish community did not go unnoticed by
the Christian majority. The growing and prominent participation of German Jews in all areas of
German commerce, society, and the arts, in conjunction with well-entrenched anti-Semitic
beliefs among the broader population, provoked an intense reaction within the general population
and among the leadership of some German political parties. The absence of strong communal
leadership institutions left the German Jewish community unprepared for the anti-Semitic and
nationalist backlash that did appear during the late-nineteenth century in Germany.
In exchange for the benefits of full emancipation, German Jews suppressed (or
concealed) public expressions of their religious and cultural distinctiveness. “The tremendous
pressure on the Jews to establish their German identity by repressing every religious, social, and
ethnic distinctiveness had transformed being Jewish [in Germany] into a wholly internal
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matter.”217 Consequently, the campaign for Jewish emancipation, and the post-emancipation
efforts of German Jews to establish their bona fides as “regular,” or “normal,” or “ordinary”
Germans, had left German Jewry without the institutions needed to effectively engage in
communal defense and public advocacy that other European Jewish communities had developed
during the mid-to-late-nineteenth century. “No regional or national organizations existed to
irritate German sensibilities. Jewish life did not extend beyond the confines of the local corporate
community.”218
Internally, beyond of the gaze of the majority of the German public, the Jewish
community was active in terms of ecclesiastical change with the development of the Reform
movement. In academia, the Wissenschaft des Judenthums (Science of Judaism) program was
methodologically innovative and historically significant, but this scholarship was not popular
literature. In terms of communal leadership and public advocacy, German Jewry “had not
produced a single permanent regional, national, or international organization.”219

The Gemeindebund
The founding of the Gemeindebund in 1869 was the first attempt by the Jewish
communities dispersed across the Kleinstaaterei to build an effective and centralized communal
leadership body. The establishment of this organization predated the formal unification of
Germany in 1871. In 1869, German Jewry lacked political organizations, but there were local
leadership bodies. Additionally, there were close relationships between representatives of
different congregations with similar philosophies about religious practice or religious reform,
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including a synod of liberal rabbis and laymen. The initial effort to establish a centralized
leadership body was structured around these existing local leadership groups and congregational
associations. The organization was envisioned as a means of “uniting the communities of
German Israel [des deutschen Israels] for the protection of common interests and the pursuit of
common objectives.”220
The Gemeindebund did engage in various forms of public advocacy to combat antiSemitism, but the initial impetus for creating the organization, which countered the established
post-emancipation custom of suppressing public expressions of Jewish communal identity, was
the appearance of illegal Jewish immigrants from Russia in Germany and the efforts of the
Alliance Israélite Universelle to recruit German members. “Cholera and famine had recently
aggravated the chronically impoverished conditions of Russian Jewry…and the illegal
emigration of destitute Jews…mushroomed accordingly.”221 The appearance of large numbers of
impoverished foreign-born Jews in the German countryside “threatened to blemish the public
image of Judaism and provided potential ammunition for anti-Semitic agitation.”222
The threat to the public perception of German Jewry was considered sufficiently serious
by German Jewish leaders that they risked the backlash that the founding of the Gemeindebund
might engender in order to build the communal and institutional resources they believed they
needed to effectively address this problem.
Nationalist sentiments among German Jewish leaders also motivated them to found the
Gemeindebund. According to Schorsch, a “spirit of German nationalism…permeated the
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deliberations” of the organization’s founders.223 In particular, the recruitment activities of the
Alliance Israélite Universelle were resented by German Jewish leaders. The Alliance had been
very successful in recruiting German Jews to join the organization.224 German Jewish leaders
considered the growth of German membership in the Alliance as a potential source of antiSemitism because, despite the Alliance’s internationalist rhetoric, they feared the organization
would be perceived as French and the participation of German Jews in its activities could
therefore be construed by the general public as unpatriotic.
As anti-Semitism grew in intensity through the late-nineteenth century in Germany, the
leaders of the Gemeindebund made organized efforts to respond to the worsening situation.
When anti-Semitic publications began to circulate widely, the Gemeindebund lobbied for
changes to press laws to prevent the circulation of these materials, but these efforts were
unsuccessful. The organization sought redress through German courts against the publishers of
anti-Semitic materials. They had some early successes, but opposition to their legal strategy from
public prosecutors, who in most cases had sole discretionary power to decide to move forward
with a case, demonstrated that the nineteenth-century German legal system could not be relied
upon as a means of Jewish communal defence.
The organization shifted towards using publications to refute anti-Semitic allegations and
enlighten the broader German public. The Gemeindebund “invested a considerable amount of
money in the distribution of apologetic literature written by Christians.”225 The organization also
sponsored academic historical research by founding the Historical Commission of the DeutschIsraelitishcer Gemeindebund, which was composed of three Christian and three Jewish
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historians. The mandate of the Commission was to revise the existing historiography on German
Jewry by treating “the history of German Jewry as an integral part of the overall history of
Germany.”226 With financial backing from the leaders of the Gemeindebund, the Commission’s
six scholars began a project to systematically collect, translate, and interpret “all Hebrew and
non-Hebrew sources dealing with the history of the Jews in Germany.”227
The public advocacy efforts of the Gemeindebund were historically unprecedented in
Germany. The organization’s public and organized response to the rising intensity of German
anti-Semitism was a clear break with German Jewry’s custom of suppressing public displays of
its communal identity. The organization was reaching out to an external audience. These efforts
were sophisticated public advocacy, but they also reveal the legacy and social impact of the
prolonged battle for full civic equality. Schorsch argues that the “Gemeindebund endeavored to
reach three distinct groups with the tactics it gropingly developed to combat anti-Semitism. The
appeal to the courts aimed at silencing the anti-Semites. The apologetic literature stated the
Jewish case to the still large body of uncommitted Germans.”228 The Gemeindebund’s third
audience was the German Jewish community itself. In common with other Jewish leadership
organizations, the Gemeindebund counselled restraint with respect to combatting domestic antiSemitism. They were willing to lobby legislators, subsidize publications, and pursue legal
challenges, but they had no enthusiasm for public demonstrations or public confrontations with
anti-Semitic agitators.
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The leaders of the Gemeindebund also believed that the Jewish community was
responsible for managing the way it was perceived by the majority and bore responsibility when
that image was tarnished. When the Gemeindebund “periodically addressed itself to the Jewish
community…The tenor of this address…was largely determined by the widely shared conviction
that the tactless and insolent behavior of many Jews precipitated much of the current anti-Semitic
furor. The self-criticism which suffused this message reflected the self-image that German Jews
had come to adopt during the battle for emancipation.”229
The public advocacy work of the Gemeindebund represent the earliest efforts at
developing a unified, national strategy for Jewish communal defense in Germany, but the
organization had a limited amount of support among German Jews. It was a self-constituted
organization composed of congregational leaders with no formal mandate from either the Jewish
community or from the state. Further, its leadership was overwhelmingly composed of liberal
Jews because many traditional Orthodox congregations declined to join the organization or send
delegates to its meetings. The organization gradually dissolved due to the absence of a broad
base of support within the Jewish community, and the decline of the organization’s leaders’
enthusiasm after most of their public advocacy efforts proved to be ineffective. Many German
Jews were either ambivalent towards the Gemeindebund and its goals or continued to adhere to
the principle that the price of full civic equality was the public suppression of their religious
identity.

The Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus (“the Abwehrverein”)
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Only after a “second unexpected wave of Jew-hatred in the early 1890’s” did Jewish
leaders begin to revive the effort to establish an effective and national Jewish communal
leadership organization in Germany.230 As anti-Semitism intensified, some Jewish activists
began to publically respond. “[T]here were many local initiatives by individuals and
organizations who chose to publically counter anti-Semitic slander. Those initiatives were
supported by large segments of the Jewish public.”231 However, intra-communal tensions
between liberal and Orthodox Jews, as well as the community’s traditional reluctance to engage
in any form of public activism, arguably delayed the formation of a larger and more ambitious
leadership organization.
Throughout the late-nineteenth century, German Jewry benefited from, and relied upon,
intercession and advocacy on its behalf from sympathetic German Christians. At the beginning
of the 1890s, the most active and effective Jewish defense group in Germany was arguably the
Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus (“the Abwehrverein”), an organization founded in 1891
by German Christians. The organization’s first public declaration was signed by five hundred
German Christians, who were all economic elites or leaders in their fields and professions. Their
first public statement “condemned the campaign of hatred against the Jews as contrary to the
character of the German people, its historical development, and its place among the civilized
nations of the world.”232
By 1893, the Abwehrverein had more than thirteen thousand members.233 Jews were
allowed to join the Abwehrverein, and many did, but Jews were not part of the organization’s
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leadership, although they were major financial sponsors of its work.234 A discussion of the
Abwehrverein’s public advocacy efforts has been included in this discussion because German
Jewry’s substantial financial support for this non-Jewish group’s activism can be described as a
form of indirect activism, a tactic that was adopted by other Jewish organizations, including the
AJC.
The Abwehrverein tried to develop a number of different approaches to combat antiSemitism through public advocacy. Their first strategy, which they ultimately abandoned, was to
send public speakers to anti-Semitic rallies to present counterarguments. The organization “soon
dropped the plan as futile and even detrimental.”235 Their speakers were often denied permission
to speak or given little time to make their arguments. “In most cases, the anti-Semitic sponsors
exploited the presence of a spokesman from the Abwehrverein to draw still larger crowds, which
they would then inflame with their own hateful oratory.”236 The Abwehrverein tried to organize
separate rallies, but “lack of funds and demand forced the discarding of this tactic as well.”237
The Abwehrverein chose not to use the German justice system to fight anti-Semitism.
The organization “feared that court cases would merely serve the anti-Semites as a sounding
board for their ideas while transforming the defendant into a hero or martyr.”238 They calculated
that the failure of these prosecutions to go forward, or acquittals, could cause significantly more
harm form a public relations perspective. German public prosecutors “repeatedly displayed an
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aversion to punishing agitators, and there was little the [Abwehrverein] could do to alter the
impression that the courts’ restraint somehow vindicated the anti-Semites.”239
In order to influence the broader German public, the Abwehrverein concentrated on using
mass media, including propaganda.240 “From the start, the major effort of the Abwehrverein was
invested in publication.”241 The organization sponsored the publication of Mitteilungen, a weekly
newspaper. The newspaper was intended for a general audience, but the publishers also believed
the newspaper’s effect in the fight against anti-Semitism could be enhanced if it was read, and
trusted as unbiased, by people who were in a position to exert the greatest possible influence on
the German public, including journalists, newspaper editors, politicians, and political candidates.
This tactic was an early manifestation of another approach to Jewish public advocacy that would
become increasingly practiced throughout the twentieth century by numerous communal defense
and public advocacy organizations, including the AJC. The goal was to persuade a subset of
important, or powerful, or famous people to exercise their influence on behalf of your agenda.
The tactic would later be described as overtures to “molders of public opinion.”242
For the Abwehrverein, “the program proved to be of limited effectiveness…Local
newspaper editors were frequently reluctant to use the material.”243 Nevertheless, the
organization continued to fund the publication of Mitteilungen, including the compilation of
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digests of material from the newspaper sent directly to newspaper editors. “Friends criticized the
effort as too academic and thereby failing to reach the circles most seriously infected. But [the
Abwehrverein’s] spokesmen contended that the publications disseminated essential information
for the eventual enlightenment of the German people.”244 While the Abwehrverein recognized
the limited immediate impact of these efforts, they adopted a long term view, believing that the
gradual accumulation and dissemination of this information would eventually bring about
important progress in the fight against anti-Semitism in Germany.
The Abwehrverein was unique for its willingness to become involved in political
campaigns. The group openly opposed anti-Semitic candidates, funded the campaigns or
fundraised for candidates who rejected anti-Semitism, subsidized the publication of campaign
literature and promotional material, and “urged liberals not to vote for an anti-Semite under any
circumstances.”245 Its involvement in political campaigning is significant because it is indicative
of the greater freedom non-Jewish activists possessed to describe their agenda and engage in
public advocacy in late-nineteenth-century Germany. Defense organizations led by German Jews
were consistently reluctant to be seen as publically involved in political campaigns because they
feared that these activities could lend credibility to the widely held belief that the political
agenda of German Jewry differed substantially from that of the majority of Germans.246 In the
United States, Jewish leaders were similarly reluctant to have the Jewish community become
publically involved in political campaigns because they did not want to foster the impression that
Jews voted as a bloc (the so-called “Jewish vote”) and, therefore, possessed more influence (or
more power) than other American citizens.
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While public advocacy was a crucial part of the Abwehrverein’s approach to combatting
anti-Semitism, the organization also practiced more traditional forms of advocacy including the
nurturing of private relationships. The group’s founders and leaders were prominent public
figures who were connected to each other and to their opponents through their work and social
circles.247

The Centralverein deutscher Straatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens
Ultimately, the Abwehrverein had very little success in countering the intensification of
anti-Semitism in Germany during the late-nineteenth century.248 As the situation worsened,
German Jewish leaders debated if they should respond, and how they could become involved in
publically defending their community. This movement towards more substantial and public
political engagement, which culminated with the establishment of the Centralverein deutscher
Straatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens, required German Jewish leaders to move boldly against their
community’s now well-established tradition of suppressing expressions of Jewish communal
identity or political solidarity. There was, however, substantial opposition within the German
Jewish community to entering into public quarrels with anti-Semites, and there was a concern
that some German progressives, who were “traditional allies of the Jews in the struggle for their
rights would react unfavorably.”249 It was the perception of, and the fear of a backlash to,
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engaging in public advocacy on behalf of Jews, and on behalf of Judaism, that was the major
impediment. 250
The establishment of the Centralverein in 1893 and the public advocacy tactics the
organization adopted were radical changes from traditional Jewish leadership practices in
Germany. It is an interesting reflection of the unique social and political conditions of latenineteenth-century German Jewry that the formation of this leadership and advocacy group is
treated in the historiography as a radical act despite the fact that the ideology of the organization
was fundamentally consistent with nineteenth-century liberalism and its political activities
mirrored those of contemporaneous non-Jewish German interest groups.251
Abraham Margaliot argues that the Centralverein “was not only a civil rights
organization; it was just as much an ideological organization.”252 At the heart of the
organization’s ideology, however, there was nothing radical beyond the unprecedented
willingness of a German Jewish organization to express its goals publically and engage in
political activism to further its objectives. The organization “and its activities reflect a major
change within German Jewry…particularly in its relationship to the surrounding German society.
This relationship changed from a passive sometimes even submissive stand towards the wrongs
inflicted upon it, to what some researchers describe as a proud ‘Jewish Activism.’”253
The leaders of the Centralverein wanted German Jews to be treated and perceived as
Germans. They balanced an effort to engage in communal defense and combat anti-Semitism
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with emphasizing the status of Jews as individual citizens of Germany. The name the founders
chose for the organization, which translates into the “Central Union of German Citizens of
Jewish Faith,” emphasizes that their conception of their own identity privileged their German
nationality over their religion. They did not advocate for special privileges or radical solutions,
and, like a number of other high profile nineteenth-century Jewish leadership organizations, they
were opposed to Jewish nationalism, and competed with Zionist organizations for the hearts and
minds, and financial contributions, of their coreligionists.254
The Centralverein was founded, composed, and led by German Jewish elites who favored
acculturation and economic integration, objectives which were consistent with the goals of the
earlier struggle for Jewish emancipation, civic equality, economic opportunity, and religious
tolerance. The founders and leaders of the Centralverein were Reform Jews who had moved
away from the rituals and ways of life of the Orthodox community. Their eagerness to defend
German Jewry is extraordinary because, even though they had chosen a German identity over a
Jewish identity, they were unwilling to abide the continuing and intensifying attacks against their
community.255 Their religious difference was a fact of their identity that they asserted and
practiced privately, if at all; however, the persistence and growing intensity of German antiSemitism caused the founders of the Centralverein to conclude that they had to act in an
unprecedentedly public manner. 256
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The Centralverein tried to recruit as large a membership as possible from among the
different branches and varied congregations of German Judaism, as well as from unaffiliated
German Jews.257 The Centralverein’s efforts to build its reputation as a mass organization were
crucial to its public advocacy strategy. The organization’s “leaders viewed widespread
mobilization of support as a precondition for fulfilling its basic goals.”258 These leaders wanted
the organization to be perceived as the representative organization of German Jewry in order to
be able to exercise the greatest amount of control and discretion over public pronouncements
made on behalf of the Jewish community, and to establish the legitimacy of their leadership
when dealing with or negotiating with government authorities. Three years after its founding, the
organization had recruited more than five thousand individual members, and an additional thirtynine corporate members, which were other German Jewish organizations and congregations that
agreed to become affiliated with the Centralverein. By 1903, the numbers had increased
substantially to more than twelve thousand individuals and one hundred affiliated
organizations.259
To be most effective at fighting anti-Semitism, the founders believed the organization
needed to espouse a conception of German Jewish identity that could earn the trust, or be

for equality. The Centralverein undertook to recondition the German Jew to assert his Jewishness publically. In
place of traditional behind-the-scenes appeals to the seat of power for special protection, the Centralverein waged its
battle against anti-Semitism before the eyes of the German public. The Centralverein’s historical importance…lies
not in its nominal success in combatting the forces of German anti-Semitism, but rather in its impact upon the
mentality of German Jewry. By means of a mass organization, it laboured during the two decades before the…[First
World War] to revive the self-esteem and self-image indispensable for survival which German Jewry had sacrificed
in the fight for equality.” See: Schorsch, 12-13.
257
The recruitment of as large a base as possible was important for the political status of the organization in
Germany. Broad appeal was also important for achieving its objectives within the German Jewish community.
According to Jürgen Matthäus: “From its foundation…the [organization’s] aim had been a double one: ‘…to gather
together the German citizens of Jewish faith regardless of religious and political orientation in order to encourage
them in the energetic preservation of their civil and social equality as well as in the cultivation of a German
sentiment.’” See: Jürgen Matthäus, “Deutschtum and Judentum under Fire: The Impact of the First World War on
the Strategies of the Centralverein and the Zionistische Vereinigung,” Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 33 (1988): 131.
258
Borut, 52.
259
Schorsch, 119.

114

acceptable to, the broader Christian German majority. They wanted to foster the notion that Jews
privileged their loyalty to the German nation over their religious heritage. Accordingly, their aim
to “cultivate” a “German sentiment” involved both their ideology and their public relations
efforts. This aspect of their declared agenda reflected the persistence of a belief among German
Jewish leaders that German Jews were at least partially responsible for some of the social and
political antagonism directed against them by the German majority.
In an era when the majority of anti-Semitic beliefs stemmed from the charge of deicide or
religious and communal stereotypes, as opposed to theories of racial inferiority, the leaders of the
Centralverein believed they could fight anti-Semitism by trying to shape the public image of
German Jewry. They wanted to restore the self-respect and dignity of a community that had been
perpetually oppressed, and, more recently, had spent one hundred years lobbying for civic
equality but had continually encountered obstructions to their social integration. In addition to
this communal restoration, the leaders of the Centralverein also endeavored to remove what they
perceived to be some of the causes of anti-Semitism that stemmed from within the Jewish
community. In particular, they believed that the communal insularity of the Orthodox community
and the unscrupulous (and well publicized) business behaviour of some German Jews reflected
badly upon German Jewry as a whole, and provided anti-Semites with evidence that could be
easily exploited to indict the entire community. The Centralverein is often grouped with other
prominent nineteenth-century Jewish organizations that favoured or promoted acculturation as
the solution to the “Jewish question.” In conjunction with its public advocacy efforts on behalf of
the German Jewish community, the Centralverein was also working to change that community
from within as part of its strategy to fight anti-Semitism.
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While it was important that the Centralverein be perceived as a large and representative
organization, it was in fact led and controlled by a small number of prominent, acculturated
German Jews, including Eugen Fuchs, Edmund Friedemann, Paul Nathans, Raphael Löwenfeld,
and Julius Issac.260 The Centralverein wanted to be perceived as a mass organization, but, like
the AJC, it always functioned as an interest group led by a small cohort of wealthy, acculturated
elites. 261
The Centralverein applied many of the same public advocacy approaches as earlier
Jewish defense groups, including the sponsorship of research and the publication of materials
designed to combat anti-Semitism. The organization established an internal “publicationsapologetics committee” to develop reprisals to common anti-Semitic canards and funded the
publication of a monthly magazine, Im deutschen Reich (In the German Empire).262 “In addition
to printing educational literature on Judaism, it also frequently responded directly to the polemics
of individual agitators.”263 The organization’s leaders lobbied German parliamentarians,
including lobbying on behalf of qualified Jewish judicial candidates for appointments to the
bench. They protested the employment discrimination practiced by German industries, and
“carefully watched the German scene for new manifestations of anti-Semitism.”264 Individual
members would report incidents of anti-Semitism to the Centralverein’s leadership, which would
then formulate a response. In many instances, this response included attempts to seek redress
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through German courts. As will be discussed further below, the Centralverein was very active in
trying to use the German justice system as a forum to fight anti-Semitism. After considerable and
contentious internal debate, the organization cautiously became involved in campaigning against
openly anti-Semitic political candidates.265
Although the leaders of the organization were certainly aware of the persecution
experienced by their coreligionists in other countries, the Centralverein concentrated on
ameliorating the social and political conditions of German Jewry.266 Any advocacy on behalf of
foreign Jewish populations would have conflicted with the Centralverein’s sense of itself as a
German organization. It “deliberately limited the scope of its…activities to Germany alone. This
self-limitation was not a question of geography, but one of ideology, and it expressed the guiding
principles of its leadership in the matters of German-Jewish identity and of German Jewry’s
relations with Jews beyond the German frontier.”267 In contrast to the Alliance Israélite
Universelle, which promoted itself as an international organization, the Centralverein
consciously adopted a significantly narrower mandate. This decision reflected the nationalist (or
Germanophile) orientation of the organization, but it was also strategic. The leaders of the
Centralverein believed that any assertion of an international agenda would have engendered
domestic hostility and undermined the organization’s ability to effectively pursue its goals in
Germany.
During its early years, the Centralverein concentrated on using the German justice system
to fight anti-Semitism. “The Centralverein itself regarded the vigorous utilization of the courts as
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its most important operation.”268 This emphasis on the use of juridical means to fight antiSemitism distinguishes the Centralverein from contemporaneous Jewish organizations that were
reluctant to practice the same methods. The AJC was willing to use juridical means to further its
objectives; however, as will be discussed in Chapter 8, its methods and objectives differed
substantially from those of the Centralverein.
Evyatar Friesel notes that the Centralverein “worked mainly on the legal level: it was a
style in accordance with its principles.”269 These principles included a commitment to a vigorous
defense of Jews and Judaism in public forums, including mass media and courts of law. “The
same year that it was founded, in 1893, the Centralverein had established a legal defense
commission (Rechstsschutzkommission), headed by Eugen Fuchs, to act through the courts
against antisemitic actions and publications.”270 The German law on libel, and three additional
articles in the Uniform Criminal Code of the German Reich dealing with incitement to violence,
defamation of religious bodies, and committing a gross nuisance, offered the lawyers of the
Rechstsschutzkommission juridical means of confronting individual anti-Semites and the
publishers of anti-Semitic materials.271 “By 1902, the legal department of the Centralverein was
handling an average of one hundred cases annually.” 272 As will be discussed further in Chapter 8
of this study, this case load represents a substantially larger degree of intervention and advocacy
through the legal system than practiced later by the first generation of AJC leaders.
Despite the risk of acquittals, potential obstructionism from public prosecutors, and an
earlier history of ineffective outcomes, German courts were embraced as an ideal forum for
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fighting anti-Semitism because their proceedings were mostly public and their decisions carried
the weight and authority of the state, and therefore the most legitimacy. “Under the leadership of
Eugen Fuchs, the Centralverein filed many successful lawsuits against anti-Semitic agitators.”273
They also lost a significant number of cases, particularly in the earliest years of the program,
when the organization had not yet developed a strict criterion to select cases that were likely to
succeed in court.
While there were successful prosecutions, these ruling did not establish a deterrence
effect. “Punishment rarely exceeded a few hundred marks or a few days or weeks in prison.”274
Nevertheless, the symbolic importance of these victories was privileged over their potential
immediate effect on fighting anti-Semitism. According to Barnet Peretz Hartston, “Fuchs did not
measure his success by the number of lawsuits he won, but considered his goal to educate the
nation and cultivate civic courage among German Jews.”275 The impact of this legal strategy may
be impossible to gauge, but the use of juridical means remained a major component of the
Centralverein’s public advocacy during the entire history of the organization.276
The Centralverein was a very important and prominent nineteenth-century Jewish
leadership organization that continued to advocate on behalf of German Jewry until it was
ultimately outlawed and dismantled by the Nazis in 1938. It is obviously difficult, in light of the
discrimination suffered by German Jewry during the Third Reich and the destruction of the
community during the Holocaust, to assess the achievements of an organization that was founded
to defend this minority community. The historiography on the organization, and assessments of
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the successes and failures of its strategies for communal defense, include strong criticisms of the
organization’s emphasis on acculturation, alleged passivity or timidity, and opposition to
Zionism; however, the historiography also highlights the political legacy of the emancipation
struggle, and the persistent hostility of the environment in which the leaders of the Centralverein
tried to exercise influence. For the purposes of this study, it is significant to note that the
organization was committed to public advocacy, and used a variety of approaches to combat
anti-Semitism, including approaches that would later be adopted by the AJC.

Nineteenth-Century Jewish Organizations as Forerunner of the AJC
The above survey of some of the public advocacy of nineteenth-century Jewish
organizations, and the different contexts in which these groups tried to exert influence, illustrates
the breadth of Jewish activism during this period, and the extent to which their activities were
innovative and represent a substantial departure from Jewish leadership and communal defense
traditions. The American Jewish Committee, which was founded after all of the organizations
described above, mirrored a great deal of the political attitudes, concern for optics, long term
planning, organizational structures, and advocacy strategies of these earlier organizations.
The exercise of political influence and encouraging social and cultural change requires
capital. The substantial philanthropic achievements of organizations like the Baron de Hirsch
Fund, the Jewish Colonization Society, and B’nai B’rith, would not have been possible without
the historically unprecedented access these organizations had to wealthy benefactors and
financial support from the burgeoning Jewish middle classes. The AJC, like most leadership
organizations, recognized that access to substantial financial resources and ongoing fundraising
were crucial to their efforts. Particularly during its early years, the AJC benefited from the
generosity of its wealthiest founders.
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In common with the leaders of the Board of Deputies and the Centralverein, the leaders
of the AJC thought it was important that the Committee be viewed as a representative
organization, but preferred that power be concentrated among the members of the Executive
Committee. Like the Alliance, the Board, the Centralverein, and the Baron de Hirsch Fund, the
AJC privileged acculturation, or at least the appearance of gradual acculturation, over perpetual
communal isolation. This emphasis on acculturation reflected their concerns about the gentile
majority’s perception of Jews, and their fears that the Jewish community would be seen as
racially inferior and alien in America.
The AJC was prepared to combat anti-Semitism publically and, in common with the
Centralverein, respond to incitement. The founders and leaders of the AJC were conscious of the
persecution experience by Jews both domestically and in foreign lands, and were prepared to act.
Like the Alliance, the AJC felt a greater degree of freedom to respond to the persecution of Jews
in other countries, and the organization is perhaps most well-known for its advocacy on behalf of
Jewish communities outside the United States. Although the AJC shared the concerns of the
leaders of the Centralverein about fostering any impression of dual loyalty, these concerns did
not constrain their willingness to lobby the American public and the American government on
behalf of their foreign coreligionists. Domestically, however, the AJC’s actions were more
cautious and were almost never reflexive. There were numerous, often egregious, provocations,
but, in most cases of domestic anti-Semitism, the AJC counselled restraint. The Committee’s
strategies balanced the domestic timidity of the Board and the Alliance with some of the
boldness of the Centralverein and the Anti-Defamation League. The AJC was prepared to
respond publically, but they were cautious. They were consistently concerned about the optics of
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their interventions and, as will be shown, carefully considered the potential benefits and risks of
their public advocacy activities.
Part II: The Historiography on the American Jewish Committee’s Public Advocacy
The American Jewish Committee has been studied by historians and political scientists as
a high-profile American Jewish leadership organization. The Committee’s earliest activities,
however, when the AJC was still a very small organization, have drawn less attention in the
historiography on the organization and in the historiography on American Jewry. The case
studies of the AJC’s early public advocacy included in this study will illustrate the
underappreciated breadth, sophistication, and innovation of these efforts.
Historians and political scientists have examined the Committee’s activities before and
after the First World War, including: its successful lobbying of American lawmakers to abrogate
Russo-American Treaty of 1832;277 its efforts to oppose the imposition of literary tests for new
immigrants and to maintain liberal immigration policies;278 its involvement with the formation of
the Kehillah in New York City;279 and its attitude towards the Zionist movement.280
The antagonism between the AJC and the American Jewish Congress has also been
studied in accounts of American Jewish history, and in examinations of the political beliefs of
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American Jews.281 There is also considerable scholarship on the Committee’s efforts, under the
leadership of Louis Marshall, to obtain a public apology from Henry Ford for the anti-Semitic
content of the Dearborn Independent.282 Because the AJC’s leadership was comprised of
successful men, including Jacob Schiff, Louis Marshall, and Julius Rosenwald, the biographies
of these leaders contain accounts of some of the Committee’s work.283
The Committee’s work between 1906 and 1929, the historical significance of these
efforts, and how its early activities influenced later work have been given less attention in the
historiography on the organization. In terms of public advocacy, one exception is the
Committee’s campaign in favor of the abrogation of the Russo-American Treaty of 1832. This
campaign was the organization’s most dramatic entry into the open practice of public advocacy,
and one of the most significant political achievements of the first generation of AJC leaders. The
purpose of the campaign was to have the United States withdraw from this trade agreement
because of alleged Russian violations of the treaty. The impetus for the AJC’s involvement was
the differential treatment and discrimination American Jews (both native-born and naturalized
citizens) suffered while travelling in Russia under an American passport. Russia’s treatment of
Jews travelling under an American passport (some of whom had been born in Russia but had fled
to the United States) violated the seventy-year-old commercial treaty signed by the two
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countries. In its advocacy, the Committee portrayed Russia’s discrimination against American
Jews travelling within its borders not as a manifestation of anti-Semitism, but as an affront to the
dignity of the United States. In later years, the practice of using rhetoric that broadened the
significance of prejudice against Jews or expressions of anti-Semitism would become a
prevailing strategy of the AJC as it sought to protect American Jewry by promoting religious
tolerance and legal protections for all minority groups in the United States.
The existing historiography on the AJC consistently incorporates nine major themes.284
Firstly, there is the theme that the organization was formed during a period of widespread and
often violent persecution against Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe. Secondly, there is the
theme that the AJC was an elite organization comprised of wealthy, acculturated Jews, and
adherents of Reform movement Judaism in the United States. Thirdly, there is the theme that, in
common with elite nineteenth-century European Jewish leadership organizations, the founding of
the AJC is identified as a significant development in the history of modern Jewish communal
leadership and the maturation of Jewish political activism in the Diaspora. Fourthly, there is the
theme that the Committee can be criticized for its elitism and undemocratic character and for the
means it used to attain and sustain a leadership position over the growing community of Yiddishspeaking Jewish immigrants in the United States. Fifthly, there is the theme that as a Jewish
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interest group, the AJC was dedicated to using quiet diplomacy and the personal connections of
its leaders to the upper echelons of American institutions, to achieve its political objectives.
Sixthly, there is the theme that the Committee preferred to frame its political ambitions and its
domestic political activities as broadly important to all Americans as opposed to narrowly
important to American Jews.285 In this regard, the motives for the AJC’s public advocacy and its
associated rhetoric are connected to the anxiety or fear exhibited by the elites of the American
Jewish establishment that the en masse arrival of new Jewish immigrants would precipitate an
intensification of anti-Semitism in the United States. Seventhly, there is the theme that the
Committee preferred to publically deny the existence of Jewish voting blocs, but, in private
negotiations with American lawmakers, “created the impression that it spoke for and perhaps
controlled the Jewish immigrant voters who were regarded by a number of politicians as an
important factor in certain local, state, and national elections.”286 Eighthly, there is the theme
that the AJC was hostile towards Zionism because the aspirations of the movement could lead to
charges of dual loyalty. Ninthly, there is the theme that the AJC encouraged the rapid
acculturation of Jewish immigrants because its founders believed that greater Jewish integration
into American society would forestall an intensification of anti-Semitism in the United States.287
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In its public advocacy work, the AJC took on the mission of persuading the broader
American public that the new immigrants who made up the majority of the growing American
Jewish community were loyal to their new home and would contribute to American society. The
AJC was founded during a period of intense anti-Jewish persecution in Russia and Eastern
Europe and the Committee was certainly an elite organization whose small, well connected
leadership cohort, tried to exercise control over both their newly arrived coreligionists and how
their community was perceived by the broader American public. Anxiety and status insecurity
shaped the AJC’s approaches to public advocacy but the existing historiography on the
organization which criticizes its efforts as timid or passive misjudges or fails to recognize the
strategies and considerations that underlay the AJC’s earliest activities. The organization was
often silent but its leadership did not ignore provocations; rather, they were deliberate about if
and how to respond. As will be discussed throughout this dissertation, they declined to respond
when they thought that there was nothing they could do to mitigate the harm that had already
been done or believed that any organized response from the American Jewish community would
only aggravate the problem. In comparison to the public advocacy and protests of the Civil
Rights movement, the AJC’s early efforts do appear timid or passive but the organization’s
archives reveal both the extent of the leadership’s deliberations and that, from an early date, the
Committee was building its capacity to engage in more obvert forms of public advocacy.
The AJC’s hostility towards Zionism is one of the most contentious aspects of the
organization’s history. The AJC is described as an anti-Zionist (or non-Zionist) group that
opposed Jewish nationalism because its goals were impractical and its rhetoric was potentially
dangerous. The anxieties and status insecurity of the acculturated Jews of the American Jewish
establishment shaped the attitudes of early-twentieth-century American Jewish elites towards the

126

aspirations of Jewish nationalism. The AJC’s antagonism towards Zionism stemmed from both
an ideological and a public relations perspective. According to Donald Fishman, the “Jewish
establishment felt threatened by the [Zionist] movement in two ways. First, they perceive that the
advocacy of Zionism by a minority faction within the Jewish community would impugn the
patriotism of all American Jews in the eyes of the non-Jewish majority. Secondly, they regarded
Zionism as an obstacle to the successful integration of Eastern European immigrants. Faced with
a dual challenge, the establishment fashioned a rhetorical response that was nativist, alarmist,
and derisive.”288 The Zionists’ assertion that Jews were a nation (as opposed to a religious group)
conflicted with the AJC’s founders’ conception of their identity, which privileged their American
citizenship over their ethnic, racial, and religious difference. They were concerned that
emphasizing separatist political aspirations would call into question the patriotism of native-born
and naturalized American Jews.
Donald Fishman argues that, notwithstanding the AJC’s reputation for discretion in the
exercise of influence, open public advocacy was at the heart of the organization’s mission from
the beginning, because it was founded to confront and marginalize the Zionist movement in the
United States. Fishman argues that, before the founding of the AJC, the American Jewish
establishment was already gaining experience in public advocacy within the Jewish community
through what he describes as a “campaign” to discredit (and thereby limit the growth of) the
Zionist movement in the United States. According to Fishman, “the anti-Zionist response was
immediate and vitriolic. The campaign contained publicly expressed statements of hostility,
intimations of disaster if the movement were to succeed, and constant appeals to the reigning

288

Donald Fishman, “Reform Judaism and the anti-Zionist persuasive campaign,” Communication Quarterly 46
(1998): 389.

127

system of values.”289 Fishman describes these efforts as sophisticated public advocacy, designed
to undermine Zionism while simultaneously building the patriotic sentiments of American Jews
and the broader American public’s perception of the patriotism of this new, and steadily
growing, immigrant community. “Overall,” Fishman argues, “the tactics employed by antiZionists were designed to exploit the pretensions and confusing aims of the [Zionist] movement,
to undermine the credibility of its leaders, and to demonstrate the impracticality of its objectives.
Beneath the surface, these efforts by anti-Zionists were tied to their general outlook: Having
found a utopia in America, it was heretical and disloyal to seek a utopia elsewhere.”290
The marginalization of Zionism, however, was not the predominant aim of the AJC’s
public advocacy during the early-twentieth century. Their main goal was to overt an
intensification of anti-Semitism and the Committee’s opposition to Zionism was part of that
effort. Marginalizing Zionism was an aspect of this effort within the larger campaign to educate
the American people and influence American public opinion, over both the short and long term,
towards tolerance, respect, and co-existence.
The public advocacy work and applications of mass media employed by the American
Jewish Committee that took place after the Second World War were more substantial and have
attracted more attention from scholars than the AJC’s activities during the time period covered
by this study.291 The motivations and the origins of this more overt postwar advocacy, however,
can be traced back to the activities of the first generation of AJC leaders. The case studies
included in this dissertation will show that all of the advocacy strategies that the AJC would
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apply after the Second World War, and the organizational infrastructure needed to carry out this
kind of work, were developed, or developing during, the early history of the organization.
The limited amount of existing scholarship on the AJC’s public advocacy between its
establishment in 1906 and the death of Louis Marshall in 1929 is found in just three studies of
the early history of the organization: Nathan Schachner’s The Price of Liberty: A History of the
American Jewish Committee, Judith S. Goldstein’s The Politics of Ethnic Pressure: The
American Jewish Committee Fight Against Immigration Restriction, 1906-1917, and Naomi W.
Cohen’s Not Free to Desist: The American Jewish Committee, 1906-1966.292 Schachner and
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Cohen’s books were both commissioned by the AJC;293 Goldstein’s book is based on her
doctoral dissertation.294
Schachner and Cohen’s studies contain accounts of some of the AJC’s earliest public
advocacy efforts but, as will be shown, there are significant gaps in their descriptions and
analyses of the organization’s activities. Goldstein’s work focuses on the AJC’s lobbying of
American lawmakers during the first ten years of the organization’s history. In Goldstein’s
account, the public advocacy and public relations carried out by the AJC is treated as historically
significant but ancillary to the organization’s activities as a lobby group. This dissertation will
provide a broader and more thorough analysis of the Committee’s efforts to shape public opinion
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and fight anti-Semitism during the leadership tenures of Mayer Sulzberger and Louis Marshall
than the accounts that appear in Schachner, Goldstein, and Cohen’s studies.
Nathan Schachner’s account of the AJC’s earliest public advocacy work concentrates on
the Committee’s response to the pogroms in Russia. He argues that the Committee wanted to
formulate a public response to the atrocities, but did not feel it could call on the American
government to intervene without first convincing the broader American public that responding to
these attacks was in American interests. “The Committee realized,” according to Schachner,
“that the problem could not be attacked frontally. It could not call on the American nation for
official intervention in Russia. The plight of the Jews in Russia, though shocking enough to the
generous conscience of Americans…did not come within the proper sphere of direct
governmental action.”295 Schachner argues that as the AJC wanted to be perceived by the general
public as an American organization, the Committee’s natural sphere of influence was on
domestic matters that concerned American citizens; the pogroms, however, were a Russian
problem.
Although it was appropriate, and not without precedent, to spearhead philanthropic
initiatives to provide aid to coreligionists in foreign countries or the survivors of violent
persecution, seeking the involvement of the American government in the internal matters of an
ally was, however, another matter. Thus, Schachner argues that to justify their advocacy on a
foreign issue, and build domestic support for government intervention, the AJC’s leaders had to
redefine the pogroms as an atrocity that in some way concerned the broader American people.
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“There were,” Schachner asserts, “indirect methods that could be properly employed by the
Committee in their capacity as American citizens.”296
Schachner argues that the Committee decided to disseminate information about Russia as
a first step towards martialling public support for government intervention: “For one thing, the
Committee decided that the Jews would best be aided in their fight for human and legal rights in
Russia by adequately informing all Americans ‘of the existing status of Russian affairs, with
particular reference to the character of the Russian people and of their existing methods of
government.’”297 This “campaign of education” resulted in the founding of the AJC’s first Press
Bureau to monitor and collect information published about Russia, and involved the publication
of a series of articles and the distribution of material to American newspapers in order to gain
sympathetic coverage and editorial comment.298 These activities, developed in the AJC’s early
years, though unsuccessful in stemming the violence in Russia or securing the intervention of the
American government, would become standard practice for the AJC.
In addition to the establishment of the AJC’s Press Bureau, Schachner briefly cites a
number of other instances in which the Committee employed public advocacy or public relations
techniques in order to further the organization’s objectives. He mentions the AJC’s investigation
of the Associated Press’ biased sources for information on Russia;299 the AJC’s publicity
campaign concerning the blood libel trial of Mendel Beilis;300 the Committee’s efforts to secure
the abrogation of the Russo-American treaty of 1832;301 the establishment of the AJC’s Bureau
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of Jewish Statistics and Research;302 the AJC’s publication of the book Jews in the Eastern War
Zone;303 the creation of the AJC’s War Records Office;304 the organization’s sponsorship of
Herman Bernstein’s The History of a Lie;305 and the Committee’s efforts to have historically
false and potentially inflammatory scenes removed from the film “King of Kings,” a
dramatization of the events leading up to the crucifixion of Jesus.306
Schachner argues that the AJC’s “policy was pragmatic and free of dogmatism. [The
organization] acted with boldness when boldness was indicated, and moved warily in cases
where reckless publicity might prove harmful.”307 He notes that there were instances when the
AJC declined to engage in any form of public relations campaign, and mentions specifically the
organization’s decision to take no action against the Ku Klux Klan out of a concern that
“reaction from Jewish organizations as such would merely provide additional propaganda for the
sheeted Knights and spread the fire instead of quenching it.”308
These important examples of the AJC’s public advocacy work and strategy are noted by
Schachner, but they are not fully analyzed. The intention of this study is to provide a more
thorough account of these instances, and others that were ignored or diminished by Schnachner,
Cohen, and Goldstein. This study will also situate these actions within the broader context of the
AJC’s efforts to prevent an intensification of anti-Semitism in the United States during the earlytwentieth century.
Judith Goldstein’s The Politics of Ethnic Pressure concentrates on the relationship
between the AJC’s leadership and American politicians. Her study focusses on the AJC’s
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activities as a lobby group dealing with American lawmakers during the early-twentieth century.
The focus of the Committee’s lobbying was on the policy debates over new immigration
restrictions, including requiring literacy tests and, most importantly, on the issues associated with
the treaty abrogation campaign. Goldstein portrays the AJC’s political ambitions as substantial,
but, with the exception of the public advocacy the organization practiced during the abrogation
campaign, she describes the Committee’s lobbying tactics as “low-keyed.”309 She argues that the
organization “never tried to galvanize the Jewish vote; it never made Congressmen its ‘mere
spokesmen;’ it never employed high-powered, prominent lobbyists or resorted to bribery; nor did
it use insider information to gain an advantage over its opponents.”310
In Goldstein’s view, the abrogation campaign to end the trade pact between Russia and
the United States, during which the AJC sponsored the distribution of pro-abrogation materials
and staged public rallies, was a major deviation from the pressure politics and advocacy tactics
that had been adopted by the Committee’s founders. Normally, the organization preferred
“inconspicuous, behind-the-scenes contacts with politicians as a way of avoiding criticism from
non-Jewish political groups.”311
Goldstein argues that the leaders of the AJC, and in particular Jacob Schiff and Louis
Marshall, “wanted to impress their political attitudes and lobbying techniques on the [American]
Jewish community because they believed in rapid assimilation rather than separatism, in reform
rather than radical change, and in quiet persuasion through direct access to men in government
rather than public rallies and mass action.”312 She shares the consensus view that the AJC’s
approach to public advocacy was shaped by the anxieties of the American Jewish establishment
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and the political divisions within early-twentieth-century American Jewry. The leaders of the
AJC, according to Goldstein, “were jealous and fearful of other Jewish leaders, Zionists or
Russian-Jewish labor leaders…They feared that others would upset the dignified, discreet tone of
the uptown style of pressure politics…and would spoil the facade of German-Jewish assimilation
and the fragile appearance of German and Russian-Jewish unity.”313 In comparison to
Schachner’s and Cohen’s account of the antagonism between the American Jewish establishment
and communal and political leaders from other segments of American Jewry, Goldstein’s
assessment is more acute: “Marshall and Schiff prided themselves on their roles as leaders and
patently did not want to share their power with new people and ideological enemies. Those
enemies were the Zionists and the congress movement that the Zionists spawned.”314
Goldstein treats the public advocacy that was funded or organized by the leaders of the
AJC more narrowly than this study. She describes the AJC’s public advocacy as part of the
organization’s efforts to sway American lawmakers as opposed to one element of a broader
strategy. The purpose of the AJC’s public advocacy, in her view, was to create political pressure
regarding particular issues and was not part of a general strategy to shape American public
opinion or fight anti-Semitism in the United States. Her narrow interpretation of the AJC’s
advocacy is most evident in her analysis of the AJC’s activities during the abrogation campaign.
“All of the AJC’s public efforts,” according to Goldstein, “were aimed at persuading Congress to
pass a joint resolution directing the President to terminate the Treaty” with Russia.315 She argues
that the campaign was successful because it was coordinated to coincide with the build up to the
1912 Presidential and Congressional elections. “Politicians recognized,” Goldstein argues, “that
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abrogation provided a good foreign policy issue with which to build support among an important
ethnic group.”316
Goldstein views the abrogation campaign more as seizing an opportunity than a part of a
larger strategy of public advocacy. Although the dispute with Russia was a complicated matter of
international relations and treaty interpretation, from the perspective of electoral politics and
strategy, support for abrogation was a simple matter of declaring oneself for or against. The issue
offered candidates an opportunity to distinguish themselves from their opponents. In districts
with large Jewish populations, it was a potential “wedge issue,” and the public advocacy work
coordinated by the AJC was designed to show American lawmakers that support for abrogation
was sufficiently animated to be the deciding factor in their races. The abrogation campaign was
without question the AJC’s most substantial and most public exercise of public advocacy during
the early-twentieth century; however, as will be shown, the scope of the AJC’s public advocacy
efforts, and the resources the organization devoted to building the infrastructure needed to carry
out public advocacy, suggests that the Committee had more ambitious social and political aims
beyond the fight against literacy tests and immigration restrictions and the abrogation campaign.
Naomi Cohen’s Not Free to Desist is the leading work on the early history of the
American Jewish Committee, and contains the most substantial analysis of the of the
Committee’s involvement in public advocacy before the escalation of the Vietnam War. She
summarizes the Committee’s approach to public advocacy by noting that the organization was
always deliberate in its actions, cautious about publicity, and wanted to control statements
purportedly made on behalf of the American Jewish community: “The Committee's tactics called
for a moderate campaign, gauging the proper moment to apply pressure and restraining
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individual Jews for making incorrect or intemperate statements. It frowned upon indiscriminate
agitation which not only ‘wasted powder and shot’ but stimulated activity among opponents.”317
According to Cohen, the American Jewish Committee was uncomfortable asking Jewish
lawmakers to act as spokesmen for Jewish causes because of how this activity might affect the
general public’s perception of the American Jewish community. The Committee “preferred to
avoid situations in which a Jewish congressman, posing as the champion of his people, might
attempt to direct policy independently of the Jewish stewards.”318 In her opinion, the same
concerns about perception also led the leaders of the AJC to publically repudiate the idea of a
Jewish vote (or Jewish voting blocs) even though, according to both Cohen and Goldstein, the
AJC was comfortable reminding vulnerable lawmakers about the potential influence of Jewish
voters in specific districts and, at times, made representations about the Committee’s ability to
sway Jewish voters. “Although the Committee preferred to deny publicly the existence of a
Jewish vote, even on specific questions,” Cohen notes that the organization “used that vote as a
weapon when bargaining with political leaders. For pragmatic purposes it realized that the
strength of a minority in a democracy rested on the ballot.”319
Cohen’s study emphasises the reluctance of the American Jewish Committee to engage in
forms of public advocacy; however, some of the material she includes in her study, and in her
later work on the AJC, demonstrates that the AJC was far more involved, and far more
concerned with public advocacy, than she acknowledged.320 Cohen's assessment of the AJC’s
approach to public advocacy is surprising given that some of her own work sheds light on the
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public advocacy work of the AJC, particularly in the treaty abrogation campaign and the
Committee’s efforts to maintain liberal immigration policies in the United States.321
During the abrogation campaign, for example, Cohen argues that the “gravity of the
situation and the high stakes encouraged the Committee to let down its usual conservative guard
and use more daring tactics. Not only did it discard backstairs diplomacy in favor of a public
campaign, but it also cultivated cooperation with non-Jews and threw its weight into the political
arena.”322 The organization earmarked twenty-five thousand dollars for the campaign, which
included the distribution of thousands of copies of pro-abrogation materials.323 In the late stages
of the campaign, the Committee supported the staging of mass protest rallies.324 In fact, the AJC
organized “an enormous abrogation rally in New York City which featured appearances by two
Presidential hopefuls, Woodrow Wilson and Champ Clark,” as well as speeches from several
Senators and Congressman, and William Randolph Hearst.325
In assessing this campaign, Cohen concludes that the AJC “succeeded in arousing
American public opinion and forcing the hand of an antagonistic administration.”326 While
Cohen identifies the AJC’s public support of the abrogation campaign as unprecedented in the
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history of the organization, she concludes that this campaign was a dramatic exception to the
strategies and approaches that typically shaped the AJC’s public advocacy work. According to
Cohen, the campaign was a singular instance of self-confidence from the otherwise cautious
Committee. 327
It is true that the first generation of AJC leaders did not engage in any further public
relations and public advocacy campaigns on the scale, and of the same visibility, as the
abrogation campaign; however, the organization did not retreat from efforts to influence
American public opinion. In the years after the abrogation campaign, until the death of Louis
Marshall, the Committee cultivated and practiced more subtle, and long-term, but nevertheless
still public, approaches to influencing public opinion.
Cohen’s assessment of the AJC’s public advocacy is surprising because she
acknowledges that the AJC believed that efforts to educate the public, and gather and
disseminate information, were part of the organization’s mandate. The American Jewish
Committee, according to Cohen, “strongly stressed ‘enlightenment’ as its proper function as
defense agency.”328 Not Free to Desist contains numerous examples of the AJC engaging in
public advocacy or building the institutions its leaders believed would help the organization
achieve its political objectives. In addition to the treaty abrogation campaign, Cohen cites the
distribution of articles on czarist Russia, the exposure of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion as a
forgery, and the research the AJC commission to analyze the economic effects of immigration as
examples when Committee resources were “directed to mobilize mass sympathy for immediate
and concrete problems.”329 Her view is also surprising because Cohen acknowledges that the
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Committee used books and pamphlets, including the studies it sponsored, such as Jewish
Disabilities and the Balkan States, Jews in the Eastern War Zone, and Jewish Contributions to
Civilization, to further its objectives.330
There were numerous additional and ambitious AJC-sponsored efforts to influence
American public opinion that were given little attention or left out of Cohen's account. For
example, Cohen gives very little consideration to the AJC’s attempt to catalogue an honor role of
all Jews who served in the American armed forces during the First World War.331 This is again
surprising given, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, the significant financial resources that the
AJC devoted to this project. Cohen acknowledges that, after World War I, the Committee
exhibited an “increased sensitivity to anti-Semitic manifestations. Statements and articles
containing derogatory remarks about Jews were systematically tracked down and answered.”332
Her study, however, does not provide a survey of these numerous cases nor detail the
organization’s strategy and deliberations when deciding how to (or if to) respond to a variety of
different manifestations of anti-Semitism in the United States. One of the purposes of this study
is to provide a more complete survey of everything that the first generation of AJC leaders tried
to do to curb the growth of anti-Semitism in the United States, and to describe the advocacy and
public relations strategies that underlay those efforts.
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Not Free to Desist contains accounts of the internal development of the AJC’s advocacy
infrastructure. The significance of these institutional developments, however, is downplayed in
favor of an interpretation of the AJC’s public advocacy that stresses the group’s exercise of quiet
diplomacy and emphasises the continuity between the AJC’s activities and Jewish communal
leadership traditions. The significance of these efforts should not be diminished. Ironically, some
of Cohen’s descriptions of these developments convey their magnitude. For example, she writes:
Seeing scientific inquiry as a tool for social planning, [the
Committee] assumed many of the tasks of a research bureau. At the
first level was self-edification. Since it was axiomatic that the
Committee leaders should know the situation of Jews abroad, they
invited reports from officials of other Jewish organizations, gave
financial assistance to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, and
employed a staff to read and translate foreign periodicals. They
initiated research on the general subject of race classification and
ferreted out legal precedents for abrogating a treaty or for using
American consulates as refuges for pogrom victims. They wanted
to know the number of Jewish congregations and the number of
Jewish criminals, how American Jewish farmers lived, how
Prohibition would affect Jewish religious practices.
The Committee set up a Bureau of Jewish Statistics, which
later was amalgamated into the Bureau of Jewish Social Research
and Statistics. It also assumed responsibility for the publication of
the American Jewish Year Book…on whose articles the executive
expended a great deal of thought. The Committee’s statistical
machinery permitted it to cooperate with the government in the
periodic censuses of religious bodies and, more important, to
disseminate significant information to the general public.333
The development of the Committee’s infrastructure was crucial to its practice of public
advocacy. Cohen states that “Obviously, all this activity was not purely disinterested”334 but, in
Not Free to Desist, she is reluctant to emphasize the broader social and political significance of
these efforts. Admittedly, it is an uncomfortable and potentially provocative notion to
acknowledge that a group of wealthy Jews sought to sway public opinion in the United States
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and devoted considerable financial resources to achieving that goal. Cohen avoids the question of
the wide-ranging ambitions of the AJC’s public advocacy, but she bluntly rejects the notion that
the activities of the AJC were designed to shape the beliefs and attitudes of American Jews. She
states: “Nor did [the Committee] ever seriously consider how it might shape the thinking of the
American Jewish community. It remained aloof, ever the beneficent patrician—a guardian, yet a
spectator—until the world-shaking events of the 1930s launched upon new paths.”335
As this dissertation will show, the evidence available in the AJC's archives suggests that
this is not an accurate assessment of the activities of the first generation of AJC leaders. Through
their philanthropy, which encouraged the acculturation of new Jewish immigrants, and through
public relations efforts, which sought to influence the social and political beliefs of both
American Jews and the broader American public, the organization was self-consciously involved
in an effort to shape American public opinion.
Additionally, the Committee’s earliest public advocacy efforts went beyond insular
Jewish issues. Cohen states that before the First World War “the Committee’s concern
encompassed merely the Jew, but it would be only a short step to the realization that the struggle
for freedom in America is indivisible, that it could not be won within the confines of a single
ethnic group.”336 Some leaders of the AJC recognized this from the very beginning and were
conscious of framing the issues that were of concern to them as matters of ensuring and
perfecting American democracy, not merely defending or securing the social status and political
rights of American Jews. Their methods were often subtle, but the American Jewish Committee
was neither aloof nor disinterested in exercising its influence to shape the social and political
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culture of the United States and the political beliefs and social attitudes of the broader American
public.
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Chapter 3: The Historical Context of the Founding of the AJC
Introduction: Interest Group Scholarship
The American Jewish Committee has been described as a communal advocacy
organization, a communal defense organization, a communal leadership body, a Jewish group, a
civil rights organization, a human rights organization, an elite cabal, and a lobby group.
Arguably, the most fitting and neutral (or least inflammatory) label for the AJC is to describe it
as an “interest group.” In contemporary society, interest groups have attracted a great deal of
media attention, public scrutiny, and academic commentary because of criticism of their role in
shaping public opinion and foreign and domestic policy.337 At the very least, it is fair to state that
interest groups are recognized by political leaders and the general public in modern democratic
states as significant, although not necessarily good faith or virtuous, participants in governmental
decisions making at all levels, from local to international.
Today, the AJC is considered a part of the so-called “Israel lobby.” For example, the
Committee is mentioned numerous times in John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt’s wellknown book The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.338 Mearsheimer and Walt’s book, which
was published in 2007, generated significant controversy and provoked substantial protest from
American Jewish organizations and other interests groups because it claimed that the “real
reason why American politicians are so deferential [to Israel] is the political power of the Israel
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lobby.”339 At the time of the founding of the AJC in 1906, there was no State of Israel and, as
noted earlier in this study, the Committee’s attitude toward Jewish political sovereignty has
changed over time, but the organization has always been an interest group and it has always been
concerned about its public image, public relations, and public advocacy. While Mearsheimer and
Walt’s work has been praised by some for its bravery in exposing the truth and derided by others
as anti-Semitic, it is significant that they also wrote that “Like the efforts of other ethnic lobbies
and interest groups, the activities of the Israel lobby’s various elements are legitimate forms of
democratic participation, and they are for the most part consistent with America’s long tradition
of interest group activity.”340 Interest groups like the AJC, and many others, have a long history
of trying to exert political influence in the United States.
Possibly because of their larger public profile, interest groups have recently been given
more attention by scholars, particularly political scientists seeking to explain their formation,
their perseverance, their role in modern democratic states, and the means they employ to
influence public policy and public opinion. The scholarship on interest groups is sufficiently
large, specialized, and enduring to have recognized landmark works including David Truman’s
The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, C. Wright Mills’ The Power
Elite,341 Robert Dahl’s Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City,342 and
Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.343
In The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, David Truman
defines interest groups as “any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes
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certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or
enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes.”344 This definition is
often cited by other scholars in the field and is sufficiently broad to encompass the diverse work
of the American Jewish Committee, including its earliest public advocacy and public relations
activities, and its efforts to prevent an intensification of anti-Semitism in the United States during
the early-twentieth century.345
In their introduction to Interest Groups Unleashed, Paul S. Herrnson, Christopher J.
Deering, and Clyde Wilcox argue that interest groups have consistently been active in the
American political process. “Throughout American history,” they argue, “interest groups have
sought to influence public policy. The right of citizens to organize and petition government is
enshrined in the First Amendment of the Constitution, and groups of farmers, workers, bankers,
religious activists, environmentalists, and others long have used their money, manpower, and
ability to lobby national government.”346 Herrnson, Deering, and Wilcox further argue that
interest group activity, although always political in nature, has never been limited to the lobbying
of lawmakers. The work of these groups has always been broader, including attempts to “lobby
government officials, the media, and the general public in an effort to influence laws and
regulations.”347
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As noted earlier in this study, David Truman argued that the “formation of associations
tends to occur in waves.”348 In the historiography on interests groups, the early-twentieth century
has been identified as an important period in the development of these organizations in the
United States. The foundation of the AJC can be seen as a manifestation of a historical trend in
early-twentieth-century America that saw the proliferation of larger, more sophisticated, and
more ambitious social and political organizations. James Q. Wilson, for example, mentions the
formation of the American Jewish Committee as part of a “great burst in the organization of
associations, especially those of national scope” that “took place in the first two decades of the
twentieth century.”349 According to Wilson, “There has never been anything like it before or
since.”350 In addition to the AJC, among the notable national organizations founded during this
period were the United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of
Manufacturers, and the American Medical Association.
In the scholarship on interests groups, there is no generally accepted single “grand
theory” in the field, although attempts have been made to develop an overarching model for
studying interests groups as “either impediments to or instruments of democracy.”351 Scholarship
in this field has been diverse in terms of methods and perspectives, including “normative
theory,” which seeks to both understand and assess the democratic merit or legitimacy of the
348
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activities of interest groups, and “formal theory,” which relies heavily upon Mancur Olson’s
theories.352 There is also a considerable body of scholarship on interests groups that attempts to
use empirical models to study these organizations. As already noted in the introduction to this
study, a number of scholars have developed and applied different empirical models to measure or
assess the impact of the advocacy work of interests groups and which attempt to quantify the
influence of these organizations on the outcomes of specific policy debates.353
In their 1998 book Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and Political
Science, Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech analyzed a significant amount of the academic
research on interest groups published between 1950 and 1995.354 Among other
recommendations, they called for scholars to be more sensitive to the context in which interest
groups form and attempt to exert influence. Less than twenty years later, in a review of existing
scholarship in the field, which was published in 2012, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, Frank
R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Barry, and Beth L. Leech, concluded that “considerable progress”
had been made in the field in paying more attention to context.355 They argued, however, that
attention to context remains important because “Efforts to systematically observe groups in the
environments in which they develop, make decisions, and take action, and in a way that
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recognizes the variation in those environments, could advance not only our understanding of
groups but also our understanding of politics and policy making more generally.”356
In light of these suggestions about more thoroughly exploring the context of the creation
and activities of interest groups, Chapter 3 of this dissertation provides a review of the historical
context which led to the founding of the AJC, including an examination of the social, economic,
and political divisions that existed between the early-twentieth-century American Jewish
establishment and the rapidly growing community of Eastern European and Russian Jewish
immigrants to the United States. This review also includes discussions of the impact of the
dynamics of race in early-twentieth century America on Jewish public advocacy, identifies the
motivations of the founders of the AJC, and substantiates the argument of this study that the
early public advocacy activities of the Committee have been misunderstood or under-appreciated
in the historiography on the Committee and the historiography on American Jewry.

The Stimuli for New Approaches to Jewish Public Advocacy in America
The founding of the AJC, the goals that it pursued, and the means that it employed are
connected to most of the important events and controversies in the historiography on latenineteenth and early-twentieth-century American Jewry. Most importantly, the establishment of
the Committee is connected to the well-documented social, political, and religious divisions that
existed between American Jews of German descent and those of Eastern European and Russian
descent, and the conflicts within the American Jewish community that accompanied the rise of
Communism and the emergence of the modern Zionist movement. Additionally, the dynamics of
racial identity, and the centrality of questions of race in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
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century American society and politics, influenced the advocacy strategies the AJC’s founders
developed and the projects they chose to support. The AJC’s social and political agenda, and the
advocacy techniques that the organization developed and employed, were shaped by the intracommunal divisions in American Jewry, the American Jewish establishment’s status insecurity,
and this elite community’s fears about an intensification of both religion and race-based antiSemitism in the United States. Several important historical factors came together to act as stimuli
for a new approach to public advocacy that included efforts to influence American public
opinion, and to utilize the rule of law and the oversight powers of constitutional courts in the
United States.

Jews in the American Racial Binary
The founders of the American Jewish Committee could not avoid confronting the
dynamics of race and race relations in the United States during the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth century. Race and questions of racial identity have shaped the United States’ social and
political evolution. Even today, social divisions, economic disparities, and antagonism between
ethnic groups remain prominent in contemporary America. The institution, abolition, and legacy
of slavery, the presence of a substantial (and unassimilated) indigenous population, the growth
through waves of immigration of large communities of ethnic minorities, and the social and
political power consistently exercised by a Caucasian (largely Protestant) patrician class, made
race and racial identification perhaps the most prominent aspect of the country’s nationalism and
national identity until the middle of the twentieth century. Gary Gerstle describes this
phenomenon as the “enduring potency of the racialized tradition of American nationalism…This
was the tradition that held that full privileges and opportunities were to be granted to particular
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‘racial’ groups and not to others. It rooted nationality in race and declared that certain national
groups should be barred from the United States because they possessed racial traits that rendered
them unassimilable.”357 In a nation founded and built through immigration, questions and
uncertainties about who could belong, about who could become insiders and who would always
remain outsiders, were central and, crucially, these considerations informed debates about
American national identify well into the twentieth century. This section will describe how
American Jews and Jewish immigrants’ attempts to acculturate into American society
complicated the strict white or black racial binary operating in the United States. This section
will also describe how questions of race, and Jewish efforts to secure identification as white,
shaped the advocacy tactics of the American Jewish Committee.358
Historian Eric L. Goldstein notes that “whites [in the United States have] consistently
tried to understand the racial landscape through the categories ‘black’ and ‘white.’”359 Goldstein
argues that “Jews gradually became Caucasian over the course of the twentieth century.”360
American Jewry’s leadership organizations, including the AJC, spearheaded the efforts of
American Jews to claim the social standing and privileges of whiteness while simultaneously
campaigning to erode the social, legal, and political significance of race in the United States.
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From their first appearance in America, Jews were recognized as different.361 This early
differentiation, however, was a matter of religion as opposed to race. “In the early republic,”
Matthew Frye Jacobson notes, “Jewishness was most often taken up as a matter not of racial
difference marked by physicality, but of religious difference marked by a stubborn and benighted
failure to see Truth.”362 Jews and anti-Semitic sentiments were present in the United States
during the earliest history of the nation but, during this period, animosity towards Jews was
grounded in the alleged complicity of the community in the execution of Jesus and disparaging
stereotypes about their commercial activities. A racial basis for anti-Jewish bigotry only gained
currency in the United States during the second half of the nineteenth century and coincided with
an intensification of a racialized conception of the nation’s identity. It also coincided with the
first wave of substantial Jewish immigration to the United States, the rise of eugenics, and the
popularization of so-called scientific theories of racism and racial superiority. The intensification
of anti-Semitism in the United States during this period “was part of a broader pattern of latenineteenth-century racism against all southern and eastern European immigrants, as well as
against Asian immigrants…African Americans, Native American, and Mexicans.”363
During the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, public debates and discussions of
race and the social and political position of American whites became increasingly animated as
the power of the Caucasian majority (and white Protestant elites) was being eroded by the
dramatic growth of immigrant populations, including European immigrants such Italian and Irish
Catholics and Russian Jews, who, as will be discussed further below, were Caucasian in terms of
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skin tone but were not perceived as white by the white Protestant patrician class and were
therefore denied the social standing and privileges of whiteness in the United States. Karen
Brodkin notes that the “late nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth century saw a
steady stream of warnings by scientists, policymakers, and the popular press that
‘mongrelization’ of the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon race—the real Americans—by inferior
European races (as well as by inferior non-European ones) was destroying the fabric of the
nation.”364 Concerns about the decline of American whites (through both immigration and
intermixing or “miscegenation”) were widely expressed during the era, including in influential
books such as Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race (1916)365 and Lothrop Stoddard’s
The Rising Tide of Color against White World Supremacy (1920).366
The racial status of American Jews became entangled in these debates as the Jewish
population of the United States grew and the community became more conspicuous. Nineteenthcentury German Jewish immigrants to the United States made a conscious effort to acculturate
into the gentile majority. They aimed to “pass as white” and their relatively small numbers, their
skin tone, their rapid rise into the middle, upper-middle, and professional classes, and their
embrace of (or conformity to) the American way of life made their effort to attain the status and
privileges of whiteness possible. “The eagerness to be white,” Brodkin notes “is not hard to
understand, since whiteness [in America] is a state of privilege and belonging.”367 The arrival of
over a million impoverished, Orthodox, and politically radical Eastern European Jewish
immigrants threatened this status and the advocacy tactics and rhetoric about race adopted by the
AJC sought to mitigate the harm to the reputation of American Jewry, and the social acceptance
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of Jews in American society, caused by the dramatic growth of a new immigrant population that
was perceived as both religiously different and racially inferior.
American Jewish leadership organizations were conscious of questions of race and how
the perception of their community’s racial identity (or racial status in the black or white binary)
would shape how mainstream American society treated American Jews and recent Jewish
immigrants. Gerstle notes that “Eastern and southern Europeans…felt the sting of racial
prejudice and sought to escape it. One way was to devote oneself to America’s civic nationalist
tradition and to fight for an end to all forms of racial discrimination. Another way was to hide
one’s lowly ethnic origins and to emulate ‘the Nordic’ in the hopes that somehow one could join
the loftiest American race. In the 1930s, these two responses coexisted side by side, sometimes
in the mind of the same individuals.”368 Long before the 1930s, however, communal leaders of
minority communities sponsored parallel efforts to both gain the privileges of whiteness and
subvert the social and political conventions (and laws) that maintained racialized distinctions
between American citizens of different colors and different faiths. Goldstein argues that
European immigrants including Italians, Irish, and Eastern European Jews “did not automatically
become white on these shores, but had to learn and claim this status as they acculturated.”369
During their earliest advocacy efforts, the leaders of the AJC tried to assert American Jewry’s
claim to the social standing and privileges of whiteness even as they campaigned and lobbied to
end discrimination based on racial and religious difference. Indeed, as will be discussed
throughout this study, concerns about the perception of Jews as a race (or as “a people,” as a
religious minority, and as “ordinary” or “regular” Americans) shaped the Committee’s
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approaches to public advocacy and were at the heart of their campaign to prevent an
intensification of anti-Semitism in the United States during the twentieth century.
In comparison to visible minority communities, American Jewry possessed advantages in
their campaign to claim the status and privileges of whiteness in the United States. Despite
widely held and disparaging views about supposedly common and identifiable Jewish physical
characteristics, American Jews, including both the German Jewish immigrants of the midnineteenth century and the later waves of Eastern European and Russian Jews, were
Caucasian.370 However, Goldstein notes that “in multiple ways, claiming the status of ‘whites’ in
America was far from simple for Jews. It involved a complex emotional process in which
conflicting desires for acceptance and distinctiveness often found no easy balance.”371 Apart
from how they were viewed by others, and how they tried to influence how they were viewed by
others, there was a countervailing and differentiating racial component to how American Jews in
both the establishment and new immigrant communities self-identified, to how they conceived of
their identity and their relationship and ties to their coreligionists regardless of national origin or
skin color.372 The “notion that Jews shared a racial identity had an emotional appeal that tugged
against the benefits of joining America’s privileged white majority.”373

370

Beyond questions of physical appearance, a further impediment to Jews being accepted into the white
mainstream in the United States during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century was language and spoken
accents. The German Jews who made up the early-twentieth-century American Jewish establishment learned
English but they could not shed their native accents. For example, according to Stephen Birmingham, when
speaking English, Jacob Schiff’s “accent made him difficult to understand.” See: Stephen Birmingham, ‘Our
Crowd:’ The Great Jewish Families of New York (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 309. Similarly, the
Yiddish speaking immigrants who arrived later could be distinguished by their accents and the extent of their
command of the English language. For both groups of immigrants, it was their American-born children who, by the
sound of their voice, would be able to more fully acculturate into the white, American mainstream.
371
Goldstein, 3.
372
This inclusive conception of Jewish “peoplehood” that transcended the racial diversity of Jewish communities
around the world did not prevent members of the American Jewish establishment from using the rhetoric of racial
difference to distinguish between themselves and their newly arrived coreligionists. At times, questions of race
permeated debates within the American Jewish community about their communal identity and conception of
“peoplehood.” With the increasing arrival of Eastern European Jews in the United States, the German Jews of the

155

In the context of the categorization of people as either black or white, the racial
component of Jewish self-identification was problematic. “An ethnic or racial conception of
Jewish identity edged close to the beliefs of anti-Semites who would fence Jews out of the white
mainstream. It resonated with the views of most white Protestant patricians.”374 Further,
asserting Jewish racial distinctiveness, while authentically felt and a matter of pride within the
community, conflicted with how the American Jewish establishment wanted the Jewish
community to be perceived by the mainstream. “While the knowledge that they were considered
a problematic group in the American racial schema motivated Jews to try to conform to the
prevailing racial paradigm and identify themselves unambiguously as white, their ongoing
commitment to a distinctive identity often cut against their attempts to claim whiteness.”375 This
tension between Jewish distinctiveness and commonality with the white American majority
shaped the early public advocacy of the American Jewish Committee. As will be discussed
further below, in their public advocacy on behalf of American Jewry, the AJC sought to
marginalize and minimize public discussion of the racial component of Jewish self-identification,
even as key members of this leadership cohort believed deeply in the notion of Jews as a distinct
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race (or people) and spoke privately about their community using the rhetoric of racial
difference.376
As Karen Brodkin argues, American Jews would eventually be perceived as “white
folks” but, during their acculturation into American society, American Jewry experienced
coercion to adopt the manners and style of white patricians from both the majority culture and
from within their community.377 According to Goldstein: “Certainly Jews…pursued whiteness; it
was key to their meteoric rise to become one of the most successful American ethnic groups. But
there was also a good deal of coercion involved in the process by which Jews became part of the
white majority.”378 External pressure in the form of social exclusion and discrimination was one
aspect of this coercion but conformity was also impressed upon new Jewish immigrants by the
American Jewish establishment, who sponsored a series of philanthropic and education programs
to accelerate the pace of the acculturation of their coreligionists and, in their public advocacy on
behalf of the community, sought to present Jews as white, ordinary Americans.
American Jews felt that they had a racial identity but the AJC publically denied that
identity, and sought to suppress public expressions of the idea of Jewish racial distinctiveness,
for the sake of how their community would be perceived and in order to obtain for American
Jewry the benefits of having the status of being white in America. In the case of the members of
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the organization’s leadership, all of whom had already acculturated into American society, it
must be noted that they were also seeking to preserve the social status that they enjoyed and
believed they had earned.
With few exceptions, notwithstanding the beliefs of American Jews and their own
personal identification with Jewishness distinctiveness, during the period covered by this study,
the extent to which the leaders of the AJC sought to minimize discussions of Jews as a distinct
race and the racial component of Jewish identity is striking. 379 AJC leaders lobbied for the
exclusion of the racial category “Hebrews” from the national census and investigations led by the
United States Immigration Commission.380 At the Versailles Peace conference in 1919, AJC
leaders promoted the inclusion of minority rights and protections for minority communities in
the treaty but explicitly rejected using race as the basis for defining who would be entitled to
these rights and, potentially, the protection of the League of Nations.381 They were concerned
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that using the rhetoric of racial difference to describe the Jewish communities that were scattered
across the redrawn borders of postwar Europe would impact how Jews were perceived in the
United States. “During the 1924 hearings on immigration restriction, Jewish advocates had
publically avoided identifying Jews as a race or people and instead had insisted that Jews
belonged to the ‘white race.’”382 Although they received numerous requests, the AJC
consistently declined to participate in or to finance studies that tried to substantiate claims of
Jewish racial difference or that described Jews as constituting a separate race.383 They also
declined to assist in the publication of books that emphasized the racial component of Jewish
identity.384
Concerns about how race would impact the treatment and social acceptance of Jews in
the United States shaped Jewish political activism during the early-twentieth century but, as
already noted, the AJC’s leaders were themselves conflicted, as was the Jewish community that
they were was attempting to lead and to represent. “Ultimately,” Goldstein argues, “despite
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growing fears about how race might be used against them, few American Jews could depart with
a racial self-understanding.”385 Racial distinctiveness and notions of Jewish “peoplehood”
continued to shape how Jews conceived of their identity but, for the AJC, it was important that
discussions of Jews as a distinct race remain within the community. The AJC sought to promote
the idea that Jews were only different from other white Americans in terms of their religious
beliefs and that this was an irrelevant difference in a society which possessed a deeply
entrenched reverence for freedom of religion. Jewish racial distinctiveness was something that
they did not want to draw attention to; it was a notion that they did not want scrutinized (or
embraced) by white Protestant patricians and the broader American public.

The Anxiety of the American Jewish Establishment
The German Jews that immigrated to the United States in the mid-nineteenth century
prospered in America. The majority had arrived in the United States poor, but they rose quickly
into the middle class and some into the upper echelons of the wealthy. Many had amassed
considerable fortunes or risen to prominent positions in the professions, the judiciary, and civil
society: “Proportionally speaking, in no other immigrant group in American history have so
many men ascended so fast from rags to riches as had this first generation of German Jews.”386
This earlier generation of Jewish immigrants embraced the Reform movement, at the
time the most liberal denomination of Judaism, and made a conscious effort to integrate into
American society. The Reform movement’s emphasis on distinguishing between private
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worship, which preserved some elements of traditional Jewish ritual, and public behavior, which
was consistent with the way of life of the gentile majority, was an important component of how a
number of the early leaders of the AJC conceived of American Jewish identity. Many of the
AJC’s early leaders were also members of Reform synagogues, including Louis Marshall, who,
in addition to his other professional and civic commitments, was a board member and president
of New York’s Temple Emmanuel, the flagship synagogue of the Reform movement in the
United States.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the American Jews of German descent were
the wealthiest, most politically secure, and socially-confident Jewish community in history.387
The German American Jews also had the good fortune to be members of one of the largest
Jewish communities in history to be full citizens of a democratic polity. German-American
Jewry had adapted to the American way of life and integrated into American society. They were
a prosperous, tolerated, patriotic, and largely invisible, minority community. As will be
discussed below, the influx of significant numbers of impoverished and Orthodox Russian and
Eastern European Jews into the United States during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
century was a source of considerable anxiety for these acculturated German American Jews.
They had successfully integrated into American society and, in defense of their own social status
and reputation, they began to encourage the acculturation of new Jewish immigrants.
In the historiography and social science research on the social integration of immigrant
and minority communities, the separate processes of acculturation and assimilation are often
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conflated.388 Indeed, the processes of acculturation and assimilation often occur at the same time,
and both are connected to the progression of integration that can occur when established
communities absorb new immigrants or when new immigrants adapt to their new social and
political conditions. Acculturation and assimilation, however, can be distinguished from each
other. In brief, assimilation implies a fusion or exchange of identities, where a minority
population adopts the custom and beliefs of the majority. Assimilation is “a process of
interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and
attitudes of other persons or groups; and, by sharing their experience and history, are
incorporated with them in a common cultural life.”389 In contrast, acculturation implies greater
balance between the preservation of tradition and accommodating or adopting the ways of life of
the majority. Acculturation also implies greater agency on the part of minority populations, as
they choose where and how to change their customs, conform to the behaviour of the majority, or
preserve elements of their ethnic, religious, and cultural heritage.
The distinction between assimilation and acculturation has been an important and often
debated topic in the historiography on the social history of modern Jewish communities,
particularly regarding countries where emancipated Jewish communities or new Jewish
immigrants transitioned relatively quickly from poverty and social isolation into the middle
class. Some historians are reluctant to describe Jewish integration as assimilation. For example,
in her book The Making of the Jewish Middle Class: Women, Family, and Identity in Imperial
Germany, Marion A. Kaplan argues that “German Jews acculturated to German society, but they
388
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did not ‘assimilate’…The terms ‘assimilation’ implies that the vast majority of Jews sought to
fuse with other Germans in the desire to give up their religious or cultural distinctiveness. It
suggests a kind of submission, an exchange of ‘Jewishness’ for ‘Germanness.’”390 In her view,
acculturation, including the acceptance of external, objective behaviour and standards of the
dominant culture, more accurately describes the integration of German Jewry. 391 Kaplan argues
that labelling the integration of German Jewry into Germany society as assimilation ignores the
conscious efforts of German Jews, including the efforts of German Jewish women in the private
sphere, to balance the preservation of their traditions with the accommodation of middle-class
German mores. 392 German Jews earnestly embraced a German identity; they wanted to be seen
as fellow citizens, but neither Judaism nor Jewishness disappeared in Germany in the aftermath
of Jewish emancipation and the integration of some Jews into German society.
For the present purposes of discussing the integration of German Jews into American
society, these notions of assimilation and acculturation are helpful. It can be argued that Reform
movement Judaism, which originated in Germany but flourished in America, was an expression
of the agency of German Jews in attempting to balance the preservation of elements of their
religious heritage with demands (or pressure) for social conformity from the majority.393 The
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term acculturation is preferred by historians of Jewish integration because nowhere in modern
Jewish history was the melding between the dominant and minority culture ever complete. Jews
across the Diaspora have a well-documented history of privileging the preservation of their
religion, culture, and heritage over complete immersion into the society and culture of the
majority among whom they live.
Acculturation is not only an individual process; the phenomenon also occurs at the
communal level where leaders, often economic elites, are able to exercise influence on how
minority communities adapt to new social and political conditions. Weighing the role of elites in
acculturation is significant for any examination of the history of Jewish integration because,
historically, Jewish communal organizations actively engaged in efforts to promote social
integration. Indeed, according to Paula E. Hyman, it was elites who were the vanguards at
succeeding in reshaping Jewish communal institutions and encouraged acculturation.394
In the United States, during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, elites among
German American Jewry actively tried to encourage the acculturation of their Eastern European
coreligionists. These efforts were the foundation of a pattern of elite intervention in both
influencing the behavior of new Jewish immigrants and trying to shape how that community was
perceived by the majority of Americans. The motivations for these efforts defined the
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relationship between German American Jews and new Jewish immigrants, and profoundly
shaped Jewish public advocacy in the United States, including the work of the American Jewish
Committee, during the early-twentieth century.
At the turn of the century, acculturated German American Jews enjoyed unprecedented
prosperity, security, and stability; nevertheless, there was considerable anxiety among the leaders
of this community about the potential consequences of an en masse wave of new Jewish
immigrants from Eastern Europe and from Russia arriving in the United States. There was also
anxiety that the rise of Socialism, Communism, and Zionism, and the popularity of these
movements among recent Jewish immigrants to the United States, would foster a belief among
the broader American public that Jews were not, and could not be, loyal, true, or patriotic
Americans.
By the late-nineteenth century, the so-called Ostjuden, who were more religious and
traditional then their coreligionists of German descent, made up the overwhelming majority of
new Jewish immigrants to the United States. The Ostjuden were for the most part poor. As many
had spent years in religious study, they did not have the practical skills and abilities that would
have been acquired through a secular education. They were also an insular community, and, in
contrast to the German-Jewish immigrants and Reform Jews, maintained many “old country”
traditions and customs in their new American home and resented the condescension and “cold
philanthropy” of the establishment Jewish community.395 According to historian Gerald Sorin,
there was reciprocal resentment and antipathy between the groups.396 In short, while the Jews of
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German descent had become acculturated and practically indistinguishable from the white,
Christian American majority, the Ostjuden, by customs, appearance, and communal insularity,
were outsiders in America. The establishment community of Jews of German descent viewed the
dramatic growth of the Yiddish-speaking immigrant population as a threat397 to their stability and
security in the United States.398
In assessing the concerns of the established Jewish community, it is necessary to ask
whether there was any need or justification for their anxiety. A great deal has been written on the
“exceptional” historical experience of Jews in the United States.399 This historiography argues
that American Jewish history can be distinguished from the history of other Diaspora Jewish
communities because cultural and racial anti-Semitism never became widely entrenched among
the majority of Christian Americans, and because anti-Semitism was never embraced by any
major American political party. According to this school of thought, the American Jewish
experience is exceptional because, in contrast to Jewish history in Western and Eastern Europe,
the “Jewish question” was never posed in the United States. American Jews “at no point
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underwent an emancipation process wherein they needed to prove themselves worthy of
citizenship. They became citizens at the founding of the republic without special
consideration.”400
The absence of official oppression and persecution, however, does not entail social
acceptance.401 The absence of the worst outrages of European anti-Semitism does not mean that
Jews felt truly comfortable in America. There were anti-Jewish sentiments among the general
American population, much of which was rooted in longstanding accusations such as the charge
of deicide.402 According to historians Robert Rockaway and Arnon Gutfeld, “demonic
representations of the Jew appeared frequently in American culture throughout the [nineteenth]
century.”403 The broader American public was regularly exposed to anti-Semitic tropes in
sermons, school textbooks, and popular literature.
The intensification of anti-Semitism in the United States was a nineteenth-century
historical development. According to Richard B. Morris, “Anti-Semitism was definitely out of
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fashion in the America of the Revolutionary Era.”404 Prior to the 1840s, the Jewish population of
the United States was very small, numbering less than 50,000 across the entire country.405 As the
Jewish population of the United States grew, and as some prosperous Jews tried to enter elite
Protestant social circles, anti-Semitism surfaced in the form of social exclusion;406 however, antiSemitism in the United States intensified in the decades after the American Civil War.407 “From
the end of the Civil War until the beginning of the twentieth century,” Leonard Dinnerstein
argues, “the United States witnessed the emergence of a full-fledged antisemitic society. Like the
hysteria exhibited during the war, the institutionalized bigotry that developed afterwards
reflected the biases of practically every stratum in society.”408 Hostility towards Jews
transgressed class and religious divides in America during this period.409 “Anti-Jewish feeling in
the late-nineteenth century was the product of a complex constellation of forces. It was tied to
general nativism, rooted mainly in agrarian regions, and was reinforced by elites who perceived
their displacement in a rapidly changing society.”410 As in other historical periods, the Jews were
a convenient scapegoat for the societal challenges that accompany dramatic social, economic,
and political change. In the case of the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century,
those challenges followed the industrialization of the economy, and the rapid growth of an

404

Richard B. Morris, “The Role of Jews in the American Revolution in Historical Perspective,” in American Jewish
History: The Colonial and Early National Periods, 1654-1840, ed. Jeffrey S. Gurock (New York: Routledge, 2013),
60.
405
Leonard Dinnerstein, Antisemitism in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 24.
406
The Jewish population of the United States numbered only 4,500 in 1830. By 1845, the Jewish population had
grown to approximately 40,000. At the start of the American Civil War, there were approximately 150,000 Jews in
the United States. See, Leonard Dinnerstein, Antisemitism in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 24.
407
In both the North and the South, the political career of Judah P. Benjamin contributed to the growth of antiSemitic sentiments. Benjamin, a British-born Jew, had served in the Confederate Cabinet, first as Attorney General,
then as Secretary of War, and finally as Secretary of State. In the North, he was despised for being part of a
conspiracy that nearly destroyed the country; in the south, he was blamed for the Confederacy’s military defeat.
Rockaway and Gutfelt, 372.
408
Dinnerstein, 35.
409
Ibid.
410
Sorin, 36.

168

ethnically and religiously diverse population. Tobias Brinkmann argues that “Jews were
identified as agents or [sic] modernity and blamed at the same time for such contradictory
developments as radical anarchism and cutthroat capitalism.”411 The economic depression of
1893, the arrival in the United States of millions of Catholic immigrants, who had been exposed
to the anti-Semitic teachings of the Catholic Church, the emergence of the populist movement,
and the rise of eugenics and a racialized conception American nationalism, also contributed to an
intensification of anti-Semitism in the United States during the late-nineteenth century:412
“Together these factors created an environment that tolerated odious characterizations of
Jews.”413 While it was not distinguished by widespread violence, the German-Jews did encounter
anti-Semitism in the United States. Some of the American-born leaders of the AJC, such as
Louis Marshall and Joseph M. Proskauer, had to contend with anti-Semitism while growing up in
America.414
It is also important to note that there was a lack of formal legal protections in the United
States to prevent discrimination against any minority population, including Jews. The Supreme
Court of the United States’ 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson415 had upheld the
constitutionality of the “separate but equal” doctrine and state laws that mandated racial
segregation. Discrimination, particularly against African Americans, Asian immigrants, Latinos,
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and the country’s indigenous peoples, was legal and widely practiced. Jews were also the victims
of discriminatory practices, particularly labor force discrimination, housing discrimination in the
form of restrictive covenants on the sale of land, and social exclusion when applying for
membership in clubs and other organizations.
The German Jewish immigrants, possibly more than any other group of nineteenth and
twentieth-century European immigrants, felt acutely that they had to demonstrate their loyalty to
America, and their leaders believed that through acculturation they would gain personal security,
economic opportunities, and social acceptance. The community’s emphasis on acculturation was
supported by their experiences in Germany prior to their migration to North America. Most of
the German Jews who immigrated to the United States in the nineteenth century left before the
unification of Germany and the complete emancipation of Germany’s Jews, both of which
occurred in 1871. However, some of the kingdoms and principalities that would later be
absorbed into the unified Germany emancipated their Jewish populations long before 1871,
including some of territories with the largest Jewish populations, such as Prussia, where Jews
were granted full rights in 1812. In the territories where Jews were granted legal emancipation,
they had quickly begun to acculturate into German society. Historian Susan Roth Breitzer argues
that the German Jewish “immigrants quickly adjusted to American society, largely because
acculturation had become a way of life for the majority in the old country, thanks to legal
emancipation that was part of the general rise of the modern capitalist state.”416 The emphasis on
acculturation reflected this community’s conception of their individual and group identity. Their
identity as Jews was subordinate to their identity as Germans. Breitzer notes that, until the First
World War, many German Jewish immigrants to the United States “identified themselves more
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as German than as Jewish.”417 Now established in the United States, they wanted to be identified
by everyone as white and American. This privileging of nationality over religion, and the desire
to disseminate the notion that they felt more strongly about their country then their faith, was
consistent with the social integration practices and rhetoric of emancipated Jews in nineteenthcentury Germany. This conception of Jewish identity reflects what was expected of emancipated
Jews in the aftermath of the removal of legal disabilities in Germany. In exchange for
citizenship, including full political rights and full participation in German society, German Jews
were expected to supress public expressions of their Jewishness. This privileging of national
identity over religious identity was so entrenched among acculturated German Jews that it
endured in many even after they immigrated to the United States.418
The German-Jewish immigrants of the nineteenth century were conscious about not
appearing or behaving as if they were separate and distinct from the majority of Americans.
Their presence in the United States garnered little attention because of their relatively small
numbers and their efforts to acculturate. The arrival of well over a million impoverished
Yiddish-speaking immigrants, the concentration of their settlement in East Coast American
cities, and their Orthodox dress and customs, was noticed by the general public and was not a
matter of indifference to the established Jewish community. Throughout the period of the mass
migration of Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe, the American Jewish establishment feared
that the conspicuous growth of the immigrant Jewish community would alienate the American
public and lead to a corresponding rise in anti-Semitism in the United States. This fear would
417
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cause significant intra-communal tension between the establishment leaders of the GermanAmerican Jews and the growing population of Russian and Eastern European immigrants.
Additionally, this fear would prove to be one of the stimuli for the development of the AJC’s
approaches to Jewish public advocacy.
The American public’s perception of the growth of the Jewish immigrant population was
treated by the American Jewish establishment as a situation that had to be managed in order to
prevent an intensification of anti-Semitism. Similarly, the arrival of hundreds of thousands of
poverty-stricken Jewish immigrants fed the expansion of Jewish political and labor organizations
in the United States, and the greater political prominence of these groups was another situation
that the leaders of the American Jewish establishment believed they had to manage.
Jewish political and labor organizations of varying sizes and ideologies had been
established in the United States long before the mass arrival of Russian and Eastern European
Jewish immigrants. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, these organizations had
grown substantially and matured beyond the recruitment and indoctrination of new members;
they began to engage in forms of public advocacy, including labor strikes, boycott threats, small
public demonstrations, and large protest marches. In response to this new wave of activism,
members of the American Jewish establishment began to organize and engage in forms of public
advocacy, including the organization of non-confrontational public demonstrations and
fundraising campaigns for relief efforts. These efforts went well beyond the traditional
boundaries of the quiet diplomacy of the shtadlan and Hofjude, and, as will be described further
below, influenced the development of the AJC’s approaches to public advocacy and public
relations.
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Some of the anxiety of the American Jewish establishment would prove to be prescient.
While no major American political party adopted anti-Semitism as a part of their platform, much
of the language surrounding the early-twentieth-century debates on immigration restrictions,
including the rhetoric of racial difference used to describe the new immigrants, were only thinly
veiled (or barely veiled) warnings about the dangerous social and political consequences of
unrestricted Jewish immigration from Russia and Eastern Europe. The passage of immigration
reform legislation that included restrictive quotas in 1921 and 1924, insofar as these reforms
aimed to limit the number of Jews and other minorities among new immigrants, could be
described as a form of state-sponsored racism and anti-Semitism. At the very least, these
immigration reforms differentiated Jews from other potential immigrants on the basis of doubts
about their ability to participate in the labor force, and integrate into the American way of life.
The debate and passage of these measures, and the press coverage of the increasingly
public activities of Jewish political and labor groups, meant that acculturated Jews could no
longer conceive of themselves as an invisible minority. The presence of millions of their Eastern
European coreligionists, and the perception that they were a politically radicalized population,
had garnered significant attention that distinguished Jews, wealthy or poor, as different from the
majority of white Christian Americans. For the leaders of the acculturated German Jews, the
development of this negative perception of Jews by the broader American public was a threat
that had to be countered.
As already noted, throughout the period of mass Jewish immigration from Russia and
Eastern Europe, the American Jewish establishment was deeply concerned that the dramatic
growth of the Jewish community would result in an escalation of anti-Semitism in the United
States. They were not wrong. Their anxiety about these developments, and their efforts to shape
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how the broader American public felt about Jews, led to the establishment of the AJC and the
development of the Committee’s approaches to public advocacy, public relations, and communal
defense. The American Jewish establishment’s perceived need for an organization that could
speak for American Jews without fostering a wider belief in Jewish radicalism spurred the
founding of the AJC and influenced how the AJC engaged in public advocacy.

The Pogroms in Russia
The worsening situation for Jews in Russia was another stimuli that encouraged the
leaders of the AJC to establish the organization and to move away from the shtadlan and Hofjude
traditions of Jewish public advocacy and to develop new approaches to public advocacy.
Historian Shlomo Lambroza has commented that “Russia has never been a good place to be a
Jew.”419 The outbreak of systematic violence against Russian Jews during early 1880s had
precipitated the first large wave of Russian Jewish immigration to the United States. For the next
twenty years, sporadic outbreaks of violence against Jewish communities in Russia were
common.420 The period between 1903 and 1906, however, was a particularly bad time. The Pale
of Settlement, the territory within Imperial Russia where Jews could legally reside, was a large
geographic region, comprising more than 1.2 million square kilometers. Between 1903 and 1906,
anti-Jewish violence touched every corner of this territory. In the three years following the first
Kishinev pogrom in 1903, there were more than six hundred and fifty further attacks against the
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Jewish communities of the Pale, including a second major attack against the Jewish community
of Kishinev in late 1905.421
The outbreak of widespread violence against the Jewish communities of the Russian
Empire during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century was a calamity of such a scope,
intensity, and duration that it could not be arrested or even modestly impeded by the intervention
of individual Jews with political connections inside or outside Russia. As will be discussed
further below, some prominent American and European Jews did vainly attempt to use their
personal political connections and financial resources to persuade Russia to do more to protect
Jewish communities and stem the violence, but these efforts were futile. During this period, there
were hundreds of spontaneous and carefully planned (and state-sanctioned) outbreaks of violence
against the Jewish communities of the Pale of Settlement.
The campaigns to stop the violence in Russia and provide aid to those who had survived
did, however, galvanize change in Jewish communities in the United States. The first Kishinev
pogrom, which occurred on April 6th and 7th 1903, was a crucial turning point in the history of
the Russian, Eastern European, and American Jewish communities. Kishinev was by no means
the first significant attack against a Jewish community in Imperial Russia. Attacks against Jews
perpetrated by the Russian majority or by members of other minorities in the Russian Empire,
including Cossacks, Ukrainians, and Moldavians, were in fact common.422 Outbreaks of violence
occurred with enough frequency that their impact, and the fear of random acts of violence, has
been inscribed on Ashkenazi culture.423 The first Kishinev pogrom, however, was unique both
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for the scale of the violence and, ultimately, for the international historical consequences of that
violence.
The first Kishinev pogrom was also significant for the coverage that it received in the
western press, particularly in the United States. For example, on April 28, 1903, The New York
Times published the following account of the pogrom:
There was a well laid-out plan for the general massacre of Jews on
the day following the Russian Easter. The mob was led by priests,
and a general cry, “Kill the Jews,” was taken up all over the city.
The Jews were taken wholly unaware and were slaughtered like
sheep. The dead number 120 and the injured about 500. The scenes
of horror attending this massacre are beyond description. Babes
were literally torn to pieces by the frenzied and bloodthirsty mob.
The local police made no attempt to check the reign of terror. At
sunset the streets were piled with corpses and wounded. Those who
could make their escape fled in terror, and the city is now
practically deserted of Jews.424
Other newspaper reports describing the violence and its aftermath would emerge in the following
days and weeks.425
The media exposure was not limited to New York City. The Atlanta Constitution, for
example, translated and printed on their front page a letter that a Jewish resident of Atlanta had
received from his brother, who had survived the first Kishinev pogrom:
[A] mob of two hundred started the massacre. I and my wife hid
three days in a cellar without food or water, and when we went
back into our house we found everything in it demolished. Besides
killing over one hundred men, women and children, the barbarians,
who call themselves Christians, broke up everything they found in
the houses. Kishinef [sic] is desolate. Please, for G-d’s sake, send
me enough money for my wife and I to go to your great country,
where a man can live in peace and worship G-d as he chooses. I
know you will regret to hear that our uncle and aunt were among
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the victims. But for the cellar under our house I and my wife would
have also been murdered.426
The American Jewish community and the broader American public were well-informed about
the outbreak of anti-Jewish violence in Russia. The American government was also aware of
what was happening to the Jews of Imperial Russia.427 The notoriety of the events called for a
response from both quarters.
The outbreak of large scale and systematic violence against the Jewish communities of
the Russian Empire, and the mass flight of Jews that was spurred by this violence, prompted
American Jews to act to protect their Russian coreligionists. Prominent members of the
American Jewish establishment led these efforts. They were trying to stop the violence, but they
were also working to assuage their own anxiety: “Although the German Jews achieved
unparalleled success in the economic sphere and many commentators praised them for their
sobriety, work ethic, low crime rate and family ties, uncertainty about their place in Christian
America beset many of them…[The] influx of impoverished eastern European
Jews…contributed to their anxiety.”428 Economic stagnation and violent persecution were the
principal causes of Jewish emigration from that country. An end to the violence would reduce the
number of Jews seeking refuge in the United States. Even a reduction in the scale of the violence
might slow the pace of Jewish emigration and give the American Jewish establishment more
time to plan for their arrival and settlement in the United States, and their integration into the
American way of life.
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The scale of the violence abroad and the anxiety over its potential consequences at home
necessitated a communal response that went beyond the traditional shtadlan and Hofjude
approach. Anti-Jewish violence in Russia motivated prominent members of the American Jewish
community to pursue new social, political and international objectives, including providing aid to
the victims of the pogroms. The response was activist and not merely reactionary or limited to
quiet diplomacy. While all elements of the American Jewish community participated in these
efforts, the communal response was led by the elite of the American Jewish community and, in
particular, the leaders of the German-American Jewish establishment.
By the end of the nineteenth century, years before the largest waves of Jewish
immigration to the United States, the America Jewish community was already well-organized.
“Jewish life in America,” according to historian Daniel Soyer, “reflected the centrality of mutual
aid societies and lodges in the creation of ethnic identity even before the arrival of large numbers
of Jews from Eastern Europe.”429 There were synagogues in every major city on both the East
and West coasts of the United States, and there were dozens of Jewish philanthropic and fraternal
organizations. Jewish philanthropy and institution-building mirrored that of other ethnic and
religious groups in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century America. “The internal culture of
the Jewish societies in the nineteenth century duplicated that of their non-Jewish
counterparts.”430 The synagogues, hospitals, and orphanages sponsored by American Jews, and
the Landsmanshaft and mutual aid societies they founded, were not conspicuous because this
kind of communal and philanthropic activity was also commonly practiced by other ethnic and
religious groups.
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In the immediate aftermath of the first Kishinev pogrom, existing Jewish philanthropic
and fraternal organizations, such as the Independent Order of B’nai B’rith, the United Hebrew
Charities, the Educational Alliance, the National Council of Jewish Women, and the Hebrew
Union Veterans Association, began to raise funds to provide aid to the survivors. New Jewish
defense and relief organizations of varying sizes and ambitions were also established in major
American cities. In New York, for example, a group of wealthy Jews of German descent
organized a new independent relief fund. The fund was chaired by Emanuel Lehman, one of the
founders of the commodities brokerage that later became a huge investment bank, and its
treasurer was Daniel Guggenheim, the extraordinarily wealthy proprietor of a mining empire. Its
sixteen man executive committee included Justice Nathan Bijur, Louis Marshall, Jacob Schiff,
and Cyrus Sulzberger, four of the founders of the AJC.431
The old and new organizations were not able to alter Russian policy, change conditions
on the ground in the Pale, nor provide much relief as the violence continued over the next three
years; however, some of the accomplishments of these organizations were substantial efforts to
animate American public opinion in the hope of spurring the American government into action.
For example, twenty-seven petitions, including one with more than twelve thousands signatures,
were sent to President Theodore Roosevelt, asking him to intervene and urge Czar Nicholas II to
put an end to the campaign of anti-Jewish violence. Local Jewish leaders of communities outside
of New York City organized public street protests. In 1903, there were large anti-Russia or antipogrom rallies in Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, New Orleans, San Francisco, and St.
Louis. The largest rally was organized in New York City, and was held at Carnegie Hall on May
27, 1903. Seth Low, the Mayor of New York, and Grover Cleveland, the former President of the
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United States, addressed the crowd and denounced the atrocities of the pogroms.432 While mass
protests were normally viewed by the American Jewish establishment as potentially dangerous,
in the case of protesting the outrages of the Russian pogroms, the establishment did not object
and, in some instances, they helped fund and organize the rallies. Their acquiescence to public
protests by American Jews was probably tied to the minimal risk involved. There was a major
humanitarian crisis unfolding in Russia, and, as the pogroms were not a domestic issue, the
American Jewish establishment was probably less concerned about how protesting this issue
would impact the reputation of American Jewry. In comparison to labor protests or Zionist
parades, the anti-Russia and anti-pogrom rallies were less likely to foster the impression that
Jews were political radicals or unpatriotic. These efforts at providing international assistance to
coreligionists also carried less risk because they were not unprecedented in America. For
example, American Catholic lay groups devoted considerable resources to sponsoring social
reform movements for, and charitable assistance to, Catholics in Europe during this period.433
Despite the protests, the violence in the Pale continued, and the Jews of Imperial Russia
continued to flee from the calamity en masse. From the perspective of Jewish communal
leadership and public advocacy in the United States, the scale of the fundraising, intra-communal
cooperation, and the willingness to engage in calculated public expressions of political views,
were important precedents for more substantial public advocacy by American Jewry throughout
the twentieth century.
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A Reaction to Zionism
In addition to the mass arrival of new Jewish immigrants in the United States and the
provocations of the pogroms in Russia, the growing popularity of the Zionist movement
triggered a response from wealthier and acculturated American Jews. The founding of the AJC
was in many ways a counter or a response to the growing popularity of Zionism. The way in
which the American Jewish establishment responded to and dealt with the Zionist movement
influenced the development of AJC’s approach to public advocacy and communal defense.
By the turn of the twentieth century, Zionism was a well-organized international
movement. In the United States, the cause was spearheaded by the Federation of American
Zionists, which had been founded in Baltimore in 1896, one year before the First Zionist
Congress in Basle, Switzerland. In less than ten years, Zionism had built a substantial
international base of support among some segments of Jewries in both Western and Eastern
Europe, particularly among proletarian Jews in the East and a small cohort of acculturated (and
disaffected) intellectuals and professionals in the West. In America, the movement remained
marginal for some time, especially among established or wealthy Jews; however, the continuous
influx through immigration of Jews who were sympathetic to the aspirations of the movement
was crucially important to the eventual ascendency of Zionism as a fundamental component of
American Jewish politics.
There were a number of wealthy American Jews who favored the creation of an
independent Jewish state or other political arrangements to secure Jewish sovereignty over a
territory that could be a safe haven; however, during this early period, support for Zionism was
divided along class lines in the United States, and the movement was significantly more popular
among working-class Jews and new immigrants. In the historiography on American Zionism,
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Justice Louis Brandeis’ embrace of Zionism in 1913, and his participation in leading the
movement, is often identified as the moment when Zionism moved from marginal to mainstream
among American Jews.434
Before Brandeis embraced Zionism, American Zionist leaders were conscious of the
opposition to their movement among wealthy and acculturated Jews in the United States. In an
article published just before the sixth annual convention of the Federation of American Zionists
in 1903, Leon Zolotkoff, the Grandmaster of the Knights of Zion, acknowledged that Zionism
lacked support from the wealthy elites of American Jewry: “It is true that the wealthy Jews are
still withholding their support from the movement. They watch and wait. They can afford to do
so. But while their support would greatly accelerate the movement, their opposition cannot stop
it. For since when have the persecuted and oppressed peoples been saved by the rich?”435
Zionism was rejected by the American Jewish establishment but elements of the ideology
were embraced by leading American Jewish intellectuals, including Solomon Schechter, Israel
Friendlander, Mordecai Kaplan, and Horace Kallen, who distinguished between the political
aspirations of the movement in Palestine and its potential cultural effects in the Diaspora. They
espoused “Cultural Zionism,” which asserted that the recognition and maintenance of a Jewish
cultural and religious distinctiveness were commensurate with the ideals of a pluralistic America,
and would allow for the cultural integration of Jews, as such, into American society. 436 In many
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ways, the proponents of Cultural Zionism and cultural pluralism were prescient about the way
that Zionist ideals of Jewish peoplehood could forge social and political cohesion among
American Jews, and more broadly, among Jewish communities across the Diaspora. Their
model, which blends pride in ethnic and religious heritage with secular patriotism, reflects the
reality of contemporary American Jewish identity and politics. During the period of large scale
Jewish immigration, however, the American Jewish establishment, due to their status insecurity
and the social and political significance of race in the United States, were concerned that public
expressions of Jewish distinctiveness could lead to an intensification of anti-Semitism in the
United States, and, accordingly were hostile towards the aspirations of the Zionism movement
and its leaders.
The rise of Zionism, particularly its popularity among new Jewish immigrants to the
United States, was viewed by some leaders of the Jewish establishment and some leaders of the
Reform movement in America as a dangerous development that had to be countered. Their
opposition to Zionism had important historical consequences. It further entrenched intracommunal divisions between acculturated Jews and new immigrants, and was the impetus for the
creation of new Jewish organizations, including the American Jewish Committee, and the
development of new approaches to public advocacy in the United States.
Opposition to Jewish nationalism was not the position of every establishment leader or
rabbi within the Reform movement; however, years before the outbreak of systematic violence in
Russia, Reform rabbis in the United States were publicly denouncing Zionism and warning of
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the potential dangers Jewish nationalism posed to acculturated American Jews and to the peace
and stability they enjoyed in America. “The future of Judaism lies in the United States,” argued
Dr. Maurice H. Harris, the rabbi of Harlem’s Temple Israel. “The law has gone forth from
Jerusalem never to return. Zionism is working against the Western trend of civilization.”437 On
October 2, 1902, in his Yom Kippur sermon, Rabbi Joseph Silverman of Temple Emanuel in
New York, echoed Rabbi Harris’ views and proposed an alternative to Zionism:
There are many millions of Jews in the world…We could be a
force in the world if united. I do not favor concentration of Israel in
Palestine, or in any place, but I do favor the thorough organization
into a strong Central Committee. There should be an International
Jewish Protective Association that could exercise great power and
influence.438
Rabbi Silverman was a very influential figure within the American Reform movement. A
number of the founders and early members of the AJC were members of his congregation. Many
of these acculturated Jews shared his view that American Jews should work towards building
world Jewry into an organized international community represented by citizens in populations all
around the world as opposed to the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state in the Middle East.
It is indicative of how Zionism created divisions not only among acculturated Jews and
new immigrants, but also within the Reform movement itself, that Rabbi Silverman’s colleague
at Temple Emanuel, Rabbi Gustav Gottheil, was a supporter of Zionism and had attended the
First Zionist Congress. When Gottheil died in 1903, there was considerable debate among
Temple Emanuel’s trustees and congregants about whether his position should be filled by a
committed Zionist. The search for Rabbi Gottheil’s replacement was a contentious matter that
persisted for three years. At least six candidates were seriously considered for the position,
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including Rabbi Stephen Wise, an important leader of the Zionist movement in the United States
and one of the first rabbis within the Reform movement to embrace Zionism.
In the end, Rabbi Judah L. Magnes, who was described by the New York Times as an
“earnest Zionist,” was chosen as Gottheil’s replacement.439 When he took the position at Temple
Emanuel, the American-born Magnes had only two years of experience as a rabbi and was only
twenty-nine years old. Nonetheless, he had a great deal of experience in communal activism. At
the time of his appointment, Magnes was also the secretary of the Federation of American
Zionists, a leader of the Kehillah, and the President of the Jewish Defense Association. Although
he was a Reform rabbi, he was a well-known and popular communal leader among the Eastern
European immigrants on Manhattan’s Lower East Side. Eighteen months after he took the
position at Temple Emanuel, Magnes accepted an appointment to the AJC’s executive
committee.440
The tension over Zionism within the Reform movement could also be found in the
differing opinions among the founders of the AJC about the merits and potential risks of
Zionism. While the AJC is often described in the historiography on American Jewry as starting
out as an anti-Zionist organization, there were among the founders of the AJC some men who
rejected Zionism, but who were not opposed to other political arrangements that could secure
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persecuted Jews a safe haven. It is also significant to note that during the early years of the
organization, a number of high profile leaders of the AJC, including Judge Julian Mack, resigned
from the Committee in order to become more active as leaders of the Zionist movement in the
United States.
By the early-twentieth century, Jewish nationalism as an international movement had
already experienced the tumult of an ideological schism between the Zionists, who favored the
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, and the Territorialists, who favored the
establishment of a free and democratic Jewish state in any suitable territory that could
accommodate the influx of a substantial portion of world Jewry. In the United States, the
Territorialist movement was led and financed by some of the same wealthy Jews of German
descent who founded the AJC. The American branch of the Jewish Territorialist Organization
(ITO) was established at a meeting at the New York home of Cyrus Sulzberger on April 26,
1906. Other future AJC leaders and members were also present at this meeting, including Oscar
Strauss, Herman Rosenthal, Herbert Freidenwald, and Daniel Guggenheim.441 At this meeting,
Mayer Sulzberger, Strauss, and Guggenheim were appointed the first Executive Committee of
the American ITO.
Their support for Territorialism was pragmatic not ideological or religious. Jews were
continuing to flee violence and persecution in Russia and Eastern Europe and the Territorialists
privileged securing these refugees a suitable safe heaven over the idealism of reestablishing a
Jewish state in Palestine. They also viewed the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state (or
autonomous zone) on any suitable territory as a means of diverting Jewish immigrants away
from the United States, where their conspicuous growth, it was believed, was a significant threat
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to those Jews who had already integrated into mainstream American society. The ITO asserted,
quite reasonably, that a Jewish nationalist movement that was willing to accept any suitable
territory was more likely to succeed. They were critical of the nationalist ideal that would only
accept a Jewish state on a portion of the most contested territory in the history of western
civilization, and believed that the preoccupation with Palestine would doom any effort to secure
an autonomous safe haven for Jewish refugees. They were wrong about the prospects of a Jewish
state in Palestine, but their support and leadership of Territorialism distinguished them from
other members of the American Jewish establishment who believed that Jewish nationalism or
Jewish political sovereignty in any form was either a temporary religious fad or a serious threat
to acculturated Jews in the United States and other western countries. In any event, they were an
activist advocacy group that was willing to publically support the idea of an independent Jewish
state (or autonomous safe haven), and engage in fundraising and political lobbying on behalf of
this cause.
Moreover, it is significant to note that this division of opinion among the American
Jewish establishment about the potential benefits and pitfalls of Jewish nationalism prompted a
debate about the goals, methods, and limits of Jewish public advocacy. While some leaders
viewed Zionism as a threat that might engender accusations of dual loyalty and call into question
the patriotism of naturalized American Jews, others saw the creation of a Jewish state as a
potential solution that could forestall a rise in anti-Semitism in the United States by diverting
potentially millions of poor Jewish immigrants away from the country. Both sides in this debate
were less concerned about the goals of Jewish nationalism and how they would be realized than
they were about how Jewish nationalism would shape or impact the broader American public’s
opinion of Jews. Both sides in this debate were also willing to engage in public advocacy.
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As events unfolded, it would take several decades for acculturated Jews to become more
comfortable in America, and confident enough about their status as a minority community to
embrace Zionism and include support for Israel as a central part of their identity and their
politics. The fact that Jewish immigrants from Russia and Eastern Europe, and particularly their
children, were rapidly acculturating in a pattern similar to other immigrant communities
encouraged the American Reform movement’s tolerance and eventual full embrace of Zionism.
Years of congressional debates in the House of Representatives and Senate about imposing or
removing restrictions to Jewish immigration to the United States and, crucially, the events of the
Second World War and the Holocaust, would also establish a consensus in favor of Zionism and
support for Israel among virtually all elements of the American Jewish community, including the
AJC’s leadership. After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, even the most ardently
anti-Zionist elements of the American Jewish community (with the notable exception of a
relatively small group of Orthodox fundamentalists), recognized that Zionism would have to be
reckoned with, and incorporated into American Jewish identity and the public advocacy of
Jewish communal leaders in the United States.
Much of the historiography on the AJC presents the organization as an anti-Zionist group
that only reluctantly accepted Zionism when it was clear that the movement had been embraced
by the overwhelming majority of American Jews and world Jewry. Although many of the
founders of the AJC opposed Zionism, the association of other founders with the Zionist
movement or the ITO shows that not all the founders and early leaders of the organization were
fundamentally opposed to the idea of an independent Jewish state. Moreover, there is evidence of
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early overtures from the AJC to important Zionist organizations, including the Zionist Central
Bureau in Cologne, Germany.442
Eventually, the AJC would become one of the most significant supporters of Zionism in
the United States and an important ally of the State of Israel, but, in the years leading up to the
founding of the AJC, the rise of Zionism, its popularity among new immigrants, and concerns
about how that support would be interpreted by the broader American public, was a source of
anxiety for some of the men who founded the American Jewish Committee. This anxiety was
another stimuli for establishing an elite leadership organization and a move away from the quiet
diplomacy that characterized the traditional approaches of Jewish communal leaders to public
advocacy.

The Problem of Communism, Socialism, and Labor Movements
The rise of communism, socialism, and labor movements in the United States was
another historical factor that influenced the development of new approaches to Jewish public
advocacy. Although the 1917 Russian Revolution, the establishment of communist states, and
the “red scares” were still years away, by the beginning of the twentieth century, there were
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already significant concerns about the rise of radical socialism and communism in the United
States.
There was a history of labor agitation and large strikes, and some elements of the
American labor movement were gathering strength during this period.443 Among those most
concerned about the rise of communism were Jewish leaders within the established community
of American Jews of German descent. Some of these leaders, it must be noted, had deep
financial ties to the large manufacturing and mining corporations whose viability and
profitability were most threatened by any potential improvement in the bargaining position of
American labor. It is clear, however, that American Jewish leaders were also very concerned
about the popularity of radical political ideas, including socialism and communism, among new
Jewish immigrants, and how that popularity would impact the American public’s perception of
Jews and the Jewish community. These concerns were not baseless. The link between Jewish
participation and leadership and the growth of American capitalism is as strong as the link
between Jewish participation and leadership and the growth of the American labor movement.444
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For example, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), founded in 1886, “was established under
the leadership of Samuel Gompers…a Jewish immigrant.”445
Even before the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Eastern European and Russian Jews
in the United States, the Jewish labor movement was already well organized in New York City.
The major Jewish labor groups, which were led by a small group of German and Russian radicals
and socialists, had been established before the arrival of the largest waves of Jewish immigrants,
which occurred after 1900.446 According to labor historian Will Herberg, among the Jewish
immigrants who arrived in New York City in the middle of the nineteenth century was “a tiny
but very aggressive minority of intellectuals and intellectually minded workers who had received
some radical indoctrination in the revolutionary movements of Eastern Europe. These radicals
included socialists of different degrees of extremism.”447
Socialism was not the only radical ideology espoused by these future labor leaders.
Among them were also “anarchists, ‘philosophical’ and violent; Comtean positivists; land
reformers; ethical culturists; and doctrinaires of almost every other school. Though engaged in
continuous and bitter conflict among themselves, with few exceptions all these radical groups
agreed on the necessity of reaching the masses with the gospel of ‘education and
organization.’”448 The leaders and members of these organizations were social and political
activists who did not shy away from building their organizations and engaging in public
advocacy.
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Among the earliest and most politically active Jewish political and labor groups in the
United States were the Jewish Workers Union, the Jewish branch (Branch 8) of the Socialist
Labor Party, and most importantly, the United Hebrew Trades. Even before the arrival of the
largest waves of Jewish immigration, these groups had already earned a reputation in New York
City. For example, in its 1905 review of the twelfth volume of The Jewish Encyclopedia, the
New York Times drew specific attention to the entry on “Trade Unionism:” “the Jewish workman
is a natural unionist, as we in this city know.”449
The United Hebrew Trades (UHT), whose membership included both skilled and
unskilled workers, was founded in New York in 1888. The UHT acted as an outreach and
umbrella organization. Its leaders helped Jewish workers in various industries and in the
performing arts to form unions. Fraternal organizations were also established, including, most
importantly, the Workmen’s Circle (WC) in 1892. The growth of a Jewish labor and Yiddish
language press also predated the mass arrival of Eastern European Jewish immigrants, including
newspapers such as the Arbeter Tsaytung (“Workers Paper”), Zukunft (“Future”), and the Frei
Arbeiter Stimme (“Free Workers Voice”). Forverts (“The Yiddish Daily Forward”), one of the
most widely read and historically significant Jewish newspapers in the United States, was
established in 1897.450
By the turn of the century, the Jewish labor movement in New York City, particularly the
UHT, was sufficiently organized, confident, and funded to openly engage in political lobbying of
city councilors in New York City and state legislators in Albany. For example, on November 16,
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1900, New York State’s Industrial Commission heard testimony from Louis Harding, an
executive member of the Builders’ League, in which he complained bitterly about the political
influence in Albany of Jewish labor groups from New York’s East Side.451 Harding alleged that
Jewish labor organizations had retained lobbyists and had set up offices in Albany to lobby
members of the State Legislatures when the houses were in session. He further alleged that
Jewish labor groups kept a “black list” with the names of legislators who were, in their view,
unsympathetic to labor, and threatened to target these legislators during the next election
campaign.452 “The legislators are afraid of the labor vote,” Harding testified, “and they don’t
hesitate to say so.”453
As more Jewish immigrants arrived after 1900, the established Jewish labor organizations
found that a significant number of the new arrivals were already sympathetic to their beliefs and
goals. In common with the small group of radicals who founded the Jewish labor movement in
the United States, many of the Eastern European and Russian Jewish immigrants who arrived in
New York City in the first decade of the twentieth century had already experienced some
ideological and political instruction (or indoctrination) in their native countries. A significant
number of the new Jewish immigrants were members or adherents of the Bund (General Jewish
Workers Union), a group which Herberg describes as “an organization of Jewish socialists that
was winning a name for itself in the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe.”454 As a result,
many Jewish immigrants were already either sympathetic to socialism, or self-professed
socialists or communists, when they arrived in America. The arrival of thousands of Jewish
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immigrants with ties to the Bund would have a significant impact on the history of the Jewish
labor movement and on the growth of socialism in the United States.455
In short, by the time the largest wave of Jewish immigrants came to the United States at
the beginning of the twentieth century, most of the infrastructure needed for class cohesion,
effective collective bargaining, applying political pressure, public advocacy, ideological
instruction, and potential radicalization were already in place on Manhattan’s lower East Side.
These forces had an influence on the founding of the AJC and the development of the
organization’s public advocacy techniques. While the leaders of the German Jewish
establishment had begun to engage in some forms of public advocacy in response to international
events, they were far less comfortable with public advocacy on behalf of domestic social and
political causes than some leaders on the East Side. In common with their response to the
popularity of Zionism, once again, the Jewish establishment’s primary concern was a matter of
public perception. They feared that the political beliefs and public activism of the East Side labor
groups might incite anti-Semitism in the United States.
The response of the American Jewish establishment to the growth of the Jewish labor
movement and the popularity of some radical political ideas on the East Side was historically
significant, and would shape intra-community relations and the means and objectives of Jewish
public advocacy in the United States for decades. In contrast to the majority of Americans, or at
least the majority of American political leaders and prominent capitalists, the leaders of the
American Jewish establishment did not fear communism in and of itself. Their concern was not a
matter of conflicting ideas about the distribution of wealth or who should control the means of
production. Many Jewish establishment leaders were wealthy capitalists who had a great deal to
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lose, but they were not afraid of a communist or radical political revolution in the United States.
Rather, these leaders were concerned about the potential social consequences for American
Jewry of any widespread belief among the general American public that Jews were
disproportionately and prominently leading or participating in radical political movements.
In this case, the leaders of the Jewish establishment were prescient. The perception that
Jews were radicals and communists did emerge and became a source of anti-Semitism in the
United States during the twentieth century.456 The American public’s perception of Jewish
radicalism and support for communism was an issue that the AJC and other Jewish advocacy
groups were required to address, particularly during the early years of the Cold War.
As will be discussed below, throughout its history, the AJC made considerable efforts to
limit the influence of Jewish radicals within the American Jewish community, and to undermine
the association in American public opinion of Jews and Judaism with communists and
communism. In the years leading up to the founding of the AJC, and as leaders from all sectors
of American Jewry began to debate the establishment of some form of national Jewish leadership
body in the United States, Jewish establishment leaders wanted to ensure that any organization
that would ultimately claim to represent and speak for the entire American Jewish community
would not be led or unduly influenced by radicals and communists.

Lessons from the Call for a National Organization
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The growth of American Jewry through the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Russian
and Eastern European Jews, the organizational successes of the anti-pogrom campaigns, the rise
of Zionism, and the popularity of socialism among new Jewish immigrants prompted the
beginning of a discussion among American Jewish leaders about the need for a permanent
national body to represent, and advocate for, the interests of the American Jewish community
and, potentially, world Jewry. In the years leading up to the founding of the AJC in 1906, these
often contentious debates had both positive and negative lessons for Jewish leaders who wanted
the American Jewish community to organize to pursue effective public advocacy. On the one
hand, these debates were informative about how the community might organize; on the other
hand, the debates over the composition and aims of a national Jewish conference would deepen
the divisions between acculturated Jews of German descent and the community of Yiddishspeaking and Orthodox Jews whose numbers in the United States were steadily increasing.
The establishment of a permanent national body was the focus of the annual meeting of
the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR) when it convened in Detroit on June 29,
1903. The CCAR was, and remains, an umbrella organization representing, and composed of, the
Reform movement’s rabbis in North America. In 1903, the CCAR’s President was Rabbi Joseph
Silverman of Temple Emanuel in New York, which, as already noted above, was the synagogue
of several founders of the AJC. During his presidential address at the CCAR, Rabbi Silverman
praised the work done in the aftermath of the first Kishinev pogrom by Jewish relief
organizations, but he also highlighted their limitations. In the rabbi’s view, the absence of any
centralized national organization to coordinate the relief effort undermined its effectiveness:
The Independent Order of B’nai B’rith and other societies felt it
was their duty and their mission to use the machinery of their
organizations for the amelioration of the unfortunate situation in
Russia, and possibly for a prevention of its recurrence. We do not
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question the right of any Jewish society to exert all its power and
influence in behalf of justice in general and Jewish interests in
particular, but we regret that, owing to the existence of so many
associations pursuing independently similar objects, much effort,
much influence and money, are often dissipated, and concerted
action, which might lead to quicker and better results, is prevented.
We often present the sad spectacle of a house divided against
itself.457
To remedy this situation, Rabbi Silverman proposed that the CCAR appoint a commission to
study the feasibility of establishing a national organization to represent the interests of American
Jews. Rabbi Silverman, in the same presidential address, presented his own proposal for the
creation of a national American Jewish Synod that could speak for the entire American Jewish
community.458
There were a number of significant problems with Rabbi Silverman’s Synod proposal.
First, in effect, Rabbi Silverman was proposing the establishment of a religious body that would
duplicate some of the mandate of the CCAR, which was the organization responsible for
resolving ecclesiastical divisions within the Reform movement in the United States and Canada.
If the goal of any new national body was effective public advocacy and communal defense, what
was needed was an organization that could address political and social issues of concern to the
entire American Jewish community, not ecclesiastical controversies.
Secondly, Rabbi Silverman’s proposal did not include Jewish congregations and
organizations that were outside the Reform movement, nor provide a platform for unaffiliated
Jews. At this time, the denomination that would evolve into Conservative Judaism was still in an
early stage of development. The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, the flagship
organization of Conservative Judaism, lacked financial support, and, until 1913, Conservative
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Judaism did not have a congregational organization in the United States. However, an
organization that did not even purport to represent the unaffiliated or the rapidly increasing
Orthodox community of Eastern European and Russian Jews could not legitimately claim to
represent the entire American Jewish community. These weaknesses appear to have been
overlooked by the Conference. The CCAR approved the creation of a “Committee on Synod,”
and gave its members one year to study the issue and compile a report.459

The Committee on Synod
Exactly one year later, the “Committee on Synod” presented its findings at the 1904
annual meeting of the CCAR in Louisville, Kentucky. The committee’s report favored the
creation of the Synod just as proposed a year earlier in Detroit by Rabbi Silverman. Their report
also outlined a number of significant recommendations for the structure and practices of the
Synod. The establishment of a national organization to represent the social and political interests
of the American Jewish community as a whole was not the goal of the proposed Synod, and the
substantial weakness of excluding the Yiddish-speaking and Orthodox Jews remained. The
committee’s recommendations, in fact, accentuated the weaknesses of Rabbi Silverman’s
proposal. The recommendations made it clear that the Synod would be another umbrella
organization for Reform Judaism in North America. There was no mention of including
representatives from Orthodox congregations. Under the committee’s proposal, the Synod would
be an entirely new institution; no existing Jewish institutions would be dissolved or folded into
the new Synod. The committee recommended that the Synod convene only once every five
years, that it be composed of both rabbis and laymen, and that those representatives be locally
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elected by Jewish communities across the country. The new body would be concerned with
ecclesiastical questions of concern to the Reform movement, not political and social issues of
potential concern to the entire American Jewish community. Finally, the committee
recommended that the Synod have “an Executive Board of at least ten men,” although its
purpose was not defined by the committee.460
While an American Jewish Synod organized according to Rabbi Silverman’s proposal
and the recommendations of the CCAR’s “Committee on Synod” was never established, the
initiative was historically significant. It was the first time that the creation of an elected national
Jewish congress of any kind was discussed openly by Jewish communal leaders, and the first
time that these kinds of intra-communal debates were covered by the mainstream press in the
United States. The proposed composition and structure of the Synod was also significant,
including, perhaps most importantly, the notion that existing Jewish institutions could continue
to exist in parallel with this new body, and could work in concert with it through a coordinating
or executive body.
Before any new body could be established, however, a number of questions would have
to be answered. Reflecting the chauvinism of the times and the context of these deliberation, the
notion that the leaders of any such body would be men was taken as a given; however; should
those men be men of industry or clergymen? And, further, should they be appointed to their
positions or elected by the community? If appointed, by whom? If elected, how would those
elections be viewed by the broader American public? An appointed committee would lack
legitimacy within the Jewish community; however, an elected committee might be dominated by
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radicals, or lead to accusations of dual loyalty, and foster suspicions among the Christian
American majority about the level of patriotism of American Jews.

Divisions in the American Jewish Community and East Side Philanthropy
The weaknesses of the Synod proposal reflected the social and religious divisions that
continued to divide the American Jewish community at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Despite these deep divisions, in an article published in the 1904 American Jewish Year Book,
Cyrus Sulzberger was optimistic that the two communities were growing closer:
American Jewry looks with confidence into the future. Growing in
numbers and importance, in culture and the means of culture, it
recognizes the problems wherewith it has to deal and its
shortcomings in handling them. The closer kinship with the
newcomer has been slow of attainment, yet those on the lookout
see the signs of the better day.461
Much of Sulzberger’s optimism was misplaced. While the leaders of the two communities
cooperated on philanthropic projects, they had somewhat different motivations and aims. For
example, there was considerable cooperation between establishment and immigrant leaders on
philanthropic projects for the residents of Manhattan’s lower East Side, but the motivations of
the establishment and Reform leaders were not without self-interest. A brief examination of the
philanthropy on the East Side of the German Jewish establishment is informative in
understanding the origins and objects of the AJC.
On one level, the philanthropy of the American Jewish establishment can be seen as a
manifestation of the noblest ideals of American progressives during the early twentieth century,
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including Jane Addams, Frances Kellor, and Robert Woods.462 “For these reformers,” Gary
Gerstle notes:
the plight of European immigrants—the inadequate wages, the
slum conditions in which they lived, the infectious diseases from
which they suffered, and the urban vices to which they had
succumb (prostitution, gambling, and political corruption)—
symbolized what was wrong with America. These reformers had
not turned on the immigrants. Rather, through extensive contacts
with immigrants at settlement houses, in unions, and in politics,
they had come to view the immigrants sympathetically and to
devise a reform agenda oriented towards their needs. The social
welfare reformers called for better working conditions, higher
wages, improved housing and sanitation, playgrounds to give
children more wholesome recreation, Americanization programs to
teach immigrants English, and public museums and libraries to
cultivate immigrant minds.463
The concentration of settlement and the poverty of new Jewish immigrants on the East Side
caused significant social problems. There was poor sanitation and a shortage of adequate
housing, and, with more immigrants moving in every week, more resources were needed to help
the community absorb the new arrivals. Both Russian and German Jewish leaders wanted to
alleviate these problems and improve living conditions on the lower East Side. The German
Jewish leaders, however, were also anxious about public perception, and about how the growing
Jewish community was being viewed by the Christian majority.
For the establishment leaders, the coverage that the overcrowding on the East Side was
receiving in the press, including reports on youth crime, filthy streets, prostitution, and spousal
abandonment, were particular sources of concern. For example, a report published in the
Chicago Daily Tribune identified “the Russian Jew as the chief offender” in what was believed
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to be an epidemic of spousal abandonment (or “wife desertion”) among new immigrants to the
United States.464 Equally troubling, the same report also emphasized the role of rabbis in abetting
this social problem by granting Jewish divorces (gettin) to men who arrived in America in
advance of their wives and children.
In response to both the real and perceived social problems on the East Side, and the
public relations embarrassments caused by the press coverage of these problems, Jewish
establishment leaders directed substantial financial and human resources towards a series of
philanthropic efforts to improve conditions on the East Side. Their motives were altruistic, but
they were not purely altruistic. Their philanthropy was shaped by their status insecurity and their
desire to accelerate the acculturation of new Jewish immigrants. To their credit, the Jewish
establishment leaders who gave generously to improve conditions on the East Side appear to
have genuinely felt that they had a duty to act; however, it must be acknowledged that they also
had an agenda, and that they had the means to see that agenda realized. Jacob Schiff, probably
the most generous philanthropist during this period of American Jewish history, saw his financial
support for charities as a duty, but he also made it clear that his generosity was not charity for
charity’s sake.465 His philanthropy was altruistic and also strategic. He aimed to improve
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conditions on the East Side, forestall a rise in anti-Semitism, and provide a means for established
Jewish communal leaders to exercise influence and control over the growing immigrant
population of the East Side.466
The efforts funded and led by the American Jewish establishment to improve conditions
on the East Side are akin to other progressive era philanthropic projects that have been praised
for the breadth of their ambitions, but also criticized for their mixed motives. On the one hand,
the wealthy and acculturated Jewish sponsors of these efforts generously provided desperately
needed aid to their newly arrived Eastern European and Russian coreligionists, and they had a
number of significant successes, including the construction of settlement houses, new hospitals,
day schools, and recreation centers. On the other hand, these efforts, and the attitudes underlying
them, were often resented by the intended beneficiaries. “The German Jews,” according to
historian Joyce Mendelsohn, “were often regarded as condescending, and their imperious manner
was resented by the poor Eastern European Jews.”467 The various projects of the American
Jewish establishment on the East Side had the goal of increasing the pace of acculturation and
social integration, and, thereby, removing the perceived threat that the continued growth of an
outsider community might foster anti-Semitism in the United States and undermine the security
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of Jews that had embraced American culture, and had already acculturated into the American
way of life.468 The projects funded by the American Jewish establishment were philanthropic;
however, at their core, they were also examples of elites disregarding the agency and aspirations
of impoverished people and imposing their mores on a marginalized and subaltern community.
While the leaders of the American Jewish establishment continued to participate, lead,
and fund philanthropic projects, they also began to take steps towards the creation of a national
Jewish organization. The anxiety caused by the continuing growth of the immigrant population
and the prevalence (or at least the perception) of radicalism among the new arrivals made the
American Jewish establishment distrustful of a democratic model for communal leadership.
While they continued to cooperate with and negotiate with Orthodox and labor leaders, in the
years leading up to the founding of the AJC, the leaders of the American Jewish establishment
started to act on their own initiative as if they had a mandate to act on behalf, and speak for, the
whole American Jewish community.

“Organization on a Rational Theory”
It is possible to distinguish, broadly speaking, the historical, social, cultural, religious,
political, and economic developments that influenced the founders of the AJC to act on their own
and found the organization. As the violence in Russia continued and more Jews arrived in
America, Jewish leaders continued to debate who would represent and act on behalf of American
Jewry. Among Reform Jews and the leaders of the Jewish establishment, there was anxiety that
468
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the founding of a national Jewish organization, particularly one composed of elected
representatives, would become an extension of the Zionist movement or be perceived by the
majority of Americans as unpatriotic, radical, or communist. Among the Orthodox, Yiddishspeaking community, there was anxiety that a new national organization would merely be a
puppet of the Reform movement, a liberal movement whose religious doctrine they rejected,
whose patronizing leaders they resented, and of which they were deeply suspicious.
Piecing together the exact order of events which led to the formation of the AJC,
however, is difficult. Judith S. Goldstein has commented that “unfortunately, no good work on
the formation of the AJC exists.”469 This is not because the AJC has been overlooked in the
historiography on American Jewry and interests groups. As one of the most prominent and
influential Jewish organizations in the United States and internationally, the AJC has garnered a
great deal of attention from historians. The absence of a thorough account of the formation of the
committee is a consequence of the fact that the creation of the AJC was coordinated by a very
small group of men. This process was not transparent or open, and this important aspect of the
AJC’s history casts a shadow over the organization; it leaves the AJC exposed to the charge that
it was a secret organization. How the AJC was established is especially problematic because the
supposed existence of clandestine Jewish societies composed of wealthy financiers is a
prevailing trope in anti-Semitic propaganda.
As the account of events described in the earlier part of this chapter reveals, the decision
to create a non-democratic communal defense organization was the culmination of a long
historical progression characterized by mostly unsuccessful political activism and persistent
intra-communal strife. The work of Jewish establishment leaders to raise funds to aid the victims
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of pogroms, increase public awareness about the atrocities in Russia, and call on American
political leaders to intervene to stop the violence were substantial and unprecedented in the
history of Jewish communal defense and political activism in the United States. These efforts,
however, were ineffective. Random and planned acts of violence against Jewish communities in
Russia continued to erupt notwithstanding protests in major American cities and the coverage
these events received in the press. The Jewish establishment leaders who had engaged in the
quiet diplomacy of the Hofjude tradition and who had spoken directly with President Roosevelt
and representatives of the State Department were rebuffed. “They confronted a President who
told them bluntly of the limits of their power and of his own. Roosevelt left no doubts in their
minds about how little he would or could do.”470 The German Jewish leaders were frustrated by
the ineffectiveness of their efforts, and they believed that these efforts would continue to be futile
as long as the American Jewish community was unable to speak with one voice. And, they were
afraid that even if American Jewry could speak with a united voice, it might not only be less
effective, it could be harmful if it was construed by the American public as radical, socialist,
communist, or unpatriotic.
Much later, by the early 1950s, there would be sufficient commonalities among American
Jews of varying backgrounds, synagogue affiliation, and economic class, that broad consensus
on social, economic, and political questions, and appropriate communal responses, might be
possible. This was not the case at the beginning of the twentieth century. During this period,
American Jewry was starkly divided by language barriers, economic circumstances, differences
in religious practice, conflicting political ideologies, extent of acculturation, and different
apprehension and unease about the future. According to Judith S. Goldstein:
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The German and Russian Jews embodied different traditions. There
was a language barrier between the Yiddish and Russian speaking
and the German and English speaking Jews. There were religious
differences between Orthodox, as well as non-practicing Russian
Jews, and the reform German Jews. Economic and political
differences separating capitalists from socialists and anarchists;
political disputes divided American assimilationist from Zionists.
But most important was the psychological gap between the
powerful and the powerless, the givers of charity and the
supplicants, between the satisfied, successful, and relatively secure
German Jews and the poor, awkward, and frightened Russian
Jewish immigrants.471
The men who founded the AJC came to the conclusion that it was simply impossible to bridge all
of these divisions. The threats to Jewish communities abroad, the prospect of new immigration
restrictions at home, and the intensification of anti-Semitism in America meant that someone had
to act. The establishment leaders were wealthier, more connected, and more powerful and they
decided to take matters into their own hands.
There is no complete record that can be used to reconstruct an account of the founding of
the American Jewish Committee. Much of the planning and negotiations was done in private
discussions. The founders left some written record of their deliberations in their personal
correspondence but, most regrettably, a fire at the Jewish Theological Seminary in 1966
destroyed a significant amount of Jacob Schiff’s archived personal correspondence.472 Thorough
minutes, including transcriptions of the proceedings, exist of the earliest meetings of the AJC,
but a great deal of the substance of the private discussions between the founders that occurred in
the months leading up to those earliest meetings is unknown. It is no wonder that Naomi Cohen
titled her introduction to her account of the AJC’s first sixty years “Organization was in the Air.”
While it is, therefore, not possible to document the entire story of the AJC’s creation, it is clear
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that in 1906, Jacob Schiff, Louis Marshall, Cyrus Adler, Cyrus Sulzberger, Meyer Sulzberger,
Samuel Greenbaum, Julian Mack, and Nathan Bijur took it upon themselves to create an
organization to represent and speak for American Jewry. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this study,
the establishment of an elite communal leadership organization was not without precedent in
modern Jewish history. In addition to the historical factors and intra-communal tensions already
discussed above, in choosing to create a non-democratic organization, the founders of the AJC
were inspired by elite Jewish communal organizations in other countries, most importantly the
Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Alliance Israélite Universelle in France, and the
Centralverein deutscher Straatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens in Germany. The decision to form an
American iteration of these groups was made with a great deal of consideration. The AJC’s
founders were aware of the controversy that would accompany their decision to act without the
participation of all elements of American Jewry. The founders brooded about the wisdom of
creating the AJC; some were deeply concerned about establishing any organization that would
explicitly reinforce the perception of Jews as different or separate from the rest of Americans.
The AJC’s founders argued about who should lead the organization, about whom they should
include in the membership, and about how those members should be chosen. They also made
some efforts to mitigate the damage that would be done to the relationship between the German
Jewish establishment and Yiddish-speaking immigrants by inviting some prominent and wealthy
Russian and Eastern European Jews to join the organization.
The wealthy and influential members of the American Jewish establishment took matters
into their own hands, and, in many cases, they disregarded or ignored the views of the growing
immigrant community of Yiddish-speaking and Orthodox Jews. The leaders of the Jewish
establishment’s answers to the questions raised by the failed Synod effort, and their response to
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their concerns about the popularity of Zionism, communism, and socialism among new Jewish
immigrants, was to fashion a form of Jewish communal leadership in the United States that
privileged acculturation into the white mainstream and was male-dominated, elitist, and
undemocratic.
In their defense, at this time, a calamity was unfolding in Russia, and American Jewry
was a heterogeneous group that lacked the social and political cohesion needed for effective
public advocacy. The American Jewish community was also, it must be noted, impacted by the
deeply entrenched racial divisions that characterized American society during this period. As
noted above, American Jews occupied an ambiguous position in America’s racial hierarchy.
Despite their Caucasian skin tone, American Jews, regardless of their economic class, were
victims of race-based and religious-based discrimination and social exclusion and were denied
the status and privileges of being perceived as white in the United States.473 A number of
significant events that occurred shortly after the first Kishinev pogrom, including the ongoing
systematic violence in the Pale, the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, and the celebration of
the two-hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the first Jewish settlement in America, provided the
small group of elites who would ultimately establish the AJC with opportunities to represent
American Jewry and, for better or for worse, influence how the broader American public viewed
the growing community of American Jews. While they had no mandate from the people for
whom they claimed to speak, they nonetheless took it upon themselves to act.
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As discussed above, before the founding of the AJC, the communal defense and
advocacy work of the American Jewish establishment was more consistent with the traditional
shtadlan and Hofjude model of Jewish public advocacy. “The tradition of the ‘Court Jew,’”
according to Arthur Silver, “influenced the political mentality of the wave of German
immigration.”474 The wealthy and connected leaders of the Jewish establishment, who thought of
themselves as “stewards” of their community, tried to intervene when they could.475 However,
their limited success and their anxieties about the threats posed by mass Jewish immigration and
the growing popularity of Zionism, communism, and socialism would eventually lead to the
founding of the AJC, and a departure from the traditional approaches to Jewish public advocacy.
Between 1903 and 1906, in the absence of a national Jewish organization, individual Jews, or
small groups of prominent men working together on an ad hoc basis, attempted to respond to
threats to the Jewish communities abroad, and to shape the broader American public’s
perceptions of the growing American Jewish community. It can be argued that the origins of the
AJC, and the origins of the AJC’s public advocacy strategies, can be traced to the work done by
these members of the Jewish establishment during this period.
The American Jewish establishment’s response to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese
War in 1904 illustrates the beginning of their transition from the old traditions of Jewish public
advocacy towards a new, modern approach. The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War coincided
with the ongoing violence against the Jewish communities of the Pale of Settlement. In the leadup to the outbreak of the war, and during the fighting, Jewish bankers in both Europe and the
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United States tried to leverage their considerable clout in international financial markets to
persuade the Russian Government to stop the persecution of Russian Jews.476 When these
attempts failed, these bankers used the same clout and connections to punish Russia by helping
Japan finance its war effort. Jacob Schiff, in his capacity as the director of the investment bank
Kuhn, Loeb and Company, helped Japan secure substantial international loans, and led the
efforts to obstruct Russia’s ability to secure financing for the war.477 In the aftermath of Russia’s
defeat, Schiff, in concert with other American and European bankers, tried to obstruct Russia’s
ability to secure loans to pay Japan any war indemnity that might have been negotiated as part of
a peace treaty.478
This potential impediment to Russia securing postwar loans attracted the attention of the
press in the United States at least in part because Jewish leaders released public statements to the
media in which they openly threatened to use Jewish influence over international financial
markets to bankrupt Imperial Russia and to undermine its relations with United States. A strong
case can be made that these interventions, over both the short and long term, did significantly
more harm than good to the interests of the Jewish community in the United States and world
Jewry, but these interventions demonstrate that the elite leaders of the Jewish community were
transitioning to a new approach to public advocacy. 479
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Another illustration of the American Jewish establishment’s move away from old
traditions of public advocacy was Simon Wolf’s effort to influence a change in Russian policy
towards the Jews of the Pale. While the Portsmouth negotiations to end the Russo-Japanese War
were ongoing, Wolf, a German-born American Jewish leader, wrote a letter to Count Sergei
Witte, a member of the Russian delegation at the negotiations. The letter was published in The
Washington Post. At the time, Wolf, a Washington D.C. based lawyer, was the President of the
Independent Order of B’nai B’rith. His letter to Witte is a tour de force of diplomatic and public
relations blunders. On the subject of Jewish influence in international finance, for example, Wolf
displayed no subtlety or foresight: “Russia, at this juncture, needs two important elements to
insure its future prosperity and happiness: money and friends. The Jews of the world, as citizens
of their respective countries, control much of the first, and would make a magnificent army of
the latter.”480 Wolf was similarly straightforward, provocative, and tactless about the harm that
Jewish-owned media could inflict on Russia by swaying American public opinion against
Russia, and, by extension, the American government’s ability to treat Russia as a friend and
ally.481 Wolf’s public statements certainly represent a break from the shtadlan and Hofjude
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traditions of quiet diplomacy, and, after the founding of the AJC, the organization’s leaders made
considerable efforts not to repeat these mistakes.482
The efforts of Jewish leaders to leverage their influence in international finance to secure
better treatment for their Russian coreligionists included other missteps, but these efforts also
demonstrate that American Jewish leaders were transitioning away from the traditional, more
circumspect approach of the shtadlan and Hofjude model of Jewish public advocacy towards a
new approach. Shortly after the publication of Wolf’s letter, Count Witte agreed to meet with an
ad hoc committee of Jewish leaders in August 1905. Among the Jewish leaders at this meeting
were Jacob Schiff, Simon Wolf, Oscar Straus, and Adolf Kraus, all acculturated Jews of German
descent who would become influential figures within the AJC. The meeting between Witte and
the Jewish delegation began cordially, but descended into a shouting match. Jacob Schiff lost his
temper after Witte suggested that Russia’s Jews were not ready for full citizenship and equal
rights, and, even if Russia’s Jews were ready, the granting of those rights would so enrage the
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rest of Russia’s population that anti-Jewish violence would only escalate.483 The meeting ended
with the delegation of Jewish leaders delivering an ultimatum to Witte—there would be no loans
to Russia as long as the persecution of the Jews continued.484 However, the absence of a war
indemnity in the Treaty of Portsmouth meant that Russia would not immediately need to raise a
substantial sum, and, despite the Jewish delegation’s threat, the Russian government was still
able to secure significant foreign investment, even after the outbreak of the First Russian
Revolution. While the threat to impose financial sanctions on Russia and the meeting with Count
Witte were mishandled, the Jewish leaders were successful in generating some favourable
editorial comment in American newspapers, and the leaders were beginning to learn new
approaches to advancing the causes of the Jewish community.485
Unfortunately for Schiff and the other leaders of American Jewish establishment, their
attempt to prompt concessions from the Russian government was not well received by their
Russian and Eastern European coreligionists in America. Their “action was loudly decried. Many
were aghast at the idea of Jews sitting down with the henchmen of the czar as well as the selfappointed nature of the representation.”486 The anger of the new immigrants was not only
grounded in the notion that the Jewish establishment had acted on their behalf without any
mandate, but also in the unique political history of Russian Jewry, in which many Russian Jews
had experienced and resented the intervention of self-appointed Jewish establishment elites, the
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maskilim, in their affairs in their birth country.487 The Russian maskilim were deeply resented by
the communities they claimed to represent. In America, the activities of the American Jewish
establishment were similarly resented by new Jewish immigrants. Thus, the efforts of the selfappointed Jewish emissaries were both divisive and ineffective. They aggravated the divisions
between Reform and Orthodox, and German and Eastern European Jews, and, furthermore, as
noted above, the efforts did not have any impact on Russian policies in the Pale.488
One consequence of the aggravated divisions in the Jewish community was that it
reinforced the approach of the elite taking matters into their own hands. In the months leading up
to and following the meeting with Witte, a group of establishment Jewish leaders was
increasingly working on its own with minimal or no participation and input from Jewish
immigrant and labor leaders. By the end of 1905, this small group had made the decision to
break with all pretense of democratic representation and started to build the organization that
would become the AJC. The urgency of their efforts to organize an effective Jewish advocacy
group in the United States was prompted not only by the ongoing violence in Russia and the
fallout from the meeting with Witte, but also by the renewed efforts of some Jewish leaders,
including Rabbi Judah Magnes, to establish an elected American Jewish congress.
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At the same time that the meetings that led to the creation of the AJC were being held,
leaders of the American Jewish establishment continued to direct or coordinate philanthropic
projects and public advocacy programs on their own initiative. After the violence of the second
Kishinev pogrom in October of 1905, prominent Jewish leaders in New York City bolstered their
fundraising and relief efforts. Jacob Schiff and Cyrus Sulzberger established the National
Committee for the Relief of the Sufferers in Russia. Schiff, as Treasurer of this committee, sent
four hundred telegrams to Jewish leaders in cities across the United States asking them to raise
funds locally and entrust those funds to his new committee. The committee raised a million
dollars in its first eighteen days.489
The leaders of this fundraising effort also decided to make a dramatic entry into public
relations with what today might be described as brand management. On their own initiative, they
decided to organize events to celebrate the two-hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the first
Jewish settlement in America. Jacob Schiff chaired the committee that planned the celebration.
Among the other organizers were Cyrus Adler, Jacob H. Hollander, and Simon Wolf.490 The
committee’s ambitions and achievements were substantial, and their activities were reported in
the American press. 491 They coordinated two days of celebrations across the United States to
coincide with the American Thanksgiving holiday. At a time when the overwhelming majority of
American Jews were foreign born, this committee gave itself the task of demonstrating to both
new Jewish immigrants and the broader American public both the pride and patriotism of
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American Jews. This was a new type of advocacy for the Jewish community. While these
celebrations were public, and in some cases quite dramatic, these were not protests.
In New York City, for example, the anniversary was celebrated with a gala at Carnegie
Hall.492 The event was a choreographed pageant and steeped in symbolism, including the
elaborate way in which the landmark concert hall was decorated for the occasion. 493 Jacob Schiff
presided as the master of ceremonies, and among the other speakers were former President
Grover Cleveland, New York Governor Frank W. Higgins, New York City Mayor George B.
McClellan Jr., and Bishop David H. Greer. A letter from President Theodore Roosevelt and a
telegram from Vice President Charles W. Fairbanks were read to the enthusiastic crowd.494 The
gala also included musical performances by “The Downtown Cantors,” a fifty man choir made
up of cantors from New York City synagogues, who were accompanied by the New York
Symphony Orchestra and another two hundred and fifty singers from the Choral Union.
While the gala was advertised as a celebration for Jews, the event was really a public
relations campaign (or event) on behalf of Jews. It was not merely an exhibition of ethnic,
religious, or cultural pride. The gala was designed to be a demonstration of the gratitude of Jews
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to be in America, and the faith Jews placed in America as their new home and the new center of
Jewish life. In his speech at the gala, Jacob Schiff went to great lengths to emphasize these
sentiments, while at the same time drawing attention to the ongoing violence in Russia. This, too,
was a new form of Jewish advocacy that seized upon American values, idealism, and national
pride. 495 The last speaker at the gala was the Rev. Dr. H. Pereira Mendes, the Rabbi of the
Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue of New York. In contrast to Schiff’s speech, in which he
emphasized the secular dimensions of Jewish culture and Jewish identity in America, Rabbi
Mendes added a religious element to this new conception of Jewish identity and politics, but both
speakers situated American Jewish patriotism in the same rhetoric traditionally used by the
broader Christian American majority.496 After Rabbi Mendes’ speech, the choir and orchestra
began singing the Jewish hymn “Adon Olam (Eternal Lord).” When the hymn was done, the
crowd rose to its feet and accompanied the choir and orchestra in a rendition of “My Country Tis
of Thee.”
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The Carnegie Hall gala shows a new approach to public advocacy and embodied the
Jewish establishment’s view of American Jewish identity, an identity in which Jews outwardly
appear and behave as every other Caucasian American,497 are as loyal to America as any other
patriotic citizen, and aspire to the same goals as their fellow citizens. In this conception of Jewish
identity, there is no place for Jewish self-identification as a distinct race and the fact of Jewish
religious distinctiveness is considered a personal or private matter; an irrelevant difference in a
free and religiously tolerant society in which, privately, a person can believe whatever they want.
To the extent that Jews were religiously different, that difference had no effect on their loyalty to
America. If anything, their belief in G-d animated their patriotism in the same way as faith
enlivened the patriotism of the broader Christian majority. The Jewish establishment leaders
sought to promote the view that, like the American founding fathers and all the immigrant groups
that later settled in the United States, the Jews had come to America by G-d’s grace to do G-d’s
work by helping to make America great. This was a much different form of Jewish identity, one
which privileged citizenship and acculturation over religious, ethnic, and cultural distinctiveness.
Promoting this conception of Jewish identity, to both new Jewish immigrants and to the broader
American public, required a more novel form of public advocacy than the traditions of the
shtadlan and Hofjude. The Carnegie Hall gala also reflected the Jewish establishment’s
preferences in terms of tactics for public advocacy. While they had decisively departed from the
quiet diplomacy of the shtadlan and Hofjude approach, they were not social and political
agitators. Their approach was pragmatic. They believed in communicating their message without
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provocative rhetoric or confrontational action that could obstruct the reception of that message,
alienate white patricians, or be used by anti-Semites and proponents of immigrations restrictions
to describe American Jews as political radicals.
The views and the methods of public advocacy of the Jewish elite were not necessarily
shared by Jewish leaders outside of the Jewish establishment. Only four days after the Carnegie
Hall gala, Jewish labor unions, fraternal societies, and the Jewish Defense Association led by
Rabbi Judah Magnes, organized a massive anti-Russia street protest in New York City. The
“Parade of Lamentation” was made up of an estimated 125,000 people, all dressed in black.498
The march started on the lower East Side and over several hours made its way to Broadway and
then to Union Square. The Grand Marshal of the parade was Joseph Barondness, a prominent
leader within the labor movement on the lower East Side.499 In contrast to the earlier anti-pogrom
rallies, the “Parade of Lamentation” was significantly larger and more overtly political. When
the crowd arrived at Union Square, Barondness read a seven-article resolution. Among other
things, it condemned the Russian government and the violence of the pogroms, chastised the
international community for its indifference, openly called on the American government to
intervene, and urged Russian Jews and Jews everywhere to take up arms and defend
themselves.500
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American Jews from all denominations and economic classes participated in the “Parade
of Lamentation,” but, by the end of 1905, cooperation between the leaders of the Jewish
establishment and those of other elements of American Jewry on the creation of a national body
to represent American Jewry had reached an impasse. While the debates over the powers and
composition of a national Jewish organization stalled, a small group of Jews of German descent
began to act. Through philanthropic projects and quiet lobbying, they continued to exercise a
degree of control and influence over Jewish communal affairs that exceeded their relatively
small numbers. It was from this group that the AJC was to emerge. At meetings in late 1905 and
early 1906 of a small club made up of members of New York City’s German Jewish
establishment, whose members called themselves “The Wanderers,” those in attendance decided
to “take the initiative” and create, in their view, a more effective and less dangerous organization
to speak for American Jewry before a competing organization could be established by Jewish
labor leaders, Zionists, and Orthodox immigrants.501
By the beginning of 1906, the membership of “The Wanderers” had already appointed a
committee made of up of Cyrus Sulzberger, Judge Samuel Greenbaum, Judge Nathan Bijur,
Professor Joseph Jacobs, and Louis Marshall, to develop a plan for a national, non-democratic,
and elite committee of Jewish leaders. This committee chose Judge Meyer Sulzberger of
Philadelphia to appoint a committee of seven men who would work to create a new Jewish
organization. Judge Sulzberger appointed the men who had chosen him to his “Committee of
Seven.”
In the letter in which he accepted his appointment to the Committee of Seven, Louis
Marshall urged that the committee “should convene at a very early day in order that we may not
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lose the benefit of the sentiment which has been developed in favor of an organization on a
rational theory.”502 By “an organization on a rational theory,” Marshall meant an association that
would assuage the concerns of the acculturated Jews of the American Jewish establishment that a
national Jewish leadership body, particularly one composed of elected representatives, would be
less effective and potentially dangerous.503 A democratic conference might not be able to benefit
from the political connections of wealthy and prominent American Jews, and could potentially
fall under the control of Communists, radicals, and Zionists and risk damaging public opinion
towards Jews and intensifying anti-Semitism in the United States.
Insofar as the leadership of the AJC was undemocratic and its membership was made up
of prominent and successful Jews, its founding can be seen as consistent with, or an extension of,
the shtadlan or Hofjude model of Jewish public advocacy in which wealthy and politically
connected elites lobby the powerful on behalf of their coreligionists. As noted above, this pattern
of leadership was also consistent with the involvement of wealthy elites and professionals in
reform movements during the Progressive Era. Within a short period of time, the leaders of the
AJC began to develop and implement new, modern means of public advocacy and communal
defense. In particular, the ways in which this small group of elites coordinated responding to
outbreaks of anti-Semitism in the United States, conducted extensive research, commissioned
numerous publications, and invoked the power of constitutional courts were significant and
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historically unprecedented in the United States. These approaches to Jewish communal defense
and communal leadership went well beyond the traditions of the shtadlan or the Hofjude. The
remainder of this dissertation provides an account of the AJC’s attempts to engage in public
advocacy during the first twenty-five years of the organization’s history.
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Chapter 4: The AJC’s Responses to Domestic Anti-Semitism
Introduction
The establishment of the American Jewish Committee was covered by American
newspapers but, among the American public, the founding of the new advocacy organization
went largely unnoticed or attracted little interest.504 Within the American Jewish community,
however, the announcement of the founding of the organization, and the publication of the AJC’s
membership and constitution, was controversial.505 Some of the Jewish community’s response
was antagonistic. Two months after the founding of the AJC, during the annual convention of the
Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the intra-communal tension and rivalry was exposed.
In a speech that The Washington Post described as having “fairly electrified his audience, and
carried them away with enthusiasm,” Rabbi Moses Gries of the Cleveland Temple challenged the
composition, elitism, and legitimacy of the newly created AJC.506
While the leaders of the Committee made efforts to alleviate the intra-communal tension
generated by the founding of the organization, they also moved forward with their advocacy
work on behalf of Jewish causes. The Committee immediately began to respond to outbreaks of
anti-Jewish violence in foreign countries, to manifestations of anti-Jewish prejudice and
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incitement, and to incidents of anti-Semitism in the United States.507 Notwithstanding the
challenges to the legitimacy of their leadership, the leaders of the AJC began to speak for, and
act on behalf of, the American Jewish community.508 This chapter describes the AJC’s response
to events in the United States that the organization perceived as either manifestations of antiSemitism or as sufficiently serious from a public relations perspective to warrant their
intervention. The AJC’s responses to these incidents illustrate the nature and the development of
the organization’s approach to public advocacy in the United States.
Throughout this chapter, the term “optics” will be used to frame the discussion of the
strategies which underlay the AJC’s decisions to take actions to counter domestic manifestations
of anti-Semitism or anti-Jewish incitement during the early history of the organization.
According to Ben Zimmer, the use of the term optics to describe “political appearances,”
“perception,” or how an event or incident will be read or interpreted by the general public, is a
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relatively recent linguistic development. The term began being used in this sense during the
1970s, and became more common in political and commercial discourse, and in the practice of
public relations, over the next forty years.509 Optics has “nothing to do with the eyes, but it has
everything to do with the way the public sees things.”510 As will be seen in the case studies
included in this study, the leaders of the AJC used different language to describe their concerns
about how manifestations of anti-Semitism, if left unchallenged, would shape the general
public’s perception of American Jews; however, the material available in the organization’s
archives clearly illustrates that the Committee was concerned about how diverse expressions of
anti-Jewish intolerance, incitement, and scandalous and unpatriotic behaviour attributed to
American Jews, could harm the public perception and social status of the American Jewish
community. Their public advocacy in response to these incidents aimed to mitigate the potential
ramifications of these events on the reputation of American Jewry, and the peace and security of
this community in the United States. The materials available in organization’s archives also
reveal that, in choosing how, and if, to respond to a provocation or incident, the AJC’s leadership
considered how their response would be perceived and interpreted by the general American
public and affect the attitudes of the general public towards American Jews.
During the period covered by this study, the Committee did not formulate a single policy
to address the diverse incidents and manifestations of anti-Jewish prejudice that they viewed as
problematic. Incidents were addressed on a case-by-case basis, and, while there are some
common elements to the way the AJC acted in response, the organization’s consideration of
optics, that is, how the American public might interpret both the incident and any response from
American Jewish communal leaders, explains how the leaders of the AJC planned their
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responses, be it through public advocacy or, more often, quiet diplomacy. During these early
years, the leaders of the Committee tended toward approaches that would minimize public
attention on the Jewish community. The leaders consistently sought to avoid publicity or greater
scrutiny of their community by the mainstream press, and, only on rare occasions, did they
release public statements to counter specific allegations made against the American Jewish
community. Their emphasis on avoiding publicity led them to decline to become publically
involved in some of the most dramatic instances of anti-Jewish prejudice during the first half of
the twentieth century. For example, out of concern for how the general public would interpret the
intervention of Jewish communal leaders, some serious provocations, including the activity and
racist rhetoric of the Ku Klux Klan, the lynching of Leo Frank, and, later, the propaganda work
of American Nazis, were not publically countered by the AJC. As a matter of strategy, the
Committee often declined to respond to provocations that they judged should be considered
offensive to all Americans, regardless of their faith. The leadership sought to avoid having
disputes or controversies given a “Jewish label,” or narrowly defined by the media and the
general public as only of concern to Jews or only offensive to the American Jewish community.
Their reticence to enter the fray following some egregious provocations is at the heart of the
criticisms made about the Committee’s passivity; however, it must be noted that this reticence
was consistent with the organization’s advocacy strategies and preferred approaches to
communal defense. The KKK threatened many segments of American society and attacked core
principles of the nation’s constitutional law. American Jews were not the Klan’s principal
victims; the KKK’s vigilantism and use of terror tactics against African American communities
in the South challenged the integrity of country’s laws and law enforcement institutions and
exposed the enduring racism of the former Confederate States. The lynching of Leo Frank,
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although incited by deeply entrenched anti-Semitism in the American South, was more broadly a
miscarriage of justice, indicative of the racial bias, absence of due process, and corruption that
tainted the State of Georgia’s legal system and law enforcement institutions. The anti-Semitism
of American Nazis was only one aspect of this fascist party’s ideology; their political beliefs and
aims conflicted with American ideals and the notion that the nation should be a free and
democratic society. In these examples, anti-Semitism was only one feature of significant social
problems or threats to the rule of law. The Committee’s reticence to see broadly significant
issues become understood by the general public as narrowly of concern to Jews explains the
cautious strategy the organization often adopted. As described in Chapter 3, given the context in
which the AJC was working, the adoption of their cautious strategy can be understood, but the
difficult circumstances and social and racial divisions that the Committee’s leaders recognized
and had to contend with does not absolve the organization of the assessment that its leaders could
have acted more boldly. As will be discussed further below, the preference of Committee leaders
to avoid publicity and to decline to respond to some of the more dramatic manifestations of antiSemitism arguably left the organization inexperienced, and ill-prepared to effectively advocate
on behalf of American Jews, and world Jewry, during the crises of the 1930s and 1940s.
This chapter will show that the American Jewish Committee took a broad view about the
types of incidents or manifestations of intolerance and incitement that were potentially harmful
to the general public’s perception of American Jewry. As the many examples that will be
discussed in this chapter illustrate, the Committee’s leaders deliberated about if, when, and how,
to publically respond to incidents that they saw as threatening Jewish interests or the general
public’s perception of the American Jewish community. The incidents that they addressed were
as multifarious as the circulation of a press account about a soldier in uniform being barred from
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entering a synagogue; the alleged corrupt business practices of American Jews; the depiction of
Jews in theatrical productions; the media attention garnered by blood libel trials in foreign
countries; the public statements released by the leader of the Ku Klux Klan; theatrical
presentations of dramatizations of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ; the publication of books with
anti-Semitic content; and the supposed link between Jews and the spread of Communism. In
Chapter 5, the two most notable case studies of the AJC’s earliest approaches to public advocacy
will be closely considered: the Committee’s response to the anti-Semitic content of Henry Ford’s
newspaper, the Dearborn Independent, and how the organization reacted when, based on
suspicions grounded in the blood libel canard, a Rabbi was interrogated during a kidnapping
investigation in Massena, New York.

The Boston Sailor Incident
One of the first incidents that illustrates the AJC’s consideration of optics, of how Jews
would be perceived by the gentile American public, and the Committee’s preference for
avoiding, whenever possible, publicity, or increased attention to a controversy, was an incident
in 1908 at Temple Adath Jeshurn, an Orthodox synagogue near Boston. The resulting
controversy, which included the dissemination of false information that cast aspersions on the
patriotism of America Jews and created intra-communal antagonism among American Jewish
leaders, followed the publication in newspapers, including a front page story in The New York
Times, of a report that a uniformed United States Marine had been barred from entering a
synagogue during a High Holiday service.511
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Some of the existing historiography on this incident concentrates on how the actions of
different Jewish leaders revealed a division among American Jewish elites in the aftermath of the
establishment of the American Jewish Committee. Older leadership organizations, including
B’nai B’rith and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, were hostile towards the upstart
AJC, and they opposed the mandate the organization claimed as the spokesperson of American
Jewry and the representative organization of the community.512 However, as will be discussed
further below, the Boston Sailor incident revealed not only that there was a “turf war” among
different elements of American Jewish leadership, but also that the various organizations and
factions within them were evolving different approaches to communal defense and public
advocacy.
It is important to note first that the initial reports on the incident that were circulated
through the mainstream press turned out to be false. The uniformed Marine, E.R. Williams, had
not been barred from the synagogue; however, before the published claims could be investigated
and refuted, Simon Wolf, the Chairman of the Board of Delegates of Civil Rights, a subsidiary
organization of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, released public statements
speculating as to why the Marine might have been prevented from entering the synagogue.
According to Mathew Mark Silver, Wolf “indulged in a dubious theory about Jewish tradition
barring uniformed persons from religious services, and (quite wrongly) involved [V.H. Metcalf,]
the Secretary of the Navy in a discussion of the incident.”513
In what Silver describes as the “ugliest moment” of the turf war between the AJC and
other American Jewish organizations, the AJC’s President Mayer Sulzberger “took the lead,
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exploiting one of Wolf’s lapses in judgement” to both discredit Wolf and to build the reputation
and status of the Committee.514 Sulzberger and Wolf exchanged letters, both publically and in
private, that were critical of each other’s responses to the incident in Boston. Wolf defended his
actions, arguing in a public letter that the “apparent offense against patriotism could only be
excused by the existence of some custom as tenaciously held by the orthodox Jews as that of
wearing the hat.”515
It was Wolf’s reporting of the incident to V.H. Metcalf, the Secretary of the Navy,
however, that was arguably his most significant misstep. After hearing of the incident from
Wolf, Metcalf publically criticized the barring of the Marine in the press, which increased the
amount of media attention and public scrutiny.
As press scrutiny of the controversy grew, Wolf appears to have recognized his mistake.
He tried to create distance between himself and the organization he led, claiming that his public
statements were made as a private individual and not on behalf of his organization. The AJC,
according to Silver: “pounced upon Wolf’s indiscretion, hoping to discredit this rival once and
for all. As though in illustration of the theory that the worst turf wars occur when rivals do not
know what they are supposed to be doing on their own turfs, the AJC’s anti-Wolf actions were
overkill.”516
Sulzberger was aggressive in criticizing Wolf. In a private letter to Wolf, Sulzberger
refused to concede that Wolf’s statements were not made on behalf of the Board of Delegates:
“When the head and representative of a public organization writes a public letter on a public
question which is peculiarly within the province of his organization, everybody has a right to
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believe, and does believe, that he is acting as the agent of his principal, as he ought to…But even
as your own letter, it ought never to have been written.”517 In the same letter to Wolf, Sulzberger
described how his own organization responded to the incident in Boston. This letter is thus
revealing about the AJC’s approach to public advocacy. Sulzberger told Wolf that the AJC did
not initially make any public statements; rather, the organization initiated an investigation in
Boston. The AJC’s Executive Committee, at the time composed of Mayer Sulzberger, Louis
Marshall, Jacob Schiff, Cyrus Adler, Judah Magnes, Isadore Sobel and Cyrus Sulzberger,
decided on this course of action during a meeting on October 8, 1908.518 The Executive
Committee delegated the task of “obtaining the facts in the case” to Lee M. Friedman, an AJC
district member from Boston.519 Friedman accepted the task and moved quickly: “Affidavits
were taken, including that of the person alleged to have been insulted, and the whole
evidence…was laid before the Secretary of the Navy.”520
In his letter to Wolf, Sulzberger also included a copy of a letter from Secretary Metcalf to
the rabbi of the Boston synagogue indicating that his department was “gratified to learn that the
story…appears to be without any foundation.”521 The Secretary’s letter to the rabbi was
subsequently released to the public in the hope that its wider distribution through the press would
mitigate some of the damage that had been done by the attention drawn to what turned out to be
a false story.
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Sulzberger was unrestrained in his private criticism of how Wolf, acting on behalf of his
organization, had responded to the Boston incident. Other prominent AJC leaders shared these
views. According to Silver, “Marshall was candid about…[the] purpose [of this criticism],
writing to Sulzberger that “the importance of this episode lies in the fact that it may possibly
minimize Wolf’s opportunities for doing further mischief.”522 Sulzberger’s letter to Wolf is an
indictment of his conduct, but includes some insights into the kind of public advocacy that the
AJC believed was in the best interest of American Jewry: “The proper course for a man of your
position is to refrain from condemning until you know the facts, and even then the voluntary
assumption of the role of accuser is neither necessary nor graceful.”523 Sulzberger notes that
Wolf released false information to the American public that, in addition to being incorrect, also
could be used to malign the patriotism of American Jews: “your guessing about a custom and
then imputing it as an actual thing to a large body of the Jews of this country was, if anything,
worse. Your experiences ought to have shown you that prejudice is easily aroused and that your
function is to allay, not increase it.”524 Sulzberger acknowledged that Wolf was trying to mitigate
the problem, but also explains why he, as the President of the AJC, felt compelled to chastise
Wolf’s efforts:
Of course, you meant no harm, but you did harm and published it
widely. It was my duty to complain as publicly…The American
Jewish Committee has assumed the duty of protecting the Jewish
name against unrighteous assault from any quarter. This duty it has
endeavored as unostentatiously as possible to perform…When,
however, any one, organization or individual, acts heedlessly and
unwisely and produces mischief, neither admiration for high
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character nor gratitude for past services warrants our standing
mute.525
Some of this criticism by Sulzberger of Wolf’s misstep reflects the fact that, during this
period, the AJC was working to assert a leadership position over American Jewry. Sulzberger’s
criticism also reflects the evolving style of public advocacy that the founders of the AJC were
trying to practice, one that, first and foremost, did not further aggravate any situation, and
secondly, privileged harm reduction and long-term social acceptance. The AJC’s approach was
that minor incidents or provocations could be ignored or addressed quietly, because public
advocacy on behalf of a vulnerably minority population was, and remains, fraught with potential
risks of inflaming the situation. The AJC believed that if incidents, whether minor or broadly
significant, were handled publically and poorly, the reputation of the entire community could be
tarnished, exposing the community to greater public scrutiny and placing its social status under
greater threat.
American Jews Seek the AJC’s Advice or Intervention
As the American Jewish Committee’s reputation grew among American Jewry, American
Jews, and Jews in other countries as well, began writing to the AJC to bring problems to the
organization’s attention and to seek the its advice. During the early years of the organization, the
Committee received a considerable amount of correspondence regarding situations or conduct
that were believed to be harming the reputation of the American Jewish community.
Among the situations that the AJC confronted was the matter of how Jews were being
represented or portrayed in theatrical productions. Potentially offensive representations of Jews
on stage, performed by both Jewish and non-Jewish actors and comedians, was not a new
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phenomenon in the United States, but it was not until these productions gained wider audiences
and greater publicity during the early-twentieth century that Jewish leaders began to consider the
potential social implications.526
Historian Esther Romeyn argues that the status insecurity of the Jewish establishment,
and this community’s anxiety about how Jewish immigrants were perceived by the majority of
Americans, shaped these concerns:
As immigrant groups like the Irish and the Jews began to
experience significant social mobility, “racial comics,” with their
lower-class antecedents and antics, confirmed boundaries of race
and class that the socially mobile desperately sought to erase. With
their exploitation of accents, malapropisms, cultural confusion, and
breach of etiquette, they became a thorn in the side of those already
more established in American society. Their collective self-image
was taken hostage by a lower-class, burlesque stage persona, who
not only did not conform to the codes of gentility, but seemed to
throw the civilizing potential of the group as a whole into doubt.527
The racial caricatures and cultural stereotypes sensationalized in these productions were
particularly problematic because, in the context of a society divided into black and white, these
representations could potentially reinforce the perception that Jews and other minority
communities were distinct, inferior, and unassimilable. Cultural production originating from
within these communities, although both produced and patronized by these communities, could
undermine their efforts to be accepted as white by patricians and mainstream white society,
dominant groups who were already inclined to harbor disparaging views of new immigrant
communities, including Catholics and Jews.
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In 1913, the AJC was asked to assist a group of local Jewish leaders in Chicago who had
organized to protest how Jews were represented in theatrical productions. The Chicago leaders,
which included Judge Hugo Pam, Professor Ernest Freund, Jacob Loeb, Congressman A.J.
Sabath, and Illinois State Senator Samuel A. Ettelson, sought the AJC’s help in preventing the
staging of a play based on Montague Glass’s “Potash and Perlmutter” short stories.
These stories, which centered on two Jewish immigrant businessmen, first appeared in
the New York Evening Post, but were subsequently collected and published as a book titled
Potash and Perlmutter: Their CoPartnership Ventures and Adventures.528 The two protagonists
are Jews involved in the garment industry; they are caricatures, and their conversations are
rendered in English using a unique dialect that includes a comic mix of strange phrases, bluster,
and odd word contractions.
The Chicago-based leaders sought the AJC’s assistance because they believed that the
wider dissemination of caricatures of Jewish businessman would harm the reputation of the
American Jewish community. Writing to Louis Marshall on behalf of the group of local Jewish
leaders, Mollie Eda Osherman, the managing editor of the Jewish newspaper Chicago Israelite,
emphasized the potential social implications of the play. She wrote: “‘Potash and Perlmutter’ as
you may judge from the series in book form, contains much which incites race enmities and
prejudice, and dramatized, will prove a monumental satire on Jewish commercial integrity.”529
Osherman’s group had already been lobbying Chicago newspapers to denounce the play,
but, as the production was scheduling tour dates in other American cities, she was seeking the
AJC’s help in broadening their campaign. In particular, Osherman wanted the AJC to dissuade
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American Jews, who were the majority of the audience for plays of this kind, from buying tickets
to these productions: “We desire to invoke your loyal and consistent support to fight this evil by
any means you consistently can to arouse the lethargic self-respect of the Jew, so that they will
not lend their patronage to such humiliating “attractions.’”530 The tone of Osherman’s letter
illustrates her frustration that American Jews, by buying tickets to these productions, were
abetting the defamation of their own community. The AJC had only been in operation for seven
years, but Osherman was confident that the Committee was capable of exercising this kind of
influence. She concluded her letter to Marshall by noting “our hearty thanks and warm
appreciation in advance for any ‘machinery’ that may be set in motion through your interest.” 531
Marshall replied to Osherman the following week. He noted that he was sympathetic
towards her group’s goals, but he also cautioned her about the potential consequences of their
efforts. Marshall wrote: “We must however be careful lest we be regarded as hyper-sensitive.
There can be no difference of opinion in regard to such cases where…the Jew is portrayed as
dishonest, vulgar, and tricky, and has attributed to him qualities which render him the object of
ridicule and contempt. Yet we must not insist that the Jew shall only be portrayed as an angelic
creation.”532
The point that Marshall was attempting to make was his view that there is risk involved
in protesting representations of Jews because not every slight deserves a response and any
response might serve to either draw greater attention to the offense or, worse, lend credibility to
the accusation. Marshall mentions, for example, Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, and
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states that he has “no patience” for people who object to this play’s representation of Jews.533
The implication here is that there is little to be gained from protesting a work that is regarded as
part of the English canon, and that such protests only serve to make Jews appear ashamed of
their history, insecure in their current homes, or overly sensitive about how their community is
represented.
Marshall was of the view that Potash and Perlmutter was not so offensive as to warrant
the kind of campaign Osherman and her colleagues were trying to organize: “I counsel you to
proceed slowly, and deliberately; that you first satisfy yourself that the play is really
offensive.”534 Marshall admitted that he had read a number of the short stories that were the
source material for the play, and claimed only “one of them…was harmful in tone and content”
(although he does not specify which).535 In general, he believed that the representation of Potash
and Perlmutter showed them to be shrewd businessmen “who also possess amiable human
traits…and are possessed of homely virtues which greatly preponderate over such eccentricities
as are attributed to them.”536
Marshall also counselled against the campaign because he felt it could not succeed. He
wrote to Osherman: “I always believe in choosing my own fighting ground, where I am strong
and my opponent is weak—In my opinion in directing your batteries against Potash and
Perlmutter you are attacking the ‘enemy’…where he is strongly entrenched, because the
multitude of readers Jew and non-Jew who have read [the stories]…regard these men as very
decent and agreeable friends, with whom they are delighted to spend an occasional hour.”537 The
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majority of the Jewish audience were not offended by the stories, and, without the backing of the
broader Jewish community, there was no hope of success.
The campaign could have also aggravated the intra-communal tension between
establishment Jews, such as the leaders of the AJC and the members of the Chicago-based group,
and the recent immigrants who were apparently not offended by the stories and were the
principal audience for the production. Marshall felt the more suitable tactic was the exercise of
quiet diplomacy. He offered to write the producers of the play to ask them “to avoid any episode
or expressions which are likely to be misinterpreted.”538
Marshall did write to the producers, Marc Klaw and A.L. Erlanger, the following month.
He warned them that a “campaign of education” was being organized to combat offensive
representations of Jews on the stage, and he noted that it would be “sound business policy” to
ensure that the Potash and Perlmutter production did not contain potentially offensive or
derogatory material.539 Marshall wrote: “We assume that you would not consciously pander to
those who are the enemies of our people, or do aught to pain those who take pride in their
Jewishness. Consequently we ask you to see to it that the forthcoming play be carefully revised
and blue-pencilled so as to avoid all episodes and expressions which are likely to be
misinterpreted and which might tend to give rise to the impression that Jews are dishonest,
tricky, vulgar, and a proper butt for ridicule.”540
Based on the correspondence that followed, it appears that Klaw and Erlanger did not
appreciate Marshall’s attempt to interfere in their production. They replied to Marshall that they
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had no control over the text of the play.541 They also accused Marshall of hypocrisy for trying to
impose a code of conduct on Jewish producers that he would not presume to impose on Jewish
lawyers: “We agree with you in the sentiments expressed in your letter generally; but we are
wondering if this same code of ethics applies to lawyers and what is the line of demarcation they
draw with regard to taking cases that would reflect on Jews. We are reminded of this by the fact
that your high standing as a lawyer might enable you to influence Jewish lawyers of lesser
standing to take the fine sentiments expressed in your letter before us.”542
In his reply, Marshall reminded the producers that even if they claimed to have no control
over the script, they were “nevertheless morally responsible for the character of the play.”543 He
also dismissed their allegation of hypocrisy. He claimed that as a member of the legal profession,
he “would apply a stricter rule to a lawyer than a layman.”544 He also dismissed the idea that
profession was at all relevant in terms of defining a person’s duty to their own people. In his
view, regardless of job or profession, the duty remained the same. Marshall wrote: “No man is
more contemptible in my eyes than one who is recreant to the sense of obligation he owes his
own people. This is especially my attitude to the Jew who so conducts his business or profession
as to fan the flames of prejudice and to give occasion for invidious reflection upon the race from
which he sprung.”545
The matter was resolved amicably, as Marshall was invited by A.H. Woods, another of
the play’s producers, to attend a showing and offer suggestions on any material he felt was
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offensive and should be cut.546 Ultimately, Potash and Perlmutter was a hit that was adapted into
a movie. Certainly there were Jews who were offended by the production, or were concerned
about its potential impact on the reputation of American Jewry, but widespread condemnation of
the play did not emerge from within the American Jewish community. Marshall himself wrote a
letter to Barney Bernard, one of the lead actors, praising his performance. The letter, although
suffuse with praise, did contain a few suggestions.547
There were other examples of members of the Jewish community seeking the AJC’s
assistance in safeguarding the reputation of Jews. Concerns about the business behaviour of
American Jews, and how this behaviour could be used to tarnish the reputation of the entire
community, were frequently brought to the Committee’s attention. For example, in 1922, the
Committee received a letter from S.M. Pye, a Jewish businessman and resident of New York,
complaining about the corrupt behaviour of young Jewish bankruptcy lawyers and warning about
how this behaviour could affect the broader American public’s perception and attitudes towards
Jews. Pye wrote that he had seen dishonest practices from Jewish bankruptcy lawyers that were
“so disgustingly rotten” that he did not know how to express his feelings: “It is the opinion of the
writer that you gentlemen, who have done so much to save the name ‘Jew,’ should look into this
matter and do something to again save the name from being disgraced. The young Jewish
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lawyers I have reference to should be in jail instead of driving around in their fancy cars which
they have earned dishonestly.”548
In his letter, Pye provided a brief account of a specific example, of which he claimed to
be a witness, in which a Jewish bankruptcy lawyer conspired with a client to cheat an Italian
merchant out of fifteen hundred dollars. “If it were not for the fact that I am a Jew,” Pye wrote,
“I would become a Jew-hater of the worst kind.”549 He noted that he was surprised that the
incident did not escalate into a violent confrontation: “I am sure that nothing is more worthy of
your attention than these conditions and sincerely hope that you will take this up.”550
Louis Marshall replied to Pye, thanking him for bringing this matter to the attention of
the Committee, but explaining that addressing this problem was both beyond the financial means
and outside of the mandate of the AJC. “It is not within the jurisdiction of the American Jewish
Committee to deal with the morals of lawyers or merchants,” Marshall wrote. “If we attempted
to take up such a subject…we would have to have the authority to supervise the moral, religious,
and intellectual training of merchants and lawyers alike from childhood up.”551 Marshall
acknowledged that “abuses” did occur in the practice of bankruptcy law, but denied that they
were disproportionately carried out by Jewish lawyers. He subscribed these abuses to the nature
of the practice of bankruptcy law. In his view, misconduct was “largely due to the sordid phases
of bankruptcy itself and largely induced by the dishonesty of bankrupt merchants…and creditors
who do not hesitate to adopt methods which cannot bear investigation.”552 Marshall advised Pye
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that Bar Associations were in the best position to investigate misconduct, and had the mandate to
punish.
Marshall also addressed the bad optics of communal leaders acknowledging their
coreligionists’ transgressions. Marshall stated that it would be “manifestly better” for these
matters to be addressed by professional associations and regulatory bodies instead of communal
leadership groups.553 The public exposure of dishonest business practices could have fed, and
arguably did promote, stereotypes about Jews; however, it was beyond the mandate and
resources of the AJC to intervene in regulating the activity of Jewish businessmen or Jews within
the professions. Certainly the Committee’s leaders would have preferred that no exposure be
given to professional misconduct by Jews; however, they calculated that drawing further public
attention to this issue by coordinating some kind of campaign of instruction in business ethics for
Jewish merchants and professionals would only aggravate the problem.
The way the Committee responded to the requests for its help in the cases of the
production of Potash and Perlmutter and Pye’s allegations about Jewish bankruptcy lawyers are
illustrative of the organization’s approach to dealing with situations that, if given broader
exposure, could potentially embarrass the Jewish community or harm the reputation of American
Jews. The approach of the AJC was consistently directed at minimizing publicity. In the AJC’s
view, there was nothing to be gained from drawing attention to an intra-communal debate
between establishment Jews and new immigrants over how Jews were represented on stage, and,
similarly, there was nothing to be gained from Jewish leadership organizations acknowledging in
any way that some Jewish lawyers were guilty of professional misconduct.
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The murder trial of Mendel Beilis, which arose from an accusation of blood libel near
Kiev, has been compared with the Dreyfus affair and the lynching of Leo Frank as significant
events in the history of modern Jewish activism. The accusations against Beilis, Dreyfus, and
Frank, although concerning very different criminal charges, escalated into what historian Albert
S. Lindemann describes as “affairs.” According to Lindemann, “for a trial to become an affair it
must have ideological implications. It must…develop into something more than a strictly legal
issue of innocence or guilt. Participants in affairs see themselves as selflessly involved in a larger
struggle, one that meshes into their general political convictions, into their view of the world.”554
Mendel Beilis found himself at the centre of an affair. “On March 25, 1911, the body of a
12-year-old boy was found in a cave near Kiev, his hands tied behind his back and 47 puncture
wounds in his body.”555 According to historian Joel Berkowitz, the “combination of the murder’s
grisly nature and its proximity to Passover led right-wing forces in Russia to dredge up the
centuries-old charge of blood libel.”556 There was no evidence in the case accept a lone witness’
report that a Jew had kidnapped the victim, Andrei Yushchinsky. Mendel Beilis, a Russian Jew
who was the “foreman of a nearby brickyard,” was arrested four months later and charged with
murder.557 In the months following his arrest and throughout his trial, Russian newspapers
published numerous overtly anti-Semitic articles which used the blood libel accusation against
Beilis to agitate ordinary Russians against Jews. “Over the next two and a half years, the
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proceedings against…Beilis would wind through a Kafkaesque maze culminating in his acquittal
on November 10, 1913.”558
The AJC became involved in the Beilis affair, which the organization referred to
internally as “the Beilis case,” only after his trial began to be widely discussed by the
mainstream media in the United States. There is no record of the AJC becoming involved in the
Beilis affair, or giving the case any attention, until November 8, 1913, almost two years after
Beilis’ arrest, and only two days before the verdict in the case was delivered. Up until this point,
the public outcry from Jewish leadership organizations surrounding this prosecution had been a
European phenomenon, with German organizations, including the Hilfsverein der deutschen
Juden, leading an effort to influence public opinion.559
As will be discussed further below, Mendel Beilis’ trial did garner the attention of
Yiddish theatre companies and audiences in the United States, but the AJC did not address the
affair until the organization began to consider the potential domestic repercussions of media
reports on the trial and the expected guilty verdict. The AJC anticipated that a guilty verdict
would precipitate another round of anti-Jewish violence in Russia. During a meeting on
November 8, 1913, the AJC’s Executive Committee discussed a number of ways to respond to
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the case, including the coordination of “a very strenuous newspaper campaign which might
eventually compel [the American government] to make official representations to the Russian
government.”560 The tone of the meeting was pessimistic. Louis Marshall believed the
Committee should “assume that a verdict of guilty would be delivered” when formulating its
response, despite the fact that the AJC had received a report from the State Department that
indicated that American diplomats were confident that Beilis would be acquitted.561
Some of the AJC’s leaders were conflicted about how to respond. They were reluctant to
draw excessive media attention to the case in the United States, but believed the Committee and
American Jewry should not remain silent on the issue. Judah Magnes, for example, noted that
“the Jews [in this country] have been very quiet in this case” and he believed that American Jews
“ought to be given a chance to express themselves.”562 Other AJC leaders counselled structuring
an advocacy campaign based on public expressions from well-known writers combined with
quietly lobbying Congress to intervene. Judge Sulzberger “suggested that a measure that would
probably go further than anything else would be the publication of protests by leading literary
men such as Israel Zangwill…in the nature of Zola’s ‘J’accuse.’”563
The idea of lobbying Congress to pass a resolution condemning the prosecution was also
discussed by the Executive Committee but was rejected because of concerns that a resolution
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could be misinterpreted by the American public and, further, would have no effect on the
Russian government’s policies. Sulzberger noted that “we do not want anything in the nature of a
certificate that the Jews do not commit ritual murder.”564 The AJC did not want to
unintentionally lend credence to the blood libel canard by asking American lawmakers to make a
public pronouncement on the subject. Instead, Cyrus Adler suggested that the Committee lobby
to have Congress abrogate the extradition treaty between the United States and Russia on the
grounds that the “Beilis case shows that Russian justice cannot be trusted and therefore we could
not trust Russia in her demands to extradite her refugees to this country.”565 Ultimately, the
Executive Committee decided to recommend the establishment of a subcommittee to “deal with
the subject of the Beilis case and the massacres that may be feared in consequence thereof in the
event of conviction.”566 Louis Marshall, who had only recently become the AJC’s second
President, was appointed to this subcommittee.
Although the Committee did not become involved until very near the end of the trial
when it began to be discussed in American newspapers, individual members of the Committee
initiated some efforts to ensure that accurate information was being relayed to the general public.
For example, on October 15, 1913, Cyrus Alder wrote to George A. Waite, the Managing Editor
of the Philadelphia Evening Telegraph, to complain about “two false statements” in the
newspaper’s reporting on the Beilis trial.567 Adler wanted the newspaper to correct the record
that Beilis was not a Jewish “priest,” and that his defense would be to deny the charges against
him.

564

Ibid.
Ibid.
566
Ibid.
567
Letter from Cyrus Adler to George A. Waite, Managing Editor, Evening Telegraph, Philadelphia, Pa., October
15, 1913, American Jewish Committee Archives, General Correspondence Papers, Series II: Subject Files, 1906-32,
Box 4, File 17.
565

247

In a column published a week earlier, the newspaper had noted that “the plea of defence
will be that Beilis while aware that a human sacrifice was being made at his alter, was not the
actual murderer.”568 Adler’s anger is easily discerned in the letter to the editor: “Every word of
this statement is false.”569 He insisted that the Evening Telegraph investigate the source of its
information on the trial, and he asked to be informed of the results of this investigation. This
request was consistent with the Committee’s earlier efforts to lobby the Associated Press to
investigate its sources of information on Russia and the wire service’s correspondents in that
country. In private letters to managers of the Associated Press, Committee leaders repeatedly
alleged that the wire service was being manipulated by agents of the Imperial Russian
government to disseminate false information to the American people.570
As already noted, the AJC was pessimistic about the outcome of Beilis’ trial, but there is
scarce evidence regarding the AJC’s response to the affair before the acquittal. The Committee’s
concern for Beilis, and how his trial and the whole affair would be interpreted by the broader
American public, in fact became more acute following Beilis’ acquittal. The trial got exposure
through Jewish newspapers in the United States, so much so that, even before the verdict,
Yiddish theatre companies in New York City were producing dramatization of Beilis’ ordeal.
“Long before the trial ended, advertisements began to appear announcing dramatizations of the
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Beilis affair. These productions were first mounted in the smaller theaters of New York City,
then moved to larger houses.”571 Eventually, these productions toured other cities in both the
United States and Canada. Beilis’ story “generated enough popularity to sustain six different
Beilis plays in New York alone in November 1913, as well as numerous others in Philadelphia,
Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Montreal, London, and elsewhere.”572
The AJC became further involved when, after his acquittal and release from custody,
rumours began to spread that Beilis had agreed to come to the United States to appear in
vaudeville productions about his story. The AJC was concerned that Beilis was being exploited
by producers, but the leaders of the organization were also clearly weary about the optics of
these rumoured stage appearances. Even though Beilis had been acquitted, the leaders of the AJC
were concerned that the publicity around his appearances in the United States would only give
greater exposure to the blood libel charge in America. They were eager to minimize public
discussion of blood libel in the hope that less exposure would keep the charge on the margins of
American opinion. They wanted the acquittal to be publically acknowledged, and then they
wanted the story to fade from the attention of the general public.
Once the AJC heard the rumour that Beilis was possibly coming to the United States, the
organization moved to “head off” the efforts of vaudeville producers to secure Beilis’
participation in their productions.573 Louis Marshall, Jacob Schiff, and Judge Sulzberger
coordinated a plan to bribe Beilis not to come to the United States because “the effect [of the
proposed stage appearances] would be to destroy the dignity with which Beilis has heretofore
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acted, and minimize the beneficial consequences of his acquittal.”574 They discussed possible
ways to provide Beilis with enough money to make the stage contracts less attractive, and
further, they wanted to urge him to relocate to Palestine as opposed to the United States.
In a letter to members of the AJC’s Executive Committee, Marshall summarized the steps
he had already taken to address this issue, and described his thoughts on the best possible
outcome. Marshall wrote that he had been in communication with the Hilfsverein, and that the
German organization was cooperating with his efforts to lobby Beilis to reject any proposals
from American vaudeville producers. James Simon, the President of the Hilfsverein, had
reported that Beilis was close to accepting offers, and believed the only way to prevent this from
happening was “to collect a fund of 100,000 Rubles, the income of which is to be devoted to
Beilis and his family.”575 Simon asked the AJC to “make a collection for this purpose,”
essentially requesting the AJC coordinate a philanthropic or fund raising campaign on Beilis’
behalf in the United States.576
Marshall, Schiff, and Sulzberger rejected this idea, but they moved forward with a
different scheme to raise the necessary funds to ensure that Beilis would not appear in any stage
productions about his story. In his letter to the members of the AJC’s Executive Committee,
Marshall suggested that “under the circumstances, it might be advisable to appropriate up to
$5,000 out of our Emergency Fund toward a fund to consist of not less than $15,000, the
remainder of which is to be contributed by the Hilfsverein or by other European
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organizations.”577 Marshall was very clear that if the AJC contributed to this fund, the
organization would attach strict conditions to their donation: “the fund [is] to be applied for the
benefit of Beilis, on condition only that he shall not come to the United States or permit himself
to be otherwise exploited.”578
It must be noted that this was a novel and unprecedented use of the AJC’s emergency
trust fund. The trust fund, which was created through an act of New York State legislatures a
year earlier, had been intended to hold funds in trust to finance the AJC’s relief work in foreign
countries.579 For example, in April 1913, the AJC had earmarked five thousand dollars from its
emergency fund for relief work for Jewish refugees from the Balkan War.580 This was traditional
relief work, including the provision of food, medical attention, and travel assistance. As will be
shown through this study, after the Beilis affair, the AJC gradually expanded the definition of
“emergency” to encompass not only calamities caused by war, natural disasters, and violent
religious persecution, to include the need to finance responses to manifestations of anti-Jewish
prejudice and anti-Semitic propaganda. By 1930, the AJC had earmarked the entire balance of
the trust fund to finance the organization’s efforts to counter anti-Jewish propaganda.581
At the time that Marshall sent his letter detailing how he wanted to deal with Beilis, the
AJC’s Executive Committee had not had a meeting for more than six weeks. Marshall was eager

577

Ibid.
Ibid.
579
For a discussion of the establishment of the AJC’s Emergency Trust Fund, see: Minutes of the American Jewish
Committee’s Executive Committee meeting held on January 1, 1913, American Jewish Committee Archives: Digital
Archives. Accessed December 19, 2014. http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajcarchive/FileViewer.aspx?id=16455.
580
See: Minutes of the American Jewish Committee’s Executive Committee meeting held on April 20, 1913,
American Jewish Committee Archives: Digital Archives. Accessed December 19, 2014.
http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajcarchive/FileViewer.aspx?id=16455.
581
The decision to devote the balance of the Emergency Trust fund to finance efforts to counter anti-Jewish
propaganda was made by the AJC’s Executive Committee on December 8, 1929. See: Minutes of the American
Jewish Committee’s Executive Committee meeting held on December 8, 1929, American Jewish Committee
Archives: Digital Archives. Accessed October 10, 2013.
http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajcarchive/FileViewer.aspx?id=16488.
578

251

to have his plan, including the novel use of the AJC’s emergency fund, endorsed by the other
leaders of the organization. Isaac W. Bernheim telegrammed a reply to Marshall: “I heartily
favor the expenditure of five thousand dollars for the purpose named in your esteemed letter.”582
Other AJC leaders had misgivings about Marshall’s proposal, but nevertheless
acquiesced to an appropriation from the emergency fund. In his telegrammed reply to Marshall’s
letter, Harry Cutler expressed his concerns with the plan, but also acceded to the idea: “If in your
judgement we have a right to divert any part of the emergency fund for the purpose indicated I
consent notwithstanding the fact that purchasing the good conduct of this man through this
method is abhorrent and deplorable to my mind[.] I presume however that of the two evils this is
the lesser[.]”583 At a meeting held by the Executive Committee three weeks later, after some
further discussion, the full leadership endorsed the plan.584
The implementation of Marshall’s plan did not go smoothly. The effort to keep Mendel
Beilis away from the United States, off the American stage, and financially solvent would
require the attention of members of the Committee for the next eight years. After his acquittal,
Beilis chose to relocate to Palestine. The AJC had some difficulty delivering the money to Beilis,
and, as late as 1920, the organization was not sure that any of the money from the emergency
fund that had been earmarked for Beilis had been successful transferred.585 Beilis and his family
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were destitute in Palestine, and he appealed to the AJC for the assistance he was promised. Beilis
also requested assistance from other Jewish leadership organizations in both Europe and the
United States.586
Harry Schneiderman, the AJC’s Assistant Secretary, initiated an investigation to discover
what had happened to the money promised to Beilis.587 Schneiderman ultimately concluded that
Beilis had never received any funds from the Committee.588 In the meantime, the AJC received a
cable from the Zionist Organization of American asking for seven thousand dollars from the
Committee to “establish Beilis on a farm [in Palestine] on a self-supporting basis.”589 The
Committee declined to contribute, noting that it was “too large an amount to be expended out of
relief funds for a single family” and in excess of what the AJC had promised in 1913.590
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The Committee debated using the money it had promised Beilis to establish a trust on his
behalf through the Anglo Palestine Bank, but decided not to pursue this option.591 Instead, the
AJC arranged to transfer the money to an account at the Anglo Palestine Bank. This money also
never made it to Beilis, because, while the leaders of the AJC were trying to decide what to do
with the promised money, Beilis travelled to the United States, where he had family.592 In March
1913, Beilis met with Cyrus Adler. During this meeting, he expressed his intention to settle
permanently in the United States, find employment, and become an American citizen. Despite
this decision being a clear breach of the conditions that Marshall had imposed, the AJC
nevertheless honored its pledge.593
The decision to provide funds to Beilis to prevent him from appearing in American
vaudeville productions was one of the more provocative actions the AJC took during the earliest
years of the organization. As already noted, some of the organization’s leaders were torn about
the ethical merit of this decision. From the perspective of optics, the leaders of the AJC certainly
would not have wanted this information to be made public. The seriousness with which the AJC
treated the potential repercussions of Beilis’ stage appearances reflects their anxiety about the
charge of blood libel being imported into the American environment. They were prepared to take
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somewhat drastic, and certainly unprecedented, measures to avoid the harm they believed these
appearances might create. These measures were consistent with the AJC’s preference for
avoiding publicity. Where other organizations might have seized on the opportunity Beilis’
acquittal presented to challenge the blood libel charge in public forums, the AJC deliberately
chose to do everything it could to limit the media exposure and public debate on the substance
and outcome of the Beilis affair.

The Ku Klux Klan and the Silent Treatment
The activities of white supremacists organizations are a social and political problem with
a long history in the United States. In contemporary America, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) is
considered a marginal organization, although its status as a secret organization with a history of
using violence to intimidate its opponents and terrorize communities means it remains a
potentially dangerous threat. The contemporary KKK, however, is a much different organization
than earlier incarnations of this hate group. “Historians of the Ku Klux Klan generally
distinguish between three different Klans in US history. The first iteration of the Klan existed
immediately following the [American] Civil War. This Reconstruction Klan was limited
regionally to the South and was organized for the sole purpose of restoring the racial order the
region had lost during the Civil War.”594 This initial incarnation of the Klan survived until
roughly 1871, after which “the Klan did not exist for roughly half a century.”595 The KKK
resurfaced in the early-twentieth century and was a strong force in American society and politics
until the late-1920s. “Unlike the Reconstruction Klan, the 1920s KKK used a wide variety of
tactics to increase its appeal, ranging from Prohibition enforcement to [campaigning for]
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immigration restriction to promotion of white Protestant Americanism.”596 During this period,
the Klan also entered the political arena and actively supported Congressional candidates.
Although many organizations opposed the activity of the KKK, through the early 1920s, the
Klan continued “to gain political power. By 1923, at least seventy-five congressional
representatives, as well as senators from Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Oklahoma, and
Texas, were said to owe their seats to the Klan.”597
The American Jewish Committee first considered how to respond to the activities of the
KKK during a meeting of the Executive Committee held on December 10, 1922.598 The context
in which the leaders of the AJC discussed the activities of the Klan is significant. Their
discussion was indexed under the heading “Anti-Jewish Propaganda,” but the real reason the
Committee’s leaders took up this issue was the recent public pronouncements made by Jewish
leaders representing other American Jewish organizations about their intention to openly oppose
the Klan’s activities and “make an open fight against the Ku Klux Klan”599 These declarations
were connected to the ongoing efforts of Jewish leaders outside the small leadership circle of the
AJC who were trying to build the reputation and public profile of the American Jewish Congress.
By 1922, there was already a well-established, and often contentious, rivalry between the leaders
and proponents of the Committee and the Congress, two of the three major American Jewish
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leadership organizations of the era. The AJC and the American Jewish Congress also competed
with B’nai B’rith and its affiliate the Anti-Defamation League. It was both intercommunal
rivalry and a difference of opinion about advocacy tactics that prompted the AJC to act.
On November 26, 1922, the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Congress held
a convention in New York City,600 with 471 delegates representing 158 Jewish organizations in
attendance. This convention was arranged to organize the New York City operations of the
Congress movement, and resulted in the founding of a subsidiary body, the New York Council
for the Jewish Congress. The American Jewish Committee did not participate. Without naming
the AJC directly, the resolutions adopted during the convention, and the public pronouncements
made following, called attention to the distinctions between the Congress movement and the
AJC, emphasizing in particular that, in contrast to the Committee, the Congress was a
fundamentally democratic movement.601
During the opening address of the Congress’ convention, Judge Aaron J. Levy, who was
a Vice-President of the Congress and the Grand Master of the fraternal order B’rith Abraham,
“attacked the Ku Klux Klan, which he denounced as a menace to American democracy.”602 The
convention adopted three resolutions that defined its mandate. The first two emphasized the
democratic character of the organization and its relationship to the broader Jewish Congress
movement, including the efforts of Jewish leaders around the world to coordinate the
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establishment of a World Jewish Congress.603 The third and final resolution addressed
specifically the KKK. The New York Council resolved to “manifest a protest against the Ku
Klux Klan by a public resolution of organized Jews of New York.”604
As already noted, the KKK was gaining notoriety and political strength during the earlytwentieth century. Until 1922, the AJC ignored these developments. When the AJC’s Executive
Committee finally considered the activities of the KKK, this discussion was in response to the
pronouncements made during the New York Council’s convention.605
During the December 10, 1922 AJC Executive Committee meeting, Louis Marshall
reported that he had already written directly to Judge Levy to describe the potential
consequences of Jewish organizations publically combatting the Klan.606 Marshall’s view, and
the view that was ultimately adopted by the AJC as an organization, was that American Jews
should avoid any action or statements which could bolster the perception that the KKK was
acting only against American Jews or was only offensive to American Jews. The KKK should be
defined as a general threat to American democracy, not a narrow threat to one minority.
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Marshall’s position reflected the reality of the KKK’s ideology, and the breadth of its hostility
towards a variety of different minority communities in the United States.
From the perspective of public relations, public advocacy, and political optics, Marshall’s
position was strategically prudent. The KKK was hostile towards other ethnic minority
communities, particularly African Americans, and religious groups, including the huge
population of Irish and Italian-American Catholics. The KKK also opposed the tolerant positions
of moderate American Protestant groups. All of these communities were targeted by the Klan
and, in Marshall’s view, all of these communities should be responsible for publically
combatting the KKK. In a letter to M.E. Lubin, Marshall wrote that “it would be a tremendous
blunder for the Jews to accept the gauge of battle…Let us act, not as Jews, but as American
citizens in all matters of this kind, and let those who naturally should take the leadership in
fighting an insidious movement go to the front. We must not make of ourselves a buffer.”607
Similarly, in a letter to Colonel Henry D. Lindsley, Marshall stated that he did not believe
American Jewry was capable of effectively combatting the KKK: “the Jewish people as a race
and as a religious body cannot be effective by themselves in a conflict against the Ku Klux Klan,
and I for one will do all in my power to prevent the Jews as such from entering upon such a
conflict.”608 In the same letter to Lindsley, Marshall praised the advocacy of the Federation of
the Churches of Christ in America, a Protestant leadership body, for its “effective action,” and
for having “repudiated the attitude of the Ku Klux Klan against those races and religions that are
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in the minority in this country.” Marshall described the Federation’s advocacy as “consistent
with the highest patriotism.”609
The AJC was always concerned that behaviour attributed to American Jewry could
potentially undermine the general public’s perception of the patriotism of American Jews. In the
case of the KKK, however, a pragmatic consideration about the potential impact of Jewish
advocacy was privileged over the public’s perception of American Jewish patriotism. The KKK
of the 1920s was a powerful organization, but many individuals and organizations spoke out
against the Klan. The patriotism of the Klan’s critics was questioned only by the Klan. Marshall
was of the view, however, that the moment Jewish organizations declared their intention to fight
the KKK, the publicity surrounding that announcement would lend greater legitimacy to the Klan
and help the organization recruit more members. “You may rest assured,” Marshall wrote to
Lubin, “that the immediate effect will be to increase the numbers of the Klan, because many of
our enemies who otherwise would never think of joining the Klan would permit their animosity
to the Jews to lead them into that organization.”610
During the December 10, 1922 meeting, the AJC’s Executive Committee adopted a
resolution that authorized Louis Marshall to compose “a letter advising the members of the
Committee, the heads of various other Jewish organizations and the editors of Jewish newspapers
and periodicals against making a Jewish issue of the Ku Klux Klan movement.”611 This was the
second time in the sixteen-year history of the Committee that the organization had chosen to
deliberately refrain from any action or public response to answer a direct threat or slander against
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the American Jewish community because of concerns about how that response might shape
public perception or be counterproductive.612 This tactic, which is sometimes described as the
“silent treatment” or the “quarantine method,” became a mainstay of the AJC’s approach to
public advocacy and communal defense.613
The silent treatment approach is grounded in a consideration of optics and the avoidance
of potential harm. The anti-Semitic rhetoric of the KKK was harmful and a provocation;
however, the Committee judged that responding to it posed greater risks. Marshall was confident
that if American Jews ignored the KKK, the organization would remain marginal among
ordinary Americans: “If matters are permitted to be worked out in a normal way the Ku Klux
Klan will die of inanition and of ridicule and contempt in a very short time.”614
The AJC maintained its policy of not responding to the KKK throughout the 1920s,
despite numerous further provocations and entreaties from American Jews and other leadership
organizations to publically combat the Klan.615 On at least two occasions, the AJC did use some
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forms of quiet diplomacy to attempt to undermine the influence of the Klan. In 1924, Marshall
wrote a private letter to President Calvin Coolidge and tried to persuade the President to make “a
statement openly condemning the Klan.”616 Marshall never reported to the Executive Committee
that he had received a reply. It is worth noting that there were three candidates in the 1924
Presidential Election, and “only Calvin Coolidge chose not to condemn the Klan.”617
A more cunning but still covert attempt by the AJC to damage the Klan occurred in May
of 1923. Marshall reported to the AJC’s Executive Committee that he had received a letter from
Daniel Alexander, the Committee’s local representative in Salt Lake City, Utah. Alexander’s
letter contained a report about the activity of the Klan in Pocatello, Idaho. Alexander indicated
that the Klan was very active in the city and “had openly threatened to expel Jews and
Catholics.”618 The letter mentioned that the leaders of the Pocatello Klan were all employees of
the Union Pacific Railroad. During an Executive Committee meeting on May 27, 1923, Marshall
revealed that he had discussed this matter with Lewis Strauss, an investment banker with deep
ties to the railroad companies. Marshall reported that Strauss “had communicated with the
officials of the Union Pacific Railroad who had promised to give the matter their prompt
attention.”619 It can be reasonably inferred that Marshall, through Strauss, was trying to get the
local leaders of the Klan terminated from their employment with the Union Pacific. There is no
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further discussion of this event in the AJC’s archives and no way to prove if the effort was
successful. The episode demonstrates the breadth of the Committee’s connections to the
wealthiest strata of American society, and how the organization’s leaders were sometimes
prepared to utilize those connections rather than more overt responses to threats to the Jewish
community.620
One notable exception to the Committee’s policy of remaining silent about the activities
and beliefs of the Klan occurred in 1923 following a speech given by Hiram Wesley Evans, the
Imperial Wizard of the KKK, in Dallas, Texas. Evans had ascended to the Klan’s leadership
position less than a year earlier. His speech publically outlined the racist beliefs of the Klan and
the organization’s disparaging views of African Americans, Catholics, and Jews. Marshall was
asked by the New York World to make a public statement in response to Evans’ speech. He
accepted the request for comment, using both humor and reasoned arguments to condemn the
Klan and its beliefs.
Marshall’s published reply opens with the following: “Hitherto I have regarded the Ku
Klux Klan movement as so utterly ridiculous as to be undeserving of serious consideration. Now
that the Imperial Wizard has openly defined…[the KKK’s] program, it may perhaps be
permissible to comment on it.”621 Marshall then proceeds to disparage the KKK’s understanding
of patriotism and American constitutional law. His statement also provides further insight into
the principles that underlay the Committee’s strategy of declining to openly fight the Klan.
Marshall wrote:
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It is not for the Negro or the Jew or the Catholic to join issue with
any organization that entertains such abominable theories. It is for
the American people as a whole…It is an insult to those of our
citizens who are loyal to the fundamental principles of our
Government to contemplate that a dogma of so monstrous a nature
can be regarded by them otherwise than with detestation and
contempt. I have such confidence in their sense of justice and
fairness and in their genuine patriotism, that I feel it to be entirely
appropriate to resume my former attitude of indifference towards
the Ku Klux Klan and all its works.622
The AJC became increasingly committed to the silent treatment throughout the first half
of the twentieth century. The organization was prepared to engage in forms of public advocacy,
but, regarding hate groups, it was committed to avoiding publicity based on the principle that
greater exposure could confer greater legitimacy upon these organizations. This emphasis on
avoiding publicity oriented the Committee towards non-confrontational approaches to public
advocacy, arguably leaving the AJC institutionally unprepared for the profound challenges that
emerged during the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, the harshest criticism of the AJC does not
center on its anti-democratic character or anti-Zionism, but rather condemns the organization’s
alleged passivity during the rise of the Nazi Party and the Holocaust.623 The way the AJC chose
to respond to the KKK was consistent with the organization’s communal defense and advocacy
strategies. The plan was effective insofar as the campaign against the KKK was framed not as a
Jewish question but a as a broad national issue; however, it can be argued that an opportunity to
publically confront bigotry was missed, along with all the lessons that might have been learned
and applied in subsequent confrontations.

Representations of the Crucifixion of Jesus Christ
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One of the main sources of anti-Semitism in early-twentieth-century America was the
collective guilt attributed to “the Jews” for their alleged role in the execution of Jesus Christ. The
charge of deicide, and the pejorative label “Christ-Killer,” is arguably the most durable source of
Christian anti-Semitism, and has been used throughout history to foment anti-Semitism and antiJewish violence in countries with Christian majorities.624 According to the Four Gospels, some
of the culpability for Jesus’ death rests on the manoeuvrings of the Sanhedrin (Jewish high
priests) and the protests of the Jewish mob that assembled before Pontius Pilate.625 Any retelling
of the story of the crucifixion that includes or overemphasizes these elements is capable of
fomenting Christian animosity towards Jews.626
In the early-twentieth century, American Jewish leaders were concerned that
dramatizations of the events leading up to the execution of Jesus could lead to an intensification
of anti-Semitism in the United States. As will be discussed further below, Jewish leaders were
also concerned about how the Crucifixion was being taught to American children, and how those
lessons would influence, in the long term, the relationship between American Christians and
American Jews.
The release of Cecil B. DeMille’s film The King of Kings in 1927 and the arrival in the
United States of German touring companies presenting large-scale, lavish dramatizations of
Jesus’ death were events that elicited the attention of the leaders of the American Jewish
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Committee.627 The potential for films, which could be viewed by thousands of people during a
theatrical run, or live-action retellings, which sometimes included casts of more than one
thousand actors and musicians and could be seen by stadium-sized audiences across the country,
to arouse anti-Jewish sentiments among ordinary Americans was taken very seriously by the
leaders of the AJC. The Committee developed strategies to minimize the potential impact on the
growth of anti-Semitism in the United States of the wide release of The King of Kings and the
touring productions of elaborate “passion plays.” Once again, in these efforts, the AJC
emphasized quieter approaches in order to achieve its objectives.
Historian Yael Ohad-Karny notes that shortly after the release of The King of Kings,
“Jews from across the…[United States] began expressing deep concern and feelings of insult.”628
They were fearful that a filmed biography of Jesus, because of the potential emotional impact of
film as a medium, could dramatically intensify anti-Semitism in America. The controversy
escalated to the point where angry denunciations of the film and warnings about its potential
repercussions for American Jewry were being expressed in Jewish newspapers across the
country. As the controversy escalated, and the film continued to premiere in different cities,
American Jewish organizations sought to open back-channel negotiations with the film’s
producers with the aim to either have changes made to the content of the film or, more
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ambitiously, to stop its wider distribution in the United States.629 According to Ohad-Karny,
American Jewish leaders, such as Louis Brandeis and Judah Magnes, “saw opposing the film as
a personal responsibility; they needed to speak out in the name of Jews wherever they were.”630
Ohad-Karny studied the Jewish community’s response to DeMille’s film of the Christ
Story, and his article about the controversy that surrounded the release of the film focusses on
the work of leaders of B’nai B’rith and the ADL. He notes that “B’nai B’rith called for the film
to be revised, a call that led, on January 5, 1928, to the two parties [B’nai B’rith and the film’s
producers] signing an agreement, in which DeMille agreed to add a prologue explaining the
historical context and to cut a particularly offensive part of the crucifixion scene.”631 Before the
negotiation of this agreement, in the wake of the agitation from Jewish newspapers, the
producers of the film and leaders of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America,
organized a private screening of The King of Kings for an invited list of American Jewish
leaders, scholars, and rabbis. “Several members of the [AJC’s] Executive Committee” attended
the private screening.632
Ohad-Karny’s article does not mention the involvement of the AJC despite the fact that
the Committee took credit publically for securing the agreement on revisions with the
filmmakers. In the AJC’s Annual Report, when describing the organization’s role in the
negotiations with the producers of The King of Kings, the AJC claimed that Louis Marshall had
been the architect of the agreement.633 The last line of the AJC’s report mentions that “other

629

Ohad-Karny, 198.
Ibid. It should be noted that by this point Judah Magnes had given up his leadership position within the AJC to
protest the organization’s stance opposing the political aspirations of the Zionist movement.
631
Ibid., 195.
632
Twenty-Second Annual Report of the American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Committee Archives:
Digital Archives. Accessed December 2, 2014.
http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/1929_1930_8_AJCAnnualReport.pdf. See, page 347.
633
The Annual Report was published in the 1929 edition of the The American Jewish Yearbook.
630

267

bodies moved independently to bring about changes,” but no other Jewish organizations are
mentioned by name.634
As the AJC consistently tried to present itself as the leading representative organization
of American Jewry and the spokesmen of the community, and because B’nai B’rith and the AJC
had a long-running rivalry, the Committee had a vested interest in perhaps embellishing its role
in bringing about some changes to the content of the film. Correspondence available in the AJC’s
archives makes it clear that the Committee was concerned about how the film could lead to an
intensification of anti-Semitism. The correspondence reveals that the Committee chose to
cultivate behind the scene contacts with the film’s producers and with film industry executives to
moderate the inflammatory material presented in The King of Kings. 635
In terms of content that was likely to provoke hostility towards Jews, the most significant
problem with the film was the representation of Caiaphas, the high priest, who whispers “crucify
him” into Pilate’s ear during Jesus’ trial. Scenes of the assembled Jewish mob chanting “crucify
him” were similarly inflammatory. Ultimately, by virtue of the agreement negotiated between the
film’s producers and Jewish leaders, both of these elements were toned down but not eliminated
from the film. In its Annual Report, the AJC maintained that their leadership and intervention
during this controversy had been valuable in the fight against anti-Semitism: “while your
Committee is strongly convinced that the total suspension of the exhibition of this picture would
be the most desirable solution of the difficulty…these modifications have at least accomplished
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the result of making the picture, unjust and offensive though it be, less liable to excite animosity
against the Jewish people.”636
The AJC claimed the credit for bringing about the modifications to the film because the
most significant changes that were ultimately made were put forward by its representative, Rabbi
David de Sola Pool. Rabbi de Sola Pool had attended the private screening for Jewish leaders,
and afterwards he submitted a short report to the AJC outlining suggested changes that could
“eliminate features which most gratuitously and most openly foment anti-Jewish prejudice.”637
De Sola Pool suggested the addition of “verbal inserts” (by which he meant “intertitles” or short
texts appearing on screen) into the film to provide greater historical context to the audience. The
Rabbi believed these inserts should make it clear that Caiaphas “was unrepresentative of his
people,” “not the chosen priest of the Jewish people but the corrupt political appointee of the
Roman governor,” and “a degenerate perverter of the holy traditions of Jesus’ chosen people.”
The aim of these inserts was to distinguish the high priest from the masses of Jews and
identify him as the chief villain in the story. De Sola Pool wanted the inserts to so “squarely”
place the blame on Caiaphas “that even the tired business man and the flapper will appreciate the
point.”638 The Rabbi also suggested that edits (or “cuts”) be made to the scenes of the chanting
Jewish mob: “There is no reason for wantonly and repetitively dwelling on the scene of the mob
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crying ‘Crucify him.’ A short and judicious cut…would help remove the impression, which is as
false to history as it is to psychology, that the Jews of Jerusalem were a lynching mob.”639
The elements of the film that de Sola Pool found most offensive would have been noticed
by other Jewish leaders who were present at the private screening (and probably by any Jew who
watched the film). Based on the available records, it is difficult to judge if the credit that the AJC
claimed for the changes to the film appropriately reflect the impact of the Committee’s
intervention or was just posturing in the ongoing rivalry between the AJC and other elements of
American Jewish leadership.
The Committee claimed the credit, but the organization itself recognized that the
compromise with the producers had only been a modest success.640 Ohad-Karny notes that the
“agreement did not restore quiet.”641 Jewish newspapers continued to warn of the potential
danger posed by the film as revised film prints toured the country. Ultimately, the cuts that were
made to the film did not remove all the inflammatory material and, it must be noted, the film was
a huge box office success.642
From the perspective of the history of the AJC’s involvement in public advocacy and
communal defense, the significance of this episode lies in the Committee’s recognition of the
potential impact of mass media to spread “anti-Jewish feeling,” and in its decision to address the
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concern generated by the film The King of Kings through negotiations with content producers.
Once again, this illustrates the AJC’s commitment to a quiet approach to advocacy and
communal defense. The significance of this episode also lies in the Committee’s decision to
accept a moderate outcome to the problem. The Committee was able to secure changes to the
most inflammatory material, and persisted in the view that to agitate through public
demonstrations for greater censorship, or the banning of the film, would have generated greater
controversy and unwanted attention. The AJC’s leaders claimed credit for a success, and, it must
be noted, there were no reports of screenings leading to outbreaks of violence against Jews in the
United States.
Concern by AJC leaders over dramatizations of the execution of Christ resurfaced several
years after the release of The King of Kings when rumours began to circulate that American
producers, including well-known Jewish producers, were planning to finance national tours of
the Oberammergau and Freiburg Passion Plays in the United States. These large scale
dramatizations of the final days of Jesus’ life had been annually performed for centuries in
Germany.643 The Oberammergau Passion Play, for example, was first staged in 1634, and since
then, according to Avner Falk, “Jews have consistently been portrayed…as evil, bloodthirsty,
murderous, and diabolical. It is [the Jews], not the Romans, who try, condemn, sentence to death,
and executed Jesus” in the play.644 Beginning in the early-twentieth century, modified, scaleddown versions of the German passion plays, as well as domestically produced passion plays,
began touring the United States. During this period, Variety and Billboard contained numerous
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announcements of upcoming American tours of both German and domestically produced passion
plays.645
Although the passion plays that had been staged in the United States during the earlytwentieth century were inflammatory against Jews, these productions did not generate any public
expressions of concern from Jewish leaders until 1929 when a report published in The Jewish
Tribune indicated that Otto H. Kahn, the German-born Jewish financier, and Morris Gest, an
American Jew and theatrical producer, were planning to stage a full scale version of the
Oberammergau Passion Play in America. The article stated that Kahn had made a special trip to
Germany to personally arrange the American tour of the production. Upon publication of this
story, Louis Marshall immediately became involved. Marshall sent a telegram to Kahn asking
him to confirm or deny the rumour. Kahn replied he had “nothing to do with anybody’s plan to
bring Oberammergau or any other passion play to America.”646
Kahn’s reply indicated that Marshall was free to publish this denial. As the rumour had
generated significant controversy within American Jewry, it appears that Kahn was eager for
Marshall to “set the public right” on his alleged role.647 Marshall gave the text of Kahn’s reply to
The Jewish Tribune, which published it in full. In the reply, Kahn confirmed the rumour that
Morris Gest was involved in staging the Freiburg Passion Play in America. The Freiburg
production, which had been the family business of the Fassnacht family for almost two hundred
years, and included one thousand actors and an orchestra of one hundred musicians, had already
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been touring in the mid-Western United States before Kahn’s confirmation of Gest’s
involvement. The tour did not generate any protest from American Jewish groups until Gest’s
ties to the production were confirmed, which was a controversial connection because Gest was
himself Jewish.
The controversy was heightened by further news that Gest planned to stage the
production in New York City at the Hippodrome, a venue that could accommodate an audience
of six thousand. The potential threat posed by a staging of the production so close to where the
majority of American Jews lived aroused greater concern than the numerous productions which
had toured through areas with relatively few Jewish residents. In the reply published in The
Jewish Tribune, Otto Kahn stated that he had written to Morris Gest to protest his actions but had
received no reply.
With a Jewish producer and a New York City venue, this production caused uproar
within the American Jewish community. Jewish newspapers criticized Jewish participation in the
production and, more broadly, warned about the potential consequences for American Jewry. For
example, the Society for the Advancement of Judaism’s Journal published a strong critique of
Morris Gest and David Balasco, another Jewish producer who had been linked to the production:
“Cannot something be done to curb the total irresponsibility of the these Jewish actor and
producer folk who would, it seems, produce even anti-Semitic riot if it brought them publicity
and profit.”648 The same editorial warned about how the vivid depictions of the end of Jesus’ life
dramatized in the passion plays could provoke a potentially violent response from the audience:
“The Passion Play has been known to arouse, by the very reason of the artistry and skill which
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often go into its production, orgiastic hatred against the Jews.”649 The editorial also criticized the
failure of Jewish leaders and ordinary American Jews to try and stop the production.
In response to the public outcry, Louis Marshall wrote directly to Morris Gest to protest
the production and Gest’s involvement. The AJC also made an effort to get more information
about the content of the Freiberg production. The Committee received a report written by
Reverend Elias Newman, a Lutheran minister. Newman attended a showing of the Freiburg
Passion Play in St. Paul’s, Minnesota, and compiled a report about the play’s content and
potential impact on fostering anti-Semitism and efforts to build better relations between
Christians and Jews in the United States. It is not clear for whom Newman created this brief
report, although it is clear that it was compiled on behalf of a Christian organization or for a
Christian audience.650 It is also unclear how the AJC managed to secure a copy. Neither
Marshall’s letter to Gest nor Reverend Newman’s report were made public.
In his letter to Gest, Marshall asked for confirmation of his involvement in the
production. Marshall stated: “I hope that this is not true, because I am confident that if this play
is enacted it will, as plays of this kind always do, result in a recrudescence of anti-Semitism.”651
Marshall’s letter also expressed concern that some Christians might be offended by the
production as a “vulgarization of what they regard as sacred.”652 He warned about the potential
emotional power of passion plays and the how this might shape the attitudes of the audience.
“The average theatregoer,” Marshall noted, “is emotional, does not possess an accurate historic
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background, nor is he capable of differentiating between fact and fancy.”653 Marshall supports
this assertion by mentioning that he was present at the private screening for Jewish leaders of
The King of Kings, and recounted his own impressions about how audiences could react to the
film: “I can very well understand from what I saw why it was that the immediate effect was to
inspire hatred and detestation of the Jews of this day, of whom you are one, on the part of those
unthinking people who were carried away by their own anger.”654 Marshall concluded by stating:
“There are some subjects which are not for the stage, and nobody should know better than you
that, whether this play is regarded as blasphemous or mischievous, it should never have been
brought into an American environment. There are limitations even to what is called art.”655 The
AJC’s President did not receive a reply from Gest.656
Reverend Elias Newman’s report on the staging of the Freiburg Passion Play in St. Paul’s
was strongly critical of the content of the production. Newman objected to the representation of
the crucifixion of Jesus as a contradiction of Christian doctrine and a false representation of
history. Reverend Newman noted a number of errors in the content of the production: “I found it
very largely a gross misrepresentation and caricature when compared with the New Testament
account of our Lord’s passion.”657 He also identified a number of distortions in the play that he
considered very serious and inflammatory against Jews, including the negative representation of
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the Sanhedrin, the positive representation of Pontius Pilate, and the fact that “Jewish characters
recorded in the Gospel as friends of Jesus are neither seen nor heard on the stage.”658 Newman
essentially described the production as blasphemous: “To my mind, the [Freiburg] Passion Play,
instead of being a Scripture portrayal is a betrayal.”659 His account of the potential impact of the
production emphasised that it could foster anti-Semitism in America, particularly if school aged
children were exposed to the play. He concluded by stating that the Freiburg Passion Play “will
not contribute towards a more or better Jewish appreciation of Christianity. It certainly will not
be of much assistance in getting Christians to like Jews.”660
The AJC did decide to respond to the touring production of the Freiburg Passion Play;
however, it chose a strategy that emphasized back-channel appeals to the producers or sponsors
of the production over a campaign based on publicity or public outcry. Their strategy had some
success but market forces had a greater effect on limiting the potential impact of the Freiburg
Passion Play on the growth of anti-Semitism in the United States. In some cities, the production
was a financial failure, especially in New York. A press account of the scheduled showings at the
Hippodrome described the project as “ill-fated,” and shortly after it closed, Gest filed for
bankruptcy.661
The Freiburg Passion Play, however, continued to tour the United States. The AJC would
be informed of scheduled showing by district members from areas across the country when local
performances were publically announced. Instead of urging public protest against the
performance, the AJC advised local Jewish leaders, including district members of the AJC and
rabbis of nearby congregations, to meet with the local sponsors of the productions. According to
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correspondence in the AJC’s archives, “district members throughout the country [were] asked to
watch for the appearance of this company with a view to endeavoring to prevent them from
making engagements to produce their play.”662
In many cases, the Freiburg Passion Play had been brought to a community by a local
organization, including Church Groups and philanthropic organizations that sponsored the
performances. The AJC “furnished Rabbis and others with literature” which they believed
“helped [local leaders] in some cases to prevent the production.”663 It is unclear what materials
the AJC provided to local leaders, but correspondence between Morris Waldman, the AJC’s
Secretary, and local district members of the Committee indicates that, when meeting with the
local sponsors, the Committee suggested that district members emphasize that the play
contradicts Christian doctrine and was potentially dangerous to the security of local Jewish
populations. In a telegram from Waldman to Edward Dato of Chicago, for example, Waldman
mentioned Marshall’s assessment that the play could “tend to revive anti-Semitism,” and that
Christian Minister John Haynes Holmes had maintained that the “play is silly gaudy
melodramatic stuff a miserable perversion of the bible tale and base libel on Jews [and] that
Christians not Jews should protest the production.”664
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The AJC’s archives contain newspaper articles describing successful efforts to prevent
productions of the Freiburg Passion Play, including lobbying carried out by a rabbi in Louisville,
Kentucky.665 The archives also contain accounts of failed campaigns, including two occasions
when the local sponsors agreed to cancel the performances then subsequently reversed their
decision.666 There is also evidence of delegations of Jewish leaders persuading local sponsors
that they should withdraw their support for the productions only to be disappointed when
contractual obligations with venues and the production’s managers made it impossible for the
sponsors to cancel the performances.667 Finally, there is also evidence of cooperation between
the AJC and B’nai B’rith’s ADL in trying to persuade local sponsors of performances of the
Freiburg Passion Play to withdraw their support.668 Both organizations adopted the strategy of
quiet overtures to local sponsors and, despite the rivalry between the AJC and the ADL, the
Secretaries of the two organizations coordinated these efforts.
As already noted, market forces had an impact on the potential influence of the American
tour of the Freiburg Passion Play to intensify anti-Semitism in the United States. The production
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was staged in cities throughout the East Coast and Mid-West, but it was not a theatrical
sensation. In some cases, the production was a total failure and performances were cancelled due
to low ticket sales.669 More importantly, the purported emotional response provoked by the
production, which was a source of great concern for American Jewish leaders, did not
materialize en masse. There is no evidence that the play had this kind of emotional impact on
ordinary Americans. In fact, the AJC began receiving reports relatively early during the tour that
audiences were not having an excessive emotional response to the production.670
The leaders of the AJC were afraid of the potential for the Freiburg Passion Play to incite
anti-Jewish feeling, but their response was moderate. They declined to try to stop the production
through judicial intervention or public protest, possibly because both recourses could have failed
and certainly would have garnered criticisms as attempts to censor the arts or suppress public
exhibitions of Christian religious beliefs. The quiet overture, in this case to local sponsors of the
production, was a tactic that became a mainstay for the AJC in the fight against anti-Semitism
and anti-Jewish incitement in the United States during the twentieth century. 671
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Similarly, the Committee used quiet overtures to address how the crucifixion, and Jewish
involvement in the crucifixion, was described in text books. There was no way for the AJC to
exercise any influence on how Jesus’ death was described by Christian parents to their children;
however, how this material was presented to children in public schools was another matter. In
early 1928, Louis Marshall received a letter from Harry Bester, an insurance salesman, whose
daughter was a public school student in New Jersey. Bester’s letter expressed concern about how
the crucifixion was presented in V.H. Hillyer’s A Child’s History of the World, his daughter’s
textbook.672 Bester also included with the letter a copy of the section he found most troubling:
“Pilate did not believe much in what the Jews said against Christ. It was a small matter to
him…But he wanted to please the Jews, so he told them to go ahead and put Christ to death if
they wanted to. So He was crucified.”673
Marshall immediately replied. He thanked Bester for bringing this matter to his attention,
and informed him that he intended to write directly to the publishers of Hillyer’s book: “I am
writing the publishers to take exception to the issuance of this kind of literature, which has a very
pernicious effect when placed in the hands of children who are unable to discriminate between
what is and what is not.”674 On the same day, Marshall composed a lengthy letter of protest to W.
Morgan Shuster, the President of the Century Company. The letter was a strong condemnation of
the offending passages, and included criticism based on errors in history, errors in theology, and
failure to appreciate the potential repercussions of the text.675 Marshall wrote: “To my mind the
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passages to which I have referred are conducive to the creation of prejudice in the immature
minds of children…Reading this excerpt…gives the impression to children, even to adults, that
the Jews were cruel and murderous and actually crucified one whom the large majority of
Americans revere.”676
Marshall received a reply from Shuster two weeks later.677 The letter indicates that
Hillyer was already in the process of revising the offending sections, and included copies of
correspondence between Hillyer, who in addition to being a textbook author was also the Head
Master of the Calvert School in Baltimore, and Lyman B. Sturgis, the Century Company’s chief
book editor, regarding changes to the text. Marshall was appreciative of how Shuster responded
to his protest, and respected how the publisher had chosen to handle the matter.678 It must be
noted that Marshall was not happy with the first round of Hillyer’s proposed changes to the text,
but, ultimately, the passages were revised in a way that was acceptable to the AJC, including
changes that clarified that only a certain faction of Jews called for Christ to be executed, and that
it was the Romans, not the Jews, who actually carried out the execution.679
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Marshall’s intervention concerning the content of A Child’s History of the World was not
the last attempt by leaders of the AJC to have more favorable (or less inflammatory) accounts of
the role of Jews in Jesus’ execution presented to the American people, particularly to American
children in both public and religious schools.680 It was also not the last time the AJC tried to
lobby publishers to remove offensive or inflammatory content from their products.681 Beginning
in 1930, the AJC began a long term project to study the content of Christian religious school text
books from all denominations across the United States. The AJC commissioned Dr. H.S.
Linfield, a rabbi, statistician, and director of the AJC’s Bureau of Jewish Social Research, to
“institute a preliminary inquiry into the pedagogic and liturgic [sic] literature of the various
[Christian] denominations with a view to discovering aspersions and distorted references to the
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Jews.”682 The study was undertaken with the purpose of presenting the findings to school boards
and church schools, and, hopefully, bring about curriculum reform. Morris Waldman described
the project as an effort to “sterilize the soil of anti-Semitism,” meaning that, over the long term,
anti-Semitism in the United States would decline because American children would not be
regularly exposed to one of the most durable historical sources of antagonism towards Jews.683
The AJC’s leadership, including Julius Rosenwald, were enthusiastic about the project.
The preliminary inquiry, however, failed to uncover objectionable material. Dr. Linfield
reported that “after a number of months…he had failed to discover any offensive references.”684
The leaders of the AJC were not satisfied that Linfield’s preliminary inquiry accurately reflected
how Jewish participation in the execution of Jesus was being taught to American children. As a
next step, the AJC secured subscriptions to several “Christian pedagogic journals with a view to
keeping tab on the situation.”685 Again, no offensive or inflammatory material was uncovered.
The AJC did not abandon the project. Waldman arranged a meeting with Reverend
Everett Clinchy, the founder of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, to get his
opinion and support for the project. Harry Schneiderman, Waldman’s deputy, also attended the
meeting. Clinchy reported that he was already in possession of objectionable material and that he
believed that “it would be highly desirable for a study of this kind to be made.”686 The Reverend
also believed that, after the results were compiled, school boards would not be “impervious to
suggestions” regarding curriculum reform.687 At this point, consideration of the optics of the
project entered the discussion. Waldman was concerned that exposure of the involvement of
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Jewish communal leaders in this type of research could cause significant harm, engendering
hostility from Christian leaders, laymen, and the general public, and undermining the project’s
long-term objectives.
Waldman suggested to Clinchy that “some scholarly young Christian prosecute” the
study under Clinchy’s direction, and that the AJC, as a silent partner, would finance the
project.688 Waldman hoped that the AJC’s involvement would “not be disclosed.”689 From the
perspective of optics, Waldman hoped that Clinchy’s organization would “appear to be doing
this [study] on their own initiative.”690 In a letter to Cyrus Adler, Waldman expressed his
enthusiasm for the project and optimism about its long-term impact: “I feel very keenly that in
undertaking this, we have the opportunity of doing something of great and lasting benefit even
though the benefit will not be realized in our generation. I have been amazed at times…at the
misconceptions entertained by well-meaning non-Jews which can be traced to the Sunday school
lessons of their childhood.”691
Professor James V. Thompson, the Dean of the School of Religious Education at the
Drew Theological Seminary in New Jersey, was charged with undertaking the project.692 With
the AJC’s financial support, Thompson’s work developed from narrowly studying Christian
liturgical material to creating new educational material and studies of the effectiveness of
religious pedagogical practices.693 The most significant achievements and innovations of
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Thompson’s work occurred after the period covered by this study. The concern of AJC leaders
about the optics of the project illustrates that the Committee recognized that, while they believed
their goals were noble, concerns about the general public’s perception of their efforts could not
be dismissed.
In the AJC’s work regarding the inflammatory material in Christian doctrine, including
dramatic presentations of this material, the Committee chose quiet approaches over public
agitation. The Committee’s leaders privileged a long-term view, and took steps to ensure that
their advocacy did not itself become a cause of further anti-Jewish incitement. They saw
America as a permanent home for its Jewish citizens and considered both the short-term optics
and multi-generational impact of their efforts.

“The words ‘Jew’ and ‘Communist’”
The alleged link between Jews and the spread of Communism was a significant concern
for the leaders of the American Jewish Committee. In his book Communist Cadre: The Social
Background of the American Communist Party Elite, Harvey E. Klehr notes that “the words
‘Jew’ and ‘communist’ have frequently been linked in the minds of the American public.”694
During the twentieth century, the association of Jews with the spread of Communism around the
world, and the disproportionately prominent role Jews played in the leadership of Communists
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parties, including the American Communist Party, was a source of anti-Semitism in the United
States that American Jewish leadership organizations felt compelled to counter.695
From a public relations perspective, any attempt to undermine the impression among the
general public that Jews were closely connected with Communism was complicated by a number
of inconvenient facts, not the least of which was the family background of Karl Marx. “The
trouble with the accusation of Jewish Communism,” according to Arthur Hertzberg, “was that it
had just sufficient truth in it to make the tale plausible to Jew-haters. Though Communism was
never a strong force in America…Jews were very prominent in the movement.”696 American
Jews, including Benjamin Gitlow, Bertram D. Wolfe, and William Weinstone, were among the
foremost leaders of the Communist movement in the United States; however, Communist leaders
of Jewish origin were even more prominent outside of the United States, most notably within the
early leadership cadres of the Soviet Union. “Three of the six members of Lenin’s first
Politburo—[Leon] Trotsky, [Lev] Kamenev, and [Grigory] Zinoviev—were of Jewish origin.”697
Jewish participation in both domestic and overseas Communist parties did not go
unnoticed by the American people. American anti-Semites and proponents of immigration
restrictions, including Henry Ford through the Dearborn Independent, emphasised the role of
Jews in abetting the spread of Communism. They did so to further their own xenophobic or antiSemitic agendas. The publication of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion in the United States
exacerbated the American people’s association of Jews with radical movements and conspiracy
theories. “The more common the notion of Communism-as-Jewish conspiracy became, the more
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fervently organizations such as the American Jewish Committee…worked to dissociate Jews
from Communism.”698 According to historian André Gerrits, the “myth of Jewish Communism
reached such grand proportions…that despite the sensitive nature of the issue and the risks
involved, the American Jewish Committee found it necessary to publically and officially
denounce the idea of a Jewish world conspiracy.”699 In his The Myth of Jewish Communism: A
Historical Interpretation, Gerrits provides a brief summary of the AJC’s decision to become
more active in efforts to undermine the American public’s association of Jews with Communism.
Gerrits notes that “the overrepresentation of Jews within the Communist Party of the United
States would force the AJC to repeatedly return to the issue throughout the [1920s].”700
The leaders of the AJC first discussed developing a strategy to combat’s the public’s
impression of a close association between Jews and Communism during a meeting of the
Executive Committee on September 24, 1918.701 This first discussion centered on how the
outbreak of the Russian Revolution and the ongoing Russian Civil War might impact the
imperiled communities of Russian Jews caught on the frontlines of the fighting. The members of
the Committee also discussed the likelihood that Russian Jewish communities could be targeted
for reprisal attacks by reactionaries because of the perception among the Russian people that the
Bolsheviks were led by Jews.
From the beginning, the AJC believed that developments in the Russian Civil War would
shape how Jews around the world were perceived. The minutes of the Executive Committee’s
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meeting provide the following summary of the AJC’s leaders’ discussion: “[It] is doubtless true
that the Jews of Russia as a body are not in sympathy with the present Bolsheviki regime. A
large number of the conspicuous leaders of that Party are, however, undoubtedly Jews and
known to be so throughout the world. This fact has given rise to the belief that the Jews of Russia
are the head and front of the Bolsheviki movement, which belief is bound to react unfavorably
against not only the Jews of Russia but also against Jews everywhere.”702 The Committee noted
that a backlash against Jews was already taking shape in Russia: “Significant symptoms of this
reaction can already be discerned.”703 Although the leaders of the AJC were certainly concerned
about the potential outbreak of another round of anti-Jewish violence in Russia, they were also
anxious about how events in Russia would shape the American public’s perception of American
Jews. They discussed a number of options to counter the bad optics caused by the
disproportionate number of Jews among communist leaders, including starting a “publicity
campaign…in order to give the [American] public the facts about the Russian situation.”704 The
Committee also debated releasing a public statement that emphasized that “while some of the
leaders of the Bolsheviki are Jews, the rank and file of the Jews of Russia are completely out of
sympathy with the Bolshevik doctrines.”705
At the end of this first discussion, the Executive Committee established a subcommittee
composed of Louis Marshall, Cyrus Adler, and Oscar Straus to formulate the organization’s
advocacy on this problematic issue. This “special committee” was also empowered to finance its
work using money from the AJC’s Emergency Trust Fund.706

702

Ibid.
Ibid.
704
Ibid.
705
Ibid.
706
Ibid.
703

288

During a meeting of the Executive Committee two months later, Adler reported on a
conversation between himself and “several influential representatives of the press and other
leaders of public opinion in Philadelphia.”707 These leaders advised Adler that something should
be done to counter the impression of a connection between Jews and radicalism in the United
States. Socialist groups had staged mass demonstrations in both Philadelphia and New York City
during the previous month. Rumours were circulating that counter-protests were being
organized, and Alder was warned “that political protest in a violent form against these radicals
and that their identity with the Jews may become so apparent that a wave of anti-Jewish agitation
may result.”708
Although there is no record of who Adler spoke with in Philadelphia, the conversation
clearly left a strong impression on him. At the Executive Committee meeting on December 9,
1918, Adler “suggested that a decisive step should be taken by the Committee to clarify public
opinion with regard to the relationship of the Jews to that species of radicalism…called
Bolshevism.”709 During the meeting, Adler put forward a proposed draft of the statement: “[The]
tenets of the Jewish faith and the traditions of Judaism are diametrically opposed to what appear
to be the cardinal principles of Bolshevism namely, confiscation of private property, and the
undermining of the sanctity of family life at[sic] the denial of individual liberty.”710
The Executive Committee resolved to prepare a public statement along the lines
suggested by Adler;711 however, the statement was not released until three months later. There is
nothing in the AJC archives that explains why the organization’s leaders chose to delay the
707
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release, but they may have been waiting to issue the statement as a response to a high-profile
provocation.
Ultimately, the statement was published in the aftermath of the appearance of Doctor
George S. Simons, a Methodist Minister, before a special sub-committee of the United States
Senate Judiciary Committee. The Senate sub-committee had been charged with investigating
Bolshevism in both Russia and the United States. In his testimony, Simons highlighted the
participation of Jews in the Bolshevist movement and leadership, and declared that there was a
link between Jewish social and political activists on the East Side of Manhattan and the
revolutionaries in Russia. Simons testified “that the Bolshevist movement in Russia was
supported financially and morally by certain elements on the East Side of New York City.”712
The AJC released its statement as a reply to Simons’ allegations. The statement was
drafted by Marshall and appeared in the New York Times on February 15, 1919.713 Marshall
described Simons’ testimony as “ridiculous.”714 The statement emphasised that Jewish doctrine
cannot be reconciled with Communism, and that American Jews are patriotic, law abiding, and
had distinguished themselves in military service. Marshall also dismissed the notion that the
ancestry of prominent Communists leaders reflected in any way the character and patriotism of
American Jews. Marshall wrote:
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I could go to Ossining [the site of the State Prison at Sing Sing]
tomorrow and prepare from the records there a list of criminals
who may happen to be of English, French, Italian, or Slavonik
parentage or who may belong to the Episcopalian, Methodist,
Baptist, or Catholic churches and seek to deduce from such lists
conclusions derogatory of the nationality or of the church to which
they belong with as much reason as Dr. Simons has to deduce from
his list the conclusion which he is apparently seeking to
inculcate.715
In the public statement, the record of Jewish military service during the First World War
was seized upon by Marshall as crucial evidence of the patriotism of American Jews. Marshall
used the statement to announce that an honor roll of Jews who served in the American military
during the First World War, including a list of those who had been killed in combat or been
awarded medals, was in the process of being compiled: “I expect shortly to supply an authentic
list of all the men who served under the colors, so as to present to our maligners irrefragable
proof that the Jews have furnished in proportion to their numbers a larger quota to our military
and naval forces than any other part of our population.”716 As will be discussed in the Chapter 7
of this study, the compilation of this honor role was one of the largest and most expensive
research projects that the AJC financed during the early history of the organization. The honor
roll project was one of the first attempts by the AJC to expand the organization’s infrastructure
beyond the Executive Committee, and its Secretary and Assistant Secretary, and to improve the
organization’s ability to engage in effective public advocacy. The AJC began as a small group of
leaders who personally carried out all the organization’s work but the scope of the responsibility
they had taken on required more resources and more staff and, as will be seen, the organization
gradually grew and reorganized to meet new challenges and launch new projects.
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Marshall’s public statement and the honor roll project were exceptions to the manner in
which the first generation of AJC leaders preferred to combat the alleged connection between
Jews and Communism. Their preference had been for quiet diplomacy and the silent treatment;
greater discussion meant greater attention, and greater attention could lend credibility to the
allegations. Numerous provocations were ignored, and, in comparison to the voluminous
amounts of written materials that the AJC produced to further its agenda on other issues, the
Committee published significantly less material designed to undermine the link between Jews
and Communism before the 1930s.717
It should be noted that, during this period, the general public’s perception of Jews as
Communists was a major concern of the Committee’s leaders, but the AJC was arguably more
preoccupied with publically countering the slanderous conspiracy theories expressed in the
Protocols of the Elders of Zion, in which the link between Jews and the spread of Communism
was only one aspect of a broader effort toward global hegemony. As will be discussed Chapter 7,
the AJC’s early forays into publishing books and pamphlets was influenced more by their
concerns about the distribution of the Protocols than the supposed ties between Jews and
Communism. It was not until the mid-1930s that the AJC felt the need to publically intervene
more regularly and more broadly in an effort to disassociate Jews from Communism.718 Between
1906 and 1929, however, the AJC used a number of different and quieter approaches to prevent
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the general American public from viewing Jews as Communists. The AJC always took this
matter very seriously.719
Although the AJC responded publically to Simons’ allegations, the organization declined
to respond to numerous other provocative statements that linked Jews with Communism or
radicalism. For example, less than a year after the release of Marshall’s statement, the
Committee debated whether to publically challenge allegations that had first appeared in the
London Times that described ties between American Jewish financiers and Leon Trotsky. Cyrus
Adler was of the view that the Committee should challenge the Times’ editor to reveal the source
of this information. The Committee, however, declined to make that challenge. The minutes of
the Executive Committee’s meeting recorded that the AJC’s leadership “deemed such action
inadvisable” without providing any specifics as to the logic of this decision.720
Similarly, in early 1920, the McClure Newspaper Syndicate distributed an article entitled
“Mopping up Bolshevism” by Major Robert Davis, a member of the American Red Cross’
Commission on South Russia. In his article, Davis alleged that Bolshevism was a Jewish
conspiracy designed to allow the Jewish minority in Russia to exploit the labor of the Russian
majority. During the Executive Committee’s discussion of this article, Harry Schneiderman
warned that the article was potentially dangerous because it sought to convey the impression that
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Bolshevism was not only a “Russian problem [but] is really a Jewish problem.”721 The AJC’s
leadership declined to respond to the article.
The AJC’s concerns about avoiding publicity meant that the organization was
deliberative about the number and nature of the public statements it made that aimed to negate
the general public’s association of Jews with Communism. The organization did, however,
employ quieter approaches to undermine this perception, making financial contributions to
support the work of other advocacy groups, including a twenty-five thousand dollar donation in
1922 to a group called the Conference of the Members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.
This organization, which was headquartered in Paris, was established to restore democratic
government in Russia.
In late 1921, the AJC received a letter from Paul N. Miliukoff soliciting funds for this
organization to help it finance a publicity campaign to counter its opponents’ propaganda.
Although many of the leaders of the AJC were very wealthy men, twenty-five thousand dollars
was a substantial sum, particularly for a political donation. At the time, it was the largest single
donation the Committee had ever considered, made more dramatic when juxtaposed against the
AJC’s 1922 budget, which was only ten thousand dollars, and with the twenty-one thousand
dollars the organization raised through fundraising that year.722 The funds for the donation were
appropriated from the organization’s Emergency Trust Fund.723
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The AJC’s decision to donate to this group was not without internal controversy. Only a
month after the leadership resolved to make the contribution, Julius Rosenwald moved that the
matter be reopened.724 However, further discussion of the issue, during the February 12, 1922
meeting of the Executive Committee, did not resolve the issue.725 Based on the limited available
evidence, it appears that Rosenwald and Judge Horace Stern, another member of the AJC’s
Executive Committee, were opposed to the donation.726 It was again discussed a month later
when Marshall read letters from AJC leaders Henry Sliosberg and Claude G. Montefiore that
urged the Committee to support the All-Russian Constituent Assembly’s efforts.727 The issue
was finally resolved in April 1922, when the leaders voted to proceed with the donation.728
It is not clear what the leaders of the AJC hoped to achieve through this substantial
donation. Despite the unprecedented amount, the minutes of the leaders’ deliberations provide no
insight into why some members of the Committee wanted to support the efforts of the AllRussian Constituent Assembly or why at least two leaders were opposed. Theoretically, the
restoration of democratic government in Russia could have improved conditions for Russian
Jews; however, better conditions for Jews would not have inevitably followed. One possibility is
that the leaders of the AJC believed that the fall of the communist regime would have eliminated
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a key piece of propaganda used by anti-Semites to substantiate allegations of an international
Jewish conspiracy to support radicalism or to control the world’s governments or economies.
There is no evidence to substantiate either of these theories as to why the AJC made this
donation, but the substantial figure suggests that the leaders of the AJC at least believed that the
All-Russian Constituent Assembly would have meaningfully furthered the Committee’s agenda.
The AJC also collaborated with other Jewish organizations to ensure that public
statements about Russia, or rebuttals to accusations of disproportionate Jewish radicalism, did
not tarnish (or further tarnish) the American public’s perception of the political views and
patriotism of American Jews. Some Jewish organizations sought the Committee’s advice before
issuing public statements about the situation in Russia. For example, in May 1923, the
Committee received letters from Rabbi E. N. Calisch, the President of the Central Conference of
American Rabbis, and Rabbi Elias N. Solomon, the President of the United Synagogue of
America, asking for the Committee’s guidance in drafting a public statement about religious
persecution in the Soviet Union, which in the early days of the Soviet Union was not limited to
attacks against Russian Jews. Calisch and Solomon wanted their organizations to adopt
resolutions and issue public statements “disavowing the allegation that Jewish influence in the
Soviet Government [was] responsible” for the ongoing repression of all religions in the Soviet
state.729
The leaders of the AJC supported Calisch and Solomon’s idea, but the advice they
provided reveals the Committee’s understanding of optics. The minutes of the Executive
Committee’s meeting on May 27, 1923 record that the AJC’s leaders resolved “that the
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Chairman advise both Rabbi Calisch and Rabbi Solomon [that] the Committee saw no objection
to the adoption of a resolution protesting against the persecution of religious bodies in Russia but
making no reference to the allegation of Jewish responsibility.”730
The AJC was trying to avoid any conflation of Jewish leadership and Communism or
Jewish responsibility for religious persecution in the Soviet Union. All religious groups were
being targeted in the Soviet Union, albeit in varying degrees, but, due to the disproportionate
number of Jews among the Soviet leadership and the American public’s awareness of this
inconvenient fact, there was risk in drawing the public’s attention to the background of the
leaders who were allegedly responsible for any religious oppression. The message the leaders of
the AJC wanted to convey was that religious persecution in the Soviet Union was wrong, as
opposed to the message that Russian Jews were not responsible for religious persecution in the
Soviet Union. The distinction between these two statements is crucial. The former conveyed a
general condemnation that was fundamentally compatible with American constitutional law and
mainstream American political culture; the latter was defensive in tone, and, further, there was
publically available information about the background of Soviet leaders that could be used to
rebut this proposition. The minutes of the meeting also record that Marshall was going to offer
his help to Rabbis Calisch and Solomon in the drafting of their resolutions and public statements.
The seriousness with which the AJC treated the matter of the public associating Jews
with Communism can also be seen in the way the organization responded to rumours about the
involvement of American Jews in radical political movements. In October of 1919, the AJC
received information about a rumour circulating through the State of Iowa that Russian Jewish
peddlers were distributing Bolshevik and revolutionary literature to their customers. Herbert
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Hirsch, an American-born Jew and resident of Mason City, Iowa, wrote to Julius Rosenwald and
informed him that he had attended a meeting of a civic organization known the Greater Iowa
Association during which the rumour was relayed in a speech to a crowd of more than five
hundred.731
Hirsch’s letter conveyed that he was deeply concerned about the potential impact of this
rumour and how it was being spread: “the Greater Iowa Association, one of the largest of its kind
in the state, speaking to an audience of five hundred and up, in each town and city, on the same
subject, will surely cause our Jewish people considerable embarrassment, and it will take years to
stamp out the feeling that it will leave.”732 Hirsch also indicated that he was trying to secure
copies of the literature that was allegedly being distributed by the peddlers.733
Stopping the guilt by association of Jews with Communism was a preoccupying concern
of the leaders of the AJC; it shaped the organization’s public advocacy, and therefore the AJC
took the situation in Iowa very seriously. Rosenwald forwarded Hirsch’s letter to the AJC’s
headquarters in New York, and Harry Schneiderman, the AJC’s assistant secretary, wrote to
Hirsch directly to get more information. In particular, Schneiderman was eager to know if Hirsch
“had succeeded in securing any samples of this literature.”734
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Hirsch replied that he was, in essence, carrying out his own investigation into the matter.
He had already contacted Woodworth Plum, the Secretary of the Greater Iowa Association, to
find out where the organization got its information, and if the organization had any copies of the
literature or knew the source. Hirsch concluded his letter to Schneiderman by stating that he
hoped his work would “be of some benefit to you and that we can put a stop to this
propaganda.”735
A month later, Hirsch wrote to Schneiderman to let him know that he had made no
progress in his investigation. Plum and the Greater Iowa Association had not replied to his
inquiries. The only change in the situation that he could report was that Chas. McNider, the
President of the First National Bank of Mason City, who Hirsch had witnessed spreading the
rumour, was now concerned that he was responsible for spreading false information and was also
working to try and get copies of the literature.
In this update, Hirsch’s concern about the circulation of this rumour and frustration about
not being able to secure copies of the literature is easily discerned: “Up to the present time we
have received nothing and cannot understand why this literature hasn’t been sent to us.”736
Hirsch suggested that the AJC take up the matter directly. His implication was that a communal
organization with the reputation of the AJC might have more success than a lone protester
getting a response from the Greater Iowa Association.
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Six days later, Schneiderman replied that the AJC was acting upon Hirsch’s suggestion
and taking steps to look further into the matter.737 Schneiderman, on behalf of the Committee,
wrote directly to Woodworth Plum on December 23, 1919, noting that the AJC “had been
informed by one of our friends” in Mason City about a rumour that Jewish peddlers were
distributing propaganda was being relayed to large crowds during meetings of the Greater Iowa
Association.738 The letter did not contain any accusations or demands for a retraction.
Schneiderman explained that that the AJC “is very much interested in this subject because of
frequent allegations which are made as to connection of Jews with the Bolshevist
movement…We are exceedingly anxious to find out where this literature originates and who is
responsible for its distribution.”739 He asked Plum to either furnish the Committee with copies of
the literature or identify the source.
In the meantime, Herbert Hirsch continued his efforts to track down copies of the
literature allegedly being distributed in Iowa by Jewish peddlers. Hirsch wrote to Schneiderman
on December 23, and was thankful that the AJC had agreed to look into the matter. He also
reported that the rumour was continuing to spread in Iowa. Hirsch, who was a member of the
Rotary Club, conveyed that he had heard the rumour discussed during four different meetings of
that organization.740 Hirsch’s letter to Schneiderman also relayed that, despite the absence of
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evidence confirming the validity of the rumour, Hirsch believed it was possibly true: “I hope that
if such is the case, we will be able to straighten out these Jewish boys who don’t know any better
than to scatter out this propaganda which is a detriment to our state and nation.”741
On December 26, 1919, Woodworth Plum replied to Harry Schneiderman’s request for
more information. Plum recounted that his organization had only received one report about
Jewish peddlers distributing “incendiary literature.”742 The report came from a farmer in southwestern Iowa who claimed to have purchased the material from a Russian Jewish peddler. The
farmer sent the material to the Greater Iowa Association, but Plum ignored Schneiderman’s
request to furnish the AJC with copies. Plum also conveyed that his organization was actively
collecting propaganda literature and had received “no further report of activities of Russian Jews
in this state.”743 Plum promised to let Schneiderman know if his organization did collect any
additional reports: “we will gladly communicate with you, because we appreciate full well that
some of our most loyal and constructive Americans are Jews and we would not knowingly
reflect upon their race.”744
Herbert Hirsch sent Schneiderman another update on the situation on December 30, 1919.
From this correspondence, it is clear that Schneiderman’s letter to Plum had produced some
results in terms of curbing the spread of the rumour. It was Hirsch’s impression that it was no
longer being actively circulated by Plum or his organization. Hirsch also reported on a
conversation between himself and Chas. McNider, in which the latter expressed regret that he
had been disseminating the rumour. McNider claimed that it had been relayed to him by Plum
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and Plum’s assistant, H. E. Moss. Hirsch’s assessment was that Plum and the Greater Iowa
Association were now trying to distance themselves from the rumour in order to avoid having to
answer for spreading false information: “I think that the Greater Iowa Association have started
something that they cannot finish.”745 He was happy that it seemed they were no longer actively
spreading the rumour, but believed it had “done enough damage throughout the state to leave
quite a bad impression for the Jewish people unless something is done to counteract it.”746
There was additional correspondence between Hirsch and Schneiderman discussing
whether the AJC should pressure Plum and his organization to publish a retraction or an apology.
Publishing Plum’s letter to Schneiderman was ruled out as a potential remedy because, despite
the fact that it was “a virtual retraction of [Plum’s] previous statement,” it was felt that the letter
was “not worded in a manner which would make it useful for [either Hirsch or the Committee] to
make public.”747
On January 6, 1920, Schneiderman wrote to Hirsch and specified that he “had been asked
to ask your advice as to the best method of counteracting the report which has been spread
throughout your state.”748 Presumably, Schneiderman was forwarding this request to Hirsch on
behalf of the AJC’s Executive Committee.749 Hirsch replied that he was confident that the
rumour was no longer being spread, but he was torn about whether the AJC should push for
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some kind of public remedy. The harm, however, had already been done, and Hirsch was torn
because he wanted something to be done to “counteract the wrong,” but also believed that
nothing should be done to draw further attention to the rumour. He wrote to Schneiderman: “I
really believe that the less that is said the better it will be…If you think that we ought to forget
about it, and try and live it down, same as we have thousands of other things that have been put
at our door, I am willing to let it go at that.”750
Although there is no record of any discussion in the minutes, the AJC’s Executive
Committee apparently addressed this matter during their meeting on January 25, 1920.751
Schneiderman reported to Hirsch that the Committee did not feel that the organization should be
publically involved. In their view, “any action taken should be local.”752 He suggested Hirsch
pursue “some sort of public recantation [from Plum] of his very mischievous statement and that
this could be given wide publicity in the local papers throughout the state.”753 If this could not be
secured, the Committee believed that the matter “should be allowed to rest,” provided there were
no further reports that the rumour was being actively spread throughout the state by the Greater
Iowa Association.754 Hirsch agreed with the Committee’s assessment and did not pursue any
further public remedy on the issue.755
The AJC’s response to the rumour in Iowa illustrates a number of facets of the public
advocacy strategies of the organization during its early history. The Committee viewed the guilt
by association connection between Jews and Communism (or Jews and radicalism) as

750

Letter from Herbert Hirsch to Harry Schneiderman, January 9, 1920, American Jewish Committee Archives,
General Correspondence Papers, Series II: Subject Files, 1906-32, Box 11, File 2.
751
Letter from Harry Schneiderman to Herbert Hirsch, January 28, 1920, American Jewish Committee Archives,
General Correspondence Papers, Series II: Subject Files, 1906-32, Box 11, File 2.
752
Ibid.
753
Ibid.
754
Ibid.
755
Letter from Herbert Hirsch to Harry Schneiderman, February 6, 1920, American Jewish Committee Archives,
General Correspondence Papers, Series II: Subject Files, 1906-32, Box 11, File 2.

303

sufficiently serious that even the circulation of a rumour in Iowa was treated as a matter of
concern. The Committee responded to the problem, but it was prepared to delegate responsibility
to a local representative, and it did not want to generate publicity by drawing the nation’s
attention to the issue. A fundamental facet of the AJC’s approach to public advocacy was that, in
contrast to other Jewish leadership organizations, the Committee was prepared to ignore some
provocations or forgo pursuing public remedies and apologies if they thought further intervention
would only cause more publicity and greater harm. In this case, the organization calculated that
if the rumour was no longer being spread, nothing further should be done to counter the harm
that had already been done.
The American Jewish Committee’s efforts to undermine the American public’s
association of Jews with Communism escalated during the early years of the Cold War, in
parallel to the escalating tension between East and West. Although the Committee became more
active on this issue in the years following the period covered by this study, many of the
organization’s approaches to this issue, including the release of carefully worded public
statements, quiet investigation of rumours, and deliberately declining to respond to some
provocative statements, were developed and employed by the first generation of AJC leaders.

Conclusion
The examples of the AJC’s early advocacy work discussed in this chapter illustrate both
the breadth of the issues that concerned the organization’s leaders and the variety of advocacy
and communal defense tactics they were prepared to employ. The avoidance of publicity,
ignoring some provocations, the calculated use of public statements, the emphasis on
investigating problems, and the use of quiet diplomacy, were the organization’s main stays
during the early-twentieth century; however, as will be discussed in the following chapter, the
304

Committee was willing to depart from these tactics and employ more overt approaches to public
advocacy and communal defense.
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Chapter 5: Dearborn and Massena
Introduction
This chapter examines the Committee’s response to two dramatic manifestation of antiSemitism in the United States, the articles published in the Dearborn Independent and the blood
libel in Massena, New York. The case studies included in Chapter 4 reveal the extent to which
the AJC counselled restraint when confronted with anti-Semitic provocations, but, as will be
seen, in some circumstances, the AJC was willing to deviate from its early more circumspect
advocacy and apply more overt tactics in order to fight anti-Semitism and safeguard the
reputation of the American Jewish community. Concerns about optics fundamentally shaped
their responses to these incidents and arguably the organization’s leadership made a number of
serious miscalculations.

The Ford Apology
No study of the public advocacy and communal defense efforts of the American Jewish
Committee would be complete without reference to Henry Ford’s 1927 public apology for the
anti-Semitic content of the Dearborn Independent. Securing Ford’s apology was the most high
profile domestic achievement of the first generation of AJC leaders, although, it must be noted,
the sincerity of Ford’s apology and its significance are controversial topics in the historiography
on American Jewish leadership and in scholarship on the development of prohibitions against
hate speech as a legal or juridical issue. The episode is among the most referenced and most
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studied events in the history of early-twentieth-century Jewish activism and communal
leadership in the United States.756
This section will describe the nature of the AJC’s leaders’ debates about if, and how, to
respond to the newspaper articles Ford published in the Dearborn Independent, the context
which influenced their deliberations, and which strategies they ultimately employed. As the
discussion will reveal, the AJC did release a public statement rebutting the allegations made in
Ford’s newspaper, but, in lieu of answering each charge in each issue of the newspaper, the
Committee began subsidizing the publication of books and pamphlets that were designed to
combat the stereotypes and conspiracy theories being propagated through the Dearborn
Independent and other sources, including the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. This section of the
Chapter will reveal how the public advocacy and communal defense efforts of the American
Jewish Committee developed and were shaped by its experience confronting the anti-Semitism
spawned by the Dearborn Independent.
Historian Howard M. Sachar describes the articles published in the Dearborn
Independent as “the single profoundest shock [the Jews] had encountered in twentieth-century
America.”757 The widespread dissemination of falsehoods and gross misrepresentations
fundamentally impacted American Jewry sense of belonging and security in the United States.
Seven years elapsed between the publication of the first anti-Semitic articles in the Dearborn
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Independent and the release of Henry Ford’s apology. During this time, the AJC sponsored the
publication of numerous books and pamphlets as part of its efforts to prevent an intensification
of anti-Semitism in the United States. These publications, including Herman Bernstein’s History
of a Lie, will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 7 of this study, which describes the
development of the AJC’s interest in publishing as a means of furthering the organization’s
social and political agenda.
The Dearborn Independent, a newspaper wholly owned by Henry Ford, purported to be a
mass circulation daily newspaper. In reality, the tone of the material it published was
characteristic of nineteenth century pamphlets, which expressed specific social and political
views as opposed to providing objective accounts of current events.
The Dearborn Independent began releasing anti-Semitic articles in May of 1920. “The
first two issues were on Marshall’s desk almost immediately. The gravity of the situation,”
according to Robert Rifkind, “was clear to [Marshall]. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion had
recently surfaced in the United States, broadcasting its paranoid fantasy of a Jewish cabal
orchestrating international banking, Bolshevism, and Zionism in a diabolic plot to take over the
world.”758 The articles in the Dearborn Independent “disseminated the main themes of this
potent myth and domesticated it for an American audience.”759
The articles were also released as a series of easily distributed pamphlets, under the title
“The International Jew: The World’s Foremost Problem.” The influence and coercive force of
Ford’s anti-Semitic publications were especially dangerous because he was one of the wealthiest
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and most respected businessmen in the United States; Ford had virtually unlimited financial
resources, and further, the general public thought of him as an American hero.760
On June 3, 1920, Marshall wrote a personal letter to Henry Ford strongly objecting to the
content of the Dearborn Independent’s articles and asking Ford to retract and disavow these
publications:
On behalf of my brethren I ask you from whom we had believed
that justice might be expected whether these offensive articles have
your sanction whether further publications of this nature are to be
continued and whether you shall remain silent when your failure to
disavow them will be regarded by the general public as an
endorsement of them. Three million of deeply wounded Americans
are awaiting your answer.
Two days later, Marshall received the following reply:
We regret the words in which you have seen fit to characterize the
Dearborn Independent’s articles. Your terms “insidious”
“fabrications” “insinuation” “pernicious” “hatred” “prejudice”
“libel” “insult” “humiliation” “obloquy” “mischief-making” we
resent and deny. Your rhetoric is that of a Bolshevik orator. You
mistake our intention. You misrepresent the tone of our articles.
You evidently much mistake the persons whom you are addressing.
Incidentally you cruelly overwork your most useful term which is
“antizamitism” [sic]. These articles shall continue and we hope you
will continue to read them and when you have attained a more
tolerable state of mind we shall be glad to discuss them with you.761
The telegram was not signed by Henry Ford, but, rather, by The Dearborn Publishing Company.
Marshall replied that he was going to infer from their telegram that the articles in the Dearborn
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Independent were endorsed by Henry Ford.762 The AJC received no denial, and the organization
had no further contact with Ford or the Dearborn Publishing Company for the next seven years.
Ford would later claim that the articles had been published and the pamphlets distributed without
his knowledge.
The AJC’s Executive Committee convened a special meeting to discuss the Dearborn
Independent on June 23, 1920.763 The purpose of the meeting was to decide “what steps, if any,
are to be taken to counteract the evil effects of such propaganda.”764 The minutes of the meeting
record that there was a consensus of opinion among the leaders present “that the Ford articles
themselves were not so serious except as evidence of a world wide movement.”765 They saw the
Dearborn Independent’s articles and the publication of the Protocols as alarming evidence of an
intensification of anti-Semitism. They would become more alarmed, and take stronger
countermeasures, as the controversy unfolded over the next seven years.
For years the AJC’s leaders had been anxious that an escalation of anti-Semitism was
coming; now that it had arrived, they debated whether to shift from an advocacy posture that had
been fundamentally based on preventing this escalation towards approaches that were designed
to confront the threat to their community. The provocations of Dearborn Independent could have
been countered aggressively, but, with a few exceptions, the AJC’s leaders continued to adhere
to moderate, more passive and less public responses.
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While the AJC’s leaders agreed that anti-Semitism was escalating, the organization’s
leadership was divided about how to respond. Judge Irving Lehman and Jacob Schiff counselled
restraint, arguing that, despite the Dearborn Independent’s weekly circulation of seventy
thousand, the articles “were not getting any wide publicity except in the Jewish press.”766 Schiff
argued that “a public defense at the present time might be undesirable and only lend further
publicity to an unpleasant situation.”767 During the leaders’ discussions, Marshall mentioned that
he had heard rumours of the impending wider distribution of the Protocols in the United States,
but he did not advocate for a stronger, immediate public response.768
The AJC’s leaders agreed that, for the moment, the best course of action was to begin
“earnest preparation…to meet the larger and more wide spread attack” that they feared was
forthcoming.769 They decided to begin collecting anti-Semitic literature and any rebuttals
published in newspapers or released by other leadership organizations. By the time the text of
Ford’s apology was made public, the AJC had amassed a massive collection of materials,
including “six thousand clippings from the general press…[and] thousands of clippings from the
English-Jewish and Jewish press in other languages” from around the world.770
During the first meeting on the problem of the Dearborn Independent, the AJC’s
Executive Committee discussed the potential usefulness of statistics about Jewish military
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service during the First World War. The AJC was already funding a project dedicated to
compiling an honor roll of American Jews who had fought during the First World War. The
Committee’s leadership believed that statistics on “the number of Jews who served in the various
belligerent countries”771 could be usefully cited to dispel allegations of an international Jewish
conspiracy. Although the initial purpose of the honor roll was to recognize the patriotism of
American Jews, the leadership thought that, because large number of Jews had served on both
sides of the recent conflict, these facts could be circulated as evidence to counter the notion of a
unified international Jewish conspiracy.
In their reaction to the articles in the Dearborn Independent, some Jewish newspapers
had advocated that a boycott of the Ford Motor Company be organized. The AJC’s leadership
opposed this plan. Their concern was that a Jewish boycott of Ford might “boomerang and
produce a counter boycott in which the Jews would greatly suffer.”772 The Committee decided
that Marshall should write a confidential letter to the editors of Jewish newspapers “cautioning
them against advising a boycott, [and] informing them that the whole subject was being carefully
watched by” the AJC.773 For the moment, the Committee adopted a cautious approach but the
leaders recognized that they should be prepared for a difficult and public confrontation with
American anti-Semites, including one of the wealthiest, most respected men in the country.
The Executive Committee did not address the problem of the Dearborn Independent
again until October 10, 1920.774 By this time, the AJC leaders estimated that the newspaper’s
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circulation had increased to two-hundred-and-fifty thousand.775 The Committee discussed the
fact that it was receiving letters from local Jewish communal leaders complaining about the
content of the newspaper, including letters from leaders in Detroit, Baltimore, and Little Rock.
During the meeting, Harry Schneiderman reported that he had been analyzing the content of the
anti-Semitic articles, and had been able to verify that most of the references and quotations they
contained came from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.776 The situation was clearly worsening,
and the AJC’s leaders resolved to establish a subcommittee to prepare “a reply to the Protocols
presenting evidence to their spurious character, and to suggest methods of counteracting the
propaganda.”777 Tellingly, the leadership also resolved that no public action would be taken
without the approval of the AJC’s larger General Committee, which was scheduled to have its
annual meeting the following month. This can be interpreted as evidence of both the seriousness
and the caution with which the AJC’s leaders approached the problem of the Protocols and the
Ford-owned newspaper. During the early history of the organization, the AJC’s leadership rarely
felt the need to seek the approval of the larger General Committee which, it must be noted, only
convened once a year.
At the end of the October 20 meeting of the Executive Committee, Marshall, Oscar
Straus and Cyrus Adler were appointed to a new subcommittee that was tasked with formulating
the AJC’s strategy on countering the Protocols. The subcommittee presented its proposals to the
Executive Committee a month later. The members of the subcommittee suggested the release of
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“a statement to the public emphatically repudiating the charge that Bolshevism is a Jewish
movement and declaring that the so-called Protocols are a forgery.”778 Secondly, they suggested
the release of a book “containing an extended argument” on the inaccuracy of the association of
Jews with Communism and a more thorough debunking of the Protocols.779
Marshall had already prepared a draft text of the public statement, which he read to the
other leaders. After a discussion, the AJC’s leaders decided that the statement should be
considered by the organization’s General Committee, which was meeting the following day. The
General Committee approved the statement and it was released to the public on December 1,
1920.780 The public statement, which was published in the New York Times and was
subsequently released by the AJC as a sixteen-page pamphlet, challenged the notion that Jews
were disproportionately leading Communist parties, and described the Protocols as a forgery
whose origins could be traced to agents of the Czarist regime. The statement, which mentions the
Dearborn Independent without specifically refuting any of the newspaper’s claims, also
describes Henry Ford as “merely a dupe.”781
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The Marshall-authored statement was a significant example of cooperation between
Jewish leadership organizations representing constituencies from across the ideological,
economic, and ecclesiastical divisions that characterized early-twentieth-century America Jewry.
Marshall drafted the statement, but the published pamphlet was co-signed by the leaders of the
Zionist Organization of America, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the Union of
Orthodox Jewish Congregations, the United Synagogue of America, the Independent Order of
B’nai B’rith and the Anti-Defamation League, the Central Conference of American Rabbis, the
Rabbinical Assembly of the Jewish Theological Seminary, the United Orthodox Jewish Rabbis
of America, and the Provisional Organization for American Jewish Congress.
During a meeting of the AJC’s Executive Committee on December 12, 1920, the
organization’s leaders voted to appropriate ten thousand dollars from the Emergency Trust Fund
to finance the distribution of two-hundred and fifty thousand copies of the public statement.782 At
the same meeting, they also voted to fund the research of Herman Bernstein, at a salary of one
hundred dollars per week, who was already conducting an investigation into the sources of antiJewish propaganda.783 As will be discussed in Chapter 7, Bernstein’s research would culminate
with the publication of History of a Lie, one the first books whose publication was funded by the
AJC.
In the aftermath of the release of the pamphlet version of the public statement, the AJC
declined to make further direct public statements refuting the allegations made in the Dearborn
Independent or other anti-Semitic publications. However, numerous other publications were
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commissioned and released by the AJC. These publications, which included Cyrus Sulzberger’s
pamphlet “Is Immigration a Menace?” and Lee J. Levinger’s A Jewish Chaplain in France, were
designed to combat the spread of anti-Jewish prejudice, but the AJC consistently refrained from
directly answering hate speech or accusations made against the Jewish community.
Marshall did, however, in another indirect approach, coordinate the release of
condemnations of the Dearborn Independent by non-Jews. The AJC’s President “organized a
protest against the Independent by a hundred non-Jews, including Woodrow Wilson and William
Howards Taft, and he was able to have the Federal Council of Churches denounce Ford.”784
Marshall also relied on the strategy of quiet diplomacy. He met with President Warren G.
Harding and asked for the President’s help with the situation.785
After the release of the public statement, Marshall received invitations to make speeches
and thus he had further opportunities to directly denounce Ford and the Protocols, but he
declined these offers. Marshall wanted to maintain the Committee’s reputation as a communal
leadership organization, and he did not want the Committee to be thought of by the general
public as a source of propaganda. For example, in late December 1920, Marshall declined an
offer from the Jamestown, New York chapter of the Fraternal Order of Eagles to address their
fourteen hundred members from the Eagle Temple platform. The invitation noted that the speech
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would be given wide publicity throughout Western New York.786 In declining the offer, Marshall
wrote:
While I greatly appreciate the invitation and the spirit which moves
you to make it, permit me to say that the American Jewish
Committee is not engaged in making propaganda, that the
statement to which you refer, which appeared in the New York
Times and other papers on December 1st, was the answer of the
Jewish people of this country to the libels that have been published
against them. It is our theory that nothing can be more injurious to
the well-being of our country than to indulge in controversy on
racial or religious lines, and that so far as the Jews are concerned,
having made a public statement to their fellow-citizens answering
their detractors, they do not intend to take the initiative in making
the matter the subject of public debate. To do so would be to
dignify what any fair minded citizen will at once recognize as an
unworthy and disgraceful proceeding.787
Whatever the effect of the publication of the pamphlet of Marshall’s public statement, it did not
discourage Ford’s newspaper. The Dearborn Independent continued to release provocative and
anti-Semitic articles for the next seven years. Throughout this period, the Committee maintained
its policy of refusing to enter into a public debate over the content of the newspaper’s articles.
“The Committee,” according to Naomi Cohen, “refused to sanction any rash attack on Ford. It
advised against a boycott, against attempts to ban the Dearborn Independent from public
libraries, against investigative commissions, and against individual libel suits. The Committee,
however, did not reflect the sentiment of the entire Jewish community, and others proceeded
with [lawsuits] against Ford.”788
In truth, the negotiations that ultimately brought about the release of Ford’s apology for
the articles in the Dearborn Independent had more to do with a series of libel lawsuits filed
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against Ford by individual Jews, Ford’s own political ambitions, and the upcoming release of the
Ford Model A, than with the intervention or advocacy of any American Jewish leadership
organization. The lawsuits, in particular one filed by a Jewish lawyer named Aaron Sapiro that
went to trial, threatened to both tarnish Ford’s reputation and to mar the release of the Ford
Motor Company’s newest model.789 Sapiro’s lawsuit “brought Ford’s antisemitic diatribe into the
public forum of the federal courts and put the substance of his allegations on national display.”790
It was the embarrassment caused by the ongoing trial that ultimately moved Ford to seek some
kind of reconciliation with American Jewry.791
The AJC was able to publically claim the credit for bringing about the Ford apology
because Ford’s representatives approached Louis Marshall after Ford, on his own initiative,
decided he no longer wanted to be associated with the views that were being disseminated
through his newspaper. That Ford chose to approach the leader of the AJC is nevertheless
significant because he could have reached out to the leaders of other major American Jewish
leadership organizations. The overture to Marshall reflects the reputation and standing the AJC
had established during the first twenty-five years of its history and Marshall’s status among the
major communal leaders of early-twentieth-century American Jewry.
During a meeting of the AJC’s Executive Committee on September 18, 1927, Marshall
reported on his negotiations with Ford’s emissaries, Earl J. Davis and Joseph A. Palma, but the
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minutes record very few details about how the negotiations unfolded.792 The AJC anticipated that
the American public, and particularly American Jews, would be curious about how the apology
came about, and Marshall released a public statement describing how the negotiations unfolded
in the American Jewish Yearbook and in the pamphlet that the AJC published containing the text
of Ford’s apology.793
According to Marshall’s account, Davis and Palma were introduced to him by former
Congressman Nathan D. Perlman. Ford’s emissaries indicated that Ford “had become satisfied
that those whom he had put in charge of The Dearborn Independent had taken advantage of him
by publishing the series of articles attacking the Jews… [that Ford] was convinced that all of the
charges made against [the Jews], individually and collectively, are without foundation and
unjust; and that he desired to know what could be done to put an end to the strained relations on
the part of the Jews towards him.”794 Marshall replied that “there must be a complete retraction
of all the false charges made, a full apology and request for forgiveness, a discontinuance of the
attacks which had been indulged in these publications…[and] a pledge that like publications
would never again be made—in other words, that there must be full amends for the wrong
done.”795 Marshall’s account indicates that, after further negotiations, Ford ultimately signed an
apology that had been “previously repaired.” The document was drafted by Louis Marshall.
The four-page apology was printed by the AJC in pamphlet form using funds from the
organization’s emergency trust fund, and fifty thousand copies were distributed throughout the
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United States.796 In the apology, Ford claims that he delegated responsibility for the editorial
content of the Dearborn Independent to men he trusted because he was too busy attending to
other matters. When, after seven years, he reviewed the content of his publication, he claimed to
have been “deeply mortified” that the newspaper “had been made the medium for resurrecting
exploded fictions, for giving currency to the so-called Protocols…which have been
demonstrated…to be gross forgeries, and for contending that the Jews have been engaged in a
conspiracy to control the capital and industries of the world, besides laying at their door many
offenses against decency, public order and good morals.”797 Ford goes on to express shock at the
content of the newspaper, apologize, ask for forgiveness, and promise that it will never happen
again.798 The scholarship on the Ford apology overwhelmingly considers it to be disingenuous,
prompted by political optics and “business calculations” rather than genuine remorse.799
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The American Jewish Committee, however, considered the Ford apology to be a major
achievement. The leaders of the Executive Committee praised Marshall for “the tactful and
dignified manner in which he conducted the negotiations with Ford’s representatives.”800 The
most prominent anti-Semite in American history had publically disavowed his views, and
simultaneously condemned as a forgery the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, one of the most
significant sources of modern anti-Semitism.
Despite their own enthusiasm for their achievement, Marshall and the AJC have been
criticized in recent scholarship on the Ford apology. Victoria Saker Woeste, for example, has
noted that the AJC’s collaboration with Ford might have held back the development of the law of
libel in the United States to include hate speech against racial and religious minority groups.
According to this argument, an opportunity was missed to expand the scope of libel law beyond
individual injury to include the defamation of entire groups. Saker Woeste also notes, however,
that, with very few exceptions, the United States Supreme Court “has given speech expressing
racial hatred essentially the same protection as ‘other speech that causes ordinary offense or
anger.’”801
Considerations about optics and potential impact shaped the AJC’s decision to enter into
negotiations with Ford as opposed to releasing numerous responses to his attacks or actively
participating in the lawsuits against him. As an organization, the AJC used litigation to further its
social and political agenda; however, it must be noted that, in many instances, particularly during
the organization’s early efforts in the arena of constitutional litigation, the AJC or its leaders
were acting on behalf of other minority groups regarding issues that only peripherally concerned
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the American Jewish community. In these instances, which involved questions about the scope
of minority rights in the United States, the Committee was litigating only indirectly on behalf of
Jewish interests. Louis Marshall, who in addition to his role in the AJC was also a board member
of the NAACP, “litigated many of the benchmark civil rights cases of his generation.”802 In
responding to the Dearborn Independent, Marshall and the AJC chose to privilege securing an
apology to the entire Jewish world over securing judicial rulings that individual Jews had been
injured by Ford’s publications or a ruling that expanded the law of libel to encompass hate
speech against minorities in the United States. Counter-propaganda, rebuttals, and legal
recourses were recognized by the Committee as important tools in the fight against antiSemitism but, in this case, Marshall and the AJC calculated that there was more to be gained
through a public apology and a retraction than through pamphlets and litigation.

The Massena Affair
One extraordinary example that illustrates the AJC’s occasional willingness to publically
and directly engage with both the media and public officials to prevent an intensification of antiJewish sentiments was the so-called “Massena Affair,” an accusation of blood libel against
residents of the Jewish community in Massena, New York, a town on the border between Canada
and the United States.803 On September 22, 1928, two days before Yom Kippur, Barbara
Griffith, a four year old Christian girl, disappeared from her home in Massena. A search for the
child, involving the town’s police department, the New York State Troopers, the Massena Fire
802
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Department, and local volunteers was initially unsuccessful. However, the child, who had
become lost in the woods while looking for her seven year old brother, was found unharmed the
following day.
Both local and national Jewish organizations became involved in this incident because,
during the search for the girl, a New York State Trooper questioned a local Rabbi at the Massena
police station about the practice of human sacrifice in Jewish rituals. Rabbi Berel Brennglass, of
Massena’s Congregation Adath Israel, was interviewed by Corporal H.M. McCann apparently, in
connection with a rumour that Barbara Griffith had been kidnapped by local Jews to be
sacrificed during a Yom Kippur ritual.804 It can be argued that the interrogation of the Rabbi was
the result of a series of misunderstandings, shoddy police work, and poor judgment, as opposed
to a manifestation of institutional (or institutionalized) anti-Semitism among the residents, law
enforcement, and public officials of the town of Massena and the State of New York. While it is
clear that some of the police officials involved in the search for the missing child were aware of
the historical allegation of blood libel against the Jews, this awareness was not used as the basis
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for a violent assault against the Jewish community of Massena. The immediate consequences of
the events at Massena in 1928 are not comparable with the violence that followed similar
allegations of ritual murder, such as what transpired in Velizh in the 1820s, Damascus and
Rhodes in 1840, Kishnief in 1903, and Shiraz in 1910. One Rabbi and several members of
Massena’s Jewish community were questioned by the police, but there was no mob violence: no
Jews were tortured or murdered nor was there any destruction of Jewish-owned property.
While there was no violence, the incident at Massena nevertheless provoked a serious
response from local Jewish leaders in Massena and communal leaders of national Jewish
organizations because of concerns about public perception and optics. When the questioning of
Rabbi Brennglass was reported in the media, there was outrage among American Jews. Jewish
communal leaders, conscious of the history of violence against Jewish communities predicated
upon the blood libel charge, moved quickly to ensure that allegations of human sacrifice did not
become the basis for the persecution of Jews in the United States.
Massena’s local Jewish leaders shared these concerns, but they were also worried about
the impact the incident would have on their relationships with their non-Jewish neighbors.
Massena was a small town, and its Jewish community, although assimilated into the town’s
economy and local affairs, was, to a certain extent, a visible minority. In a summary of the
incident, outlined in a signed statement in the AJC’s archives, Jacob Shulkin, the President of
Massena’s Congregation Adath Israel, remarked that the incident had both local and national
dimensions: “Now the rumor is broadcast that after questioning the rabbi the guilty became
frightened and gave up the child. We feel we can not [sic] drop this case. We are strong in our
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opinion that this is a national affair.”805 Shulkin was concerned that the discovery of the child
unharmed was not being viewed as an exoneration of the Jewish community, and that the
incident would create an enduring suspicion of the Jews of Massena as a local minority
community and of American Jews generally across the country.
At the national level, Jewish leaders did not want to see allegations of blood libel become
the basis for the persecution of Jews in the United States. They were particularly concerned
about the potential legitimacy that might be conferred upon allegations of Jewish human
sacrifices by the blood libel’s application as the basis for a kidnapping investigation. Although
the Jewish population of the United States was overwhelmingly concentrated in East Coast
American cities, there were small Jewish populations spread out across the entire country. The
concern of national Jewish leaders, based on quite recent European and Middle Eastern historical
precedents, was that the disappearance of every non-Jewish child could be used as a predicate for
anti-Jewish violence anywhere in America.
After Rabbi Brennglass was questioned by Corporal H.M. McCann at the Massena police
station, the Rabbi reported the incident to the lay leaders of his congregation. The shocked
leaders filed an official complaint with the New York State Troopers.806 At the same time, they
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also sought out advice from both the AJC and the American Jewish Congress about how they
should respond, and, the Rabbi and the local leaders, retained Louis Marshall to act as their
attorney.807
Both the AJC and the American Jewish Congress assumed leadership roles in responding
to the incident, but the two organizations did not coordinate their efforts. 808 The American
Jewish Congress was the first to respond. On September 29, 1928, Rabbi Wise wrote to Mayor
Hawes and Police Superintendent Warner and requested an internal investigation of the
incident.809 Marshall, on behalf of the AJC, wrote to Hawes two days later and demanded a
public apology and threatened legal action against the Mayor.
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In responding to the blood libel charge and the interrogation of Rabbi Brennglass,
American Jewry’s two leading communal organizations both diverged from the approaches to
public advocacy that normally characterized their efforts. On September 29, Rabbi Stephen S.
Wise, the President of the American Jewish Congress, wrote to W. Gilbert Hawes, Massena’s
Mayor, and Major John A. Warner, the Superintendent of the New York State Troopers, and
requested that the interrogation of Rabbi Brennglass be investigated internally by the State
police. Marshall’s response was bolder and significantly more public. Citing his position as
President of the AJC, Marshall publically called for Mayor Hawes to either resign from office or
make “an immediate and public written apology to the Jewish people.”810 Marshall also
demanded to personally approve the text of Mayor Hawes’ apology before publication. He stated
that if the Mayor did not resign or make a sincere apology, he would initiate legal proceedings
seeking to have Hawes removed from office for official misconduct.811
Massena was a rare instance in which Louis Marshall voiced his anger publically.
Marshall’s ire over this incident may have impacted his judgment as he arguably overreached
and made some public relations errors in leading the AJC’s response. In responding to the
provocation, the American Jewish Congress pursued a significantly more moderate and quieter
approach than the AJC under Marshall’s leadership.
Wise’s request for an internal investigation was not made public, whereas Marshall’s
letter demanding a public written apology and threatening legal action was published in
newspapers. Marshall’s letter also included a thorough refutation of the blood libel charge,
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including a reference to Papal pronouncements condemning the accusation, numerous citations
from the Bible which establish the prohibition on using blood in Jewish rituals, and a summary
of the trial and acquittal in Russia of Mendel Beilis that featured testimony from European
intellectuals debunking the blood libel against the Jews.812 Marshall ended his letter by stating
that he would “wait for a few days for an indication” from the Mayor whether Hawes intended to
comply with his requests.813
While Marshall waited for a reply, Mayor Hawes and Police Superintendent John A.
Warner moved quickly to resolve the matter by complying with Wise’s earlier request for a
further investigation. In what proved to be a well-executed public relations and conflict
resolution maneuver, Hawes and Warner rather shrewdly ignored Marshall’s threat and
expedited the internal investigation of the incident. On the morning of October 4, Warner
presided over an administrative hearing to scrutinize the actions of Corporal McCann during the
kidnapping investigation and the questioning of Rabbi Brennglass.
Mayor Hawes and Massena’s attorney A.J. Hanmer were present at the hearing. Despite
the fact that Marshall had been retained by members of Adath Israel, he was not invited to
attend. Some of his clients, however, including Jacob Shulkin, were present, as were
representatives of the American Jewish Congress, including Rabbi Wise, the Congress’
President, and three of the organization’s lawyers, Bernard G. Richards, Louis Lande, and
George Gordon Battle.814
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The hearing’s findings matched those of the internal investigation led by Lieutenant
Heim. Corporal McCann was blamed for the entire affair. After the hearing, Warner wrote New
York State Governor Alfred E. Smith to summarize his findings: “I have severely reprimanded
Corporal McCann and indefinitely suspended him for gross lack of discretion in the exercise of
his duties and for conduct most unbecoming an officer.”815
Both McCann and Hawes issued apologies for the incident. Mayor Hawes’ apology was
released as a statement to the press. Corporal McCann’s apology was shorter, and arguably more
sincere, and was made in the form of a private letter to Rabbi Greenglass. McCann wrote:
I am writing to say that I regret more than I can tell you and am
very, very sorry for my part in the incident at Massena. After the
hearing today, I realize as I did not before, how wrong it was of me
to request you to come to the Police Station… to be questioned
concerning a rumor which I should have known to be absolutely
false. I was terribly excited and fatigued at the time, having been on
duty for many hours without food or rest. Otherwise, I would have
thought of the consequence of such an act and would not have done
what I did. I mean every word of this apology and I hope you will
take it in the spirit in which it was written.816
The text of Mayor Hawes’ public apology, which was released as a statement to the press,
included expressions of regret and an admission that he knew that the Rabbi was going to be
questioned by police. The Mayor’s apology, however, also included evasions and equivocations,
and concluded by placing some of the blame for the Massena affair on the Jewish community
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because of the publicity the interrogation of Rabbi Brennglass had received in the mainstream
press.817
Marshall was almost certainly deliberately not informed by Hawes and Warner of the
administrative hearing. Given Marshall’s threat to pursue legal action against the Mayor, it is not
surprising that neither Hawes nor Warner informed him of the quickly arranged proceedings.
Stephen Wise and the other representatives of the American Jewish Congress who were present
at the hearing likely did not inform Marshall because of the rivalry that existed between their
organization and the AJC.
It is significant that Marshall’s clients said nothing to him until the proceedings had
concluded. Marshall did not have any knowledge of the hearing until Jacob Shulkin and Rabbi
Brennglass wrote him after it was concluded and informed him who was present and included
copies of both Hawes’ and McCann’s apologies.818 In their letter to Marshall, written only
several hours after the administrative hearing and the suspension of Corporal McCann, Shulkin
and Brennglass now downplayed the national implications of the blood libel accusation in
Massena; instead, they emphasized the possible local implications of pursuing further redress.
With a public apology from the Mayor secured and McCann punished, they concluded that, for
the sake of social harmony and the security of their minority community, it was best to let the
matter rest. “We wish to assure you that we desire to live in peace with our Christian neighbors
in Massena,” Shulkin and Brennglass wrote to Marshall. “We are entirely satisfied of the
sincerity of Mayor Hawes’ expression of regret, and we beg to call your attention to the enclosed
817
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letter of regret and apology to us by Corporal McCann.”819 They knew, or should have known,
that Marshall would be displeased about being excluded from the proceedings and about the text
of the Mayor’s public apology. In his communications with Massena’s Jewish leaders and with
the town’s municipal government throughout the affair, Marshall consistently stressed that the
blood libel accusation was not only a narrow or local problem. Anticipating Marshall’s
indignation, Shulkin and Brennglass ended their letter by emphasizing that the Jewish
community of Massena, as a whole, was satisfied with the outcome of the hearing and did not
want to pursue the matter any further: “In closing we wish to say that it is the unanimous
sentiment of the Jews of Massena that deplorable as the incident was this is the best possible
disposition of the matter and the incident should be regarded as closed.”820
Based on correspondence between Marshall and his clients in Massena, as well as
correspondence between Marshall and members of the AJC and Superintendent Warner, it is fair
to say that the President of the AJC was angered that he was not informed about the
administrative hearing. It is also clear that while Marshall thought the indefinite suspension of
McCann was the appropriate punishment, he also thought the text of Mayor’s Hawes public
apology was inadequate. The language Marshall chose in his reply to Shulkin and Breenglass’
letter is measured, but it also clearly illustrates that he was upset to have been excluded from the
proceedings, the manner in which he was excluded, and how the matter was concluded,
including the drafting of apologies, without his intervention. Marshall wrote to Shulkin and
Brennglass:
I am rather surprised that after you had enlisted my interest in this
subject and requested my aid and advice…[that] you should have
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failed to communicate to me the fact that you had been summoned
to the office of the Superintendent of the State Police, so that I
might at least have been accorded the courtesy of availing myself
of an opportunity to be present on that occasion. You appreciated
from the very beginning that this was not a matter which concerned
merely the Jews of Massena, but that every Jew throughout the
world was affected. You also stated that I had been asked to
represent the Jews of Massena. Yet you undertook without
submission to me, to accept the apologies of the Mayor and the
Corporal, disregarding the important condition that I had made in
my letter to the Mayor that any apology that he might make should
be in a form approved by me. You knew very well that resort to the
courts was the very last thing that I desired… I have been active in
Jewish life for fifty years, but never before have I received a leter
[sic] like that signed by you…which in a most cavalier manner
practically dismisses me from the case and decides an important
proposition which in no manner concerns you. I refer to the
question as to what the attitude of the Jewish people as a whole
should be towards this episode.821
Marshall’s language was less restrained when he wrote to Superintendent Warner. His anger is
easily discerned:
I am entirely satisfied with the fact that you have reprimanded
Corporal McCann and have indefinitely suspended him for gross
lack of discretion in the exercise of his duties and for conduct most
unbecoming an officer. That was inevitable. My criticism is of the
extraordinary manner in which this proceeding was rushed through
immediately on the heels of the publication of my letter which
indicated that enormity of the offense committed. While I do not
pretend to be a great mathematician I am at least able to appreciate
that 2 and 2 make 4. If you desire an explanation of this cryptic
statement I can give it to you.822
Despite his anger and his clients’ desire to move on from the incident, Marshall did not abandon
the case. He began to work on the text of a second public apology that he hoped Mayor Hawes
would sign.
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The Mayor’s apology had been readily accepted by Jewish leaders in Massena because
they did not want to create a permanent rift between themselves and the majority of their
neighbors. Mayor Hawes was a popular local politician who was currently serving his fifth term
as the town’s Mayor; four of the five times he had been elected unanimously. 823 Marshall
understood why the leaders of Massena’s Jewish community were eager to move on, but he was
always more concerned about the broader implications of the appearance of the blood libel in
America. In a letter to Jacob Shulkin, Marshall acknowledged the local leaders concerns about
the safety of their community in the aftermath of the affair; however, he also made it clear that,
despite their concerns, he was not prepared to abandon his efforts:
You may rest assured that I shall do nothing which in any way will
affect the comfort and serenity of your Congregation and of the
Jews of Massena. The courage and good sense manifested by Rabbi
Brennglass at the time when he was put upon the rack in a manner
worthy only of a grand inquisitor of the Middle Ages, proved more
of a protection to the Jews of Massena against acts of hostility than
all the crawling sycophancy that may be exhibited by any
individual Jews. Please convey my respects to the Rabbi, who has
gained my admiration.824
Marshall had other, broader concerns than strong and prudent leadership of small Jewish
communities or social harmony in one small town. The blood libel and violence against Jewish
communities based on this accusation could not be allowed to be imported into America. In
Marshall’s view, it was appropriate for American Jewish leaders to more aggressively intervene
to insure that accusations of this kind remained marginal and, if possible, unacceptable in public
discourse. The blood libel would always remain a centerpiece of anti-Semitism, and anti-
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Semitism would always have to be resisted, but Marshall was hoping to use the publicity and
fallout from the Massena affair as a step towards broadly suppressing the blood libel charge as a
basis for suspicion against American Jews and as a predicate for anti-Jewish violence in the
United States. He was also hoping to establish a deterrent effect whereby government and law
enforcement officials, despite the hostility towards Jews that they might privately harbor, would
feel constrained about citing anti-Semitic canards in public statements. Marshall’s preoccupation
with the language of Mayor Hawes’ apology should be considered in this context.
The text of the Mayor’s apology was fundamentally important for Marshall’s purposes.
Ideally, as with the text of Ford’s apology, it would not only be a public apology, but also a
refutation of the old allegations of Jewish human sacrifice and a significant precedent. Shaming
one small town Mayor and a display of sincere contrition might serve to prevent public officials,
at all levels of government, from citing the blood libel in public statements, and thus conferring
legitimacy upon the old charge in the future. The text of Mayor Hawes’ public apology that was
accepted by the leaders of Massena’s Jewish community could not be used to further Marshall’s
objectives. In private, Marshall would later describe the Mayor’s statement as “ridiculous,” and
condemned the acceptance of the apology by Massena’s Jewish leaders without consulting him
as “inexcusable.”825
Mayor Hawes’ apology begins by stating that there were many rumours circulating in
Massena about what had happened to Barbara Griffith, and that they were all being investigated
by the police simultaneously. Hawes then mentions the arrival at the police station of a “Jewish
young man named Shulkin” who “made several contradictory statements about the whereabouts
of the child.” Hawes links Shulkin’s statements to the eventual questioning of Rabbi Brennglass:
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“His statements were such as to arouse suspicion and it was evident he had a deranged mind. As
a result of the statements made by this young man, the local Rabbi was asked to call at the police
station.” The Mayor asserts that he “did not send for the Rabbi,” but acknowledges that he knew
the Rabbi was going to be questioned. He also states, however, that he knew nothing about the
substance of the questions the Rabbi was going to be asked. The blood libel charge is never
mentioned. The statement is clear that the Rabbi was offended by some of the questions he was
asked, and viewed the questions as an insult to both his religion and his people, but, because the
blood libel accusation is never discussed, the Mayor’s statement is vague as to why the Rabbi
was offended.
For Marshall, the most troubling part of the statement was the closing sentence which
minimizes the incident and blamed the Jewish community for the coverage of the controversy in
the press. Hawes states: “So far as I know the incident is not generally known in Massena, and
any publicity given the matter must come from The Jewish People.”826 The conclusion
mischaracterizes the incident as a publicity embarrassment for the town because of the negative
press coverage rather than an instance where bigotry and myth slandered a minority community
and undermined or potentially hindered a serious police investigation. Further, the statement
does not acknowledge that the basis for the questioning of the Rabbi was unreasonable, false, or
grounded in prejudicial beliefs.
The flaws of Hawes’ public apology are not present in a private letter from the Mayor to
Rabbi Stephen Wise in which Hawes acknowledges receipt of his request for a further
investigation and provides an account of the administrative hearing concerning Corporal
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McCann’s questioning of Rabbi Brennglass. Instead of formally replying to Marshall’s public
demand for an apology, Mayor Hawes forwarded a copy of his letter to Stephen Wise to Louis
Marshall. Hawes’ letter to Wise offers a far more sincere apology, including powerful statements
of regret and direct references to the blood libel charge.827 This letter was never made public.
Marshall was clearly angered and offended by the content of the Mayor’s public apology,
particularly the closing paragraph:
The apology of the Mayor is not at all what it should be…[T]he
closing paragraph is couched in phrases which should be most
offensive to a self-respecting Jew, especially when such expression
comes from a man who only a week before had been guilty of the
most serious offense ever perpetrated in this country upon the
Jewish people, infinitely worse than anything that Henry Ford ever
did. It sounds too much like a lecture and is utterly devoid of
sincerity.828
Disregarding the wishes of Massena’s Jewish leaders, Marshall prepared an alternative apology
and planned to lobby Hawes to sign it; however, before Marshall submitted it to Hawes, the
Mayor’s apology and Marshall’s October 1 public statement began to garner some coverage in
the mainstream American press. The AJC’s Annual Report notes that the “American press was
quick to recognize the implications of the occurrence and it was made the subject of a number of
editorial articles, all of them expressing indignation that the circulation of this slander should
have emanated from public officials.”829
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Editorials, such as one that appeared in the New York Sun under the headline “Stamp Out
This Fire!,” praised Marshall for securing the Mayor’s apology and for the detailed refutation of
the blood libel that appeared in the AJC’s President’s public statement in which he had
demanded Hawes apologize and threatened legal action:
As a leader among American Jews Louis Marshall cannot be too
strongly commended for his vigorous letter to the Mayor of
Massena…Until now…American common sense has prevented this
grotesque libel from gaining credence here…Mr. Marshall has
done wisely in dragging the case out into the daylight. This kind of
thing is like fire in stubble, easily stamped out at first but hard to
control once it gains headway.830
In the days after the publication of Hawes’ apology, Marshall and the AJC received numerous
letters from American Jewish groups, fraternal organizations, and synagogues applauding
Marshall for his leadership in dealing with the Massena affair and for securing the public
apology from Mayor Hawes.831 Marshall led the AJC’s response to the Massena affair. It is
noteworthy, however, that despite the credit the AJC claimed and was given, the resolution of
this incident was more directly the result of how the American Jewish Congress, under the
leadership of Rabbi Stephen Wise, responded to the interrogation of Rabbi Brennglass.
As already suggested, Marshall’s anger over this incident may have led him to make a
public relations error. His demand for an apology and his threat to have the courts remove the
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Mayor from office were arguably an overreaction, particularly because his threat was made
publically. The fact that the two leading American Jewish organization’s responded
independently to this incident and did not coordinate their efforts created an opportunity for
Hawes and Warner to simply bypass the more extreme demands of Marshall and the AJC. By
quickly complying with Rabbi Wise’s request for a further internal investigation, severely
punishing Corporal McCann, and by issuing public apologies, Hawes and Warner lessened the
potential public outcry that could have been generated if the Massena affair had resulted in a
prolonged and public dispute between municipal and law enforcement officials and Jewish
advocacy groups.
Although ultimately not pursued, from a public relations perspective, there were risks
associated with Marshall’s plan to pursue the matter further. Marshall and the AJC wanted a
stronger statement from the Mayor; however, with a public apology now made, further protest
could be characterized as vindictive and vengeful, as opposed to righteous and legitimate, and
therefore the plan could seriously backfire.
Although the Massena affair was a significant episode in the history of anti-Semitism in
the United States, the incident was only discussed once by the AJC’s Executive Committee.832 In
the AJC’s records on this incident, the extent to which the AJC’s leadership minimized the
involvement of the American Jewish Congress is noteworthy. The minutes of the AJC’s
November 10, 1928 Executive Committee meeting and the organization’s Annual Report do not
mention by name the American Jewish Congress or summarize the Congress’ role in securing
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Hawes’ apology. The minutes and the Annual Report mention that “other bodies intervened”833
and that “other bodies took action in this matter,”834 but the only organization that is directly
referenced is the Commission on Good Will between Jews and Christians, which had issued a
public statement condemning the revival of the blood libel in America.
After Mayor Hawes issued his apology, Marshall wanted to continue his efforts to secure
a more just and contrite public apology from the Mayor, but the very positive public attention
given to Marshall’s letter and the Mayor’s apology appears to have assuaged the AJC leader’s
anger. Although the Mayor’s apology was flawed, Marshall calculated that further protest would
be counterproductive. In a letter to Leo Wise, the publisher of The American Israelite, Marshall
accepted that the fight over what transpired in Massena was over: “I heartily appreciate your
very kind and generous letter regarding the Massena matter, as well as your expression of
confidence in me. The subject was one of such a character that I thought that vigorous action was
necessary, and the enemy surrendered without delay. An adequate written apology has been
made.”835 Marshall and the AJC, as well as the Jews of Massena, let the matter rest and moved
on.

Conclusion
The articles in the Dearborn Independent and the blood libel in Massena were the two
most serious domestic provocations the first generation of American Jewish Committee leaders
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confronted.836 In the former, they adhered to many of the advocacy practices that characterized
the early efforts of the organization; in the latter, Marshall’s denunciation of Mayor Hawes was a
significant departure from the AJC’s preference for avoiding publicity and using quiet
diplomacy.
In both cases, the AJC was able to publically claim credit for outcomes that arguably had
more to do with the advocacy work of others. In the case of Ford, it was the media attention and
public scrutiny generated through the libel suits that changed the situation. In Massena, it was the
American Jewish Congress’s Rabbi Wise whose moderate position and practice of quiet
diplomacy ultimately brought about a resolution to the controversy.
These two dramatic incidents illustrate both the potential and limits of advocacy
strategies based on avoiding publicity and quiet diplomacy. Ford could have been confronted
directly, but to adopt such a strategy requires resources and an ability and willingness to educate
the public and take on the risk of provoking some kind of backlash. Similarly, Massena could
have been treated as the unfortunate consequence of poor decisions made by one ignorant law
enforcement official. Although very serious because of the brutal history around the use of the
blood libel as a predicate for anti-Jewish violence, an organization better equipped to publically
describe the fallaciousness of the blood libel charge arguably would not have felt the need to take
such a strong stand in response to an incident that did not result in any violence.
While these incidents were unfolding, the AJC was already beginning to develop its
ability to employ more sophisticated approaches to public advocacy and shaping public opinion.
It was in the ten years prior to the Ford apology that the Committee began to develop greater
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institutional infrastructure; however, it was not until almost twenty years after the Ford apology
that the Committee matured into an organization that was willing to practice public advocacy
using a variety of modern techniques, including the use of mass media. During the period
covered by this study, the organization’s leadership and staff remained very small, but the
Committee gradually expanded its activities, requiring more attention from its busy leaders, more
full-time staff to oversee specific projects, and greater resources to fund its operations. Although
the most significant expansion of the organization occurred after the Second World War, the
development of the Committee’s advocacy infrastructure and the origins of the organization’s
transition towards the use mass media can be traced to the period covered by this study. As will
be shown in the following two chapters, the institutions and internal bodies that would shape the
Committee’s exercise of public advocacy for the rest of the twentieth century were founded
during the leadership tenures of Mayer Sulzberger and Louis Marshall.
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Chapter 6: Building the Infrastructure for Public Advocacy, Part I
Introduction
Today, the American Jewish Committee is a substantial organization with over 175,000
members,837 a staff of more than two hundred,838 more than a dozen departments,839 and an
endowment with over 130 million dollars (US) in assets.840 The AJC has a ten-story corporate
headquarters on East 56th Street in New York City, which houses its library and archives, and it
operates twenty-two regional offices in major cities across the United States.841 The organization
is global, and maintains satellite offices and agencies in Berlin, Brussels, Hong Kong, Jerusalem,
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New Delhi, Paris, Rome, São Paulo, and Tokyo.842 Throughout the period covered by this study,
however, the Committee was a very small organization. Before 1931, the AJC had fewer than
three hundred dues-paying members, it did not have a large office or staff, 843 and, as discussed
in earlier chapters, it was directed by a very small leadership circle.844
As will be discussed in this chapter, the early leaders of the Committee slowly expanded
the organization’s operations and institutional infrastructure, but the most dramatic increases in
membership, institutional growth, and fund raising occurred after 1930. “Dealing with the Nazi
threat and the enormity of post-World War Two problems would cause [the AJC] to grow
exponentially. Early meetings, however, had as few as half a dozen participants.”845 In the early
days, the members of the AJC’s leadership both directed and administered the Committee’s
initiatives, including the organization’s press bureau, publicity bureau, and research departments.
The Committee relied on the efforts, talents, and financial resources of its small group of
leaders. “Expensive offices and salaries for employees were not an issue: the original New York
City offices were modest, and the organization’s general affairs were attended to successfully by
one paid executive and three or four clerks.”846 There was no paid professional staff. In addition
to their own professional, philanthropic, and family responsibilities, the early leaders of the AJC
oversaw the operation of the organization and its advocacy projects essentially in their “spare
time.”
Structurally, the Committee’s mandate, agenda and tasks were divided among different
subcommittees, including those on finance, fund raising, immigration (lobbying), and research
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(the Statistical Committee). With so few leaders actively involved in managing the operations of
the organization, there was considerable overlap in the membership of these critically important
subcommittees, with leaders serving on several simultaneously.847 Notwithstanding that they
were cautious about expanding the organization, hiring full-time staff, and establishing separate
departments dedicated to specific tasks or projects, the founders and early leaders of the AJC
conceived of the organization as an advocacy agency, and they recognized that, in order to
further their agenda, they would need to plan and finance activities that would make it possible
for them to influence public opinion.
From the beginning, the founders of the AJC recognized that efforts to influence public
opinion by providing the general public with information would be an important part of their
efforts. As discussed in the introduction of this study, the Committee was founded in the
aftermath of a series of pogroms in Russia and Eastern Europe. The transcript of the 1906
conference that resulted in the founding of the organization illustrates the extent to which the
AJC was created to help coordinate the American Jewish community’s response to the ongoing
calamity in Eastern Europe. Part of that response was a decision to make the general American
public aware of the persecution experienced by Russian Jews and the ongoing violence. The
goals of this campaign were to build public support to pressure the American government to do
more to deter the Russian government from tolerating (or actually encouraging) anti-Jewish
violence and, perhaps more importantly, to maintain open American immigration policies for
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refugees from the ongoing persecution. The founders understood that the organization would
need to collect information, analyze information, and have the means to disseminate its findings.
The first “tentative plan for the organization of the Committee,” which was a draft of
what later became the promulgated constitution of the AJC, included regulations relating to
information collection and the management of publicity.848 It called for the setting up of an office
in New York City “which shall collect and arrange and have at its disposal statistics and
information on all subjects relating to the Jews which may be of importance.”849 The plan also
noted that these statistics should be “constantly kept up to date.”850 Under article ten, which
carried the heading “Publicity,” the plan called for the strict management of public statements
made by members of the Committee, or in the name of the Committee; only the Chairman was
empowered to act as a spokesperson for the Committee. The regulations authorized the
Executive Committee, however, to empower other members of the organization to speak on its
behalf “in cases of emergencies.”851
The transcript of the conference that resulted in the founding of the Committee provides
numerous insights about the deliberations of the AJC’s founders on a wide variety of issues,
including the composition, objectives, and methods of the new organization. During the
discussions at the conference about whether the Committee should endeavor to influence public
opinion, there was an important exchange between Jacob Voorsanger852 and Morris Loeb,853 two
of the thirty-four delegates in attendance. The exchange is illustrative of the founders’ concerns
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about both influencing public opinion and managing the public’s perception of the nature and
legitimacy these efforts. The exchange illustrates the founders’ understanding of both the
importance of influencing public opinion and also of the potential risks and bad “optics” (in the
sense discussed in the previous chapters) of any conspicuous advocacy efforts.
The exchange between Voorsanger and Loeb occurred during a discussion about how
American press accounts of the persecution of Jews in Russia were inadequate or false, and were
thus failing both to inform the American people of the calamity and to encourage outrage or
protest from ordinary Americans. American Jews, including the Jewish establishment and the
community of new immigrants, were well-informed about the state of affairs in Russia and
Eastern Europe, but the AJC’s founders believed that the broader American public’s exposure to
this issue was limited by the minimal, and in some cases, false or biased information being
disseminated through the mainstream American press.854 The false or biased press coverage was
seen by the founders of the Committee as an impediment to building public support for
intercession by the American government to lobby the Czar’s regime to stem the violence. “It is
known to you all,” Jacob Voorsanger stated, “that there are some countries from which it is
difficult to get news, and yet the formation of a correct public opinion about affairs in those
countries is desirable. One of the most important affairs of this Committee is to bring about the
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proper dissemination of this news.”855 Morris Loeb replied that the Committee should proceed
with caution, noting that how any effort to influence public opinion was described would
fundamentally impact how it was received by the general public: “You would not want to
publish the fact that we propose to establish a news bureau, but you have the right to state that
you shall do your best to contradict any incorrect reports.”856 Voorsanger replied: “What we
suffer from in this country is ignorance of what is going on abroad. One of the functions of this
Committee should be to educate the public—to give the people information as to what is going
on abroad…And it therefore should be one of the functions of this Committee to get correct
information and give it to the people.”857
This exchange and others during the November 11 founders’ conference reveals that the
delegates were unclear about what they meant when referring to the “general public.” In some
instances, the delegates were referring narrowly (and sometimes condescendingly) to the Jewish
population of the United States, the majority of whom were recent immigrants. In other
instances, the delegates use the term to refer to the opinions of the broader American people,
irrespective of their religion. The delegates’ uncertainty about who was to be the Committee’s
principal audience is less significant than the fact that the delegates recognized that public
advocacy would be an important component of their work as a leadership and communal defense
organization. There was an appreciation that the Committee’s mandate would not be limited to
fundraising and relief work; their activities would include advocacy and efforts to shape public
opinion both inside and outside the Jewish community. In eventual practice, the AJC did strive to
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influence the political beliefs and attitudes of Americans of all faiths, and their advocacy work
went well beyond the American Jewish community.
On the matter of shaping public opinion, immediately after the exchange between Loeb
and Voorsanger, Louis Marshall intervened: “One of the great difficulties that we have
encountered in the Russian question has been to instruct the conscience of the world. We have
not had accurate information. Whatever the Associated Press has been allowed to filter into the
press of this country has been published, and nothing more, and it is our duty to disseminate
accurate information.”858 Another delegate, Dr. David Philipson,859 agreed with Marshall: “I
think that not only the Jewish public should be informed. There are things going on in this
country which the whole public should know.”860 By the end of the November 11 conference, the
delegates were able to agree that some form of public advocacy, including efforts to circulate
information to influence public opinion, would be within the mandate of the new organization.
Near the end of the meeting, the delegates passed a broad resolution which empowered the new
group’s Executive Committee to “at the earliest possible moment arrange for the dissemination
of correct information touching Jewish affairs generally.”861 All of the Committee’s efforts to
influence public opinion, including the resources the AJC’s leaders devoted to building the
organization’s ability to collect information, subsidize research projects, and engage in modern
forms of public advocacy, developed from this initial mandate.
As discussed in previous chapters, the founders preferred to practice quiet diplomacy or
the silent treatment, particularly in response to incidents of anti-Semitism, but they were also
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building an organization with the ability to engage in more active forms of advocacy on behalf of
American Jews and world Jewry. This chapter will show that, while quiet approaches were the
mainstay of the Committee during its early history, between 1906 and 1930, the organization was
also developing and engaged in more active and modern forms of communal defense and public
advocacy. This capacity to engage in modern forms of public advocacy, however, was in a
nascent stage. As will be discussed below, it would take more than ten years for the practice of
these approaches to mature, and at least another forty years of growth (and further domestic
provocations and international calamities), before the Committee had established all the
institutional infrastructure of modern public advocacy groups.
Successes and Failure and Early Initiatives and Institutions: the AJC’s First Headquarters,
the Statistics Bureau, the Washington Office, the Committee on Press Bureau, the Russia
Correspondents, and the Turn to Publishing
Two weeks after the last of the formational conferences, during the first formal meeting
of the AJC’s Executive Committee, the organization’s leadership made several important
decisions that would develop the AJC’s institutional infrastructure, including its capacity to both
collect and disseminate information. The first gathering of the newly formed organization’s
leadership, which took place on November 25, 1906 and was held at Temple Emanu El, covered
a great deal of ground. Among other decisions, the leaders: appointed new local members;
elected Herbert Friedenwald to be the organization’s first Secretary; decided where the
Committee’s headquarters would be established; voted to assume control and finance the
operations of the United Hebrew Charities’ Statistical Bureau; agreed to make the Statistical
Bureau’s resources available to the Jewish Publication Society and the American Jewish Year
Book; and inaugurated a fundraising campaign to help the Jewish community of San Francisco
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rebuild its institutions that had been damaged or destroyed in the recent earthquake and fire. 862
Although the establishment of a press bureau had been one of the main institutional ambitions of
the founders of the Committee, during this first meeting, discussion of the “matter of the
dissemination of information was postponed.”863 As reflected in the founder’s concern about the
public’s reaction to conspicuous advocacy efforts, and as will be discussed further below, the
members of the Committee were encountering, and would continue to encounter, both
organizational and ideological obstacles during its earliest attempts to define how the
organization would interact with, and attempt to influence, the press.
During the first meeting of the Executive Committee, the AJC's leaders “gratefully
accepted” an offer from the trustees of the United Hebrew Charities (UHC) Building to set up the
Committee’s first headquarters at the UHC “for the nominal rental of $75, per annum.”864 A
Statistical Bureau dedicated to gathering information about the American Jewish community was
already in operation in the United Hebrew Charities Building, and the UHC trustees also offered
to “place [this Bureau] at the disposal of the American Jewish Committee.”865 In response to this
offer, the AJC’s Executive Committee appointed a subcommittee “to make arrangements to take
over the [existing] Statistical Bureau,” and earmarked an annual budget of one thousand dollars
to fund the Bureau’s operations.866 A year later, the AJC agreed to more than double their
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financial support for the Statistical Bureau and increased its annual contribution to $2,200.00.867
The degree of their financial commitment, which represented about a quarter of the Committee’s
operational budget, reflected the founders’ preoccupation with building the Committee’s
capacity to collect and organize information.868
During the November 25 seminal meeting, the Executive Committee also resolved to
establish an AJC office in Washington, D.C. under the direction of Dr. Cyrus Adler, with an
annual budget of fifteen hundred dollars. The Committee’s founders had debated at length about
where the Committee should be headquartered. From the perspective of demographics, it was
clear that the organization should be based in New York City, whose still growing Jewish
population was by far the largest in the country, and where of most of the Committee’s leaders,
including Louis Marshall, Judah Magnes, Cyrus Sulzberger, and Professor Morris Loeb, called
home. However, from the perspectives of both claiming a national mandate and being able to
engage with the federal government and lawmakers, the founders recognized that the
organization would also need to establish itself in other American cities. The founders resolved
that the “principal offices of this Committee shall be established in the City of New York, and
there shall be established such other offices and agencies as the Committee or the Executive
Committee may deem necessary from time to time.”869
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The minutes of the November 25, 1906 meeting contain very few details about the
substance of the discussions that led to the decision to establish the Washington D.C. office. In
order to be an effective lobby group, the Committee needed representatives in the capital;
however, “obtaining information on Jewish matters at Washington” was the only grounds cited
in the meeting’s minutes to justify the expense.870
Although the importance of a presence in Washington was recognized from a very early
date, it actually took the Committee twelve years to establish an office in the nation’s capital.
From the outset, the New York and Philadelphia based leaders of the Committee made frequent
trips to the capital to meet with lawmakers, politicians, and diplomats, but the Committee did not
open an office in Washington until 1918. For several years, the organization relied on Fulton
Brylawski, a Washington D.C. based lawyer, to act as its representative in Washington.871 As
will be discussed in the following chapter, the Committee opened its Washington office in 1918
after the organization decided to subsidize the compiling of a list of American Jews who served
in the First World War.872
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The delay in establishing a formal presence in Washington reflects the nature of the
Committee in its formative period: it persisted as a very small New York based organization, led
by very few, with minimal staff, and with a modest designated budget. Rather than reaching out
to new members across the country, the AJC relied substantially on the connections, reputations,
and resources, including the considerable financial resources, of its leadership circle. Those
Jewish leaders’ connections with political and commercial leaders in the United States were a
crucial element of the organization’s early efforts to further its social and political agenda,
particularly during the Committee’s campaigns to lobby against the imposition of new
immigration restrictions and during the treaty abrogation campaign.
In terms of the ability to effectively disseminate information, the early leaders of the
Committee were conflicted about how to use mass media to communicate their message to the
broader American public. The Committee’s founders had deliberated at length about how to
define the relationship between the new organization and the media, particularly newspapers and
the wire services that provided information to newspapers. The leaders recognized the usefulness
of the media as means of disseminating information, but they were also alert to avoiding the bad
optics of press manipulation and influence peddling. They wanted the organization to build its
reputation as the leading representative organization of American Jewry as opposed to being
perceived as a purveyor of Jewish propaganda.
On January 27, 1907, rejecting suggestions from the Jewish community, the Executive
Committee decided that the AJC would not publish its own newspaper or magazine. Less than a
week earlier, the Committee had received a letter from Henrietta Szold, of the Jewish Publication
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Society, suggesting that the AJC finance a publication as its own.873 The Committee replied that
they “did not consider it advisable to designate any publication as the organ of the
Committee.”874 The AJC was willing to attach its name and seal to the pamphlets it published
and some of the books that it sponsored, but for other publications, the organization preferred to
maintain the impression that they were not in direct control of the content of the publication.875
During the January 27, 1907 meeting of the Executive, the AJC’s leaders also discussed a
letter from Max Senior and David Philipson, both non-executive members of the AJC. In their
letter, the two men suggested that the Committee establish a “Press Bureau to disseminate
correct news of affairs in Russia.”876 Senior and Philipson were repeating some of the early
deliberations of the founders of the AJC, including extensive debates that had occurred during
the November 11, 1906 founder’s conference. A press bureau of some kind, dedicated to
monitoring the media and attempting to influence newspaper coverage and editorial comment,
had been one of the principal items discussed by the Committee’s founders when defining the
objectives of the organization.
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Somewhat cautiously, the AJC leadership acted on Senior and Philipson’s suggestion,
and the Executive Committee passed the following resolution to explore how to establish a Press
Bureau:
[I]t is the sense of this Committee that, for the prevention of
massacres of Jews in Russia, no means can be considered so
effective as the enlightenment of the people of the western world
concerning real conditions in Russia, which have hitherto been
systematically concealed or distorted by the power of the Russian
Government; that to this end a Press Bureau should be established
to gather and disseminate correct news of affairs in Russia…and
that a Committee of three…be appointed to consider the best means
to carry out the objects of this resolution, and especially to devise
means for the distribution, through the press of the United States,
of such news as may be gathered.877
Louis Marshall, the AJC’s Secretary Herbert Friedenwald, and Leon Kamaiky, the publisher of
the Jewish Daily News, were appointed to the committee of three. At the same meeting, the
Executive Committee instructed Friedenwald to write to Dr. Paul Nathans, the President of
Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden, to ask what steps he and his organization had taken “to perfect
a Press Bureau.”878 Friedenwald was also instructed to inform Nathans that the AJC considered
the creation of a Press Bureau to be “of the highest importance” and to inquire if the German
organization was already involved in trying to disseminate information about anti-Jewish
violence in Russia.879
On March 10, 1907, the AJC’s Committee on Press Bureau reported that it had been in
communication with Paul Nathans and that they had begun to independently collect information
on the conditions of Russian Jews. The AJC’s leaders discussed what to do with this information,
including how to distribute it in the United States. Although the minutes of the March 10
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Executive Committee meeting provide very few details, they record that the AJC’s leadership
decided to form a subcommittee to seek out the cooperation of other organizations, including the
Friends of Russian Freedom, to get their advice on how to gather more information and how to
use a Press Bureau to distribute this information to both the delegates to the upcoming Hague
Conference880 and, more broadly, to the American people.881
A more thorough report from the Committee on Press Bureau was included as an
addendum to the minutes of the March 10 Executive Committee meeting. In this report, the
members of the Press Bureau Committee noted that there was “considerable dissatisfaction” with
the details provided by Paul Nathans “respecting the steps he had taken to establish a Press
Bureau in Berlin, and especially with regard to what he had done to procure the dissemination of
information.”882 After expressing this dissatisfaction, the members of the committee outlined a
three-point plan designed to “enlighten the American people.”883
The first element of the plan called for articles to be written “of an educational character,
descriptive of the existing political and educational institutions of the Russian people and of the
characteristics of the Russian people in general.”884 This element of the plan was the first
expression of the Committee’s ambition to produce content whose purpose would be to inform
the broader American public. As will be seen, in its public advocacy work, the Committee would
ultimately choose to prioritize the production of materials for distribution over efforts to
influence the information being disseminated through wire services and newspapers.
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As a second element, the plan suggested that Jewish businessmen, the so-called “large
advertisers” in cities across the country, be requested to approach newspaper editors “as
individuals” and request that their publications “furnish more adequate information along
definite lines” in their articles.885 This part of the plan was in essence a form of quiet diplomacy.
The AJC was suggesting that Jewish businessmen use the leverage they possessed with
newspapers (because of the money they spent on purchasing space for advertisements) to
influence what was being published about the persecution of Russian Jews. The inclusion of this
use of quiet diplomacy in the plan is significant because it could be described as an attempt to
both manipulate the media and disguise that attempt by emphasising that these efforts were to be
undertaken at the behest of individual advertisers, as opposed to on behalf of the AJC or the
American Jewish community.
It is not clear that the AJC ever formally implemented this element of the plan, nor is
there evidence that the tactic had any impact. Frustration with the mainstream press, including
media outlets that were owned or edited by American Jews, would be a constant irritant for the
early leaders of the organization. The AJC was consistent in finding fault with the way American
newspapers covered Jewish affairs, and world events concerning Jews, and this dissatisfaction
contributed to the organization’s decision to become involved in publishing both books and
pamphlets, but not a newspaper of its own.
The third element of the plan by the Committee on Press Bureau reiterated the
organization’s ambition to establish a Press Bureau in the United States. No further details were
given beyond the fact that the Committee had discussed who should lead the Press Bureau, and
that there was consensus that it should be directed by someone “well informed about Russian
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affairs.”886 George Kennan was among those discussed as possible directors, but it appears that
no action was taken to offer him the position.887
The Press Bureau Committee’s Report indicates that the AJC was committed to
establishing a Press Bureau based, at least in part, on the earlier experiences of some Executive
Committee members of using the press to disseminate information. Cyrus Adler commented
during the March 10 Executive Committee meeting that “he had frequently sent ‘copy’” to
correspondents from the three largest wire services, and that, as a result, this information had
ultimately been circulated to “three to four thousand” newspapers in the United States.888 Adler
suggested that the AJC gather a list of useful reference books on Russia and begin compiling a
list of potential titles for articles. The Committee could have these articles written on
commission and then distributed to specific newspapers.889
The plan to commission the drafting of articles would later become an important aspect
of the AJC’s involvement in publishing its own materials.890 The AJC’s leaders recognized from
a very early stage in the development of the organization that exploiting the dependence of many
American newspapers on wire services as sources of information on events around the world
represented a potentially efficient means of reaching a large audience, but the AJC’s leaders also
recognized some problems and pitfalls to using this approach to distribute information. One
serious problem concerned disseminating information about anti-Jewish violence in Russia. In
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particular, the leaders were concerned about how the wire services would handle situations in
which the Russian government offered a version or interpretation of events that contrasted with
the information being distributed by the AJC. For obvious reasons, the Committee placed no
trust in the Russian Government, and the leadership had serious doubts about the accuracy of the
information being transmitted by the wire services out of Russia, and subsequently reproduced or
cited as accurate in thousands of American newspapers. With these concerns in mind, the
Executive Committee members began to debate the idea of “procuring correspondents in Russia”
to gather uncensored or unbiased information that would not be tainted by the intelligence and
security services of the Czar’s regime.891 The exact date is not clear from the available records,
but, at some point in early 1907, the AJC’s Executive Committee appointed a subcommittee,
consisting of Judah Magnes, Elias Wolf Lewin-Epstein, and Herbert Friedenwald, “to consider a
correspondent in Russia.”892
The leaders’ debates about finding correspondents in Russia coincided with the
Committee’s efforts to establish its own press bureau. These simultaneous efforts reflect the
leadership’s ambition to develop the AJC’s capabilities to both gather and distribute information,
but, as will be seen, the organization encountered difficulties during its attempts to realize both
projects. There is a very limited amount of evidence, but the efforts to establish a press bureau
did not go smoothly for two major reasons. First, while the leaders of the Committee wanted the
organization to be able to exercise influence on how events in Russia were covered, they did not
know how to accomplish this aim without drawing negative or antagonistic attention to their
efforts. The founders of the AJC had expertise in numerous areas of advocacy, particularly in
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law, academia, and politics, but none of the members of the Committee on Press Bureau had
experience as press agents or publicists, and the leaders were not knowledgeable about the
operation of a press bureau. Secondly, there was disagreement among the leadership about
whether the organization actually needed a “publicity bureau” instead of a press bureau; the key
distinguishing feature between the two institutions being that a publicity bureau would be more
transparent about the advocacy nature of its work, which was to influence the substance of media
coverage; a press bureau would purport to be more objective in reporting the truth of events. The
press bureau envisioned by some of the AJC’s founders ideally would be able to influence press
coverage to be favourable to Jewish interests. The press bureau that the leadership wanted to
establish would have, in essence, been an adaption of quiet diplomacy, providing a means to
lobby journalists and editors in addition to government officials and lawmakers.
During the October 7, 1907 meeting of the Executive Committee, Judah Magnes
“suggested the appointments of a Committee on publicity, whose object should be to furnish
information to the Press upon matters of interest to the Jews of this country.”893 The leaders of
the Committee discussed the suggestion, and referred the matter to the Committee on Press
Bureau. During the next meeting of the leadership, Louis Marshall reported “progress,”894 but no
details are recorded in the minutes. Significantly, perhaps because it reveals the ambivalence of
the leadership, the only detail recorded is that the title of the Committee on Press Bureau had
been changed to the Committee on Press Bureau and Publicity.895
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The following month, the question of the press bureau or publicity bureau became part of
the jurisdiction of the AJC’s Statistical Committee, which was composed of Justice Nathan
Bijur, Professor J.H. Hollander, Jacob Hollander, Professor Morris Loeb, and Cyrus Sulzberger.
As will be discussed in the following chapter, the AJC’s Statistical Committee was the nascent
research department of the organization. Other than Herbert Friedenwald, who in his capacity as
Secretary of the organization was ex-officio a member of every AJC subcommittee, there was no
overlap in the composition of the Statistical Committee and the Press Bureau and Publicity
Committee,896 and the minutes of the December 1, 1907 Executive Committee meeting record
that it was “resolved to refer all matters respecting publication and kindred subjects, hitherto
referred to the Press Bureau Committee to the Statistical Committee.”897 After this resolution, the
idea of establishing a press or publicity bureau stagnated.
The question of a press bureau was not revived for further discussion by the leadership
for five years. In the interim, as will be discussed in the following chapter, the Committee
concentrated on building its capacity to conduct independent research projects, and continued to
exercise quiet diplomacy to further its agenda, especially during the early phases of the treaty
abrogation campaign, and regarding its efforts to prevent the implementation of new immigration
restrictions. While the leadership of the Committee was intermittently debating establishing a
press or publicity bureau, the organization was, as previously noted, exploring options for
securing better information about events in Russia, including the hiring of their own foreign
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correspondents. The idea of establishing a network of correspondents in Russia was suggested to
the AJC by a Mr. A. Lubarsky in a letter he sent to the Committee dated April 11, 1907.898 On
April 21, 1907, the AJC’s Executive Committee appointed a subcommittee, consisting of Elias
Wolf Lewin-Epstein, Joseph H. Cohen, Cyrus Sulzberger, Judah Magnes, and David H.
Lieberman, to study Lubarsky’s suggestions and confer directly with him about his suggestion.899
The proposal to secure independent correspondents in Russia was discussed at length
during the May 29, 1907 meeting of the AJC’s Executive Committee. The subcommittee
appointed to meet with Lubarsky recommended that the AJC proceed with a plan to establish
“direct communication with correspondents in Russia.”900 The subcommittee also reported that
Lubarsky had volunteered to travel to Russia the following month to recruit the AJC’s
correspondents. The plan called for Lubarsky to recruit correspondents for the AJC in six cities:
Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, Wilna (Vilna), St. Petersberg, and Moscow. Their duties would include
keeping the AJC “informed of the condition of affairs in their respective districts, and to furnish,
so far as possible, all information requested of them by the Committee.”901
The subcommittee overseeing the implementation of the plan to recruit correspondents in
Russia made a progress report to the AJC’s Executive Committee on October 7, 1907. According
to the minutes, the reading of their report led to an “extended discussion” but no action was taken
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and further discussion was deferred until the next meeting.902 Although the minutes do not record
any specifics about the leaders’ discussions, based on subsequent events, it is apparent that some
of the Committee’s leaders must have had serious misgivings about sending Lubarsky to Russia
to essentially recruit agents for the Committee.903
The issue of the Russia correspondents was discussed again by the Executive Committee
the following mouth, but again no action was taken, and the minutes of their November 9, 1907
meeting record no details of the discussion.904 More than four months passed, and the question of
hiring foreign correspondents did not come up again until the March 22, 1908 meeting of the
Executive Committee, during which the “Committee on Russian Correspondents was
discharged” without further comment.905 Lubarsky’s plan to recruit foreign correspondents was
abandoned by the Committee.
The idea of securing independent correspondents in Russia was an ambitious plan;
however, it was fraught with risks. These included uncertainties about recruiting able and
reliable correspondents in Russia and about the personal security of the correspondents
themselves. Even if Lubarsky had been successful in recruiting the correspondents, the AJC
would not have been able to guarantee the correspondents’ security nor could the organization
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trust the accuracy of the news information the correspondents would be able to relay about
events in Russia.
The leaders of the AJC wanted to both monitor the media and to influence the content
and the tone (or slant) of newspaper coverage of events that were pivotal to Jewish interests,
including prompting help for Russian Jews. Although this was their ambition, the leaders
confronted the reality that to exercise this kind of influence required the practice of propaganda
or the use of press agents, and the leadership did not want the AJC to be accused of engaging in
attempts to manipulate the media. Allegations of this kind would have been counterproductive to
the leaderships’ aims, among which was to discourage allegations of Jewish influence over the
mainstream press that, in turn, might foster anti-Semitism.
After the idea of correspondents in Russia and the press/publicity bureau plans were set
aside, the organization pivoted to concentrating on using traditional quiet diplomacy to further its
objectives. The shadtlan and Hofjude techniques of advocacy (discussed in previous chapters of
this study) suited the early phases of the two most significant advocacy campaigns in which the
organization was involved before the First World War. The Committee’s two main objectives
were first preventing the passing of new immigration restrictions and, second, promoting the
treaty abrogation campaign. However, the traditional techniques were not enough, and,
ultimately, influencing public opinion became an important aspect of both of these campaigns,
and it was during these campaigns that the AJC began to produce its own materials to educate
the American people.
Throughout these two major campaigns, the AJC continued to develop its advocacy
infrastructure. Although unaided by a press bureau or foreign correspondents, the AJC did not
abandon efforts to gather information on a wide variety of subjects important to the Jewish
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community, to disseminate this information, and to offer interpretations of it to American
politicians, American Jewry, and the broader American public. To gather information, the
leaders of the Committee built their own research department. To disseminate that information,
the organization turned away from newspapers and became involved in publishing books and
pamphlets.
Publicity Reconsidered: The AJC’s New Subcommittee on Publicity Bureau and the Treaty
Abrogation Campaign
Even as the AJC emphasized the quiet lobbying of lawmakers and the publication of its
own materials to further its agenda, the idea of establishing some kind of press or publicity
bureau did not completely fade away. The AJC’s subcommittee on Press and Publicity Bureau
was never disbanded and, in 1911, Louis Marshall, the subcommittee’s Chairman, and Jacob
Schiff, revived discussions among the AJC’s leadership about establishing an internal Publicity
Bureau for the AJC.
Based on the records of the discussions, it appears that Louis Marshall’s and Jacob
Schiff’s attendance at a political conference with President William Howard Taft prompted them
to renew the AJC’s leadership’s interest in establishing a press or publicity bureau. The February
15, 1911 meeting at the White House, which was also attended by leaders of the Union of
American Hebrew Congregations and B’nai B’rith, had been arranged so that the leaders of
American Jewry could lobby the President to abrogate an 1832 commercial treaty between
Russia and the United States.
The campaign’s aim was to persuade American lawmakers and the President to have the
United States withdraw from the treaty on the grounds that Russia, by refusing to grant American
Jews visas to travel into and through Russian territory, was in breach of the agreement. The
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campaign began as a traditional exercise in quiet diplomacy, but it escalated into the AJC’s first
major public advocacy campaign.
After months of Jewish leaders quietly meeting with American lawmakers,
representatives of President William Howard Taft’s administration invited a delegation of Jewish
leaders to meet with the President. For the Jewish delegation, the meeting ultimately was a
failure: Taft was sympathetic to their goals and agreed that Russia was violating the terms of the
treaty, but the President refused to support the abrogation campaign.906 The President’s
objections to the abrogation campaign were grounded in concerns about protecting American
commercial investments in Russia, including safeguarding the large factories that the Singer
Manufacturing Company and the McCormick Harvester Company had built in Russia
Jacob Schiff was angered by the President’s refusal to support the abrogation campaign
and, although the language of the record is nuanced and muted, there is evidence that Schiff may
have lost his temper during the meeting with the President.907 In his report to the AJC’s
Executive Committee on the meeting with Taft, Louis Marshall wrote about Schiff’s agitation:
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I never knew Mr. Schiff to be so much worked up over anything.
He considers it to be the most vital question before the country today [sic] as far as the Jews are concerned. He realizes that we must
make a fight all along the line, and that we must now initiate an
elaborate campaign of education. He has expressed a strong desire
for the immediate establishment of a publicity bureau with the best
literary talent at the head, and has stated that the necessary funds
with be forthcoming.908
After discussing Marshall’s report, the AJC’s Executive Committee resolved to appoint a new
subcommittee “to arrange for the immediate establishment of a publicity bureau.”909 Marshall,
Schiff, Cyrus Alder, Julius Rosenwald, and A. Leo Weil, were appointed to this new
subcommittee.
Another resolution passed during the same Executive Committee meeting reinforced the
AJC’s decision to try and influence public opinion to achieve the goals of the abrogation
campaign. During the meeting, Cyrus Adler “pointed out that heretofore [the AJC] had attempted
to secure the passport right through executive and diplomatic action.”910 Adler then stated that
the Committee “had formally passed that stage, and that we have nothing to expect from
Washington.”911 Finally, Adler moved that “the Committee now endeavor to secure the righting
of the passport matter by Congressional action and by informing the people of the United States
of the facts with a view to influencing public opinion on the subject.”912 Adler’s motion was
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approved by the Committee’s leadership; he subsequently referred to this vote as “the adoption
of the policy of public agitation.”913
Since the start of the abrogation campaign, the leaders of the Committee had been
persistent in arguing that Russia’s refusal to allow Jews holding American passports (some of
whom were Russian-born American citizens) to travel freely through Russian territory was a
violation of the terms of agreements between the two countries and a violation of the spirit of
American constitutional law, which prohibited race and religion-based discrimination. The AJC
was now committing to impress this argument on the minds and emotions of the American
people by arguing that Russia’s failure to abide by the terms of the treaty was a stain on “the
honor of the nation.”914
It was in this context of planning and preparing for the public advocacy phase of the
abrogation campaign that discussions about establishing an AJC publicity bureau were given
renewed interest by the Committee’s leadership. The new publicity bureau subcommittee, under
Louis Marshall’s direction, reported during the March 19, 1911 Executive Committee meeting
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that they had sought out the advice of both Samuel Strauss, the Editor of the New York Globe,
and Adolph Ochs, the owner of the New York Times.915

The Ochs and Strauss Debate
In his March 19, 1911 committee on publicity bureau report to the Executive Committee,
Marshall provided no details about Ochs’ advice, but he recounted that Strauss had suggested
that the AJC “make use of some existing agency in the matter of distribution of news.”916
Strauss’ suggestion was that, rather than develop its own bureau, the AJC could simply become a
client of an existing press or publicity agency. Marshall reported that Strauss had declined an
offer to directly participate in managing AJC’s media relations but had “promised to send the
Committee his suggestions at length.”917
Meanwhile, during the same meeting, the AJC’s leadership also discussed the importance
of finding better news sources on events in Russia. The plan of recruiting their own
correspondents had been abandoned, but the Committee did not want to rely on wire services. In
the leadership’s view, the Jewish Chronicle of London appeared to have better Russian sources,
and they decided “to find out what these sources are.”918 In this case, the leadership’s motivation
to gather better information was connected to a specific purpose. The Committee’s leaders were
contemplating a plan to compile a list of “concrete examples” of Russia’s treaty violations with a
view to publishing these examples in newspapers articles.919 The publicity bureau subcommittee
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was also empowered to “solicit the cooperation of Mr. [Adolf] Kraus of the B’nai B’rith.”920
Although B’nai B’rith was one the Committee’s major rivals, during the abrogation campaign,
the two organizations adopted the same strategies and coordinated their efforts.921
When the AJC’s Executive Committee met again the following month, both Samuel
Strauss and Adolph Ochs were in attendance. Neither was officially connected to the AJC, but
the two had been brought in “to confer with the Committee on the matter of the publicity
bureau.”922 During the meeting, Marshall reported that after a series of consultations with both
Strauss and Ochs, Strauss had arranged several meetings for the members of the AJC’s publicity
subcommittee with Atherton Bromwell, the President of the Century Syndicate. Marshall
described the Century Syndicate as “a news distribution company;”923 however, in essence, the
Century Syndicate was a commissioned third-party that, on behalf of its clients, lobbied
newspapers and wire services to publish content that its clients considered favourable to their
interests.924 This so-called news distribution company aimed to “shape” the news to “meet the
needs of [its] clients,”925 and from the perspective of optics, the Century Syndicate, like the other
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press agencies of the era, created the facade of a separation between its clients and newspapers,
thus minimizing the appearance of press manipulation. Marshall reported that Bromwell had
tendered a proposal to have his company carry out the AJC’s publicity and media relations work
for an annual fee of fifteen thousand dollars.926
Bromwell’s plan was discussed at length by the Committee’s leadership on April 23,
1911, and there was a powerful debate between the owner of the New York Times and the editor
the New York Globe. Ochs spoke out against Bromwell’s plan. According to the minutes, Ochs
“feared that the success of the whole publicity campaign would be jeopardized if the Committee
made use of a press agency.”927 The bad optics of the strategy was Ochs’ main concern. He noted
that if “it were found out that the matter issued by the Committee was paid for to an agency, the
articles sent out would soon be blacklisted and newspaper publishers would refuse to accept
them.”928 In Ochs’ view, the “better plan would be for the Committee to engage the interest and
services of men of standing…ask them to write articles, pay for them and then sell them to the
papers. This would not only be a more straightforward way of doing things, but might become
self-supporting.”929 Beyond the potential economic benefits, concerns about optics were at the
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heart of Ochs’ proposal. “The employment of a syndicate,” Ochs argued, “smacks too much of
promotion schemes of a disreputable character. It is better for the Committee to rely on the
justice of the cause and eminent presentation of it for securing publicity.”930
Strauss, however, defended the idea of hiring the Century Syndicate by drawing an
analogy between the activities of press agencies and political lobbyists. He indicated that he had
his own misgivings about the activities of press agencies but, in his view, there was no other way
for the Committee to circulate information to influence the American people. “Even the best
causes,” Strauss argued, “occasionally need the services of the lobbyist to bring those causes to
the attention of legislators.”931 Strauss clearly supported the goals of the abrogation campaign; he
believed that it was of sufficient importance that the Committee could risk and withstand being
accused of engaging in press manipulation and being labeled propagandist. “The campaign must
be carried out systematically,” he urged. “We must harp on the same string until American
public opinion is educated on the subject.”932
Strauss’ comments during the meeting with the AJC’s Executive Committee reveal that
his support for using a press agency was motivated, at least in part, by the nature of the subject
matter and the goals of the abrogation campaign. The AJC was trying to get American
lawmakers to abrogate the treaty, and they needed the American public’s support to secure the
legislators’ votes and the President’s support; however, abrogation was only a means to an end
for the Committee. An American withdrawal from its agreements with Russia was of symbolic

930

Ibid.
Ibid.
932
Ibid.
931

372

importance, as opposed to practical importance.933 The AJC knew that Russia would continue to
discriminate against its own Jewish population and against American Jews seeking to travel to
Russia, regardless of the status of the treaty obligations between Russia and the United States.
However, the AJC had additional concerns and objectives.
During the abrogation campaign, the Committee used the fact that discrimination was
being practiced by Russia against American passport holders, some of whom were American
Jews, as a predicate to further other elements of the organization’s political agenda. The
Committee was trying to embarrass the Russian government, who purported to preside over a
modernizing nation that was open to, and soliciting, international investment, and to encourage it
to become a genuinely open society that did not discriminate against its Jewish citizens. Further,
over the long term, the AJC’s leadership envisioned the abrogation campaign as a first step to
ending the discrimination Russia practiced against its Jewish citizens, including obliging them as
a matter of law to live in the Pale of Settlement. This was the most ambitious and frankly farfetched of the AJC’s goals for the abrogation campaign, but there is a considerable amount of
evidence that confirms that this long term goal was one of the justifications for their advocacy
campaign.934
The issues involved in the abrogation campaign, and the breadth of the issues, were
complicated, and they presented formidable challenges for the Committee in how and what to

933

Some AJC leaders were in fact worried that the abrogation campaign could backfire if the American public
became more concerned about the potential economic consequences of breaking the treaty with Russia than with
Russia’s treatment of the few Americans who travelled to the country.
934
Louis Marshall was very clear about the long term goals of the abrogation campaign. “The result,” he stated,
“will be that [Russia] will soon recognize the folly of refusing to a portion of its own subjects the rights and
privileges that it grants to the subjects of other countries. The ultimate result of the entire movement will be the
opening of the Pale by the gradual grant of concessions to certain classes of Jewish business men and artisans.” See:
See: Minutes of the American Jewish Committee’s Executive Committee meeting held on April 23, 1911, American
Jewish Committee Archives: Digital Archives. Accessed February 19, 2015.
http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajcarchive/FileViewer.aspx?id=16451.

373

communicate to the American people, particularly because the Committee wished to avoid any
backlash from the campaign that would reflect badly on the American Jewish community and
world Jewry. In his support for using a press agency, Strauss believed that the goals of the
campaign would not by themselves connect with the broader American public. He argued that
the American people “do not care anything about passports.”935 Most Americans could not afford
to travel; the majority did not have passports. Strauss thought that the Committee would need to
describe their objectives using ideas and language that would actually resonate with the masses:
“Our theme must be that there is discrimination being practiced against American citizens.”936
The Committee needed to convey to ordinary Americans that Russia was insulting or
disrespecting their country; this was a theme that would resonate or connect with the broader
American public. In his view, a press agency was in the best position to communicate this
message to the broadest possible audience while simultaneously minimizing the fact the
American Jews specifically were the foremost victims of Russia’s treaty violations and American
Jewish leadership organizations were the main supporters and coordinators of the abrogation
campaign.

The Aftermath of the Ochs and Strauss Debate and the Abrogation Campaign
The vigorous discussion during the April 23 Executive Committee meeting about the
publicity campaign and the contracting of a press agency ended strangely. After Strauss
concluded his remarks supporting the hiring of the Century Syndicate, Jacob Schiff simply
“moved…that the entire matter be referred to Mr. Strauss and Mr. Ochs for consideration, and
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that the Committee abide by their unanimous decision.”937 Schiff’s motion was approved by the
AJC’s leadership.
In essence, the Executive Committee was handing over the power to decide on both the
future of the AJC’s press and publicity bureau and the organization’s media relations strategies
to two outsiders who had taken opposite sides of the debate. Admittedly, both Strauss and Ochs
were experts in the field, but this level of deference to their expertise is surprising considering
the significance of the advocacy strategies being debated, the stakes of the abrogation campaign,
and the egos of the AJC’s leadership. These were not men who customarily handed over control
of affairs that concerned them; they guarded their control over the AJC and its activities, and
there are no other examples of the Committee’s leadership delegating this kind of decisionmaking power to outsiders during the early history of the organization.
It is noteworthy that nothing came of this transfer of power. According to the available
records, there is no evidence that Strauss and Ochs came to a consensus nor made any further
suggestions to the AJC’s leadership. Their involvement in the Committee’s leadership’s
deliberations simply ended without further comment.
Although Straus and Ochs’ involvement went nowhere, in contrast to the earlier debates
over the establishment of a press bureau, after the end of Strauss and Ochs’ debate, discussions
among the leadership about how the Committee should approach its relationship with the media
did not stagnate. The abrogation campaign was ongoing, and the AJC’s leadership made a
number of significant decisions that shaped the organization’s advocacy and relationship with the
media during the last phases of the abrogation campaign, and throughout the early-twentieth
century. The AJC did not hire the Century Syndicate nor any other press agency; rather, the
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organization maintained its subcommittee on publicity. But, as will be detailed in the following
chapter, the subcommittee’s work became closely intertwined with the Committee’s burgeoning
research department. Further, the AJC did establish an internal Press Bureau, although the
Committee limited the mandate of the internal bureau to “collate all news items on Russian
affairs and to distribute information to the American press.”938 The AJC began distributing
materials to newspapers and wire services. The leadership clearly hoped that on its own, this
material would influence the nature of press coverage of events in Russia. They did not,
however, implement a systematic campaign to lobby journalists and editors;939 instead, through
their own new research department, they began creating materials that could be distributed to the
general public to further the Committee’s objectives. The Committee’s leaders, most importantly
Louis Marshall, also began releasing public statements to the press.
The AJC made decisive moves to become more involved in public advocacy, but the
leadership was conscious of the optics of their efforts. Through speaking to the press and
releasing their own materials, they were engaging in modern and public forms of communal
defense and public advocacy. Quiet diplomacy and the silent treatment in response to antiSemitism remained crucially important tools, but it was during the abrogation campaign that the
Committee began to transition into a modern communal leadership and advocacy organization.
From the seeds of an internal press bureau, a research department, publication projects, and press
releases, overt forms of public advocacy were emerging.
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The abrogation campaign can also be distinguished for the growing sophistication of the
AJC’s communications strategies. As already noted, the issues underlying the abrogation
campaign were complicated, and in adopting a policy of education and public agitation, the
leaders of the AJC were conscientious and deliberate about the message they would try to
impress on the broader American public. They sought to frame the passport affair as a matter of
principle and of national honor, not as a Jewish issue. Their message was that Russia’s
discrimination against American passport holders was a violation of Russia’s treaty obligations
and an affront to the values of the American nation, and thus to all Americans, irrespective of
their religious beliefs. In the future, this would become a pattern in the AJC’s public advocacy.
The leaders consistently aimed to “Americanize” issues by emphasizing that their positions and
their advocacy was consistent with American ideals and values and in the best interest of all
Americans, regardless of faith. During the abrogation campaign, the Committee sought to
broaden the issue as much as possible by highlighting Russia’s discrimination against Christians
holding American passports. “To hammer home the thesis that theirs was an American cause, the
Committee leaders recounted over and over how Russia refused visas to Catholic priests and
Protestant missionaries.”940
Abandoning its normally cautious approaches, during the final phases of the abrogation
campaign, the AJC began to engage in numerous public advocacy measures to build public
support for the United States to withdraw from the treaty with Russia. The AJC commissioned
pamphlets and articles on the subject. It issued public statements in newspapers and magazines,
including the New York Times. “When editorials or statements appeared which might have
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affected the cause adversely, the Committee prepared public rebuttals.”941 The organization
urged lawmakers and prominent public figures to make statements favouring abrogation.942 The
Committee’s leaders lobbied both the Republicans and Democrats to include pro-abrogation
statements in their election platforms, and the leaders lobbied state legislatures to pass
resolutions supporting the campaign. The organization even went so far as to coordinate public
demonstrations and rallies, including one in New York City which featured speeches delivered
by Woodrow Wilson and William Randolph Hearst.943
The abrogation campaign, which successfully culminated in 1911 with the United States
notifying the Russian government that it was withdrawing from the 1832 treaty, was a major
achievement for the AJC. The Committee unquestionably believed that the campaign was
historically significant and, because the AJC had coordinated both the quiet diplomacy and
public agitation that characterized the campaign, the organization’s leadership believed they
deserved the credit for this success. “We have just passed,” Jacob Schiff stated, “through an
episode which, in my opinion, is of greater importance than anything that has happened since
civil rights were granted to the Jews under the first Napoleon, or since English Jews were
admitted to Parliament. I do not think that, in our own time, the importance of this thing will be
recognized.”944 Schiff’s statement is hyperbolic, but it must be regarded as reflecting the
triumphalism of the AJC’s leadership, who for the first time in the short history of the
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organization, had set a definite political goal, devoted considerable resources to its achievement,
and campaigned openly.
Lives were not saved by the abrogation campaign; it was a largely symbolic victory.
Nevertheless, it was certainly a pivotal moment in the history of Jewish activism in the United
States. According to Naomi Cohen, the Committee “only a handful in number but fired by strong
passion, succeeded in arousing American public opinion and in forcing the hand of an
antagonistic administration.”945 Cohen also argues, however, that, from the perspective of Jewish
political activism, the campaign should not be considered as a major precedent. In her view, the
AJC’s public advocacy on abrogation “was a single, self-contained episode…after successfully
completing an open campaign where issues were aired, popular cooperation solicited, and
political noses counted, the American Jewish Committee retreated into its shell of caution. Never
again did it publically show the same degree of self-confidence.”946 It is true that, during the first
twenty-five years of its history, the AJC did not engage in another public advocacy campaign
with the same intensity and visibility as the abrogation campaign, and it is also true that, in the
aftermath of this achievement, the Committee did revert to its emphasis on quiet diplomacy and
the silent treatment; however, the organization did not renounce the strategies that it had
successfully applied during the abrogation campaign, and Cohen understates the lasting
significance of the advocacy strategies and institutional infrastructure that emerged during the
early days of the Committee and which shaped its future public advocacy efforts. As will be seen
in the following chapter, during the leadership tenure of Louis Marshall, by devoting
considerable resources to the development of its own research department, and gradually
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becoming more involved in publishing books and pamphlets, the AJC developed, refined, and
practiced sophisticated public advocacy techniques.
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Chapter 7: Building the Infrastructure for Public Advocacy, Part II: Research
and Publications
Introduction
Between 1906 and 1929, the leaders of the American Jewish Committee resolutely built
the organization’s capacity to carry out research projects and to disseminate the findings of those
projects to a broad audience.947 This chapter will show that, from the beginning of the
organization’s history, the AJC’s mandate included efforts to influence public opinion, and from
the outset, the Committee undertook a series of initiatives to develop its public advocacy
infrastructure, to engage in independent research, to collaborate on research projects with other
organizations (including other Jewish leadership organizations and the American government),
and to release materials to edify the broader American public.
Among the AJC’s leaders’ first acts was to establish a subcommittee to develop a bureau
of information and statistics for the AJC. The Committee established an internal Bureau of
Information and Statistics at its founding in 1906. The AJC had substantial ambitions for the
Statistics Bureau; it was envisioned as a means of influencing public opinion. “The American
Jewish Committee strongly stressed ‘enlightenment’ as its proper function as defense agency.”948
Statistics that were both accurate and perceived by the broader American public as free from bias
were considered very useful as a means of influencing public opinion. This emphasis on
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empirical methods and the collection of data was characteristic of social reform organizations
during the Progressive Era. The creation of the AJC’s subcommittee inaugurated a commitment
to conducting research and to investigating issues that were relevant to American Jewry. 949 In
terms of publications, also among the leaders’ first decisions were providing financing and
assuming editorial control over the American Jewish Year Book, an annual digest whose first
seven volumes had been edited and published by the Jewish Publication Society of America. 950
The first twenty-five years of the AJC’s involvement in research and publishing was a
period of experimentation. During the organization’s early history, the AJC’s leaders were
exploring different ways of building, funding, and coordinating the organization’s capacity to
conduct research and influence public opinion by publishing materials. The case studies included
in this chapter illustrate the ambitions of the AJC’s early research projects, the breadth of the
publications the organization sponsored, and the different arrangements the AJC employed to
coordinate and fund these efforts. These examples also illustrate that there was a continuity of
effort by the leaders of the AJC to engage in forms of modern public advocacy.
The Committee had many noteworthy early achievements, but it would not be until after
the Second World War that the organization flourished as a research bureau, a sponsor of
independent research, and as a publisher. “After the war,” Marianne Sanua notes, “the library,
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research, and publications programs of the AJC were all enlarged and strengthened.”951 The
origins of these later and more substantial organizational innovations, advocacy campaigns, and
research projects, including the establishment of the AJC’s Scientific Research Bureau, the
publication of The Authoritarian Personality, the Committee’s support for Commentary
Magazine, and the AJC’s sponsorship of Kenneth Clark’s pioneering work on the psychological
impact of racial segregation, followed in the wake of the efforts and precedents established by
the Committee’s founders and its first generation of leaders.952
The founders’ concerns about optics, that is, how the AJC and the Jewish community
would be viewed by the American public and by American politicians, influenced which projects
the AJC chose to pursue and the extent to which the leaders dedicated the Committee’s financial
resources to this form of advocacy. “Research was needed to reform, persuade, or arouse public
opinion. Whether to refute or to advance issues concerning Jews, [the Committee] needed
precise statistics and information on such subjects as racial classifications, Jewish military
service…the number of Jewish criminals, and legal precedents for the abrogation of treaties or
for U.S. intervention in foreign affairs.”953
Attempts were made during the early years to centralize the coordination of the AJC’s
research projects and publications, but, as will be seen, in practice, these attempts to build the
organization’s advocacy infrastructure, and engage in public advocacy, were haphazard in
nature. An ambitious plan to consolidate all the research activities of the AJC under the
jurisdiction of a single AJC “Bureau of Research” was devised sometime after the death of
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professor Morris Loeb in 1912, but it was not until after the Second World War that the
Committee was able to improve the efficiency and expand the scope of its research activities.
The first plan for the Bureau of Research called for the unified bureau to prepare the
manuscript of the American Jewish Year Book, compile a directory of all Jewish organizations
throughout the world, amass the reports and publications released by these groups, assemble a
list of all Rabbis and Chazanim (Cantors), create a list of all Jewish communal workers, collect
information from newspapers and magazine articles relevant to Jewish interests, and carry out
“investigations of specific problems, two or more of which may be conducted at the same
time.”954 During the period covered by this study, different AJC subcommittees, bureaus,
leaders, staff members, and affiliate organizations were undertaking all of these activities without
the advantage of a single internal body to supervise and coordinate these efforts.
The AJC’s founders had ambitious aspirations for the research arm of their organization;
however, it was not until after the Second World War that the Committee was able to improve
the efficiency and expand the scope of its research activities. The post-War reorganization of the
AJC’s operations, including the apportioning of responsibilities for research and publications
among a new set of subcommittees during the leadership tenure of John Slawson, facilitated the
further development of the organizational structures that would ultimately shape the AJC’s
advocacy work, research projects, and publications (including the use of other forms of mass
media) for the remainder of the twentieth century.955
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In common with Progressive Era philanthropists and social reformers, the founders of the
AJC emphasized efficiency, but, in practice, they had difficulty consolidating control and
structuring the organization’s research activities. As noted above, the scope of their projects and
the ability to organize and manage them was initially limited by their low budget and limited
human resources. The small number of leaders actively involved in managing the operations of
the AJC did not result in a streamlined organization nor prevent the establishment of internal
institutions and research projects that had overlapping mandates. The founding of the statistics
bureau and the takeover of the American Jewish Year Book were the earliest attempts to develop
the organization’s ability to conduct research and release publications to influence public
opinion, but the founding of similar internal research-focussed institutions, including the
founding of the AJC’s Information Bureau in 1915, overlapped with these efforts.956

subcommittee that would be responsible for the Committee’s research projects. See: Minutes of the American
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In order to both increase the AJC’s Statistical Bureau’s funding and to create the
appearance of distance between the information compiled by the bureau and the Committee, in
1919, the AJC negotiated a merger between its Statistics Bureau and similar research bodies
controlled by the Bureau of Philanthropic Research of New York City and the National
Conference of Jewish Charities.957 This agreement resulted in the founding of the Bureau of
Jewish Social Research (BJSR). The BJSR was technically an independent organization, but, as
will be discussed further below, a great deal of its activities were coordinated and funded by the
AJC.
The political goals of the AJC and its leaders’ privileging of efficiency did not avert
internal squabbles over how to structure and coordinate the Committee’s activities. For example,
the AJC’s founders knew that they wanted the organization to be involved in publishing, but they
debated whether jurisdiction over the Committee’s publications should be within the purview of
the subcommittee on Press Bureau or the Statistical Committee. In the event, responsibility over
the AJC’s publications was placed under the jurisdiction of the AJC’s Statistical Committee,
which was composed of Justice Nathan Bijur, Jacob Hollander, Professor Morris Loeb, and
Cyrus Sulzberger.958 In practice, many of the publications that the organization chose to sponsor
during the period covered by this study were discussed and approved by the Executive
Committee during its regular meetings or were personally overseen and financed by individual
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members of the Committee, including Jacob Schiff and Julius Rosenwald, at their own expense,
and sometimes without the formal endorsement of the AJC.
Historian Marianne Sanua argues that the AJC “early established itself as a research
bureau whose information was utilized by Jews and non-Jews alike.”959 As this chapter will
show, although somewhat inefficient and disorderly, the AJC sponsored a great deal of research,
and released a significant number of publications during the first twenty-five years of the
organization’s history. Although historically significant for both their scope and breadth, gauging
the impact of these projects and publications is less important than the fact that these efforts were
undertaken at all; the Committee’s early initiatives laid the foundation for later and much more
substantial, and unquestionably historically significant, work.

The American Jewish Year Book
The Jewish Publication Society of America (JPSA) began publishing the American
Jewish Year Book in 1899, seven years before the founding of the American Jewish Committee.
Cyrus Adler, one of the Committee’s founders and early leaders, was the Year Book’s founding
editor. The early volumes contain Jewish calendars and summaries of important developments in
the Jewish world. They also include lists of active Jewish organizations, and document the
activities and leaders of American Jewish institutions, including synagogues, fraternal orders,
and philanthropic organizations. The Year Book was distributed widely; American Jews could
subscribe to the publication or access copies housed in libraries in synagogues, fraternal lodges,
or charities.
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The AJC’s Executive Committee resolved on May 30, 1907 that “the continuance of the
American Jewish Yearbook was necessary for the work of the Committee.”960 On the same day,
the Executive Committee also resolved “to make arrangements to prepare the manuscript, the
publication to be issued by the Jewish Publications Society of America as heretofore.”961 The
AJC’s financial commitment to the Year Book, and the transfer of editorial control of the
publication from the JPSA to the AJC was part of the Committee’s efforts to gather information
about American Jewry, attain a leadership position over American Jewry, and exercise influence
over the social and political agenda of the American Jewish community.962
The decision to assume editorial control over content while not publically claiming the
credit for publishing the Year Book can be interpreted as reflecting the Committee’s leadership’s
understanding of optics. It is possible that the AJC’s leaders wanted to establish the pretense that
the publication remained an organ of the JPSA, a separate organization and one which was less
political (and divisive) within the American Jewish community than the AJC, and thereby
depoliticize the Year Book to secure its legitimacy and influence among American Jews and the
broader American public.
The AJC revealed more clearly that the nature of the relationship between the AJC and
the Jewish Publication Society was as much editorial as it was financial in a resolution passed on
October 6, 1907: “That the Executive Committee believes it a good policy that, in cooperation
with other agencies or bodies as may be determined, the preparation of the material for such a
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Year Book should be undertaken, provided that the Jewish Publication Society of America would
undertake its actual publication and distribution upon an understanding that the American Jewish
Committee assume the entire cost of furnishing copy to the Publication Society.”963 Ultimately,
the Committee chose to be transparent about its role in financing and compiling the annual
volumes.964 Henrietta Szold, an editor with the JPSA who would later co-found Hadassah, edited
the 1907 edition, the first volume of the Year Book published after the AJC’s leadership decided
to finance the preparation of the publication. The following year, Herbert Friedenwald, the AJC’s
Secretary, assumed the role of Editor. The title page of the 1908 edition of the Year Book
indicates that Friedenwald was acting as editor “for the American Jewish Committee.”965
Friedenwald, or Harry Schneiderman, the AJC’s Assistant Secretary, oversaw the preparation of
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the Year Book on behalf of the Committee throughout most of the period covered by this
study.966
The expense of subsidizing the Year Book was justified by the AJC’s leadership on the
grounds of efficiency. The information about the American Jewish community that was collected
and organized in these volumes was information that the Committee believed it needed. “Even if
the Year Book was not published,” the AJC’s leadership acknowledged that “the Committee
would have to continue to collect this data for the sake of the efficiency of the work of the
Committee.”967 The leadership also expressly recognized that the annual publication was a
means for the AJC to communicate with the American Jewish community, including informing
American Jews about the organization’s activities, and providing a forum for the AJC to exercise
influence over the social and political beliefs and political agenda of American Jewry. The
Executive Committee acknowledged that the Year Book “is a medium through which the
Committee informs a large number of Jewish people of this country the work that it is doing.”968
Beginning in 1908, the AJC published their Annual Reports, which described the
Committee’s achievements and its ambitions, in the Year Book.969 The Annual Reports, which
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ranged in length from approximately thirty to one hundred pages, included lists of all leaders and
district members of the AJC, short reports from the different AJC subcommittees, and
correspondence between the AJC’s leaders and prominent social and political figures from the
United States and around the world. In the text of the Second Annual Report, the Committee
began describing its activities using the introductory clause “your Committee” to convey a sense
that the organization was acting on behalf of American Jewry.970 The Annual Reports, which
were supplemented in each issue of the Year Book by other articles that the AJC commissioned
and approved for publication, identified social and political issues that the Committee believed
should be of concern to American Jews.
The compiling of the Year Book was viewed by the AJC’s leadership as an aspect of both
their research agenda and their capacity to communicate with American Jews and the broader
American public. From the time that the AJC assumed control of preparing the manuscript, most
of the work was delegated to the Statistical Committee and the AJC’s Bureau of Statistics. This
delegation of responsibility became a matter of contention during the negotiations that brought
about the merger of the AJC’s Statistical Bureau into the Bureau of Jewish Social Research
(BJSR) in 1919.
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The BJSR received a significant amount of its financing from the AJC, but it was
technically a separate organization. The AJC’s Executive Committee wanted to maintain
oversight power over the preparation of the Year Book despite the fact that some of the work
involved had been allocated to a separate organization. There were some among the AJC’s
leadership who were concerned that the merger would result in the AJC losing control over the
content of the publication. As the merger negotiations were unfolding, Louis Marshall expressed
that “he was firmly of the opinion that the Year Book should be kept under the control of the
Committee.”971 Under the merger scheme, the AJC agreed to continue to finance the compilation
of the Year Book and it also was agreed that the Committee would retain the responsibility of
editing of it, and thus control content.972
The merger was significant because it resulted in the founding of a larger and wellfunded organization dedicated to studying the Jewish community; however, with respect to the
Year Book, there was no fundamental shift in the Committee’s policy of maintaining control over
the content of the publication. Using funds provided by the AJC, the BJSR, and specifically its
Department of Information and Statistics, was tasked with compiling the statistics and lists that
were an important part of the publication, but the Committee remained in control of drafting and
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approving the manuscript. The 1925 edition, for example, contained biographies and
commemoratives on Rabbi Emil G. Hirsh of Chicago, Rabbi Martin A. Mayer of San Francisco,
and Congressman Julius Kahn of California. This edition also included an article on “The Jews
of Canada,” an article about the status of the Jewish community in Palestine, an article about
Synagogue architecture in the United States, an article about the Jewish community in Chicago, a
chronology of important events in American Jewish history, and a “selected list of books on
Jewish subjects in the English language.” The AJC’s Executive Committee discussed and
approved each of these additions.973
The AJC consistently maintained control over the content of the Year Book. “This Jewish
almanac,” Marianne Sanua notes, “was of use not only to all Jewish communal organizations but
to the general public as well.”974 The Committee used the publication to update the American
Jewish community about important matters, including the abrogation campaign (or passport
affair), documented instances of anti-Jewish discrimination, the negotiations with Henry Ford,
and the conditions of their coreligionists across the country and around the world.975
The Committee was able to establish the reputation of the Year Book as an authoritative
digest on the composition and social and religious institutions of the American Jewish
community. The Year Book’s primary audience was American Jews; the Committee saw the
publication as a means of fostering social cohesion among the disparate elements of American
Jewry. As will be seen, other Committee initiatives more overtly attempted to influence the
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attitudes of the broader American public, but the Year Book was significant because it influenced
the development of the AJC’s aspirations and capacity to carry out research and, was the
Committee’s first foray into publishing.976

The Bureau of Jewish Social Research and the Department of Information and Statistics
As already noted above, the Bureau of Jewish Social Research (BJSR) was formed in
1919 as the result of a merger negotiated between the AJC’s Bureau of Jewish Statistics, the
Bureau of Philanthropic Research of New York City, and the Field Bureau (research department)
of the National Conference of Jewish Charities. The amalgamation was suggested by Felix
Warburg, a member of the AJC’s Executive Committee. At the time, the AJC was spending
about twenty-five hundred dollars a year to fund the operations of the Committee’s internal
Statistics Bureau. Through the amalgamation, and through greater cooperation between the AJC
and its proposed new research partners, Warburg hoped the budget for BJSR’s statistical research
on the Jewish community could be increased to fifty thousand dollars annually.977
The newly established BJSR was technically independent from the AJC. There was,
however, considerable overlap in the leadership of the two organizations. For example, Cyrus
Sulzberger and Felix Warburg were on the Executive Committees of both organizations. Morris
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Waldman and Cyrus Adler were also part of leadership of both organizations. Additionally, the
AJC was one of the Bureau’s principal sources of financial support.978
Although the AJC’s Statistical Bureau was technically amalgamated into the BJRS, in
practice the Committee’s research infrastructure remained independent from the rest of the
activities of the new organization. The AJC’s infrastructure was set apart from the rest of the
BJRS and designated as the Department of Information and Statistics of the BJSR. A 1919 AJC
memorandum on the progress of the amalgamation of the three research bureaus refers to the
resources that were previously controlled by the AJC as a “definite division of the Bureau of
Jewish Social Research.”979
The preparation of materials for the Year Book was the primary focus of the Department
of Information and Statistics, but the Department was given a much broader mandate. The
Department was envisioned as a significant research institution. Among the AJC’s leaders’
ambitions were for the Department to serve “as a central source of information upon social and
communal question pertaining to Jewry;” “Making abstracts from all sources of significant facts
of Jewish sociological interests;” “Providing important bibliographical service, reviewing books,
and compiling reference lists of current articles of value in the interpretation of Jewish
problems;” and, perhaps most significantly, “Preparing bulletins on Jewish questions of moment,
for the enlightenment of public opinion.”980
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At the time of its founding, the Department’s resources were insufficient to meet all of
these goals, but these were the stated aims of the institution. Hyman Kaplan, the Superintendent
of the United Jewish Social Agencies of Cincinnati, was the Department’s first director, and,
initially, the Department had only three additional staff members: Rose Herzog, who was
employed to read all English-language Jewish periodicals “to secure material for the American
Jewish Year Book,” Bertha Sherline, who was responsible for “bibliographic research,” and
secretary Ada Aneckstein, who also did “general information work.”981
By 1921, the Department had a new Director, Harry S. Linfield, who was both a rabbi
ordained by the Hebrew Union College and a statistician with a Ph.D. from the University of
Chicago. The Department continued to compile material for the Year Book, but, under Linfield’s
direction, they also began releasing a digest known as the “Summary of Matters of Jewish
Interest.” The Summary evolved into a monthly publication that included press releases from
Jewish organizations in both the United States and internationally, news stories, and statistical
analyses. In a memorandum to the AJC, Linfield provided the following description of the
Summary:
The Summary of Events of Jewish Interests is not a newspaper. It is
a collection of summaries of events of Jewish interests. We have
before us the chief press-organs of the Jewish world, numerous
press releases and reports of organizations, and private
communications. Of these reports of events, we select for
publication each month a number of items totalling an average of
12,000 words. These items, insofar as they are not based on firsthand sources, are verified as much as possible and summed up.
Care is taken that our summary of event should have dates, places
and names and should contain all the important steps in the
development of the event in chronological order. Finally, the
source on sources of the summary is scrupulously indicated in
order to make it possible for the reader to judge for himself the
value of the report of the event. The chief features of the
981
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“Summary” in comparison with other publications…may be said to
be the following: truthfulness, accuracy, fullness of statement,
omission of hearsay statements and outright false statements, and
the inclusion of “non-newsy” material; events considered by the
ordinary newspapers as uninteresting or too complicated.982
By 1925, the Department was distributing twenty-five hundred copies of the Summary
monthly around the world. In the United States, the Summary was circulated to a carefully
selected audience. Of the approximately thirteen hundred copies that were distributed in the
United States each month, 180 went to other leadership organizations, 107 to specially selected
newspapers and periodicals, 603 to Rabbis, 284 to Jewish communal leaders, 138 to all members
of the AJC, and 50 to “leading non-Jews.”983
The Summary was used to disseminate information, but it was also a means of tracking
the activities of other Jewish organizations, both within the United States and internationally.
After the circulation of the Summary was widened, Jewish organizations sent their press releases
and public statements directly to the Department of Information and Statistics for publication in
the monthly Summary. Samuel Goldsmith, the Director of the BJSR, believed the exchange of
information facilitated through Linfield’s Department and the Summary was helping to secure
better cooperation between Jewish organizations, and he was hopeful that greater funding from
the AJC would help the Department expand its capacities as a research institution and enable it to
release more material for general distribution.984
The AJC closely monitored the content of the Summary. For example, reflecting the legal
acumen of the AJC’s leadership, the Executive Committee asked Linfield to include a disclaimer
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in each issue explaining that “items contained in the Summary are collected from the sources
indicated in each instance but that the Bureau [of Jewish Social Research] does not assume any
responsibility for their accuracy.”985 In 1921, Judge Lehman and Cyrus Sulzberger met with
Goldsmith and Linfield to discuss ways to improve the publication; they also requested “that
each issue of the Summary be submitted for correction” to Cyrus Adler, Cyrus Sulzberger, and
Harry Schneiderman.986
Under Linfield’s leadership, the BJSR’s Department of Information and Statistics
continued to evolve, despite its limited staff and budget. In 1922, the Department had been
reorganized into six divisions: “(a) The collection of information, abstraction, and classification;
(b) Publications; (c) Statistics; (d) Public and Press Information Service; (e) Reference Library;
and (f) Year Book.” Only six staff members, including one who was employed as a full-time
“reader” of Yiddish-language publications, were responsible for all of this activity.987
The preparation of materials for the Year Book remained a central responsibility of the
Department, but the small office had taken on and been given several additional and substantial
tasks. By 1925, the Department was running an Information Service “to answer inquiries and
supply information, addresses, lists, and directories to Jewish organizations and institutions, and
to persons for legitimate non-commercial use.”988 As part of building its capacity to prepare
materials for the Year Book and to respond to inquiries for information, the Department
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meticulously began collecting and collating information. This archives project, which included a
“Dictionary File of Clippings” from newspapers around the world and a “Photograph File,” was
organized using a card index. By 1925, there were more than ten thousand cards in the index.989
The Department was also contracted to work with the Federal Government on the 1926 Census
of Religious bodies in the United States.990 Harry Linfield was designated a “United States
Special Agent” of the Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, during his work on the
project.991
The relationship between the AJC, the BJSR, and the BJSR’s Department of Information
of Statistics is difficult to definitively characterize. The amalgamation that brought about the
establishment of the BJSR was publicized as the founding of an independent research institution
whose mandate would include studying the American Jewish community and providing data that
would help scholars and social workers to understand the growing community and furnish better
aid and social programs. The Department of Information and Statistics’ independence, however,
was notional; it was doing research for the AJC, while being both supervised and financed by the
Committee.992 For example, in 1927, shortly before the ties between the AJC and the BJSR were
dissolved, Linfield prepared a report on the number of Jewish prisoners in New York State penal
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institutions. The report had been prepared at the behest of Louis Marshall, who was seeking to
rebut the widely held assumption that Jews were disproportionately involved in crime.993 The
BJSR was technically an independent organization, but the AJC was a major financer. Internally,
the Department of Information and Statistics was a branch of the BJSR, but it was principally
financed by the AJC and doing work on its behalf. The AJC exercised a certain amount of
editorial direction and supervision. Further, a great deal of the Department’s work had previously
been done by the AJC internally. Goldsmith, the BJSR’s director, referred to the AJC as a
“client”994 of the Department of Information and Statistics, but he also acknowledged that the
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AJC’s financial support covered “practically the entire expense of the Department.”995 Thus, it is
reasonable to include the Department of Information and Statistics as part of the AJC’s advocacy
infrastructure. The research projects the Department undertook, the information it collected and
collated, the contacts that it maintained with Jewish and non-Jewish organizations, and the
publications it prepared helped further the AJC’s social and political agenda.
The AJC’s relationship with the BJSR on the preparation of the Year Book lasted less
than ten years; in 1927, the partnership between the two organizations was dissolved.996 Neither
the AJC’s Annual Report nor the minutes of the Executive Committee’s meetings reveal any
explanation as to why the Committee chose to end this relationship. A desire to assume even
greater power over the research done to prepare the Year Book and the steadily increasing budget
of the AJC may be an explanation for the dissolution. By the late-1920s, Felix Warburg’s
increasingly generous contributions to the AJC meant that the Committee had sufficient financial
resources to fund research internally, under their own auspices, and at their complete discretion.
After the relationship between the AJC and the BJSR was dissolved, the Committee hired
Linfield to direct their Statistical Department. Along with Linfield, the AJC “took over the staff
which had been doing this work” at the BJSR and integrated them into the Committee’s
expanded and reorganized Statistical Department.997 Although the AJC continued the practice of
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collaborating on research projects with other organizations, including with the BJSR, the
Committee maintained an internal capacity to carry out research projects and statistical analyses.

The Office of War Records
The most expensive research project that was financed by the American Jewish
Committee during its first twenty-five years was the attempt to assemble statistics revealing the
level of American Jewish participation in the First World War, and to compile an honor roll of
Jews who served in all branches of the American armed services during the conflict. Work on
this project began shortly after the United States entered the war, and was first conducted under
the auspices of the AJC’s Bureau of Statistics. In early 1919, the AJC established the “Office of
War Records of the American Jewish Committee,”998 a separate department, that was devoted
exclusively to this work.
Between 1919 and 1920, the AJC delegated more money to financing the Office of War
Records than to all of its other research projects, advocacy work, and maintenance expenses
combined. The project was so substantial that it was not included as a regular expense item in the
organization’s annual financial audits; for accounting purposes, the Office of War Records was
treated as separate entity.999
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The compilation of the honor roll was a collaboration between the AJC and the Jewish
Board for Welfare Work in the United States Army and Navy, a coalition made up of
representatives of fifteen different American Jewish leadership organizations that financed
support services for Jewish service personnel in the American armed forces.1000 Planning for the
honor roll project began shortly after the United States entered the First World War in 1917. The
AJC directed its internal Bureau of Statistics to gather information about the numbers of Jewish
service personnel. At this earliest stage, this research was envisioned as part of larger effort to
“prepare the material for a monograph on the Jews in the wars of the United States with special
attention to the present war.”1001
In its Eleventh Annual Report, the Committee was vague about why they believed this
information should be gathered : “Your Committee believes that an effort should be made to
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collect and record as much statistical and other information with regard to the participation of
Jews in the military and civilian activities of the United States in connection with the war as is
possible to procure…Your Committee feels certain that the possession of adequate information
of this character will be of interest to all Jews.”1002 Later, as will be seen, the AJC’s leaders were
candid about the fact that they believed reliable statistics on Jewish participation in the American
armed forces could be a powerful tool in the fight against anti-Semitism in the United States.
The AJC’s Bureau of Statistics was confronted with a difficult assignment. The
information they were trying to procure was not easily available because, at the time, the
American military did not register the religious affiliation of its officers and enlisted men.1003
Even if the Bureau of Statistics could have accessed the War Department’s rolls listing the
names of all service personnel, the members of the Bureau recognized that this list could not
simply be examined with an eye towards identifying traditionally Jewish surnames. Julian
Leavitt, who the AJC put in charge of the project, and who was later made director of the War
Records Office, acknowledged that many American Jews “in the process of Americanization
[had] changed their names” or sought “to conceal their racial and religious identity.”1004
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Without the resource of useful military records, the AJC’s internal bureau depended on
information sent by representatives of the Jewish Welfare Board who were stationed on
American bases and who were in forward positions overseas. The Board’s representatives
distributed Bibles and Jewish prayer books with cards inside that could be filled out by Jewish
service personnel, identifying their name, their hometown, their unit, and their rank. The Board
also “posted conspicuous notices” at military facilities advertising that an honor roll of Jewish
service personnel was being compiled.1005 The completed cards were then shipped back to the
AJC’s Statistics Bureau for processing and verification.
The overseas canvassing approach was very successful. By October 20, 1918, just prior
to the end of the war, the Statistics Bureau had already received fifty-five thousand records.1006
By the end of the year, they had received almost one hundred thousand.1007
After the Armistice, the Committee’s enthusiasm for the project to compile a list of
Jewish military veterans continued and grew. The degree of the leaders’ enthusiasm was
reflected in the financial resources they were prepared to earmark for the project. In late 1918,
Julian Leavitt was asked by Louis Marshall and Cyrus Adler to prepare a tentative proposal and
budget for the completion of the honor roll by the end of 1920. Leavitt was told he could spend
up to five thousand dollars a month over the next twelve months. This sixty-thousand dollar
budget was a significant sum, and represented more than three times the annual expenditures of
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the AJC during this period.1008 Leavitt’s proposal included the opening of a separate office, the
hiring of thirty staff members to process and to verify the records that were continuing to be sent
in by Jewish service personnel, and the financing of additional “field work” to track down and
survey decommissioned personnel who had returned home.1009 The Executive Committee
approved Leavitt’s proposal, inaugurating the AJC’s Office of War Records.
One of the War Records Office’s first undertakings was the release of a fifty-three page
report outlining their preliminary findings, and describing the methods the office was using to
gather additional records, verifying the records that had already been submitted, and outlining
how they were tabulating estimates of the overall participation of American Jews in the war
effort. The project was ongoing, but Leavitt estimated that a minimum of 150,000 American
Jews had served during the war, and that it was possible that as many as 200,000 had served.
According to these estimates, American Jews, who represented only three percent of the
population of the United States, accounted for between four and five percent of the personnel in
the American armed forces during the First World War.1010
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As the newly-established War Records Office continued to process the cards that had
been relayed through the Jewish Welfare Board, plans were also being developed to carry out
“community surveys” to ensure that all American Jews who had served, been wounded, killed in
action, or awarded commendations would be counted and recorded. At this stage, the AJC’s
pronouncements about the project were becoming grander.1011 An AJC report describing the
ambitions of the community surveys stated that the honor roll “promises in its complete form to
be the greatest monument in the history of American Jewry…The Jews of America recognize the
full significance.”1012 The potential importance of the completed figures in combatting the spread
of anti-Semitism in the United States was not explicitly acknowledged, but the AJC’s leaders,
based on early, preliminary tabulations, were confident that the breadth of Jewish contributions
to the American war effort would reflect positively on the entire American Jewish Community:
“Not only have the individual Jewish fighters acquitted themselves with honor and glory, but the
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Jews as a whole seem to have contributed a quota of fighters greatly in excess of their proportion
of the general population.”1013 In terms of influencing how the broader American public viewed
American Jewry, these early results were seen by the Committee’s leadership as potentially very
useful. If accurate, these statistics could be cited by Jewish leaders to substantiate the patriotism
of the American Jewish community and dispel racial stereotypes.
To secure as many records as possible, the Office of War Records paid for posters
advertising that the honor roll was being compiled to be displayed in major American cities.
Blank record cards were distributed to synagogues, religious schools, and public schools. Jewish
organizations across the country, including Zionist societies and Jewish labor groups, were
contacted and asked to provide the names of their members who had served. By January 1920,
the War Records Office had amassed two-hundred thousand records.1014
It was, however, at this point that the project and Julian Leavitt, the project’s director, fell
out of favor with some members of the AJC’s leadership. There was disappointment because,
even with the War Records Office’s considerable budget and staff, the honor roll would not be
completed by the end of 1920. Based on the correspondence between Leavitt and AJC leaders, as
well as correspondence between AJC leaders about the project, it appears that a substantial
misunderstanding developed about the ultimate goals of the War Records Office. The AJC was
satisfied to have at its disposal reasonably reliable estimates about Jewish participation in the
war. Although Leavitt was interested in compiling reliable estimates, he also advocated that the
AJC should endeavor to compile an actual complete list of the names of all Jewish service
personnel. Leavitt’s ambitions for the War Records Office were outstripping the considerable
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resources that the AJC and the Jewish Welfare Board were prepared to devote to the project.1015
He made numerous requests for more funding and proposed a series of different ways to
complete the honor roll, including hiring field workers to canvass the cities with the largest
Jewish populations and lobbying for access to the official War Department records.
The AJC, however, had already spent over a hundred thousand dollars on the project, and
the leadership gradually came to the realization that the costs of compiling the honor roll were
beyond the Committee’s means and, further, the statistics that had been compiled already served
the intended purpose of the project, which was to demonstrate to the broader American public
the disproportionately high level of Jewish contributions to the American war effort. Based on
Leavitt’s initial estimates, the leaders of the AJC were comfortable making public statements
about the level of Jewish participation in the war.
The announcement in 1920 that the War Department was going to release a “dishonor
roll” of the names of deserters provided Leavitt with an opportunity to press for the completion
of his vision of the project. “I have no doubt,” Leavitt wrote to Cyrus Adler, “that among these
names there will be many Jewish names, as well as other foreign-sounding names which will be
attributed, in many quarters, as Jewish. It seems to be particularly fortunate that we shall be in a
position to offset, with indisputable evidence, any abusive generalizations…For every Jewish, or
possibly Jewish, name that may appear on the dishonor roll, we shall have thousands on the
honor roll.”1016
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The AJC and the Jewish Welfare Board continued to finance the project, but only on a
month by month basis.1017 In April 1920, Leavitt submitted a progress report to the AJC’s
Executive Committee which concluded with an earnest request for the AJC and the Welfare
Board to make a decision about the future financing for the project.1018 He estimated that it
would cost a further sixty-seven thousand dollars to complete the honor roll.1019
The future of the War Records Office was discussed during the 1920 General Meeting of
the AJC. The General Committee passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a
subcommittee to study what it would cost to complete the honor roll and to evaluate whether this
sum could and should be procured. Judge Irving Lehman, Cyrus Adler, and Harry L.
Glucksman1020 were appointed to the subcommittee that was created to study the issue. In late
December 1920, Lehman reported to the AJC’s Executive Committee that his group had
concluded “that it would be advisable to discontinue the project.”1021 The Executive Committee,
however, rejected this opinion and voted to continue the project and confer with the Jewish
Welfare Board to secure additional funding.1022
After the Executive Committee’s vote, Cyrus Adler, on behalf of both Lehman and
Glucksman, sought out a second opinion about Leavitt’s requested budget to complete the
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project as well as the methods Leavitt had used to compile his estimates of Jewish participation
in the American armed service during the war. Adler wrote to Lee K. Frankel, the director of the
United Hebrew Charities of New York, who also had a doctorate in Chemistry, and requested his
advice: “since we are not statisticians, we would like to have an expert opinion both on the
method of work so far as well as on the plan for completion…It is the very strong wish of Judge
Lehman and myself that you should do this for us.”1023
Frankel agreed to examine the matter. Leavitt was informed that Frankel would be
undertaking a review of the War Records Office, and was asked to submit a brief report to
Frankel summarizing his methods and the results to date.1024 In addition to Leavitt’s report,
Frankel also met twice with Leavitt to discuss his work.
Frankel’s report on the War Records Office was harshly critical. He described 125,000 of
the records that had already been filed by the Office as “useless.” Further, he recommended that
the current research strategy be abandoned and that a “fresh start be made from the records of the
War and Navy Department.”1025 Leavitt was understandably upset. In a letter to Cyrus Adler, he
rejected the criticisms and pointed out that Frankel’s alternative approach was unfeasible because
the War Department and the Adjutant General had already denied requests by the AJC’s Office
of War Records to examine the official files. He also emphasized that, even if they were granted
permission to examine the military’s records, the same hurdles that led to the adoption of the
canvassing approach would still make the adoption of Frankel’s strategy very difficult and very
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expensive. There were more than four million records on file at the War Department, many of
them were incomplete, and, in any event, they “bore no indication of Jewish affiliations.”1026
Adler forwarded Frankel’s report and Leavitt’s rejoinder to Louis Marshall. Marshall
replied that the exchange between Frankel and Leavitt “confirmed” his view that it was the
AJC’s Executive Committee’s “duty to discontinue the [War Records] Bureau at once.”1027
Marshall also revealed that he had his own serious doubts about statistical estimates and
therefore the preliminary results that Leavitt had been relaying to the Executive Committee in his
regular reports: “I have had a considerable experience with statisticians. I had one on the
witness-stand yesterday on cross-examination. I am impressed that they only differ from one
another in that, though they all guess, the reasoning processes of some are superior to those of
others. So far as accuracy is concerned, it is not to be found in their vocabulary.”1028
In subsequent correspondence with Adler, Marshall said he believed that the AJC had
been misled by Leavitt and that, in hindsight, he was convinced that Leavitt had “either tackled a
job which he was not capable of performing or…wilfully led [the AJC’s Executive Committee]
into the belief that there would be no difficulty in accomplishing what we had in mind to do…I
have lost confidence.”1029
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After discussion with the Jewish Welfare Board, which was by now providing the
majority of the funds that were continuing to finance the War Record Office on a month by
month basis, the AJC resolved to discontinue the project.1030 By August 1921, the offices had
been closed, and the record cards placed into storage.1031
The War Records Office was by far the most expensive research project financed and
directed by the AJC during the early history of the organization. The AJC and the Jewish
Welfare Board spent at least $115,000 on the project.1032 The size of this expenditure was
unprecedented, but it can be argued that it was commensurate with the ambitions of the project.
The AJC hoped to gather reliable statistics that could be cited to dispel entrenched and
disparaging stereotypes about the martial abilities of Jews and the notion that American Jews did
not contribute to the United States armed forces.1033 In one of a series of letters that Julian
Leavitt wrote to leaders of the AJC to try to save the War Records Office, he explicitly
acknowledged the social and political goals of the honor roll project: “The work was undertaken
as an instrument of defense…It was designed to prove, what we have always known, but what
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the American public did not generally know, that in a time of national emergency the Jewish
stock would prove itself the equal of any.”1034
Although the AJC had substantial ambitions for the project, it was ultimately not a
success. In the AJC’s 1922 Annual Report, the organization provided a brief summary of why
the project had been discontinued, citing specifically that access to official records had been
denied. The report also commended, perhaps only for the sake of appearances, the efforts of
Julian Leavitt in leading the project: “Your Committee is unanimous in the belief that a most
creditable piece of work has been done by the Office of Jewish War Records under the faithful
and competent direction of Mr. Julian Leavitt, and that he has discharged his responsibility
conscientiously and with great ability. We wish to place on record the Committee’s appreciation
of his devotion to the task with which he was charged and for the efficiency with which he has
conducted his office.”1035
Ultimately, the AJC chose not to widely distribute the War Records Office’s findings.
After 1923, there is no further record of any discussion of the War Records Office or the volume
of material it had collected. Despite this project’s failings, the Committee remained eager to
release something to the general American public that would highlight the contribution of
American Jews to the war effort. To this end, in 1923, the Committee sponsored the publication
of Rabbi Lee J. Levinger’s A Jewish Chaplain France. Levinger had served in the First World
War as an Army Chaplin, at the rank of First Lieutenant. The AJC was transparent about why the
organization had chosen to sponsor this publication: “Inasmuch as this book contained valuable
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information with regard to the participation of American soldiers of the Jewish faith in the World
War…your Committee believed that this book would be read with interest by the American
public.”1036 The AJC gifted copies of Levinger’s work to public libraries, public schools, and
universities and colleges. As will be seen below, the sponsorship and distribution of Levinger’s
work was consistent with one of the advocacy approaches that the first generation of AJC leaders
relied on during the early history of the organization. In addition to sponsoring research, from an
early date, the Committee began releasing books and pamphlets to further their social and
political objectives.

The AJC as Publisher
By the 1950s, the AJC had a substantial publishing operation, commissioning and
distributing new volumes, articles, and the results of Committee-sponsored research, every year.
It was during the first twenty-five years of its history that the AJC made its first moves to
become involved in book publishing. The works and studies discussed below including,
Immigration and Labor (1913), Jews in the Eastern Warn Zone (1916), The History of a Lie
(1921), Israel und die Volker(1922), The Crucified Jew (1927), Juden und Judentum von heute
(1925), and Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash (1931) illustrate the types of works the AJC
chose to subsidize, publish, and distribute during its formative years. The Committee’s choices
illustrate the organization’s earliest strategies about how to use publications to shape public
opinion and advance the Committee’s social and political agenda.
The case studies of the AJC’s foray into book publishing discussed below reveal the
organization’s ambitions to exercise influence and its understanding of optics. As will be seen,
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the Committee’s leaders carefully chose which works to sponsor; they anticipated potential
sources of anti-Semitism, and they prepared replies in advance. The leaders considered how each
author’s connection to the Jewish community might impact the potential reception of the work
by the general public. The case studies also illustrate that, as a matter of strategy, the Committee
took a long-term view; it sponsored material that would be accessible to future leaders and
molders of public opinion. As publishers, the early leaders of the AJC made pragmatic and
strategic decisions.

Isaac A. Hourwich’s Immigration and Labor
The first book that the AJC published was an extended version of the first pamphlet the
organization released to influence public opinion. Long before the most intense battles over the
passage of immigration restriction legislation, the AJC anticipated that the growing number of
Jewish immigrants in the United States would not go unnoticed, and would generate a backlash
from both American “nativists,” who viewed Jews as racially inferior, unassimilable aliens, and
American labor leaders, who believed immigrants, regardless of the their faith and nation of
origin, were driving down wages in the manufacturing sector, including the garment industry. In
1907, during its first year of operations, the AJC commissioned Isaac A. Hourwich, a
Lithuanian-born economist, to prepare a pamphlet describing how immigration facilitated
economic growth,1037 and, in 1911, with American lawmakers seriously debating imposing
immigration restrictions, the AJC commissioned Hourwich to expand the pamphlet into a book
containing “an analysis of the Immigration Commission,” a bipartisan special committee that had
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been empowered to study the impact of immigration on America’s economy. The AJC also
asked Hourwich to undertake and include in the book his own statistical analysis of the economic
impact of immigration.1038
Hourwich asked the AJC’s Executive Committee for instructions about “the manner in
which the book should be written.”1039 Specifically, he wanted to know if it “was to appear as the
work of an individual student of the question or as the result of an investigation by an
organization interested in the subject.”1040 The Executive Committee considered the optics of
releasing the book without a named economist author but under the imprint of the Committee. In
its view, it was “clearly inadvisable for such a book to be published under the name of the
American Jewish Committee, but that it was not clear, on the other hand, that Dr. Hourwich’s
name as author would carry the desired weight.”1041 The Committee debated the question and
resolved to wait for the manuscript to be completed before deciding the matter.
In commissioning the work, the Committee instructed Hourwich that he was to proceed
“upon the theory that [the book] is to be the work of an individual,” but the Committee also
imposed a series of conditions, including reserving ownership of the copyright of the book, and
the right to “make such alterations of matter and form in the manuscript as are deemed
desirable.”1042 Hourwich accepted the conditions, and the following month appeared before the
AJC’s Executive Committee to submit a report on his findings and progress. During this
meeting, Hourwich stated that “practically all the preliminary work was completed…[and] that
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he had begun to prepare the manuscript; he believed he could complete this in about two months’
time.”1043
Hourwich, who at the time was an employee of the Census Bureau, also reported that he
had requested a leave of absence from his job in order to focus on completing the book. The
Committee’s leadership imposed a deadline of February 1, 1912, but also voted to provide the
author with a salary of eight dollars a day to compensate him for his lost salary during his
leave.1044 Hourwich’s request for a leave of absence from the Census Bureau, however, was
denied; consequently, he was not able to meet the February deadline.
Meanwhile, the so-called Burnett Bill, an immigration restriction act that also included
the imposition of a literacy test for new immigrants, was moving through the United States
Congress. The AJC felt they needed the findings outlined in Hourwich’s book to rally American
public opinion in opposition to the bill. During a trip to Washington D.C., Louis Marshall
personally met with Hourwich and urged him to “hasten the completion of the work.”1045
Hourwich promised to finish the book by May. In the interim, the AJC secured a publisher for
the work, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, but, by October of 1912, the manuscript was still not ready for
publication.
The heart of the argument of Hourwich’s anticipated book was that immigration
facilitated economic growth by ensuring a steady supply of new labor. The AJC was eager to
gain a wider circulation for this argument because there was a labor shortage in parts of the
United States, and immigration restriction legislation would only serve to make this shortage
1043
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more acute. Jacob Schiff argued that “Congress will be little disposed to pass the Bill in view of
the growing scarcity of labor all over the country. Public opinion will oppose the restriction of
immigration. What we need now is to get the public press to begin now to point out the absurdity
of deliberately creating a labor famine.”1046
As the manuscript of the book, which had originally been called The Economic Aspects of
Immigration but was now titled Immigration and Labor, was still not ready for publication,
Mayer Sulzberger proposed widely distributing the introductory chapter in pamphlet form. In his
view, the first chapter “constituted a splendid summary of the work and of the results of the facts
and reasonings [sic] in the book, and indicated that the proof of the dogmatic statements made
could be found in the body of the book.”1047 After some further discussion, the Executive
Committee “resolved that 25,000 copies of the first chapter…be printed and be widely
distributed by the publisher to the newspapers and in other quarters where it would do good.”1048
During the same meeting, the leadership also voted to circulate 25,000 copies of a speech on
immigration made by Cyrus Sulzberger, and the Committee appropriated two thousand dollars
(as a loan) from the remnants of the Russian Relief Fund to finance the printing of both
pamphlets.1049
Finally, by January 1, 1913, the book had been published. Morris Waldman arranged for
copies to be delivered to “all members of Congress, to the President [of the United States], to the
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members of the Cabinet, to leading economists, to the press including scientific, economic and
political science journals, and to many prominent public and state libraries.”1050
The impact of the Hourwich’s book is difficult to assess. The Burnett Bill passed both
houses of Congress in 1913, but, amid public uproar, was ultimately vetoed by President
Woodrow Wilson. Three years later, however, virtually the same act was passed by Congress
again; Wilson vetoed again, but, this time, his veto was overridden by American lawmakers and
the literary test became American law. Immigration and Labor established an important
precedent in the history of the AJC practices of public advocacy. In the future, the organization
would continue to commission the writing and distribution of texts that they hoped would serve
to sway public opinion.

Jews in the Eastern War Zone
Many of the Jewish communities of Russia and Eastern Europe had suffered through
significant waves of violence for years. Before the outbreak of the First World War, this violence
against Jewish communities emanated from what could be described as domestic sources, but the
outbreak of the First World War placed many of the Jewish communities concentrated in the
Pale of Settlement directly in between, and ultimately on the front line, of what was then the
largest international conflict in history. Shortly after the outbreak of the First World War, the
AJC commissioned a study of how the war was affecting Jewish communities. The 130-page
report, which was ultimately published in the form of a booklet that could be easily and
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inexpensively distributed by mail, was released on February 4, 1916 with the title Jews in the
Eastern War Zone.1051
Since the establishment of the AJC, the organization had been closely monitoring the
Jewish communities of Russia and Eastern Europe in order to expose the scale of the violence of
the pogroms and publically shame the Russian government into ending the violence. These
advocacy campaigns and this newly published book were also connected to the AJC’s goal of
maintaining liberal immigration policies in the United States to keep the country open to more
Jewish immigrants. Jews in the Eastern War Zone was distributed by the AJC across the United
States and internationally.1052 In what would become a pattern in the AJC’s use of printed
materials, the organization compiled a list of individuals considered “creators and leaders of
public opinion,” and mailed them copies of the report.1053
These copies of the report were accompanied by a letter from Harry Schneiderman, the
AJC’s Assistant Secretary. In the letter, Schneiderman stressed the objectivity of the report:
“Every essential statement of fact is based on evidence emanating from unprejudiced sources,”
the accuracy of which had “been verified beyond all reasonable doubt.”1054 As the AJC’s
hostility towards the Russian government, and Jacob Schiff’s efforts on behalf of Japan during
the Russo-Japanese War, were well known, Schneiderman emphasized that “all the evidence
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regarding Russia, is derived directly from Russian authority. None of the statements concerning
that country comes from sources inimical to it.”1055
The remainder of Schneiderman’s letter attempts to balance an idealistic tone with
declarations that the AJC was a neutral organization and was not lobbying for American entry
into the First World War:
This publication may be regarded as a message from its silent
millions, to the people of America, and gives utterance to their
protest against the cruelties and indignities to which their Jewish
compatriots have been subjected. The report is not intended as a
polemic or for partisan purposes, or to arouse prejudice. Its sole
object is to appeal to human sympathy and to the conscience of the
world in the cause of justice. It is issued by an organization that is
bent on maintaining an attitude of strict neutrality as between the
European belligerents, but nevertheless believes that to know the
truth is never untimely. It is even more important to friends than to
foes.1056
The impact of Jews in the Eastern War Zone on American and international public opinion is
difficult to assess; however, the distribution of the book did generate at least one interesting and
positive development with respect to the security of the Jewish communities of Poland and the
relationship between Jewish and Catholic leaders. Among the recipients of Jews in the Eastern
War Zone was Pope Benedict XV. The copy of the report the AJC sent to the Pope was
accompanied by a petition “praying him to exert his influence to ameliorate conditions in [the
Eastern war zone], especially in Poland.”1057 The AJC received a reply from the Holy See on
February 9, 1916, which included a statement that the American Jewish Year Book described as
“a virtual encyclical” that outlined “directions to the Catholic clergy of Poland, admonishing
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them to use their best endeavors to put an end to persecution which has prevailed.”1058 In April of
1916, the so-called “virtual encyclical” was also published in European and American
newspapers.1059

Herman Bernstein’s The History of a Lie
As part of the Committee’s strategy to combat the growth of anti-Semitism in the United
States that was being abetted by the wider distribution of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and
the articles printed in the Dearborn Independent, in late-1920, Louis Marshall personally hired
Herman Bernstein, a novelist and journalist who had gained some fame for publically exposing
private correspondence between Kaiser Wilhelm II and Tsar Nicholas II, “to make various
investigations in connection with…anti-Jewish propaganda.”1060 Marshall reported to the AJC’s
Executive Committee that he was paying Bernstein a salary of one hundred dollars a week, “it
being understood that the arrangement is temporary.”1061 The leaders of the AJC believed that
the Protocols were a forgery; Bernstein had been hired to investigate the sources of this
propaganda.1062
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In early January 1921, Bernstein reported to the AJC that he had made significant
progress. He had “discovered two Russian books, one published in 1872 and the other in 1907”
from which sections of the Protocols had been directly lifted (or plagiarized) without
attribution.1063 During the January 9, 1921 meeting of the AJC’s Executive Committee, the
leadership discussed how to make this information public. No decision was made, but the
minutes of the meeting convey the impression that the question of how to circulate Bernstein’s
proof was being left to the discretion of Louis Marshall.1064
While Marshall was deliberating how to distribute Bernstein’s findings, the author was
quickly preparing a manuscript for a book detailing the results of his investigation. Only a month
after the first update on his investigation was submitted to the Committee, Marshall reported that
Bernstein had completed a book detailing his findings. Marshall told the organization’s
leadership that Bernstein had been able to independently secure a publisher for his work. In these
circumstances, the Committee “agreed to buy two thousand copies” and arrange for their
distribution.1065
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The following month, however, the leadership debated whether, by distributing these
books, the organization was placing its reputation at risk. As already noted, the AJC did not want
to be perceived as propagandists, and the leadership was receiving correspondence urging it to
clarify to both its membership and the general public that the AJC “was not engaged in
propaganda work, but in presenting indisputable facts which merit the public’s attention.”1066
While they were certainly concerned about their reputation, the leaders of the AJC privileged
releasing Bernstein’s discoveries. They did not think it was possible avoid giving the impression
that the organization was disinterested in the growth of anti-Semitism that was being nurtured by
the wider distribution of the Protocols and the general public’s acceptance of the forgery’s
authenticity. By this point in its development as an advocacy organization, the AJC had accepted
that the sponsorship and release of publications was within the organization’s mandate,
consistent with the Committee’s social and political objectives, necessary to maintain the
organizations credibility and influence, and worth any risk to its reputation.
In March of 1921, the Executive Committee appropriated five thousand dollars from the
organization’s Emergency Trust Fund “for the purpose of defraying the expenses in connection
with the combating of anti-Jewish propaganda.”1067 This became a regular practice of the AJC:
the Committee routinely appropriated money from the Emergency Trust Fund, which had been
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created to fund overseas relief work, to finance the distribution of books and pamphlets in the
United States.
Bernstein’s book, which was released by J.S. Ogilvie Publishing with the title the History
of a Lie: “The Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion,” A Study, was one of the AJC’s most
significant contributions to the ongoing efforts by Jewish advocacy groups around the world to
discredit the Protocols.1068 It made a lasting contribution; some of the evidence that is still used
to debunk the Protocols was first uncovered and broadly disseminated as a result of Bernstein’s
AJC-sponsored investigation. Throughout Louis Marshall’s tenure as the AJC’s President, the
Committee remained committed to ensuring Bernstein’s book gained as wide a circulation as
possible.1069

Rabbi Josef Samuel Bloch’s Israel und die Volker
In late 1921, the AJC received an unsolicited letter from Benjamin Harz, the director of
Benjamin Harz Verlag, a German-language publishing house with offices in Berlin and
Vienna.1070 In the letter, Harz, who was Jewish, announced that he was shortly going to publish a
book by Rabbi Josef Samuel Bloch entitled Israel und die Volker, which Harz translated into
English as “Israel and the Peoples.”1071 Harz explained that he believed this book would be of
interest to the leaders of the AJC, because it could be useful in the fight against anti-Semitism in
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the United States. In the same letter, Harz proposed a series of contractual terms under which his
publishing company and the AJC could collaborate on distributing an English translation of the
book in the United States. Harz stated in his letter that he had already lined up a qualified
translator in Berlin, whom he declined to name. He proposed printing and binding the books in
Europe and then shipping them to America. That Harz approached the AJC with this offer says a
great deal. It indicates that, by the early 1920s, the AJC had established for itself an international
reputation for funding publications that were intended to combat anti-Semitism.
The author, Rabbi Bloch, in addition to his religious training, held a doctorate from the
University of Zurich, and was a politician that had been elected three times to serve in the
Austrian Chamber of Deputies. Bloch was, according to Harz, “well known over the world as a
man who since more than 40 years stands in the first row fighting antisemitism.”1072 Harz was
not exaggerating. Bloch did indeed have a significant history of participating in Jewish public
advocacy in Europe. He had played a prominent role in the so-called Tiszaeszlár Affair, an
accusation of blood libel against a group of Hungarian Jews that followed the disappearance of
Eszter Solymosi, a fourteen-year old Christian girl, on April 1, 1882.1073
The Tiszaeszlár Affair dragged on for fifteen months. There was widespread incitement
against Hungarian Jews and periodic outbreaks of violence. The affair culminated with the trial
of fifteen Hungarian Jews. Four were accused of murdering Solymosi, and the remainder were
charged with either conspiring to assist in the murder or in helping to dispose of her body.
During the period leading up to the trial, August Rohling, a prominent anti-Semite and
professor of Catholic theology at Prague University, offered to testify for the prosecution and
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provide expert evidence under oath about Jewish rituals involving (or requiring) the spilling of
the blood of Christian children.1074 When news of Rohling’s intention to testify became well
known, Bloch attacked Rohling in a series of articles in which he suggested that Rohling would
be committing perjury if he testified about his views on Jewish rituals. Ultimately, Rohling
withdrew his offer to testify. The trial culminated with the acquittal of all the accused; however,
the verdict precipitated further outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence in Hungary.
In his letter to the AJC, Harz cited Bloch’s history as a leader in Jewish public advocacy,
in particular Bloch’s “victorious struggle against Rohling,” and urged the leaders of the AJC to
work with him on publishing and distributing an English translation of Bloch’s book. 1075 As
Harz expressed it, the new book would be a useful instrument of Jewish public advocacy because
it “represents a very arsenal, out of which one may easily draw the arms for struggling against
the calumnies and accusations brought forth against us.”1076 By “us,” Harz meant world Jewry:
“This book is containing not only an abundance of original researches apt to satisfy the learned
man, but it is written such as to thoroughly instruct the public about the real nature of our law
and tradition, pointing out the very moments that have caused all the offences and accusations
against us.”1077 Harz emphasized that the book would not only enable Jews to defend themselves
but, if translated into English, would also provide information that sympathetic gentiles could
use to curb of Anti-Semitism “in the Anglo-Saxon world and especially in America.”1078
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The AJC did not agree to Harz’s terms and Israel und die Volker was published only in
German in 1922. The AJC did not, however, entirely reject Harz’s proposal. The Executive
Committee agreed to buy five hundred copies of the German language edition of the book and
distribute them as gifts to university and college libraries in the United States.1079 All the editions
that were gifted to libraries were preceded by a letter to each librarian signed by Louis Marshall.
A copy of the form letter has been kept on file at the AJC archives:
You will receive in a few days by parcel post (or express) a
copy of a noted work written by Dr. Joseph S. Bloch, entitled
“Israel und die Volker.” Unfortunately there has been as yet no
English translation of the work. Nevertheless, it is believed that
those who desire to learn the truth from dispassionate sources with
regard to the many unfounded charges that have been made against
the Jews, would embrace the opportunity to read this important
literary contribution. It is based principally on the researches [sic]
into the Talmud and other Jewish literature by Christian scholars,
who were designated by a high judicial tribunal to give their expert
testimony on the subject.
We trust that you will accept this volume as a gift and make
it accessible to your readers. Believing that every fair-minded man
is desirous of knowing the truth, the Committee of which I have the
honor to be the President has concluded to place this book within
the reach of thinking men, in order that, to some extent at least, the
egregious libels that have been uttered against the people of the
Book may be authoritatively refuted.1080
Marshall’s letter to the librarians is interesting in several respects. Firstly, in order to
establish the dispassionate objectivity of the book’s author and the intellectual merit of the book,
Marshall neglects to mention that Bloch was a Rabbi and activist for Jewish causes; instead, he
emphasizes that the work is based on investigations conducted by Christian scholars. Marshall’s
attempt to establish the objectivity of the work, however, is undermined by his vague reference
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to a high judicial authority of some kind who apparently handpicked Christian scholars to study
Jewish texts. Neither the participation of the Christian scholars nor the involvement of a “high
judicial authority” was mentioned by Harz in his letter to the AJC.
Marshall’s letter to the librarians is also interesting in that it openly acknowledges that
the AJC was aware that their gift would have only a limited impact in the fight against antiSemitism. While Marshall acknowledged that the book’s impact would be minor, the letter does
convey that he believed that there was advantage to be gained in the fight against anti-Semitism
in the United States by making this book available to American intellectuals and university
students. As already discussed, the AJC’s leaders employed both long-term and short-term
strategies in their efforts to combat the spread of Anti-Semitism. The distribution of Bloch’s
book was certainly part of a long term strategy which emphasized educating future leaders. Six
years later, after a translation of the book into English had been made without any assistance
from the AJC, the Committee agreed to buy and distribute five hundred copies of the English
translation to college and university libraries.1081
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Max Hunterberg’s The Crucified Jew
During its formative years, the AJC did not yet have the resources to fund the publication
of all the books that were brought to the organization’s attention by outsiders or promoted by its
leadership. Although the AJC has the reputation of being a well-funded organization, in truth, in
its formative years, it had limited resources. The records of the AJC reveal that because of its
finite resources, the leaders of the organization had extensive debates about expending
comparatively small sums to purchase and distribute books that served the organization’s
interests. While most of the AJC’s members and the organization’s leaders on the Executive
Committee were successful or very wealthy men, through the 1930s, the financial resources of
organization itself, although growing, were still modest, particularly when compared to the
collective wealth of the organization’s founders and leaders. While the AJC has the reputation of
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being well financed, during its first three decades, the AJC’s leaders were always preoccupied
with raising more funds, and continually debated the best ways to use those that were available.
At times, individual members of the AJC would finance particular projects on their own
initiative because the AJC itself did not have the funds available to subsidize the project or there
was no consensus among the AJC’s leaders about the merits or utility of the project.
One example of an individual AJC member intervening where the organization could not,
or would not, occurred in 1928 when the AJC’s leaders debated distributing Max Hunterberg’s
The Crucified Jew. Hunterberg, in common with many of those involved in Jewish public
advocacy in the early-twentieth century, believed that the accusation of deicide against the Jews
was a fundamental source, if not the fundamental source, of anti-Semitism. Throughout his
career, Hunterberg’s work was polemical; he sought to decisively undermine the widely-held
belief that the Jews were responsible for the execution of Jesus Christ.
Hunterberg’s book, which was ultimately titled Jesus, The Crucified Jew, was published
by Bloch Publishing in 1927, with an initial publication run of fifteen hundred copies. The book
did not sell well. By mid-1928 only two to three hundred copies had been sold or given away.1082
Sometime before May 1928, Hunterberg requested the assistance of the AJC in distributing his
book. A letter from Harry Schneiderman to Julius Rosenwald, the President of Sears, Roebuck
and Company and the AJC’s Vice-President, shows that Hunterberg applied to the AJC for
assistance after being personally urged to do so by Rosenwald.1083
Hunterberg’s book and its potential usefulness in the fight against anti-Semitism were
discussed briefly at a meeting of the AJC’s Executive Committee on May 13, 1928. At this
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meeting, Louis Marshall, the AJC’s President, and Executive Committee member Max J. Kohler,
a prominent lawyer and former District Attorney for the Southern District of New York, spoke
out in favor of the book and its potential value in the fight against anti-Semitism.1084
Nevertheless, the Executive Committee, citing a lack of funds, declined to provide Hunterberg
with assistance distributing his work. However, “to show its interest and to encourage Mr.
Hunterberg, the Committee did vote a contribution of $50.00.”1085
After the vote at the May 13th meeting, Harry Schneiderman wrote to Julius Rosenwald to
inform him of the Executive Committee’s decision.1086 In this letter, Schneiderman stated that he
had met several times with Hunterberg, was impressed with him as “an out and out idealist,” and
personally shared Hunterberg’s view that the charge of deicide was an essential source of antiSemitism. Schneiderman also told Rosenwald that he believed it would be “very worthwhile” if
the remaining copies of the initial publication run were distributed to “libraries of theological
schools and seminaries, and among leading Christian ministers.”1087 Schneiderman also noted in
his letter that he was aware that it was Rosenwald who had advised Hunterberg to request
assistance from the AJC. Knowing that Rosenwald had expressed some interest in Hunterberg
and his work, Schneiderman offered to personally coordinate an effort to distribute Hunterberg’s
book if Rosenwald would agree to underwrite the project: “If, dear Mr. Rosenwald, you feel like
going into this thing, I shall be glad to attend to all the details, negotiating with the publisher for
the remaining copies, making up a mailing list, having the books wrapped, addressed, and
mailed.”1088
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Rosenwald agreed to finance the project. Based on Schneiderman’s correspondence with
Bloch Publishing, Rosenwald must have agreed to do so on the condition of anonymity. On
September 5, 1928, Schneiderman wrote to the publisher: “I take pleasure in informing you that
through the generosity of an interested person, I am in position to purchase for his account 850
copies of the book.”1089 By this time, Hunterberg was already working on revising his book in
the hopes of publishing a second edition. Bloch Publishing was willing to publish the second
edition if they were provided with a guarantee that five hundred copies would be purchased for a
total of $225.00. Schneiderman advised the publisher that they should proceed with publishing
the second edition: “I am happy to be able to inform you that the same friend who has made
possible the purchase of 850 copies of the first edition, has authorized me to say that he is willing
to cover the guarantee.”1090 Despite the AJC Executive Committee’s decision, the organization’s
Assistant Secretary took it upon himself to secure financing from another AJC leader and
coordinate the distribution of Hunterberg’s book. This episode is illustrative of an important
aspect of the AJC’s history. The Committee was an organization that was founded to coordinate
American Jewish public advocacy. In practice, however, the men who led this organization did
not always act through the Committee.

Jonas Kreppel’s Juden und Judentum von heute
As the AJC’s reputation for assisting with book distribution grew, the organization began
receiving requests from writers asking for the organization’s endorsement and assistance. The
AJC took these requests seriously, and the leadership made calculated decisions about which
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works they were prepared to sponsor. The leaders of the AJC were judicious and cautious about
the assistance they provided to writers; publications that might have served to influence public
opinion or further the AJC’s objectives were rejected either because the AJC did not feel it could
spare the funds or because the leadership discerned some flaw in the form or content of the
work.1091
By way of illustration of the AJC’s approach, in 1925, the Executive Committee
considered subsidizing the translation and distribution of Dr. Jonas Kreppel’s Juden und
Judentum von heute (Jews and Judaism Today). After the publication of his book in Vienna,
Kreppel had sent a copy to Louis Marshall. Based on Marshall’s references to the amount of
correspondence he received from Kreppel, the author was quite eager to solicit the cooperation
of the AJC in translating his book into English and publishing it in America.1092
On August 3, 1925, Marshall wrote to Kreppel and told him that he had received his copy
of the book but had been very busy and had only had the time to briefly examine the work. In
this letter, Marshall offered Kreppel some hopeful encouragement: “The plan is excellent and
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gives more than a birdseye view of contemporary Judaism.”1093 Marshall promised to study the
book thoroughly and reply, but he was also uneasy about Kreppel’s requests because it was
unclear what kind, and how much, assistance the author hoped to get from the AJC. Marshall
wrote to Kreppel: “If your idea is that if the book is found to be useful and valuable that we shall
recommend it to the public, then I can assure you that it will be cheerfully done. If you have
anything more in mind I should like to be informed.”1094
Kreppel replied to Marshall ten days later, and, while he did not directly ask for financial
assistance, he made it clear that he hoped the AJC could help him publicize his work: “I have no
great expectations, indeed, but I suppose that the gentlemen of the Executive Committee will
acknowledge the moral duty of the leading jewish[sic] organization in America to promote such
an enterprise in a suitable way.”1095 Kreppel also noted in this letter that his book had garnered
some attention in Europe from Jewish communities, institutions, and scientists; however, this
was proving to be more of a financial burden than a blessing as many of the people or groups
interested in the book requested half-priced or gratuitous copies, and Kreppel felt, in his own
words, “induced to comply with their wishes.”1096
Over the next three months, Kreppel wrote Marshall several times, but did not receive a
reply until the beginning of September. Marshall explained that he had not replied because he
had not yet an opportunity to discuss the book with the AJC’s Executive Committee, and,
consequently, he had nothing to report.1097 Marshall also took the opportunity to remind Kreppel
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that he was “at liberty to get in touch with the various individual members [of the AJC] and
endeavor to interest them.”1098
By December 1925, Marshall had studied Juden und Judentum von heute more closely,
and had brought it to the attention of the members of the AJC’s Executive Committee. In a letter
dated December 3, 1925, Marshall informed Kreppel that the Executive Committee had
discussed his requests for assistance, but had ultimately decided that the organization was not in
a financial position to provide him with any assistance.1099
In the same letter, Marshall provided some criticisms of the book which provide insight
into why the leaders of the AJC declined to help Kreppel translate and distribute his work in
America. Marshall was direct in his assessment: “It is my opinion that for a book of this kind to
have any considerable sale in English-speaking countries, it would have to be prepared in an
entirely different manner. I do not think that a translation of the book as it stands would be
successful.”1100 Marshall concluded the letter by expressing regret that he was unable to provide
Kreppel with any help.
The reference to the potential commercial prospects of Kreppel’s work is significant
because it is unusual. Typically, when the Committee declined to provide their assistance to an
author it was because they judged their project to be flawed or because the work promoted a
view or interpretation of events or history that was inconsistent with the organization’s social and
political agenda. For example, in 1913, the AJC declined to provide Dr. Liebmann Hersch, a
demographer and statistician at the University of Geneva, with funds to translate and distribute
his book Le Juif Errant D’aujourd’hui (The Wandering Jew Today). The leadership “decided
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that it would be inadvisable for the Committee [to undertake the translation and publication of
Hersch’s book] as we do not desire to make any special Jewish question out of the immigration
problem.”1101 As already discussed, the AJC worked to preserve America’s liberal immigration
policies but the organization preferred to avoid emphasizing Jewish interest in maintaining these
laws and policies.
The AJC was prepared to finance projects with the knowledge that they were funding the
distribution of works that both furthered their interests and would otherwise not gain a wide
circulation. The leadership was prepared to lose money (or expend money) to see these projects
widely distributed. Some AJC-sponsored projects, including Hourwich’s Immigration and
Labor, generated small amounts of revenue for the AJC, but, in general, the organization raised
money from its members to fund the organization’s advocacy efforts.1102 During the period
covered by this study, the Committee was run by a number of very successful businessmen, but it
was not a business. The concern for the commercial prospects of Kreppel’s work is strange
because the AJC routinely expended money to distribute books to libraries as gifts, knowing that
the organization would never recover the costs it had accrued.

Hermann L. Strack’s Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash
In their deliberations about which books to subsidize or distribute, the AJC’s leaders were
not blind to the potential significance of an author’s religion. These discussions were not
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centered on the objectivity or abilities of the scholars themselves; rather, the chief concern of the
AJC’s leadership was the optics of both the work and how any assistance the Committee might
provide would impact the reception of the work. Within the AJC leadership, there were some
who strongly believed that the distribution of books by Christian scholars would be more useful
to the cause of curbing anti-Semitism. They believed that if the author were both an accredited
scholar and Christian, their work could have a more significant impact on shaping the views of
non-Jews in the United States. Christian scholars making arguments and presenting evidence that
undermined conspiratorial accusations against the Jews, or that was sympathetic to Jewish
equality, minority rights, and the plight of Jewish communities, could not, in the view of the
Committee, be as easily dismissed as propaganda.
The greater potential usefulness of the work of Christian scholars was an important
feature of the AJC’s deliberations when the Executive Committee decided to commission a
translation and find a publisher for Hermann L. Strack’s Introduction to the Talmud and
Midrash. Strack, a German Protestant and professor of Old Testament and Semitic languages at
the University of Berlin, was a prolific and highly regarded scholar. His Introduction to the
Talmud and Midrash was originally published in Germany in 1877, but Strack updated his work
and substantially revised his book throughout his life. A second edition was published in 1894, a
third in 1900, a fourth in 1908, and a fifth in 1920, two years before the author’s death. In 1923,
Alexander Marx, a German-born professor at the Jewish Theological Seminary, reviewed the
final German-language edition of Strack’s books and concluded that there “is no other book
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similar in scope and value to Strack’s volume and the author is justified in his statement that
there is no scholar who will not find this volume very helpful.”1103
Shortly after Strack’s death in 1922, Louis Marshall, on his own initiative, purchased the
rights to publish an English translation of the fifth edition of the book from Strack’s widow.1104
The AJC’s Executive Committee then “agreed to have the book translated into English and to
secure its publication in order that this scientific exposition of the content and spirit of the
Talmud and Midrash by a renowned Christian scholar would be accessible to students in
English-speaking countries and also available in the event of attempts to use the Talmud as the
basis for anti-Jewish propaganda.”1105 This concern about preventing the Talmud or Midrash
being used to foment anti-Semitism can be understood in the context of the publication of the
Protocols of the Elders of Zion and its wide distribution in the United States. Jewish leaders were
concerned that anti-Semitic propaganda could create the impression among the general public
that the Hebrew-language books closely studied by observant Jews were hiding malevolent
religious rituals and political conspiracies. The fear was that these books would be misconstrued
as evidence of a Jewish conspiracy similar to the one described in the Protocols. The
Committee’s leaders’ thought that a Christian scholar’s description of these sacred texts would
dispel the impression that there was something sinister in them.
The decision to publish a translation of Strack’s book is interesting because it shows that
the AJC anticipated the potential exploitation of Jewish liturgy as a source of anti-Semitic
propaganda and took steps to ensure the organization had a reply ready. The AJC commissioned
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Max L. Margolis, a professor at Dropsie College, to translate Strack’s book into English and
submitted this translation to the Macmillan Company for publication.1106 In April 1928, the
Macmillan Company offered to publish the English translation, but only on the condition that the
publication was subsidized in some form by the AJC.
The Macmillan Company proposed two different arrangements to the AJC. Under the
first, the AJC would provide the publishing company with three thousand dollars to be used to
finance the initial publication of the book. In exchange, the Committee would receive a fifteen
percent royalty for the first thousand copies sold, and a twenty percent royalty on any additional
sales. The publisher proposed setting the price of the book at six dollars per copy. Under the
second proposed arrangement, Macmillan would finance the publication, but the AJC would
agree in advance to purchase a thousand copies of the book for $3.60 a copy. Under this
arrangement, the Committee itself would be responsible for distributing or selling the first
thousand copies of the book at whatever price it chose. In exchange for this guarantee, the
Macmillan Company would provide the AJC with a ten percent royalty for any other copies of
the book sold by the publisher. At a meeting of the Executive Committee on April 1, 1928, both
proposed arrangements were discussed but no decision was made.1107
The two arrangements were discussed again at a meeting of the Executive Committee
held on May 13, 1928. According to the minutes of this meeting, “it was the sense of those
present that the offer did not appear to be altogether favorable.”1108 The Executive Committee
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rejected both plans, but the leadership also decided that they should not abandon the effort to
find a publisher to distribute the English translation of Strack’s book.
At the May 13th meeting, the Executive Committee delegated the effort to find another
publisher to the AJC’s Committee on Information and Publications, which was Chaired by Lewis
L. Strauss, and made up of Lee K. Frankel, Herman Bernstein, Alexander Marx, and Cyrus
Adler, who would become the AJC’s third President after the death of Louis Marshall. The
participation of both Marx and Adler on the AJC’s Committee on Information and Publications
would prove to be important. The AJC’s attempts to find a publisher for Introduction to the
Talmud and Midrash dragged on for three more years. Ultimately, the AJC was unable to find a
mainstream publishing house to work with; instead, the AJC decided to collaborate with the
Jewish Publication Society of America (JPSA).
The JPSA was founded in Philadelphia in 1888, almost twenty years before the AJC.
Since the founding of the AJC, the relationship between the AJC and JPSA had been very close,
and there was overlap in the leadership of the two organizations. Alexander Marx and Max L.
Margolis, the translator of Strack’s book, were both members of the JPSA’s Publication
Committee. In 1928, Cyrus Adler was the Chairman of both the JPSA’s Publication Committee
and the AJC’s Executive Committee. By the time the English translation of the book was finally
published in 1931, Adler was President of the AJC and a Trustee of the JPSA.
On December 21, 1931, Julius Grodinsky, the JPSA’s Secretary wrote Morris Waldman,
the AJC’s Secretary, and confirmed that the JPSA was going to publish the English translation of
Strack’s book. Grodinsky noted that the JPSA had agreed to publish the book because the
organization believed that it would prove to “be very valuable in serving the purpose which I
know the American Jewish Committee had in mind of presenting the Talmud in the proper way
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by a Christian scholar.”1109 The AJC believed that because the book had not been written by a
Jew but rather by a German-born Protestant, the work would claim more credibility if it was ever
needed to disprove accusations of a Jewish conspiracy.
Given the leadership’s concern about importance of the author’s religion for enhancing
the credibility of the work, it is noteworthy that the plan to have the book released by the Jewish
Publication Society, an organization that was clearly linked to Jewish communal leadership
organizations, was not seen as a possible impediment to its use in fighting anti-Semitism. The
impact of the publication of Strack’s book in furthering the AJC’s agenda or suppressing antiSemitism is difficult to gauge; however, Strack’s work was and remains a very significant work
of scholarship. According to Edward A. Goldman, since the book “first appeared in translation in
1931, it has been the premier reference volume in English for all those who wish to wade into the
sea of rabbinic scholarship.”1110

The AJC as Pamphleteer
Generally speaking, the publishing efforts of the AJC, and the books that the early leaders
of the Committee chose to support, were not intended for a general audience. The AJC’s
publishing efforts were expensive. There was no revenue in distributing books as gifts to college,
university, and public libraries, and the influence of these works was, at best, modest. In contrast,
it was through the distribution of pamphlets, which were written for a general audience and
relatively inexpensive to print and distribute, that the AJC sought to influence the attitudes of the
broader American public.
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During the first twenty-five years of its history, the American Jewish Committee
subsidized the distribution of dozens of pamphlets, regularly printing tens of thousands of copies
to ensure the broadest possible audience. The pamphlets were connected to the most prominent
issues that comprised the organization’s early agenda, including preventing the passing of new
immigration restrictions, promoting the abrogation campaign, and combatting the spread of antiSemitism in the United States.
Beginning with Isaac Hourwich’s pro-immigration pamphlet, the AJC used pamphlets to
try and influence the course of public debates and the deliberations of American lawmakers
about immigration reform. In 1910, the Committee released a pamphlet entitled
“Recommendations Respecting Revision of the Immigration Laws and Regulations,” delivering
copies to the lawmakers on the Dillingham Immigration Commission, and printing one thousand
additional copies.1111 Two years later, during the height of the legislative debates about imposing
a literary test for new immigrants, the AJC widely distributed a pamphlet entitled “Injustice of
the Literacy Test.”1112 In 1913, the Committee resolved to release in pamphlet form an article
written by Max J. Kohler, entitled “The Immigration Problem and the Right of Asylum of the
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Persecuted.”1113 Perhaps to curry favor with lawmakers, after the 1914 Congressional Elections,
the AJC had ten thousand copies of a speech made by Senator James A. Reed of Missouri on the
subject of immigration reform printed and distributed throughout the country. 1114
The rallying of American public opinion through pamphlets was an important component
of the late stages of the AJC’s treaty abrogation campaign. For example, in 1911, the AJC
arranged for twenty-five thousand copies of a speech by Louis Marshall entitled “Russia and the
American Passport,” which was delivered at the annual conference of the Union of American
Hebrew Congregation, to be widely distributed among journalists and “members of political
organizations.”1115 The distribution of Marshall’s speech, which provided an account of Russia’s
discrimination against American passport-holders, including Jews and Catholic priests, was
subsidized with the remaining capital from the 250th Anniversary of Jewish Settlement in the
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United States Celebration Fund.1116 Ultimately, the AJC released thirty-five thousand copies of
Marshall’s speech, and the organization credited the publication of this pamphlet with helping to
secure positive editorial comment in American newspapers and the passage of six resolutions in
State Legislatures condemning Russia’s behavior.1117
The Committee’s decision to actively try to prevent a further intensification of antiSemitism in the United States strongly influenced the organization’s use of pamphlets to reach a
broad audience. For example, to combat the public perception that Jewish immigrants were
exclusively settling in large American cities, in 1912, the AJC funded the distribution of a
reprinting of “The Agricultural Activities of Jews in America,” which had originally appeared as
an AJC-commissioned article in the 1912 edition of the American Jewish Year Book. Ten
thousand copies were distributed to “agricultural colleges and schools, to farmers’ institutes,
granges, agricultural journals, the United States Department of Agriculture, and to the various
Departments of Agriculture of the various States.”1118
Most significantly, after the Protocols of the Elders of Zion gained wide circulation in the
United States, the AJC’s General Committee passed a resolution during the organization’s
Annual Meeting authorizing Louis Marshall to release a public statement to refute the allegations
made in the Protocols and identify the work as a forgery. Marshall’ statement, which was
released as a sixteen- page pamphlet entitled “‘The Protocols’ Bolshevism and the Jews: Address
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to the American Public,” was the most expensive and widely distributed pamphlet produced by
the AJC during the early history of the organization.
The text of the pamphlet includes a summary of the results of Herman Bernstein’s
investigation into the source materials of the Protocols, a refutation of the allegation that Jews
were disproportionately Communists, and an earnest expression of the loyalty of American Jews
to the United States. Marshall wrote:
The Protocols are a base forgery. There has never been an
organization of Jews known as The Elders of Zion…There has
never existed a secret or other Jewish body organized for any
purpose such as that implied in The Protocols. The Jewish people
have never dreamed of a Jewish dictatorship, of a destruction of
religion, of an interference with industrial property, or an
overthrow of civilization. The Jews have never conspired with the
Freemasons, or with any other body, for any purpose…The great
mass of the Jews were hampered in every way in their efforts to
earn a livelihood. Far from desiring to govern the world, they were
content with the opportunity to live. Numerically they constitute
less than one per cent of the population of the Earth; and more than
one-half of them are on the verge of starvation. The suggestion
that, in their feebleness, they have been planning in secret conclave
to seize absolute power and to dominate the ninety-nine per cent of
non-Jews upon the globe is a ridiculous invention…We have an
abiding confidence in the spirit of justice and fairness that
permeates the true American, and we are satisfied that our fellowcitizens will not permit the campaign of slander and libel that has
been launched against us to go unreproved…Let not hatred and
misunderstanding arise where peace and harmony, unity and
brotherliness, are required to perpetuate all that America represents
and to enable all men to know that within her wide boundaries
there is no room for injustice and intolerance.1119
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The Committee appropriated ten thousand dollars from the Emergency Trust Fund to finance the
distribution of a quarter of a million copies of Marshall’s address across the United States.1120
Beginning during the period covered by this study, the American Jewish Committee was
actively involved in using pamphlets to influence American public opinion. The substantial
resources that were devoted to financing these publications during the early history of the AJC,
however, pales in comparison to later commitments. During the twentieth century, the AJC
released pamphlets addressing social and political issues as varied as the fight for civil liberties
and civil rights, the separation between church and state, race relations in the United States, and
the Middle East conflict. The resources that were devoted to pamphlets by the early leaders of
the AJC were the precedent for the organization’s later use of other forms of mass media,
including, magazines, comics, radio, film, and television. It was during the early history of the
Committee that the organization began to build the capacity to generate these forms of content,
including conducting research, and became resolved to use more than quiet diplomacy to further
its social and political agenda.

Conclusion
The first twenty-five years of the American Jewish Committee were crucially important
to the subsequent development of the organization’s advocacy infrastructure and its later
research projects and applications of mass media. Those later and significantly more well-known
projects, including Commentary Magazine, the AJC’s social issues films, and the organization’s
patronage of Theodor Adorno and Kenneth Clark, can be described both as the maturation of the
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Committee’s earliest strategies to influence public opinion and as expansions of earlier efforts to
engage in research and generate and release content to both narrow and broad audiences. The
takeover of the American Jewish Year Book, the evolution and expansion of the Committee’s
research infrastructure, the War Records project, the sponsorship of books, and the wide
distribution of pamphlets were the earliest manifestations of the organization’s aspiration to
influence public opinion and generate content that could be effectively used to achieve this aim.
These efforts were significant because they further indicate that the organization had moved
away from the advocacy approaches that had been initially applied by the founders of the
organization and that were historically practiced by Jewish communal leaders. The books
published by the Committee reached only a modest audience but they were part of an active
strategy to edify a potentially influential segment of the general population, the future leaders of
the country. The organization’s pamphlets were more ambitious and represent a more immediate
effort to further the Committee’s social and political interest and respond publically to threats the
American Jewish community faced. In all cases, the books and pamphlets constitute a shift away
from quiet diplomacy towards public advocacy, from the judicious exercise of influence towards
the practice of propaganda. As this chapter shows, even as the AJC moved away from relying on
quiet diplomacy, it leaders were consistently cautious about the optics of their efforts. They
chose their publications carefully.
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Chapter 8: Activism through the Courts
The AJC’s Early Applications of Juridical Means
During the November 1906 founders’ conference that led to the establishment of the
American Jewish Committee, there was a great deal of discussion among the delegates about
“civil rights” and “religious rights.” These terms were used repeatedly in the debates about
defining the proposed organization’s mandate. Doctor Lewis N. Dembitz, for example, stated:
“The whole thing is the protection of our rights, to protect against the invasion of the rights of
the Jews in this or any other country.”1121 Some of these discussions centered on whether the
Committee would be concerned only for the rights of American Jews or would it also extend its
mandate to protecting and enhancing the rights of Jews in foreign countries. The fear was that an
extended mandate ran the risk of the organization incurring accusations of having dual loyalty or
of undiplomatically meddling in the domestic politics of foreign countries, or worse, of being
unpatriotic. The founders were concerned that they and their coreligionists not be viewed as
outsiders in American society. The language that the AJC’s founders ultimately chose for the
organization’s constitution includes as one of its objectives simply “to prevent infringement of
the civil and religious rights of Jews.” As discussed in earlier chapters, in practice, the AJC’s
efforts to protect the civil and religious rights of Jews had a large international component.1122
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This chapter, however, will focus on the organization’s domestic efforts and describe how the
early leaders of the Committee began to use the American legal system to define and protect the
rights of Jews and other minority communities in the United States.
In America, during the first twenty-five years of the AJC’s history, the Committee
gradually became more inclined to use juridical means (judicial review of administrative action
and constitutional test cases) to challenge immigration restrictions and to further its aim of
protecting the civil and religious rights of American Jews. The legal strategies the leaders chose
illuminate the character of the Committee because, in many cases, its strategies reflected its
founders’ concerns about optics, that is, about how the Jewish community would be perceived by
the public and the leadership’s preoccupation with avoiding the general public’s scrutiny of the
Jewish community or the perception that Jews were in some way different or apart from
American society. As the discussion below will reveal, whenever possible, the Committee
preferred to broaden social and political issues, framing them as “American questions” as
opposed to “Jewish questions.” As a result, a great deal of the legal activism carried out by
leaders of the AJC was not directly coordinated through the Committee; often this work was
done independently, as part of the private legal practice of some of the lawyers who were
members of the Committee, or through the leaders’ support of special interest groups
representing other minority communities in the United States, including, most prominently, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). For example, the AJC,

held on October 12, 1919, American Jewish Committee Archives: Digital Archives. Accessed February 17, 2015.
http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajcarchive/FileViewer.aspx?id=16468. Similarly, the AJC supported the World Court
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religious minorities that were included in the Paris agreements. On November 16, 1924, the AJC’s Executive
Committee “resolved that the American Jewish Committee favor the entrance of the United States in the World
Court. Mr. Marshall agreed to draw up a memorandum for the information of the members of the Committee in
order to enable them to take local action.” See: Minutes of the American Jewish Committee’s Executive Committee
meeting held on November 16, 1924, American Jewish Committee Archives: Digital Archives. Accessed February
17, 2015. http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajcarchive/FileViewer.aspx?id=16478.
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and prominent Committee leaders, made financial contributions to the NAACP; Louis Marshall
was a board member of the organization, and he acted on the NAACP’s behalf in a number of
court cases.1123
Among the founders and early leaders of the AJC were a number of lawyers and judges,
including Louis Marshall, Julian Mack, Nathan Bijur, and Max J. Kohler. The organization’s far
more activist and substantial intervention in the arena of litigation concerning questions of
constitutional rights and protections occurred after the Second World War, but the use of public
interest litigation as an approach to public advocacy began with, and can be traced back to, the
activities of some of the AJC’s leaders and founders during the period covered by this study. In
adopting litigation-based tactics, the AJC was following a path set by other special interests
groups in the United States, but the Committee’s traditional concerns about optics and its
leaders’ reluctance to draw conspicuous attention to the social and political interests of American
Jewry restrained how, in its formative years, the AJC chose to use the American justice system in
the organization’s public advocacy.
In the early history of the AJC’s use of juridical means, Max J. Kohler and Louis
Marshall were by far the most important figures. Kohler, a former District Attorney, led the
Committee’s efforts to use juridical means to review the decisions of immigration officials, and
constrain the strict or arbitrary enforcement of restrictive immigration laws. He had begun his
career acting on behalf of the government, but later he shifted his practice towards the protection
of individual rights, including the rights of immigrant aliens who were not yet American citizens.
Kohler was doing this kind of legal work on behalf of immigrant communities before the
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founding of the AJC. For example, in 1904, he represented the Chinese Charitable and
Benevolent Association of New York in several so-called “Chinese Exclusion cases,” which
involved challenging immigration restrictions that specifically targeted Chinese-born
immigrants.1124 According to Irvin Lehman, Kohler “had the vision to see in aliens, properly
admitted to this country, the citizens who must, in the future, uphold its ideals. Where there was
injustice to an alien, he saw justice withheld from a future citizen.”1125
Louis Marshall was one of the most prominent lawyers of his generation; although the
majority of his practice concerned corporate and commercial law, Marshall is considered among
the most important trial attorneys and civil rights litigators in American legal history. Marshall
worked independently, through special interest groups, and under the banner of the American
Jewish Committee, to use American Courts to protect and defend the rights of aliens and
minority communities in the United States. “As a consummate jurist,” Mark A. Raider argues,
“Marshall strove above all for fair application of the law. When circumstances beyond his
control made that impossible, as in the case of much of the [immigration] restrictionist
legislation passed by the U.S. Congress…he used his legal expertise to help minimize the
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harshest aspects of the government’s statutes.”1126 Marshall’s legal work would inure to the
benefit not only of his clients, but also to the legal and religious rights of the Jewish community
in the United States and other minority communities.
In his article “‘Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus:’ The Judicial Activism of Louis
Marshall,” Raider describes Marshall as a “champion of minority rights.”1127 Although Marshall
was a famous trial attorney, a great deal of the judicial activism ascribed to him took place
outside of the court room in the form of political lobbying, including Marshall’s efforts to
persuade lawmakers to pass civil rights legislation that included provisions barring religious
discrimination. With reference to the 1913 New York State Civil Rights Act, for example,
Jeffrey Gurock notes that Marshall was instrumental in both drafting the legislation and lobbying
for its ratification.1128 These efforts, although not strictly speaking part of a litigation approach to
public advocacy, did help develop a legal structure for prohibiting discrimination, and prescribed
sanctions and legal remedies to protect civil rights. It is important to note that, during this period,
discrimination against Jews and other minority groups was legal in the United States; it was
widely practiced and had diverse manifestations in employment, housing, and education.
Marshall’s legislative lobbying was also consistent, according to Oscar Handlin, with Marshall’s
beliefs about how the law should function to shape and regulate society: “Justice, he felt,
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depended upon the consistency of an established body of rules which gave men a dependable
framework within which they could act and which limited the authority of the state over their
persons and property.”1129
Marshall’s application of juridical means (law making in the court room through judicial
rulings or in the statehouses through lobbying) was often done at his own initiative, without the
supervision of the AJC, input from other Committee leaders, discussion among the
organization’s leadership, or financial assistance from the AJC, although the Committee was
obviously aware of his activities. Marshall’s contribution to various civil rights cases and his
lobbying campaigns are well documented by his biographers as well as civil rights historians,
historians of American Jewry, and American legal historians.1130 The absence of AJC records
describing these endeavours indicates that, in many instances, Marshall was not carrying out this
work under the auspices of the AJC but, rather, in parallel to the advocacy efforts he was leading
on behalf of American Jewry through the Committee.
Marshall did a great deal of this work outside his role as President of the AJC but, the
Committee did itself begin developing and using a litigation approach to public advocacy shortly
after the founding of the organization, and Marshall was a leading figure in the AJC’s application
of this form of public advocacy. The Committee followed Marshall’s lead and adopted similar
approaches to public interest litigation as a means to secure its objectives, and these efforts
progressively increased after the Committee’s formative years.
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The early efforts of Kohler and Marshall established the model for the AJC’s later
attempts to use juridical means to further the Committee’s social and political agenda. In the
application of these civil rights activism techniques, the leaders of the AJC were not innovators;
court challenges to the constitutionality of legislation, appeals for review of the power, scope of
discretion, and the decisions of regulatory or administrative bodies, and the submission of
amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs, had been features of American jurisprudence long
before the founding of the AJC.
The amicus brief is a unique tool in public interest litigation. It allows parties who have
no legal standing in court actions but are interested in, and may be impacted by the ruling to
intervene to formally submit arguments and opinions (in written form) for the consideration of
the Judges deciding the case. Organizations representing special interests, including other
minority communities as well as commercial interests such as the insurance industry and the
railroads, submitted amicus briefs to the Supreme Court, and State and lower Federal Courts,
long before the AJC adopted this tactic.1131
The AJC’s early modest judicial activism is somewhat surprising given the considerable
legal expertise among the organization’s first generation of leaders. Because of their professional
experience, the AJC’s leaders were in an excellent position to use their legal knowledge and
skills for political purposes and on behalf of the American Jewish community, but, in the United
States, courts are a public forum and the leadership in the early years was reticent to draw
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attention to the organization’s efforts.1132 It was consistent with their preference to avoid
publicity that, during the period covered by this study, and well into the twentieth century, the
AJC chose to intervene in legal cases and court challenges in which Jews were not directly
involved but which concerned the rights of other minorities in the United States, particularly
African-Americans.
Some of the most important early leaders of the AJC were highly experienced jurists and
litigators. They understood American law, and from the perspective of strategy, understood how
the power of American courts to interpret and strike down legislation could be used to further the
social and political interests of the Committee and American Jewry. As in their use of other
advocacy techniques, in the use of juridical means, the AJC was cautious and deliberate; they
considered the optics, risks, and potential impact of their direct interventions.
The AJC made a strategic decision not to use litigation to fight anti-Semitic expression in
the United States. The adoption of this strategy is best exemplified by how the AJC chose to
respond to Henry Ford and the articles published by the Dearborn Independent. The pamphlet
discussed in Chapter 7 of this study, which was drafted by Marshall and widely distributed by
the Committee across the United States, was the AJC’s only public pronouncement on the Fordsponsored propaganda until, six years later, when the organization announced that Ford had
apologized. The AJC deliberately remained on the periphery of attempts by individual American
Jews and other American Jewish organization to combat anti-Semitism using court proceedings
and the law of libel.
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Similarly, where Jews were directly involved in legal proceedings, including criminal
proceedings tainted by anti-Semitism, the early leaders of the Committee were very cautious
about publically involving the organization.1133 In the 1913 Leo Frank case, in which Frank was
convicted of raping and killing a thirteen-year old girl employed in the factory he managed in
Georgia, for example, Louis Marshall acted on behalf of Frank for his appeal from the trial
conviction, but the AJC was not officially involved in the case, which the Jewish community
believed was motivated by anti-Semitism. Mark Raider describes the Frank appeal as
“Marshall’s most notable courtroom failure…Frank was later lynched by an angry white mob. In
retrospect, it is painfully obvious that Marshall’s determined and forceful counsel was no match
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for the lawlessness and racist extremism of Atlanta, Georgia, in the heyday of the Ku Klux
Klan.”1134
The minutes of the AJC’s Executive Committee meetings indicate that the organization’s
leadership was, in common with the majority of American Jews, following the Frank case
closely, but they chose not to organize demonstrations against, or make public pronouncements
and release media statements about Frank’s arrest (which was based on very limited evidence),
the anti-Jewish prejudice evinced by law enforcement officials and prosecutors, or the antiSemitic agitation in Southern newspapers that arguably tainted the jury pool and made it
impossible for Frank to get a fair trial in Georgia. Notwithstanding these provocations, on
November 8, 1913, the AJC’s Executive Committee formally resolved to “take no action with
respect to the Frank case.”1135 This decision, which remains controversial, reflected the AJC’s
advocacy strategies and practices during this period. They preferred that, as much as possible,
the trial remain a local story and did not want to draw national attention and media coverage to
the case. In the Committee’s view, although the prosecution of Frank was motivated by antiSemitism, this was a case against an individual. American Jewry as a community was not
implicated in the case and, as Naomi Cohen notes, the AJC “skirted issues affecting individuals
or limited numbers of Jews; in some cases it sought to divest the issue of any Jewish label.
Accordingly, although Louis Marshall served as counsel for Leo Frank, the Committee refused
to act as an organization, insisting upon treating the case as a travesty of justice of concern to all
Americans irrespective of religion.”1136
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After Frank was lynched, the AJC’s only official involvement in the affair concerned
optics: that is, minimizing the adverse impressions and perceptions of the American public about
the affair. When the AJC learned that movie footage of the lynching existed, it intervened to stop
the footage from being circulated. The Committee’s records do not indicate how this was
accomplished. Photographs of the lynching, nevertheless, did gain a wide circulation, including
publication in newspapers and in the form of postcards. Marshall himself “requested that the
family of Leo M. Frank…avoid any publicity in connection with the funeral of the young man,
and the Jews of Brooklyn to avoid a demonstration.”1137
In response to the lynching, the AJC began to compile evidence against The Jeffersonian,
one of the newspapers that had published inflammatory anti-Jewish material during the Frank
trial, in the hope of persuading the Attorney General and the Solicitor of the Post-Office
Department to ban the distribution of the newspaper through the mail.1138 The Committee also
considered establishing an internal subcommittee to consider what could be accomplished by
lobbying for legislation to ensure that “the denial of due process of law exemplified in the Frank
case” was never repeated.1139 In the long term, the Frank case was significant for the AJC
because it both revealed the extent of the intensification of anti-Semitism in early-twentiethcentury America (which the Committee’s leaders had long feared and were working to avert) and
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encouraged or incented the organization towards using juridical means to protect American
Jewry and advance the social and political interests of the community.1140
For civil and constitutional rights cases, the AJC’s filing of amicus briefs increased over
time, and at the same time as other ethnic interest groups, including other Jewish groups such as
the Anti-Defamation League, expanded their use of this approach to communal defense and
public advocacy. Despite the experience and level of legal expertise among the first generation
of AJC leaders, under Louis Marshall’s leadership, the Committee’s judicial activism was in a
nascent state, and it was not until after the Second World War that the Committee became a
leading organization in American civil rights and public interest litigation.
During the period covered by this study, the AJC directly intervened using an amicus
brief in only one case adjudicated before the Supreme Court of the United States. That case,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, involved the constitutionality of a State of Oregon law which
mandated that all children attend public schools, effectively outlawing private schools in the state
including parochial or religious schools.1141 As will be discussed further below, the American
Jewish community had a clear interest in the ruling. The AJC intervened on behalf of Catholic
parents who wanted to continue to send their children to parochial schools in the State. The case
offered the AJC an opportunity to exercise influence on an important judicial ruling about the
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rights of religious minorities in the United States without drawing much attention to Jewish
concerns or how the ruling would impact the American Jewish community.

The Immigration Cases
From its earliest days, the American Jewish Committee turned to the courts as a means to
advance the individual interests of Jews and its own mandate to advance the interests of the
larger Jewish community. The AJC’s earliest involvement in legal actions concerned the
interpretation of American immigration laws and the discretion exercised by immigration
officials in choosing to admit or deport new immigrants. Within three years of the organization’s
founding, AJC members were actively involved in trying to use American Courts to review the
decisions of immigration officials in individual cases.
The hostility of some immigration officials towards the so-called “new immigrants,”
which included Russian Jews, Eastern European Orthodox Christians, and Irish and Italian
Catholics, predated the intense public disputes and legislative debates about the imposition of
new immigration restrictions in the United States. Although the AJC would eventually become
involved in a series of public relations, education campaigns, and lobbying efforts designed to
influence immigration regulations to be more favourable for immigrants, in the years before the
rise of the broader public debate and the imposition of new immigration laws during the 1910s
and 1920s, the AJC attempted to use juridical means to prevent Jews from being arbitrarily and
unfairly denied entry to the United States.
Ellis Island, New York was the port of entry for the overwhelming majority of new
immigrants, including the steadily increasing number of Russian and Eastern European Jews
who were trying to resettle in the United States. The scale of immigration during this period,
with often more than a thousand people arriving in New York daily, necessitated the
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establishment of substantial infrastructure on Ellis Island to evaluate and process the new
arrivals, including medical evaluation boards and boards of inquiry, which were empowered
under existing immigration legislation to make decisions about who was allowed to stay and who
would be deported.
William Williams, the Commissioner of Immigration of Ellis Island, oversaw a quasijudicial apparatus that, in practice, exercised sole discretion on questions of admittance. “The
decisions of boards of inquiry could be appealed to the commissioners and even to the
Department of Commerce and Labor, which housed the [Federal] Immigration Bureau, but the
sheer volume of appeals elicited only cursory attention in Washington. Since those who
interpreted and administered the law made the final judgement, the fate of immigrants at Ellis
Island rested in the hands of the faceless immigrant inspectors and Williams.”1142 The AJC’s
earliest interventions in immigration cases attempted to degrade the power of immigration
officials and the sometimes arbitrary nature of their decisions. At this time, appeals of these
decisions were possible under the relevant immigration legislation, which had been written in
1832, and lawyers representing the AJC sought to invoke these review mechanisms on behalf of
small numbers of excluded immigrants.
For example, in “July 1909, Max Kohler and Abram Elkus…drew up a legal brief, ‘In the
Matter of Hersh Skuratowski,’ which argued on behalf of four Russian Jews whose deportation
had been ordered by the [Ellis Island] board of inquiry.”1143 Through this brief, Kohler and Elkus
attempted to transform the commissioners’ decisions about these four Jewish immigrants into a
test case about the discretionary power of immigration officials. The brief covered a great deal of
legal ground, including Williams’ unsanctioned imposition of the equivalent of a head tax
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because he required new immigrants to have at least ten dollars in their possession. “The brief
charged that Williams had exceeded his powers by requiring the fee, first because he was
usurping a legislative power and second, because Congress had not required a fee of the
immigrants. The brief also contended that the immigrants had been denied a fair hearing before
the board of inquiry, an administrative rather than judicial body, thus abridging their right to due
process under the law.”1144
Cunningly, before Kohler and Elkus had the opportunity to be heard in a Federal Court,
the immigration authorities simply reversed their deportation orders. “The four Jews were
spared, and since the constitutional question was now mute, a chance for a judicial ruling…was
lost. Kohler and Elkus were invited, however, to submit the brief and a list of suggested reforms
to…[Charles] Nagel,” the Secretary of Immigration and Commerce.1145 The AJC paid for their
brief to be printed essentially as a short run pamphlet. The Committee printed a hundred copies
of the brief to distribute to lawmakers, members of the AJC, and other immigrant rights
activists.1146
Over the next twenty years, Kohler and Marshall became involved in a series of further
legal challenges to the discretionary power of immigration officials, including, among others,
Commissioner of Immigration Port of New York v. Gottlieb,1147 and Luria v. United States.1148
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The Committee’s leadership followed closely and supported these efforts; summaries of the
cases and descriptions of the AJC’s involvement and aims where included in the organization’s
Annual Reports.1149
Through these cases, Kohler and Marshall sought to use litigation to establish that
immigrants were entitled to due process during deportation and naturalization proceedings. They
also sought to clarify the limits of the decision-making power (discretion) of immigration
officials. Finally, they used these cases to try to establish that the decisions of immigration
tribunals and naturalization proceedings in district courts were subject to judicial review, thus
establishing a clear right to an appeal to a higher court. The AJC’s early involvement in
immigration litigation culminated with Marshall’s successful appearance before the Supreme
Court in Tutun v. United States,1150 which established an individual’s right to appeal the decision
of a district court in a naturalization proceeding.1151
The Tutun decision was a significant ruling in the history of administrative law in the
United States, but it had no appreciable impact in terms of the American Jewish Committee’s
efforts to maintain liberal immigration policies. Before the ruling had been handed down in
1926, the United States Congress had already enacted a series of restrictive measures under new
immigration laws in both 1917 and 1924. Among these new controls on immigration was the
imposition of a quota system that substantially reduced the number of people, regardless of
religion or birth country, who could legally resettle in the United States each year.
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In comparison to the scope of the judicial advocacy that was later practiced by the AJC
on civil and minority rights questions, the organization’s early efforts to clarify and restrict the
discretionary power of immigration officials had significantly narrower social and political
implications. The AJC’s involvement in the immigration cases, however, was historically
significant because it reveals that the organization, from an early stage, was oriented towards
using juridical means to further its objectives.
Group Defamation and “The Canada Libel Case”
As open expressions of anti-Semitism became increasingly common in the United States
in the years leading up to the First World War, a rift emerged among American Jewish leaders
about how to counter this problem. As discussed in earlier chapters, the American Jewish
Committee, in contrast to the Anti-Defamation League, made a deliberate decision not to use
Courts to press libel claims against anti-Semites. “The AJC’s policy of not litigating anti-Semitic
insults,” according to Victoria Saker Woeste, “was predicated on the assumption that the best
way for Jews to demonstrate their fitness for citizenship was to avoid the instrumental use of law
to challenge anti-Semitic defamation; to do so was to attack freedom of expression, an integral
aspect of constitutional democracy.”1152
The adoption of this strategy by the Committee was also based on the lawyers among the
organization’s leadership’s understanding of the law of libel in the United States. At this time,
there were no laws against hate speech (or group libel).1153 In order for an individual to sustain a
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suit for libel, the plaintiff had to be specifically named or mentioned in the inflammatory
material, and the plaintiff had to establish that the published statements were “both false and
malicious.”1154 The absence of prohibitions against general statements that defamed entire ethnic
or religious groups, in addition to the nation’s well-entrenched reverence for freedom of speech
under the First Amendment, meant that American Courts were a difficult arena in which to seek
redress if a person had not been specifically mentioned and slandered. Even if a person was
named, the plaintiff’s burden was to prove both the falseness of the statement and how he or she
was harmed by the statement, and there were high legal thresholds for both elements of the
wrongdoing.
As discussed in earlier chapters, the AJC’s strategy not to sue anti-Semites became
controversial within the American Jewish community when the Dearborn Independent began to
publish anti-Semitic content, including versions of the conspiratorial accusations contained in the
Protocols of the Elders of Zion. When the Henry Ford-sponsored articles were initially released,
Louis Marshall contemplated initiating legal action against Ford and the newspaper, but he was
persuaded by other AJC leaders to adhere to the organization’s established policy of refraining
from using litigation to confront anti-Semites.1155
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Individual American Jews, however, were not subject to the Committee’s policies, and a
few initiated legal proceedings against Ford and his newspaper. Although the AJC did not
officially become involved in any of these cases, Samuel Untermyer, one of Marshall’s partners
in his private law practice, represented Herman Bernstein, a writer and employee of the AJC, in a
libel action against Ford. The proceedings initiated against Ford, including Bernstein’s,
floundered. Only one case, that brought by Aaron Sapiro, went to trial and it ended in a mistrial.
It should be noted that in both the Bernstein and Sapiro cases, articles published in the
Dearborn Independent had specifically mentioned them by name, and the authors alleged that
the two men were part of different Jewish-led conspiracies. Accordingly, in neither of these cases
were the plaintiffs trying to substantiate their libel claims based on general statements about
Jews; they were seeking redress because they personally had been publically maligned in widelypublished materials. Marshall’s negotiations with representatives of Ford that brought about the
publication of Ford’s apology arguably undercut the active cases that had been filed against Ford
and his newspaper; following the publication of the apology, the outstanding cases were either
withdrawn or settled, and an opportunity to clarify (or establish) prohibitions against hate speech
was lost.
During this formative period of the AJC, group libel or prohibitions against hate speech
simply did not exist in the United States. The AJC made a pragmatic and public relations
decision not to initiate legal actions that were likely to be lost before the courts, and, further, the
leaders felt that the legal challenges would just garner more publicity for the defendant antiSemites, giving them a public platform to disseminate their views. From the perspective of the
AJC, there was no effective means of bringing a winnable action before the courts and there was
no legislation whose interpretation could be expanded through judicial ruling to include
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prohibitions or punishments for publishing statements that slandered entire minority
communities.
In truth, at that time and to this day, the First Amendment’s protection of free speech
fosters a legal system that makes libel claims difficult to win, especially if the plaintiff is not
specifically named, cannot easily prove that the statements are false, and cannot easily
demonstrate that the statements caused him or her specific harm. Moreover, the law of libel has
several defences or privileges that favour freedom of expression and that discourage claimants.
The AJC and Marshall did, however, become involved in Ortenberg v. Plamondon,1156 an
ultimately successful group libel case that was argued outside the United States, in the Province
of Québec.1157 In May 1913, Samuel W. Jacobs, a Canadian Jewish lawyer and community
leader, wrote to the AJC to seek their assistance in an action he had filed in Québec City.
Jacobs was representing Benjamin Ortenberg and Louis Lazarovitch, two practicing
Jews, small businessmen, and Québec City residents, in a libel case against Réné Leduc, the
publisher of La Parole Libre, an anti-Semitic newsletter, and Joseph Edouard Plamondon, a
notary who had made speeches expressing his anti-Semitic beliefs. One of Plamondon’s
speeches, which was delivered in front of an audience made up of members of a Catholic youth
group, “sparked a series of attacks in the anti-Semitic press, the boycott of Jewish businesses,
and the assault of several Jews in the streets.”1158 In neither the newsletter nor the speeches were
Ortenberg or Lazarovitch specifically named. The written material and oral statements that were
the basis of their suit were reprises of general condemnations made against Jews that were
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regularly repeated by French-Canadian Catholic clergy and in the works of prominent French
anti-Semites such as Édouard Drumont and Abbé Maximillian de Lamarque.
On May 12, 1913 Jacobs wrote to Harry Friedenwald, an AJC member who lived in
Baltimore, Maryland, to apprise him of the upcoming trial and to ask for help. In this letter,
Jacobs acknowledged that the libel action he had filed was part of a broader political strategy.
The boycott against Jewish-owned businesses in Québec City had dramatically impacted his
clients’ businesses,1159 but they were only seeking five hundred dollars in damages;1160 the trial
was, in fact, a means to further a social and political end.
The proceedings had been initiated as part of a campaign being led by Canadian Jewish
leaders to curb the spread of anti-Semitic materials in the country and, in particular, in Québec,
where the majority of Canadian Jews resided in Montreal, and where anti-Semitism was nurtured
by the entrenched social and political influence of the Catholic Church over the majority of the
populace. “The community in Canada intends, if possible,” Jacobs wrote, “to put an end, once
and for all, to the publication of matter such as this, and the object of the present proceedings is
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for that purpose.”1161 In his letter to Friedenwald, Jacobs included copies of both his clients’ and
the defendants’ pleadings.1162 The trial was scheduled to begin in two days; the matter was
urgent, so Jacobs also sent Friedenwald a telegram:
My firm is acting in libel case against defendant who has circulated
statements to the effect that Jews are the enemies of the faith honor
lives and well being of their Christian fellow citizens that Jews are
thieves corrupters of women assassins of Christian children
investigators of revolutions and that they have done these things
wherever they lived and will attempt to do the same in the Province
of Quebec as soon as they are sufficiently powerful also that Jews
offer sacrifice to G-d by shedding blood of non-Jews.1163
The AJC, through Friedenwald, had developed a good relationship with Cardinal James
Gibbons, the Archbishop of Baltimore. Jacobs was hoping that Friedenwald would ask Gibbons
to draft a statement that could be read to the court during the trial: “Knowing that his
Eminence…is actuated by kindly feelings towards our race, as expressed on many public
occasions, we thought that a statement from him…would have an important bearing on the trial
and I thought at the last moment of getting in touch with you in order to enlist your assistance to
obtain this declaration.”1164 At this time, the Catholic Church possessed considerable political
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power and social influence in Québec. Jacobs hoped to adduce as evidence a statement from the
Archbishop to substantiate the argument that the defendant’s anti-Semitic statements were false,
and were acknowledged to be false by high ranking leaders of the Catholic Church.
Friedenwald sent a telegram to the AJC’s headquarters in New York apprising them of
the situation.1165 He also sent a reply telegram to Jacobs informing him that he had referred the
matter to the Committee’s leadership in New York. The following day, the AJC telegrammed a
reply to Jacobs: “Time too short to send authoritative repudiation of indefinite charges…Ritual
murder or blood accusation repudiated in papal bulls by Popes Innocent Fourth, Gregory Tenth,
Martin Fifth, Paul Third. See Jewish Encyclopedia Volume three page two sixty six.”1166
On the same day, Harry Schneiderman, the AJC’s acting secretary, also sent Jacobs a
letter explaining the Committee’s reluctance to become involved in the case: “It appears to us
that the other charges referred to in your telegram are so absurd and medieval, that it would be
ridiculous even to notice them.”1167 Schneiderman’s telegram was consistent with the AJC’s
policy of declining to litigate against anti-Semites and the organization’s desire to avoid offering
anti-Semites opportunities to widely disseminate their views through the media attention that the
coverage of a trial might generate.1168 This reply was, of course, of no help to Jacobs as he and

1165

Telegram from Harry Friedenwald to American Jewish Committee, May 13, 1913, American Jewish Committee
Archives, General Correspondence Papers, Series II: Subject Files, 1906-32, Box 6, File 5.
1166
Telegram from American Jewish Committee to S.S.W. Jacobs, May 13, 1913, American Jewish Committee
Archives, General Correspondence Papers, Series II: Subject Files, 1906-32, Box 6, File 5.
1167
Letter from Harry Schneiderman, Acting Secretary, to S.S.W. Jacobs, May 14, 1913, American Jewish
Committee Archives, General Correspondence Papers, Series II: Subject Files, 1906-32, Box 6, File 5.
1168
Jacobs replied to Schneiderman in a letter addressed to the entire leadership of the AJC. He agreed that the
accusations made against the Jewish community were absurd, and agreed that, under different circumstances, they
ought to be simply ignored; however, he disagreed with the contention that the silent treatment was the appropriate
response in this case: “You observe quite rightly that the mediaeval charges such as those referred to are absurd, and
that no notice ought to be taken of them, but when I tell you that the small body of Jews resident in Quebec City
have been seriously damaged by the public utterances of men occupying positions of some prominence, resulting in
bodily attacks on the streets, and the stoning of the windows of their synagogue, you will understand that it was high
time for something to be done.” In the same letter, Jacobs also thanked the Committee for giving the case their
attention. This statement of appreciation was likely a formality of courtesy as, up to this point, the Committee had,

472

his clients were already committed to pressing a libel suit based on the repeated public
expression and publication of some of the traditional allegations made against Jews. The trial
opened the following day in Québec City.
Peculiarly, Jacobs’ initial request for the AJC’s help was not put in front of Louis
Marshall. It is not clear how this happened, but, nine days after the trial opened, Marshall wrote
to Jacobs and apologized for not getting involved: “I regret very much that I had not learned
about this matter sooner.”1169 At this time, Marshall was under the mistaken impression that the
start of the trial had been delayed until June 15.1170 He offered to secure for Jacobs a statement
from Cardinal John Murphy Farley, the Archbishop of New York, which could be read to the
Court and “which would answer your purposes.”1171 Ultimately, Jacobs introduced an article
written by Cardinal Farley that had been published in the Catholic Encyclopedia as evidence that
the allegations made against the Jews were false and had been recognized as such in a series of
papal bulls.1172
Over the next month, Jacobs and Marshall exchanged a series of letters in which the two
lawyers discussed the state of the law of libel in Canada and in the United States, the legal
strategy Jacobs had chosen, and why Marshall had been reluctant to use this approach in
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America.1173 Early in this exchange, Jacobs indicated that he felt his case was “of sufficient
importance” that, if he were to lose at first instance, he would “appeal to a higher court.”1174
Marshall sent Jacobs a summary he had compiled of American judicial rulings in libel cases that
might be useful.1175 In some of these examples, general defamatory statements against groups
were ruled libelous because the disparaged group was so small that general statements still
impacted their reputations and caused them harm despite the fact that they were not specifically
mentioned by name.1176
Jacobs was confident that Justice Albert Malouin of the Superior Court of Québec would
“find a way to condemn the defendants,” but, nevertheless, he lost the case at first instance.1177
Just as Marshall had feared, Justice Malouin ruled that “the plaintiff, being neither named nor
specifically indicated, ha[d] no recourse civilly against the defendant.”1178 Justice Malouin
dismissed the action with costs. On appeal, however, Malouin’s decision was reversed.
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The logic of the Québec Court of Appeal’s decision was consistent with the American
rulings that Marshall had summarized in his letter to Jacobs. At the time of the trial, the Jewish
population of Québec City was very small; it was comprised of less than seventy families. In his
speeches, Plamondon made general statements against the Jews of Québec City. The appellate
Court ruled that this group of people was small enough to be encompassed and injured by his
general anti-Semitic statements. Justice Henry George Carroll, writing on behalf of a five judge
panel that included the province’s Chief Justice, Sir Horace Archambeault, ruled: “I am of
opinion that [the Jewish community of Québec] are sufficiently designated, that the plaintiff was
included in this slander, that he has been injured in his sentiments and in his well-being, and that
he ought to obtain judgment.”1179 Plamondon was fined fifty dollars; Leduc, only twenty-five.
Economically, the fines imposed were insignificant. The ruling was far more meaningful as a
symbolic victory. The Ortenberg appeal has been described “as an important step in Canada’s
journey towards hate propaganda legislation.”1180
Jacobs thanked Marshall and the AJC for their attention to, and assistance with, the case.
He specifically thanked Marshall for “the citations referring to the Jewish libel case.”1181 The
Ortenberg decision was a significant ruling in the history of Canadian law, but Jacobs’ success
on appeal did not change the AJC’s policies regarding the use of litigation to combat antiSemitism in the United States. During the period covered by this study, the AJC did not
collaborate with the Anti-Defamation League in that organization’s mission to use a litigation
approach to combat anti-Semitic expression in the United States.
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The Society of Sisters Brief and the AJC as “Friend of the Court”
As noted earlier in this chapter, during the period covered by this study, the American
Jewish Committee submitted only one amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court of the United
States. The brief, filed on behalf of the appellee in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,1182 supported the
decision of the lower District Court to impose an injunction restraining the Governor and Oregon
state officials from enforcing a ban on private schools.
The ban on private schools was not an initiative of the State legislatures; rather, it had
been enacted through a referendum. On November 7, 1922, voters in the State of Oregon “had
passed by initiative an act which required all children of school age to attend a public
school.”1183 According to Clarence J. Karier, there “could be no mistake; both the intent and the
effect of this act was to abolish the parochial schools in the state of Oregon.”1184 The appeal to
the Supreme Court was significant because it had potentially important ramifications for
education policy across the country.
The American Jewish community had a clear interest in the Society of Sisters case.
Across the country, Jewish parents wanted to ensure that their children could attend Jewish
schools. These institutions, which were often heavily subsidized through philanthropic
donations, were considered fundamentally important to the preservation of Jewish cultural
heritage and religious practice in the United States. Pierce v. Society of Sisters offered the AJC
an opportunity to help clarify the rights of parents to send their children to parochial schools, but
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because the case involved Catholic parents, the AJC could also avoid (or more likely minimize)
public discussion of American Jewry’s interest in what was, at the time, a contentious national
debate over mandatory public education, civic instruction, and the role of universal child
education in fostering social cohesion among a large, steadily growing, and heterogeneous
population.
Louis Marshall drafted and signed the AJC’s Society of Sisters amicus brief. Mark Raider
notes that “Marshall’s arguments were nearly always a synthesis of information and data
concerned with social and economic problems in addition to matters of law and fact.”1185 The
twenty page document is argumentative; many of Marshall’s claims are grounded in emotional
language. In identifying the significance of the case, for example, Marshall’s rhetoric is forceful.
“Fundamentally,” he wrote, “the questions in these cases are: May liberty to teach and to learn be
restricted? Shall such liberty be dependent on the will of the majority? Shall such majority be
permitted to dictate to parents and to children where and by whom instruction shall be
given?”1186 Marshall is equally forceful in identifying the potential implications if the lower
court’s injunction against the enforcement of the ballot measure were removed: “If such power
can be asserted, then it will lead inevitably to the stifling of thought. If the will of a temporary
majority may thus control, then it is conceivable that it may prohibit the teaching of science, of
the classics, of modern languages and literature, of art, and of nature study.”1187 Marshall’s brief
in this case is certainly polemical and, with the exception of data or any statistical analyses,
contains the elements that Raider describes as the quintessential features of Marshall’s courtroom
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advocacy. “Marshall focussed his brief…around the issue of individual rights under the
Constitution.”1188 In Marshall’s view, the referendum-passed initiative, if allowed to come into
force, would have had the effect of suppressing parents’ rights to teach their religion to their
children by limiting the venues where that education could be given. Marshall describes this
limitation as an infringement upon the parents’ “right of selection:”1189
The legislation is clearly calculated to confer upon the public
schools a monopoly of education. That necessarily would tend to
the suppression of all religious instruction, the importance of which
cannot be minimized. Under our system of government the State is
powerless, as it should be, to give religious instruction. That is a
right and a duty that rests upon parents, upon churches and
synagogues. If private, parochial and denominational schools are,
however, to be deprived of the right to educate the children, and the
parents are forbidden to send their children to such schools, then
we shall be in precisely the same situation as that which now exists
in Russia. There it is forbidden to give religious instruction of any
kind to children until they reach the age of eighteen years.1190
In the remainder of the brief, Marshall includes a discussion of how the ban on parochial
schools clashes with previously enacted Oregon State laws,1191 and attacks each of the seven
arguments that the appellants submitted in their pleadings. The brief contains no references to
sociological research, only Marshall’s opinions about how religious and sectarian schools, rather
than obstruct civic instruction, in fact promote social cohesion:
The assimilation, so-called, of our foreign born citizens is advanced
rather than retarded by the private, parochial and religious schools.
It is in such schools as these…that special efforts are made not only
to educate the foreign born citizen, but the immigrant…and it may
be said without exaggeration that our foreign born citizens
frequently have a better understanding of the principles of our
1188
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government than is possessed by many of our native born citizens.
They have better opportunity to appreciate the differences between
our form of government and that prevailing in the countries in
which they were born, and they devote themselves with greater
intensity to an understanding of those principles than is the case
with many a descendant of the elder population.1192
The brief concludes with a discussion about how the ban on parochial schools should be seen as
a form of intolerance, contrary to American ideals and American law.
In the ruling in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the lower court’s ruling; however, the decision did not center on the freedom of
religion. The Court ruled that Oregon’s ban on private schools violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s prohibition “against state action impairing life, liberty, or property interests.”1193
In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled that the “act requiring children to attend only public
primary schools [was] not reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose because children could
be adequately educated in private, as well as public schools.”1194 Secondly, the Court found that
“the act unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents to direct the education of their
children.”1195
Although the decision turned on an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
ruling was crucially important to religious schools in the United States; in effect, it established a
legal protection for these institutions. Seventy-five years after the ruling, the U.S. Department of
Education presented the AJC with a “Certificate of Appreciation” to recognize the “significant
contribution” the organization made to the case.1196
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The Committee’s use of a litigation approach to public advocacy did not escalate until the
middle of the twentieth century.1197 By the mid-1950s, the AJC was a significant actor in civil
rights litigation, submitting amicus briefs in cases dealing with issues as varied and as
contentious as restrictive covenants,1198 school prayer,1199 discrimination,1200 and racial
segregation.1201 In these later applications of juridical means, the AJC collaborated with other
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Jewish organizations, sometimes filing joint briefs with the Anti-Defamation League, the Union
of American Hebrew Congregations, and the American Jewish Congress.1202 The Committee
also increasingly collaborated with other sectarian and non-sectarian interests groups and civil
rights organizations, including the Catholic Legal Society, the General Conference of Seventhday Adventists,1203 People for the American Way,1204 Americans United for the Separation of
Church and State,1205 and the American Civil Liberties Union.1206 Pierce v. Society of Sisters was
the seed of what grew to be a major contribution of the AJC.
Litigation and juridical means can be used as tools in public advocacy and communal
defense. In the United States, litigation has been used by a variety of special interest groups to
complement other more populist approaches to influencing social and political change. “Court
cases where Jews appear as litigants, sponsors, or friends of the court are,” Naomi Cohen argues,
“instructive indices to the totality of the Jewish condition at any time.”1207 Cohen also argues that
“when the setting and arguments of a particular case are contrasted with those of another case in
a different period, developments and changes within the larger [Jewish] community can be more
easily discerned.”1208 This chapter illustrates that, in its approaches to public advocacy and
communal defense, the AJC was from an early date attempting to utilize juridical means to
further the organization’s agenda.
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These early attempts are significant in and of themselves because of what they
accomplished and because they reveal the breadth of strategies employed by the first generation
of Committee leaders. These efforts were models for the organization’s later use of litigation in
its advocacy. In comparison to the AJC’s initial applications of juridical means, the
organization’s later activism in public interest litigation suggests an advocacy organization (and
minority community) that was significantly more comfortable in its social and political
environment; comfortable enough to use a widely covered public forum (the Supreme Court) to
advance legal arguments and positions on contentious social and political issues that were in
some instances outside mainstream opinion in the United States. The AJC’s uses of juridical
means described in this chapter were more cautious and discrete, and were shaped by the
organization’s emphasis on avoiding publicity and drawing attention to American Jewry and its
aim to prevent controversial social and political issues from being described as Jewish issues.
Later Committee leaders were more willing to advocate on behalf of American Jewry and other
minority communities openly, more comfortable with the attention and criticism that these
actions would generate, and less afraid of the potential consequences for the organization and the
community it purported to represent.
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Chapter 9: The Continuities of the AJC’s Public Advocacy
The death of Louis Marshall at the age of seventy in 1929 was a defining moment in the
history of the American Jewish Committee, and more broadly, in the history of American Jewry.
The period between 1915 and 1929 has been described in the historiography on American Jewry
as the era of “Marshall law.” “The term ‘Marshall law,’ Mathew Mark Silver notes, “was the
English Jewish playwright Israel Zangwill’s epigrammatic tribute to the extraordinary authority
enjoyed by Louis Marshall in American Jewish affairs, particularly in the 1920s, following the
death of Jacob Schiff.”1209 Given the emergence of new leaders and new Jewish organizations
that challenged Marshall’s standing among American Jews, including Louis Brandeis, the
American Jewish Congress Movement, and the American branch of the Zionist movement,
Zangwill’s description is more poetic than representative; however, the scope of Marshall’s
influence over the Committee in its formative years is difficult to overstate. He was the source of
much of what was to follow. The Committee was by no means a “one man” (or “one person”)
operation, but Marshall was, even before he assumed the role of President, the most significant
figure in shaping the Committee’s agenda and in developing the techniques that the organization
used to further its social and political objectives during its early history. As noted throughout this
study, Marshall often acted alone, without consulting other AJC leaders. Naomi Cohen notes that
the AJC’s Executive Committee “met to hear Marshall report on what he had done between
meetings; and to the public at large he and the American Jewish Committee became one and the
same.”1210 As the previous chapters have shown, Marshall’s experience from his legal career and
his beliefs about public advocacy and communal defense, were developed and used during his
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leadership of the AJC and his ideas would fundamentally shape the approaches of the Committee
to public advocacy.
Throughout this study, the argument has been made that, in contrast to the conventional
view presented in much of the historiography on the AJC, which was that during its early history
the organization was passive and committed to quiet approaches to public advocacy, the reality
was that the Committee was slowly but assuredly developing a new and vibrant approach. The
conventional view of the AJC is that it did not adopt the practices and advocacy techniques of
modern leadership organizations and interest groups until after the Second World War. This
study has shown, however, that, long before the Second World War, the AJC made conspicuous
attempts to influence public opinion, and it developed the institutional infrastructure to support
those efforts. Further, the use of these techniques in the early years, the strategies which underlay
them, and the internal infrastructure that supported its campaigns, shaped the AJC’s later
advocacy. There is a historical continuity in the blend of quiet diplomacy and public advocacy
used by the AJC from its foundation in 1906 and its later, more conspicuous campaigns on
behalf of American Jewry and minority communities in the United States. The AJC became
more committed to the transparent use of public advocacy after the period covered by this study
but those later campaigns grew from the lessons learned from the organization’s earlier efforts.
As this chapter will show, the continuity of the public advocacy of the American Jewish
Committee from its formative years to until the 1950s is revealed by two internal analyses
prepared by AJC staff after the end of Marshall’s leadership. Shortly after Marshall’s death, the
AJC produced a significant policy paper that summarized the organization’s objectives and
identified the public advocacy techniques the Committee would use to realize these aims.
Similarly, shortly after the Second World War, the Committee produced a series of policy papers
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and reports that restated the organization’s mandate and described the advocacy methods it was
prepared to employ. Brief examinations of these documents illustrate the extent to which there
was historical continuity between the earliest advocacy techniques employed by the AJC and the
organization’s subsequent efforts. These documents from the 1930s and 1940s illustrate the aims
and methods of the AJC, detail the breadth of its strategies, and reveal the extent to which the
organization’s later campaigns were indebted to, or extensions of, the public advocacy
approaches adopted by the first generation of AJC leaders.

“Memorandum on A Larger Program for the Defense of the Position of the Jew in the
United States”
Between 1930 and 1934, the Committee composed a policy paper entitled “Memorandum
on A Larger Program for the Defense of the Position of the Jew in the United States.”1211 This
policy statement was compiled shortly after the death of Louis Marshall and during the
leadership tenure of Cyrus Adler, another of the founders of the organization, who succeeded
Marshall as the AJC’s President. The sixteen-page collection of suggestions and reports is a
comprehensive description of the public advocacy techniques and resources the AJC was
prepared to use to further its social and political objectives. Quiet approaches to public advocacy
are not even mentioned in the documents. It was probably taken as a given that the AJC would
continue to use quiet diplomacy, but it is telling that within a year of Marshall’s death, the
Committee’s leaders began compiling an inventory of more conspicuous forms of public
advocacy.
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Reflecting the context in which they were written, the memorandums evince a strong
concern for the rise of authoritarian regimes in Europe. They describe how the Jewish position in
the United States can be further secured by promoting democracy: “Our program is based upon
the belief that the civil and religious rights of the Jews are dependent upon the maintenance of
our democratic form of government and our democratic institutions; that we can best help
maintain those rights by fortifying in every way the adherence to the fundamentals of
democracy.”1212 The documents are forthright in stating that public advocacy and attempts to
influence public opinion or educate the general public were crucial components of the AJC’s
work. The memorandum notes “that the specific actions relative to educating the public on the
truth about the Jews must be integrated with the major task of maintaining peaceful relations
between the various groups composing our population.”1213 It endorses “the utilization of every
instrument of publicity” and the “subsidization of special devices” to reach and influence the
general public.1214
The program described in these memorandums is comprehensive. They demonstrate a
greater enthusiasm for the use of public advocacy than would have been openly endorsed or
practiced during the period covered by this study. The documents also support the adoption of
tactics that were not used by the founders of the Committee, but they call for the maintenance
and expansion of practices employed by the first generation of Committee leaders. For example,
one report suggests that the organization continue to monitor the American and foreign press and
continue to translate and archive materials that may be usefully cited to sway public opinion. The
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memorandum suggest that the AJC build upon established practices and calls for the “study of
trends in developments in the press, radio, films, schools, etc., which are adaptable for our
general program of education in democracy.”1215 Further, the memorandum endorses the
continued printing and distribution of literature and other written materials and includes a list of
seventeen publications, including works by Charles A. Beard, Franz Boas, and Heinrich Mann,
which the AJC had already committed to disseminating. The plan endorsed the distribution of
literature despite the fact that the impact of these materials could not be measured: “While this
method cannot…be accurately gauged, it remains an essential part of our program to combat the
flood of violent anti-Semitic literature in book and leaflet form that is making its way throughout
the country.”1216 As discussed in Chapter 7 of this study, the founders of the AJC released
numerous publications knowing that their impact could not be measured but in the hope that, in
the long run, they would be influential. All these techniques, including the expanded use of
publicity, further research, and the use of new forms of mass media, are reiterations and
broadenings of the public advocacy techniques employed by the first generation of AJC leaders.
By the time this collection of documents was written, the AJC had already become much
more comfortable with openly engaging in public advocacy. The tactic of deliberately ignoring
some provocations is not mentioned in the documents; neither do they include any discussion of
the use of juridical means or further interventions in public interest and civil rights litigation,
although the Committee had already gained some experience in resorting to the courtroom to
advance a cause. The use of the silent treatment, quiet diplomacy and juridical means obviously
had not been abandoned by the AJC, but the breath of the means the Committee was prepared to
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use at this point in its history indicates that the organization was now more committed to the
transparent use of public advocacy, advertising, public speakers, press agencies, and mass media
to influence public opinion and further its agenda.1217 Only a few years after the death of Louis
Marshall, the AJC had already subsidized the production of its first short film, “Toward Unity,”
had sponsored essay and art contests to “obtain good suggestions, good copy, and good art work”
to support its campaigns, and was openly supporting the establishment of a new national holiday,
“Brotherhood Day.”1218 One report noted that all the activities endorsed by the AJC’s program
required “the expenditures of large sums of money.”1219 The organization recognized that “the
effectiveness of this planned endeavor to educate public opinion will be measured entirely by the
sums made available.”1220 By this point, the Committee was spending more than fifty thousand
dollars a year on its public advocacy work.1221 With the exception of the financial resources that
the Committee had devoted to distributing Marshall’s pamphlet on the Ford apology and the
huge expense of the compilation of the World War I honor roll, this figure represented a
substantial increase in the AJC’s commitment to public advocacy, but it was an expansion, not a
radical new initiative for the organization which, as earlier chapters have noted, had already
developed the infrastructure for these types of public advocacy campaigns.
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The Post Second World War Policy Papers
After the Second World War, the American Jewish Committee compiled another series of
policy papers to reiterate the organization’s mandate and methods. This second compilation of
the Committee’s approaches to public advocacy is perhaps more noteworthy than the collection
of documents that comprised the “Larger Program Memorandum” because it included an attempt
to encourage the American Jewish community to embrace the AJC’s strategies. This is
significant because the AJC had traditionally promoted itself as the representative body of
American Jewry, but the elitist leadership had not sought to include directly the majority of
American Jews as participants in its various approaches. As noted in Chapter 3 of this study, this
attitude caused significant intra-communal antagonism. By the mid-1940s, partly because of
competition from other American Jewish organizations, the AJC was looking to enhance its
legitimacy by directly involving American Jews in its campaigns.
As discussed in Chapter 4 of this study, the AJC had long been using a strategy known as
the “silent treatment” (or the “quarantine method”) to respond to domestic anti-Semitism. The
heart of this strategy was to refuse to respond to some provocations because there was nothing to
be gained through engagement. In the formative years of the organization, there was also the
view that responding to some anti-Semitic provocations simply provided more public and media
exposure for anti-Semites and their beliefs. After the Second World War, the Committee
organized a campaign to encourage American Jewry to adopt this strategy.
The historical context of this effort to co-ordinate the community’s reaction to antiSemitism is significant.1222 The campaign occurred during increased scrutiny of the American
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Jewish community because of concerns about the rise of Communism and during a period where
public expression of anti-Semitic beliefs through mass media were becoming increasingly
common and vitriolic.1223 The Committee was eager to contain the damage caused by this
eruption of anti-Semitic fervor in the United States.1224
The AJC’s effort to propagate the silent treatment began with the September 1946 issue
of Commentary, which included an article written by Solomon Andhil Fineberg, the Director of
the AJC’s Community Service Department. His article was titled “Checkmate for RabbleRousers: What to Do When the Demagogue Comes,”1225 and it concentrated on arguments
against the effectiveness of mass demonstrations to combat anti-Semitism. The article was the
first public discussion of the tactics of the silent or quarantine treatment, and it was written to
explain, justify, and popularize the approach among the American Jewish community.1226 At the
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same time as the publication of Fineberg’s article, the AJC also released an illustrated pamphlet
with the title “What to Do When the Rabble-Rouser Comes to Town” to encourage American
Jews to adopt this tactic.1227
It is worth noting, however, that the Committee’s attempt to popularize the silent
treatment with the majority of American Jews was an elitist and undemocratic campaign.
Motivated by concerns that herald back to its formative years about how the Jewish community
would be perceived by the majority of Americans if they engaged in mass political protests, the
Committee wanted American Jews to refrain from engaging with anti-Semites and with agitators
while the AJC’s leadership took the lead through quiet diplomacy and the judicious use of public
advocacy to combat anti-Semitism on the community’s behalf.1228
The Committee called its approach the silent treatment, but an analysis of the internal
documents that summarize the tactics that the AJC included in this approach reveals that this
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form of public advocacy included and employed the more conspicuous techniques developed by
the founders of the organization. These documents, which were written outside the time period
covered by this study, present a clear and succinct summary of the public advocacy approaches
that the AJC had been developing and using since its founding. They also demonstrate that there
was continuity in the AJC’s practice of using both quiet diplomacy and forms of public
advocacy.
In an AJC memorandum entitled “The Rational of the Quarantine Treatment,” Fineberg
identified “eight proposals,” which he argued constitute the silent treatment. This memorandum
was not just an internal AJC communication because Fineberg wrote it with the intention of
having it widely distributed to local Jewish leaders across the United States in an effort to
coordinate Jewish political advocacy in the country. 1229
Fineberg’s “eight proposals” were not eight separate public relations and advocacy tactics
because many of them are interrelated and reinforce one another. Proposal 2, 3 and 6 refer
specifically to the elements of the strategy that privilege silence over confrontation. It is
important to note that Fineberg and the AJC did not view the silent treatment as passive or
pusillanimous; in their view, refusing to respond to hate speech or scurrilous allegations was
strategic. “Silent treatment,” Fineberg wrote, “does not mean supineness.”1230 The organization
was certainly aware that elements of the American Jewish community deeply resented the silent
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treatment and dismissed it as cowardly. Over the course of the AJC’s promotion of this
approach, they changed the name they used to describe it from the silent treatment to the
quarantine method because they recognized that the latter implied greater agency, while the
former denoted inaction.1231
In the Committee’s view, at all times concerns about public perception should guide the
community’s response. Fineberg advises Jewish leaders and activists to refrain from public
demonstrations, protest, and condemnations in the press because they give greater public
exposure to their opponents and, as will be discussed further below, could harm the community’s
reputation. He states that “Picketing of meetings should never be used” and cautions that the
distribution of leaflets during protests is both “utterly wasteful and may cause fights.”1232 These
proposals also contain warnings about the potential adverse public relations consequences of
being perceived by the broader public as attempting to disrupt free speech and of encouraging
the growth in prestige of anti-Semites when confrontations between their supporters and Jewish
protesters are covered by the press. These proposals are a continuation of the Committee’s early
leaders’ concerns about optics, about how the Jewish community was being perceived by other
American citizens, and about providing greater exposure to anti-Semites and their beliefs.
Proposals 1, 5, and 6 concentrate on the collection and effective distribution of
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information. According to Fineberg, “No rabble-rouser, however insignificant should be
ignored.”1233 Instead of public condemnation and protest, however, the sensible response is to
investigate the situation quietly. Fineberg specifically mentions both the AJC and the AntiDefamation League as the organizations that are best equipped to gather information on antiSemites or anti-Semitic organizations. He undoubtedly made this recommendation because, at
the time that he was writing, both organizations had matured into high-profile special interest
and public advocacy groups, and had invested significant resources into developing their
information gathering and investigative infrastructure. Former rivals, the AJC and the ADL were
by this point formally cooperating in a series of efforts to combat anti-Semitism and reinforce
laws protecting minority rights in the United States. With respect to the argument of this study, it
is significant to note that the information gathering and its dissemination endorsed by Fineberg
was a continuation of projects started in the formative years of the AJC. During the time period
covered by this dissertation, the AJC was developing its abilities to collect and disseminate
information. As discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, during the early history of the organization, the
AJC’s leaders were already relying on the gathering of information and the calculated
dissemination of that information as a public advocacy tool.
From its earliest days, the AJC employed different forms of mass media to influence
public opinion and social and political altitudes. This study focused on a period before the advent
of most of the modern means of mass communication, and during the period between 1906 and
1929, as discussed in Chapter 7, the AJC concentrated on the publication of books and pamphlets
as the best means of influencing public opinion. The deliberations of the organization’s leaders
during this period laid the foundation for significantly more dramatic applications of mass media
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as a tool for public education and public advocacy by the AJC. From the beginning, the AJC was
involved in using mass media to influence public opinion, and as new forms of mass media
proliferated during the twentieth century, the organization eagerly embraced the new means of
reaching and influencing the views and beliefs of mass audiences.1234
In his fifth proposal, Fineberg recommends that the information collected by the
organization or through its research projects should be distributed to the “media of
communication and molders of public opinion.”1235 This aspect of the strategy relies of the
perceived neutrality of the media as a potential public advocacy asset. Undeniably, this is an
antiquated view of the media, particularly from the perspective of today’s cynicism about the
objectivity of contemporary news coverage. Although bias has always tainted aspects of media
coverage, arguably, in earlier eras, the public had greater faith in the truth of what was being
reported to them. In any event, the emphasis on information gathering and overtures to
journalists and prominent public officials is consistent with the AJC’s long standing preference
for controlled quiet diplomacy. An internal and confidential AJC memorandum is more explicit
on the use of quiet diplomacy in modern public advocacy and as an aspect of the silent treatment
than Fineberg’s description in his eight proposals. According to this memorandum, the silent
treatment “does not preclude approaches to the owners of meeting halls to acquaint them with
the rabble-rousers background.”1236 From the founding of the organization, the leaders of the
AJC employed the technique of quiet approaches to “strategic persons,” including journalists,
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publishers, politicians, and educators in many different contexts as a means of curbing antiSemitism or furthering the organization’s social and political agenda.1237 They practiced this
technique during the early history of the organization and continued to rely on it even as the
organization became more engaged in public advocacy and public interest litigation during the
twentieth century.
Proposals 4 and 8 of Fineberg’s summary of the silent treatment address efforts to
influence the social and political attitudes of the American public. “Public education,” according
to Fineberg, “should continue at all times.”1238 This aspect of the silent treatment is idealist in
terms of the promotion of liberal, tolerant and democratic values; however, it is also not
genuinely silent because, although the majority of American Jews were being asked to remain
quiet and to repress their desire to respond to accusations made against their community, this was
designed to allow a central elitist leadership body to provide a response on their behalf through
the calculated release of materials and media statements or tactful approaches to “strategic
persons,” that is, patricians and influential members of the American public, including
journalists, business leaders, and politicians.
Finally, Fineberg’s proposal 7 briefly describes how legal recourses, including the quiet
lobbying of justice officials to invoke existing “breach of the peace and inciting to riot statues”
was also an integral component of the silent treatment. “Public cooperation,” by which Fineberg
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meant the cooperation of law enforcement, “should be assured.”1239 The inclusion of this
proposal within the premises or tactics of the silent treatment is significant because it reflects the
AJC’s established practice of utilizing the American judicial system to further the organization’s
communal defense agenda. Controversially, attempts to sensor anti-Semitic publications and
speech were a feature of early-twentieth-century Jewish communal activism. “The American
Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League had from their inceptions campaigned for
censorship of anti-Semitic literature and speech.”1240 As discussed in Chapters 2 and 8 of this
study, the AJC also tried on several occasions to invoke existing statutes, including prohibitions
on the distribution of offensive material through the mail, to suppress anti-Semitic media. The
use of this approach by the organization, however, was rare and unsuccessful. In terms of the
application of juridical approaches to protecting the rights of the Jewish community and fighting
anti-Semitism, the AJC adopted a litigation approach from an early date. Initially, as discussed in
Chapter 8, their utilization of the Courts to further their agenda was modest but, slowly and
progressively, the AJC increased its use of this approach.
Beyond questions of effectiveness and potential repercussions, the tactics that are
included by Fineberg within the silent treatment are significant because they reflect the anxieties
of the early-twentieth-century American Jewish establishment and the divisions that
characterized American Jewry. There is elitism at the heart of the silent treatment. It can be
argued that, fundamentally, the strategy reflects the concerns of the American Jewish
establishment, and later the first generation of Eastern European immigrants who joined the
professional, middle, and upper middle classes, that the behavior of impoverished, religiously
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traditional, or politically radicalized Jews would tarnish their reputation and threaten their social
status. Paternalism, as well as overriding concerns about optics and how American Jewry was
perceived, underlay the advocacy of the AJC.
Another memorandum by Fineberg written for AJC staff illustrates the extent to which
anxiety, and arguably a sense of superiority, continued to shape the communal defense and
public advocacy policies and practices of the AJC well into the twentieth century and long after
the end of the largest waves of Eastern European and Russian immigration. Fineberg wrote:
While it is impossible to provide all Jews with a good public
relations sense which will make them aware of the hurtful factors
that are involved in certain public statements, and while even a
majority may believe that any adverse publicity given a rabblerouser is to their advantage, it is the duty of those entrusted with the
defense of the good name of the Jew, to serve the best interests of
the Jews in any and every circumstance. Their judgment should be
based upon a far more mature and critical understanding of
publicity than is available to the average layman.1241
Some of the AJC’s approaches were undemocratic and suited the interests and advocacy
preferences of the wealthiest and most politically conservative segments of American Jewry.
This reflects the origins of the AJC, which as discussed in Chapter 3, were rooted in the anxiety
and status insecurity of the early-twentieth-century American Jewish establishment. Strictly from
a public relations and advocacy point of view, however, the silent treatment had a number of
positive attributes beyond denying anti-Semites free publicity. It was certainly a sophisticated
approach that, as outlined by Fineberg and demonstrated by the numerous case studies included
in this dissertation, sought to use a variety of techniques to exercise influence and assuage the
status insecurity of a vulnerable minority community. It can be argued that the approach is also

1241

To: Staff Members of AJC, Memorandum by S. Andhil Fineberg, April 7, 1947, in HVQ, AJC Subject Files
Collection. Correspondence and reports on the “Quarantine Treatment” for dealing with extremists advocated by S.
Andhil Fineberg, director of AJC’s Community Service Department, American Jewish Committee Archives: Digital
Archives. Accessed March 5, 2014. http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajcarchive/FileViewer.aspx?id=15431.

498

idealistic and optimistic. The emphasis on public education is based on the belief that if people
have to be taught to hate then they can also be taught to be tolerant. The approach is flexible
because it allows for a number of different types of responses depending on the situation, and it
is conservative and realistic because there is recognition that not every battle can or should be
fought. These optimistic, albeit patronizing views and practices were developed in the formative
years of the Committee and continued to be employed by subsequent generations of the
organization’s leadership.
The public advocacy work of the AJC from its founding through the 1950s illustrates a
series of continuities that both shaped and defined the activities of the organization. There was
the continuity of anxiety and status insecurity among the leadership. During the formative
period, this anxiety stemmed from how the rapidly growing immigrant community, including the
poor, religious, and politically radical, would be perceived by the majority of Americans. In later
years, the “red scares” and increasingly common public expression of anti-Semitic views would
continue to be sources of concern for American Jewish leaders and the community as a whole.
As demonstrated by the attempt to popularize the quarantine method, the later advocacy of the
AJC illustrates continuity in terms of elites attempting to assert a leadership position over the
community they purported to represent. The effort to assert some control over the political
aspirations of the American Jewish community reflects another continuity in the history of the
organization’s advocacy, the emphasis on optics and managing how American Jewry was
perceived by the majority. Even as the organization became more engaged in overt efforts to
shape public opinion, consideration of how those efforts would be perceived by the general
public shaped their work and the activities they sponsored. As revealed by both Fineberg’s
memoranda and the examples discussed in this study, there was also continuity in terms of the
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breadth of approaches the organization used to further its social and political objectives. They
consistently sought to build connections or rely on pre-existing relationships in their quiet
diplomacy; they invested considerable resources to carry out research; they used different forms
of media to disseminated information; and they understood the rule of law and integrated
political lobbying and public interest litigation into their advocacy.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
From its founding in 1906, the American Jewish Committee sought to exercise influence,
including asserting a leadership position over American Jewry, guiding government policy, and
shaping public opinion. This dissertation examined the organization’s earliest efforts to develop
the ways and means to exercise influence. At the heart of this dissertation is the argument that
the early activism of the AJC has been inadequately and sometimes wrongly described in the
historiography on the organization. The conventional interpretation of the Committee and its
activities does not adequately capture the nature of the Committee’s early advocacy work or its
connection to the advocacy strategies employed by older European Jewish leadership
organizations.
In contrast to much of the historiography on the AJC, this study reveals that the
Committee and its leaders were more than just modern iterations of the shtadlan and Hofjude
traditions of Jewish public advocacy. They certainly practiced the quiet diplomacy that defined
much of the history of Jewish communal activism in the Diaspora, but they were not just
ambassadors who enjoyed the confidence of political leaders or who possessed access to the
ruling class. As noted throughout this dissertation, the techniques the Committee used to further
its social and political agenda were diverse and sophisticated and characteristic of modern
special interest groups. 1242
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This dissertation reveals that the AJC’s leadership was preoccupied with the optics of
how its activities would be perceived by the American public. Its leaders considered the
implications and potential consequences of their actions and how those actions would be
perceived by the broader American public. They reflected on how their advocacy on behalf of
American Jewry would be interpreted and reflect upon the community as a whole.
During the period covered by this study, the AJC was involved in numerous campaigns
on behalf of both American Jews and imperilled Jewish communities around the world. As the
previous chapters reveal, its leaders were at the forefront of efforts to provide relief to persecuted
Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe. However, in the United States, the nature of the AJC’s
advocacy was different from the activities that its leaders sponsored overseas, and its work
differed from the efforts of other contemporaneous American Jewish organizations. The AJC
was not a charity or a fraternal order, and it was not among the American Jewish organizations
that provided financial assistance or social services to new immigrants.
Successful in America and motivated and informed by the often ill-fated Jewish historical
experience as a vulnerable minority and outsider community in Europe, domestically, the
Committee’s leaders focussed on preventing an intensification of anti-Semitism in the United
States. The AJC’s founders, many of whom were born in Germany during the nineteenth
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century, had first-hand experience trying to balance preserving their cultural and religious
identity while acculturating into, and being accepted by, a majority Christian population.
During an era of unprecedented immigration, rather than charitable work, some of which
they did privately, the elites who led the Committee lobbied to maintain the United States’ liberal
immigration policies. They supported both materially and in principle attempts to encourage the
acculturation of their newly-arrived coreligionists, and they used public advocacy to respond to
some of the allegations made against Jews and the Jewish community. Significantly and
tellingly, the founding leaders of the AJC declined to respond to some provocations because they
purposefully adopted a strategy that denied their opponents more public attention and media
exposure.
As described throughout this study, the Committee took a long-term view about the
impact of its work, and it used a variety of public advocacy techniques to foster a society,
culture, and legal system that was more tolerant of ethnic and religious difference. The AJC
promoted a society where all citizens, regardless of faith, enjoyed the same rights, privileges, and
status. It invested heavily in information-gathering and in establishing an infrastructure that
reflected this long-term approach to advancing the interests of the Jewish community.
As discussed in the introduction to this study, the Committee’s activities can be seen as
manifestations of the “cult of synthesis,” one of the most prominent themes in the historiography
on American Jewry. The Committee’s programs and campaigns were conscious efforts to present
or represent Jews as patriotic Americans who could acculturate into the white mainstream and to
portray Judaism as consistent with American values. The organization’s most noteworthy and
well-known early achievements, including, for example, the treaty abrogation campaign,
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centered on establishing that American Jews were loyal Americans entitled to the same
protections as all other Americans.
The AJC’s efforts can also be connected to “American exceptionalism,” one of the other
major themes in the historiography on American Jewry. Although Jewish communities have
thrived in other modern democratic societies, the Jewish experience in America was
unquestionably exceptional and the community’s leadership organizations, including the AJC,
and the level of social and political engagement of its leaders, including the founders of the AJC,
helped make this success possible.
The AJC’s advocacy approaches were variations of techniques first used by older
European Jewish advocacy groups but adapted by the Committee’s leaders to address the
concerns and anxieties of the American Jewish establishment during a period of unprecedented
Jewish immigration into the United States. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this study, the
Committee’s public relations, public advocacy, fundraising, leadership structure, and legal
strategies had been variously practiced by the Committee’s nineteenth-century European
forerunners. These older organizations, including the British Board of Deputies, the
Centralverein, and the Alliance Israélite Universelle, had been employing versions of these
tactics long before the AJC was founded; however, the AJC was the first Jewish organization to
use some of these tactics in the United States and, as the case studies included in this dissertation
show, the AJC’s leadership tailored these approaches to suit the unique social conditions,
entrenched racial hierarchy, and political circumstances of early-twentieth-century America and
according to their understanding of the threats the American Jewish community faced.
The ambitious goals the AJC pursued and the strategies it adopted were unquestionably
indebted to the work and approaches of European Jewish communal leadership organizations,
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including the reliance on wealthy and elite leadership evinced by the British Board of Deputies
under Moses Montefiore. The AJC utilized the cautious and calculated rhetoric of the British
Board of Deputies, the Centralverein, and the Alliance Israélite Universelle. Like these earlierfounded organizations, the AJC demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how the language
they used to communicate their message would impact the reception of that message.
With the exception of several high-profile missteps, such as the Massena incident
described in Chapter 5, the AJC carefully managed its public statements. Similarly, in common
with the Board, the Alliance, and the nineteenth-century German organizations, the AJC
emphasized acculturation. It encouraged Jews not to live apart from the majority, and it
advocated that in their participation in gentile society, local and national politics, the professions,
the economy, and the arts, Jews should enjoy the same rights and status as their fellow citizens.
Like their European colleagues, the leaders of the AJC believed that through participation in the
institutions and economy of the majority society, Jews would gain acceptance and inclusion.
Although some of the leadership of these European and American organizations were no longer
practicing Jews, they understood Jewish history, valued Jewish cultural particularism, and
believed in freedom of religion. These leaders had no tolerance for separatism. Their vision of
the future of the Jews emphasized full participation in the civic and economic systems of their
homelands and citizenship over faith. These leaders often-criticized opposition to the aspirations
of the Zionist movement was rooted in their antagonism towards the idea that the Jews
constituted a separate people or nation. In privileging citizenship over faith, they saw the
assertion of Jewish peoplehood (or nationality or distinct race) as a threat to their acceptance and
inclusion by the majority.
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The context in which the founders and early leaders of the AJC attempted to exercise
influence shaped the strategies they used and the goals they pursued in America. They had
enjoyed enormous success in the United States; the founders of the AJC were the patricians of an
establishment community that had maintained some of its religious traditions while
simultaneously integrating with the majority population. They came from a community relatively
few in number, and, in essence, they were an invisible minority. As noted in Chapter 3, the
arrival of over one million new Jewish immigrants in the United States during the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth century presented this already established community of American Jews with
numerous challenges, including how to manage the general public’s reaction to the conspicuous
enlargement (and ongoing growth) of an immigrant, minority population. The AJC’s leaders
confronted the fact that while most Americans had never met or had regular contact with Jews,
they already had some anti-Semitic views, or possessed hostility towards Jews for their alleged
complicity in the execution of Jesus Christ.
The AJC’s leaders, motivated by insecurity over their own social status, by the historical
legacy of dispossession and mass expulsions of Jewish populations, and by the media exposure
of the social problems experienced by impoverished new Jewish immigrants, sought to exercise
control over their coreligionists and to manage how new Jewish immigrants would be perceived
by the majority of Americans. Although paternalism underlay much of the AJC’s efforts, like the
landsmanshaftn and larger organizations such as B’nai B’rith, the Baron de Hirsh Fund, and the
Jewish Colonization Association, the leaders of the AJC were conscientious about their
responsibility to their coreligionists. Although not purely altruistic, the Committee’s leaders
believed they had a duty to protect their fellow Jews. They earmarked considerable financial
resources and devoted themselves to improving their coreligionists’ conditions by making the
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society in which they lived more tolerant. The AJC was not a democratic organization. The
nobleness of its cause does not negate the fact that its leaders were acting on their own initiative,
without democratic legitimacy and, at times, contrary to the opinions of the mass of the minority
population that they purported to represent.
The leaders of the AJC were attempting to influence, but, in turn, they were being
influenced by the views of the enlarged American Jewish community. As already noted, earlytwentieth-century American Jewry was a deeply divided community. The AJC had rivalries with
other Jewish organizations, and, while the AJC claimed to speak on behalf of the whole
community, it was an elite organization, and it could not profess any elected mandate from the
Jewish community. The fractious nature of the American Jewish population at the turn of the
century, including the wide range of political beliefs espoused by some new immigrants,
influenced the AJC’s founders to establish the organization and shaped their approaches to
public advocacy.
Initially, the organization embraced quiet diplomacy as its primary tactic because it was
consistent with Jewish historical practice and, perhaps more importantly, this form of advocacy
served to further the organization’s goal of minimizing public and media scrutiny of the
American Jewish community. In adopting this tactic, the Committee’s leaders were simply
continuing to do what they had done before the founding of the AJC. They used their substantial
commercial and professional connections to set up meetings with political leaders to lobby them
on behalf of Jewish interests.
Any campaign to prevent an intensification of anti-Semitism in the United States,
however, required means of exercising influence on a significantly wider scale. Quiet diplomacy
was incapable of swaying public opinion and, as this study has shown, from a very early date, the
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AJC began to experiment with different approaches to public advocacy and to build the
organizational infrastructure required to coordinate the kinds of campaigns that could effectively
respond to anti-Semitism. As noted above, however, the AJC also refrained from responding to
some provocations. Its silence in response to threats to its community has been strongly
criticized, but it is important to note that the leadership’s reticence to respond publically was
purposeful and strategic and, as the numerous case studies included in this dissertation show, the
organization was often silent, but it was never inactive. Even as it allowed aspersions against
American Jewry to go unanswered (and encouraged American Jews and other Jewish
organizations to also refrain from entering the fray), the Committee was building its capacity to
engage in modern public advocacy and to be ready for the occasions where anti-Semitic
provocations could not just be ignored.
The examples of the AJC’s early advocacy work discussed in Chapter 4 of this study
illustrate both the breadth of the issues that concerned the organization’s leaders and the variety
of advocacy and communal defense tactics they were prepared to employ. While their responses
may not have been dramatic or overt, the case studies included in Chapter 4 illustrate that the
AJC was not passive about potential threats to the reputation of American Jewry. The case
studies reveal, for example, that before determining whether a response was warranted, the
Committee’s leaders diligently investigated the veracity of a report that a soldier in uniform had
been barred from entering a synagogue because the story, if true, could be used to tarnish the
reputation of the whole community. The organization also counselled American Jews about how
to respond to allegations that Jews were engaged in corrupt business practices, and the
Committee closely monitored instances where Jews and Judaism were conflated with
communism. The Committee considered how the depiction of Jews in theatrical productions
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would affect the broader public’s perception of the community. The leaders weighed the
potential impact of media coverage of blood libel trials in foreign countries, and the AJC sought
to minimize the adverse effects of the coverage on how Jews were perceived in America.
Similarly, the AJC’s leaders scrutinized theatrical presentations and filmed dramatizations of the
crucifixion in order to minimize how their content would impact the security of the American
Jewish community. They lobbied publishers to have books with anti-Semitic content, including
school text books, revised or removed from circulation. They were as outraged as other segments
of American Jewry about the rhetoric of the Ku Klux Klan but, out of concern for optics and
consideration of the potential social and political risks, the Committee counselled restraint.
The avoidance of publicity, ignoring some provocations, the calculated use of public
statements, the emphasis on investigating problems, and the use of quiet diplomacy, were the
organization’s main stays during the early-twentieth century. The Committee was, however,
willing to depart from these approaches, and their forays into publishing set precedents for later,
and more substantial, attempts to use mass media to shape public opinion and to combat the
spread of anti-Semitism.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the Committee’s response to two dramatic manifestation of
anti-Semitism in the United States, the blood libel in Massena, New York, and the articles
published in the Dearborn Independent, show that the organization was willing, in some
circumstances, to depart from its more circumspect advocacy and to employ more overt tactics to
fight anti-Semitism and to safeguard the reputation of the American Jewish community.
Although the AJC was given a great deal of credit for containing the potential damage
from the Massena incident, this credit was largely undeserved, and, but for the intervention of
Stephen Wise, Louis Marshall’s threats to remove the Mayor from office could have caused
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significant harm. The incident, nevertheless, shows that even in its early days the AJC was
prepared to act conspicuously. In the case of the Dearborn Independent, the Committee
deliberately made few public statements to respond to the newspaper’s scurrilous articles, but the
affair motivated the organization to begin to build its capacity to engage in public advocacy. In
the end, through negotiations that were initiated by representatives of Henry Ford, Louis
Marshall was able to secure a public apology from Ford and, in the form of an easily
distributable pamphlet, the AJC circulated the apology widely throughout the United States. The
discussion of the Ford apology and the blood libel incident in Massena, New York included in
this study reveal that, far from relying on quiet diplomacy, the AJC used the strategic release of
public statements to mitigate the potential impact of Ford’s propaganda and the wider public
discussion of the blood libel charge in the American press.1243
As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, even as the AJC continued to use quiet diplomacy to
achieve its aims, the organization was already building the institutional infrastructure to move
beyond quiet diplomacy and to employ modern means of public advocacy and communal
defense. They made several attempts to establish internal press and publicity bureaus and
considered recruiting their own press correspondents in Russia. Chapter 6 details the various
schemes the AJC experimented with to reorganize and augment the organization’s capacity to
carry out research, follow media coverage of current events, and influence how those events
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This is not to say that in either of these cases the use of public statements was well executed by the Committee.
The decision to refrain from responding to the majority of Ford’s conspiratorial accusations meant that these charges
went largely unanswered, and were therefore allowed to spread unchecked, for years. The extent of the harm is
impossible to quantify; Ford was a highly respected public figure in the United States and his newspaper was a
widely distributed publication. In the case of the blood libel in Massena, as argued in chapter 5, there is evidence
that Louis Marshall made several miscalculations in how he led the AJC’s public response to the incident. His
demand for an apology and public threat to seek Mayor Hawes’ removal from office was arguably an overreaction
and, in the event, the American Jewish Congress’ leadership’s more moderate request for an investigation of the
incident diffused the situation, limiting the press exposure and prolonged public discussion of an incident that the
AJC would typically have preferred been given as little media attention as possible.
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were covered. The leaders of the AJC sought the advice of press and publicity experts, including
Samuel Strauss and Adolph Ochs, about how to sculpt more aggressive public advocacy
approaches.
In its public advocacy, the organization was most assertive between 1911 and 1913,
during the treaty abrogation campaign. This campaign was unique for the scale of the AJC’s use
of public and overt approaches to public advocacy, including the coordination of mass public
demonstrations. During the period covered by this study, the Committee did not engage in
another public advocacy campaign of the same scale as the abrogation campaign; however, this
unprecedented success was another turning point in the early history of the organization. As
described in Chapters 6 and 7, all the developments that followed, including the expansion of the
AJC’s research infrastructure, the War Records project, the sponsorship of books, and the
distribution of pamphlets were attempts by the Committee to influence public opinion.
In common with the expansion of its use of public advocacy techniques, the AJC’s
adoption of juridical approaches to further its aims illustrates that the organization was, from an
early date, involved in activities that were beyond the scope of the traditions of the shtadlan and
Hofjude. The discussion in Chapter 8 of the Committee’s earliest involvement in public interest
litigation reveals that the AJC’s leadership recognized that courts offered minority communities
a mechanism to effect dramatic social and political change. The leadership’s concerns about
optics and the perception of their community can also be discerned in the fact that they supported
litigation initiated by other minority communities, particularly African-Americans. As much as
possible, they did not want to draw the public’s attention to the Jewish community’s interest in
defining and reinforcing minority rights and protections under American law, but they used
amicus curiae briefs to contribute to the campaign and participate in the process.
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The first twenty-five years of the American Jewish Committee were crucially important
to the subsequent development of the organization’s advocacy infrastructure, its sponsorship of
academic research, its release of publications, its involvement in public interest litigation, and its
applications of mass media to influence public opinion. In the case studies included in this
dissertation, there are numerous lessons about how minority communities can act (and have
acted) through political lobbying, public statements, the press, mass media, and the courts to
protect themselves and shape the culture and society into which they are acculturating.
Certainly the founders and early leaders of the AJC preferred quieter approaches to
influencing government policy and practices, but they also recognized that public opinion could
not be ignored and could be usefully martialled to further elements of the organization’s agenda,
including the Committee’s efforts to prevent an intensification of anti-Semitism in the United
States. “Backstairs” or “backroom” or “quiet” diplomacy was the organization’s predominant
approach in its early years, but, as this study shows, this technique cannot be said to encompass
the wide variety of activities and public advocacy approaches developed and employed by the
Committee during the leadership tenures of Mayer Sulzberger and Louis Marshall.
The founders and early leaders of the Committee conceived of themselves as “stewards”
of their community.1244 The ethos that brought about the establishment of the organization was a
perpetuation of the shtadlan and Hofjude traditions of Jewish public advocacy and communal
defense; however, while the organization was founded upon the idea that the discreet
intervention of leading Jewish public figures was a highly effective means of defending the
American Jewish community, this study has shown that the Committee was, from an early date,
developing and using more public forms of advocacy and integrating these approaches into their
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Cohen, Not Free to Desist, 38 and 98.
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campaigns on behalf of American Jewry. Throughout the twentieth century, the AJC expanded
upon the efforts and public advocacy innovations of its founders and first generation of leaders.
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